


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FRANCISCAN STUDIES

Vol. 27

Annual V, 1967



Published by
THE FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE
ST. BONAVENTURE UNIVERSITY
ST. BONAVENTURE, N. Y.

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FRANCISCAN STUDIES is published annually. Annual subscription, \$ 7.00. Entered as second-class matter March 10, 1941, at the Post Office, St. Bonaventure, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879.

All communications whether of a business or a literary nature should be addressed to *Franciscan Studies*, St. Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 14778

Cum permissu superiorum.

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Apostolic Letter of Our Most Holy Father PAUL VI, by Divine Providence, POPE to Our Venerable Brethren, Cardinal John Carmel Heenan, Archbishop of Westminster, and Gordon Joseph Gray, Archbishop of Saint Andrews and Edinburgh and to the other Archbishops and Bishops of England, Wales and Scotland. On the Occasion of the Second Scholastic Congress held at Oxford and Edinburgh on the Seventh Centenary of the Birth of John Duns Scotus.

Venerable Brethren, Greetings and Apostolic Blessing:

A devoted mother of valiant men, Great Britain is distinguished by a quality no less estimable than the honour and the feats of her glorious children, for she knows how to cherish fondly the memory of her glorious sons and, when tradition demands that recurrences be celebrated solemnly, she knows how to sing their praises as though striving to repay them a debt of honour.

These were the thoughts that sprang to our mind, and gave no slight satisfaction as we dwelt upon them, when we first learned the details of the Second International Scholastic Congress which is being prepared in your countries in memory of the Venerable John Duns Scotus on the seven hundredth anniversary of his birth.

This Congress will be held at Oxford and Edinburgh under your patronage, Venerable Brethren, with lively interest and careful organization. One can already foresee that it will produce excellent results and will be of considerable importance, in view both of the arguments that will be discussed and of the distinguished persons who will take part in the sessions. Universities of England and Scotland and, from abroad, the universities of Paris and Cologne where he lectured, and many others, will send official representatives; apart from Catholics, there will be outstanding members of the Anglican Communion, of the Church of Scotland, of other Christian Communities of Great Britain, and well known exponents of sacred learning from every part of the world.

As We voice our wishes for a successful Congress and abundant fruits to follow from it, we express frankly our satisfaction at the particular character of this Congress and certain features with which it is intended to distinguish it. Its principal and definite purpose is to shed

a brilliant light on the person of John Duns Scotus, on his philosophical and theological doctrine, and his moral and ascetic principles. Avoiding the reefs of discussion and controversy which so often stood in the way in times gone by, the critico-historical method has been adopted in accordance with modern preferences, a method which, employed by learned men in discovering which are the genuine works of the Subtle Doctor and what are really and truly his teachings, has yielded excellent results.

For this reason combined efforts are being made to produce the broad outline of a panorama, namely a unified vision of the whole family of the Scholastic doctors, in which it will be possible to measure and understand the variety, the richness, and the fecundity of the philosophical and theological doctrine which flourished in the Middle Ages.

There is no doubt that in this panorama Saint Thomas Aquinas with his "Summa theologia" rises like a lofty peak dominating the mountains in the vicinity, that is, the whole world of sacred learning developed during his time. The synthesis created by the Angelic Doctor in describing the relationship between Faith and Reason, between Faith seeking understanding (as your own Saint Anselm of Canterbury had already expressed it¹) and understanding seeking Faith, achieved such universal agreement that he is recognised as leader in the ranks of the Scholastics and is rightly celebrated by the name of Doctor Communis. Side by side with him, however, other prominent Scholastic teachers and doctors stand out, like stars illuminating the Catholic learning of the period.

In the encyclical letter *Aeterni Patris*, in which Our Predecessor of happy memory, Pope Leo XIII, pleads for the revival of Scholasticism under the leadership of Saint Thomas Aquinas in opposition to modern errors, after the statement that "Saint Thomas towers above all others",² other Scholastic doctors are enumerated and a prominent place is reserved for Saint Bonaventure, whom Saint Pius X afterwards called "the second leader of Scholasticism",³ and it is universally recognised that John Duns Scotus surpassed the Seraphic Doctor.

It is also to be noted that the Second Ecumenical Council of the Vatican, in its decree on the training of priests, prescribed: "Philosophical subjects are to be taught in such a way that the students are led to

¹ ST. ANSELM, *Proslogion*, prooemium (*P. L.*, 158, 225; Ed. F. S. Schmitt, I, Seckau, 1938, p. 94).

² LEO XIII, Encyclical letter *Aeterni Patris* (*Acta Leonis XIII*, I, Rome, 1881, p. 272).

³ PIUS X, Letter *Doctoris Seraphici* (*Acta Pii X*, I, Rome, 1905, p. 235).

acquire a solid and coherent knowledge of man, the world and God, based upon the patrimony of perennially valid philosophy",⁴ which without any doubt includes the Franciscan School.

Beside the principal and magnificent temple, which is of Saint Thomas Aquinas, there are others, among which, although differing from it in style and size, is that splendid temple which John Duns Scotus, with his ardent and contemplative genius, based on solid foundations and built up with daring pinnacles pointing towards heaven. In the field of speculation he usually follows the Platonic and Augustinian method and tendency; sometimes agreeing with the Stagirite, sometimes disagreeing. Following in the wake of more than fifty Franciscan Scholastics, among whom were Saint Anthony of Padua, Alexander of Hales, Saint Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta, Richard of Middleton, Adam Marsh, Roger Bacon, and William of Ware, he assimilated and perfected their teachings and excelled them all, becoming the principal standard-bearer of the Franciscan School.

Saint Francis of Assisi's most beautiful ideal of perfection and the ardour of the Seraphic Spirit are embedded in the work of Scotus and inflame it, for he ever holds virtue of greater value than learning. Teaching as he does the pre-eminence of love over knowledge, the universal primacy of Christ, who was the greatest of God's works, the magnifier of the Holy Trinity and Redeemer of the human race, King in both the natural and supernatural orders, with the Queen of the world, Immaculate Mary, standing beside him, resplendent in her untarnished beauty, he develops to its full height every point of the revealed Gospel truth which Saint John the Evangelist and Saint Paul understood to be preeminent in the divine plan of salvation.

It is widely expected that this Congress which will be held in Great Britain to honour the memory of the Subtle and Marian Doctor will yield a ripe and abundant harvest, both in the field of thought and prayer and in the field of morality and activity. We look forward in the first place to a revival of interest in the history of theology and especially the history of Scholastic theology, manifesting itself in eagerness for honest research and systematic study.

We are deeply convinced that the valuable theological treasure of John Duns Scotus can provide formidable weapons in the struggle to disperse the black cloud of atheism which hangs darkly over our age. More often than not those who deny the existence of God either in theory

⁴ Decree *De Institutione Sacerdotali*, n. 15 (Vatican Press, 1965).

or in practice are merely adoring idols or phantasms of their own creation, becoming futile in their own thoughts.⁵

The Subtle Doctor, who built up his theodicy from the Scriptural principles regarding God, namely, "I am who am",⁶ and "God is love",⁷ explains and develops his teachings with admirable precision about Him who is "infinite truth and infinite good",⁸ "primum effectivum", "primum finitivum", "simpliciter primum secundum eminentiam", "a sea of perfections",⁹ and "essentially love".¹⁰

We cherish however yet another hope. In the declaration which we made, together with our venerable brother, Michael Ramsey, Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury, on 24 March this year in the basilica of the Apostle Saint Paul Without-the-Walls, the intention was expressed of arranging "a serious dialogue which, founded on the Gospels and on the ancient common traditions, may lead to that unity in truth for which Christ prayed".¹¹

The teachings of Scotus may perhaps provide a golden framework for this serious dialogue between the Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion as well as the other Christian Communities of Great Britain. During the three centuries before the breach with the Apostolic See, his doctrine was commonly taught in the schools of Britain, not a foreign imposition but brought to flower on the fertile soil of the fatherland by one who was born and bred in Great Britain and who now brings glory to her by his ready and universal genius as well as by his practical wisdom. He was a constructive theologian, and he loves with that real and definitive love which is a *praxis*, according to his own dictum: "It has been shown that true love is a practical thing".¹²

The theoretical elements in pursuing this dialogue can well be provided by one who assigns the noblest and principal role to Seraphic love. He warns us that progress be gradual: "in matters of belief, nothing must be asserted unless it can be proved by what is already known to be true",¹³ "Nothing is to be held as of the substance of the faith unless

⁵ Cfr. *Rom.* I, 21—22.

⁶ *Exod.* 3, 14.

⁷ I *Ioan.* 4, 16.

⁸ *Ord.* I, dist. 3, n. 59 (Vatican edition, III, p. 41).

⁹ *Ord.* I, dist. 2, n. 57—59, 60—62, 41; dist. 8, n. 198—200 (Vatican edition, II, pp. 162—165, 165—167, 149—150; IV, pp. 264—266).

¹⁰ *Ord.* I, dist. 17, n. 171 (Vatican edition, V, pp. 220—221); *Lectura* I, dist. 17, n. 116 (Vatican edition, XVII, p. 217).

¹¹ Declaration of Paul VI and the Archbishop of Canterbury (*A.A.S.*, LVIII, 1966, 287).

¹² *Ord.*, prol., n. 303 (Vatican edition, I, p. 200).

¹³ *Ord.* IV, dist. 11, q. 3, n. 3 (Vivès edition, XVII, p. 352 a).

it can be learned expressly from Sacred Scripture, or has been expressly declared by the Church, or unless it follows evidently from something contained plainly in Scripture or plainly decided by the Church".¹⁴

It was furthermore the Subtle Doctor's constant care that the teaching authority of the Church should be dutifully respected and obeyed with unfailing reverence, for it has the divine guarantee of the truth: "If anyone taking the place of a doctor asserts something new, nobody is bound to agree . . . but he is bound to consult the Church first and thus avoid falling into error".¹⁵ "The Church our guide and teacher": under that standard he marched, that was the banner he unfurled.

He examines and pursues the development of knowledge with careful critical method, his eyes always fixed on the fundamental principles, and enunciates his conclusions with calmness of judgment, his purpose being, as Jean Gerson said: "not to assert himself with quarrelsome singularity, but with humility to establish concord".¹⁶

Against the teachings of Rationalism he observes that reason and thought are limited in acquiring knowledge of divinely revealed truths, and emphasizes that the latter are quite necessary if man is to attain the last end for which he was created. But in the noble attempt to find harmony between natural and supernatural truths, to marry Faith with philosophy, he points out the danger there may be of falling into the errors of paganism or — he quotes with approval the words of Saint Bonaventure — mixing so much water of "philosophical knowledge with the wine of Holy Scripture, that the wine is turned into water".¹⁷

The above considerations decide the terms of our wishes, namely that a golden harvest may ripen in that naturally fertile soil and that from these learned and broad discussions and agreed conclusions the truth will flourish with renewed vigour, "the truth that doth lift us so high".¹⁸

In confirmation of Our paternal wishes for the Second International Scholastic Congress to be held in Oxford and Edinburgh to honour the name of John Duns Scotus, We invoke the protection of God, source of truth and love, who wishes us to be "united in love" in his one act of love,¹⁹ and with these greetings We bestow the Apostolic Blessing on

¹⁴ *Ord.* IV, dist. 11, q. 3, n. 5 (Vivès edition, XVII, p. 353 a).

¹⁵ *Reportatio* III, dist. 25, q. un., n. 6 (Vivès edition, XXIII, p. 462 a).

¹⁶ JOHN OF GERSON, *Lectiones duae «Poenitentini»*; *lectio altera*, consid. 5 (*Opera*, IV, Paris, 1521, fol. 34 rb).

¹⁷ SAINT BONAVENTURE, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, visio 3, coll. 7, n. 14 (Ed. Delorme, Quaracchi, 1934, p. 217).

¹⁸ DANTE, *Paradiso*, Canto XXII, line 42: «la verità che tanto ci sublima».

¹⁹ *Ord.* III, dist. 28, q. un., n. 2 (Vivès edition, XV, pp. 378 b—379 a).

you, Venerable Brethren, on those who are engaged in preparing the Congress, and on all who will take part in it.

Given in Rome, at Saint Peter's, on the fourteenth day of July in the year MCMLXVI, the fourth year of Our Pontificate.

POPE PAUL VI

The Significance of the Apostolic Letter „Alma Parens” of Pope Paul VI. The inaugural address delivered by Archbishop H. E. Cardinale, Apostolic Delegate to Great Britain, in the Church of St. Mary the Virgin, Oxford, on the occasion of the Second International Scholastic Congress marking the Seventh Centenary of the Birth of John Duns Scotus.

You have come from all parts of the world in rather impressive numbers to participate in the Second International Scholastic Congress, which is about to take place in this ancient seat of learning to mark the seventh centenary of the birth of John Duns Scotus. I deeply appreciate the honour of addressing you on this significant occasion. In doing so I suppose that I assume in your eyes a dual personality: that of a Papal Delegate and that of an Archbishop.

As a Papal Delegate I cannot ignore the many bonds which in the glorious past tied Oxford to the Holy See. Oxford is referred to as an ancient Academy in a deed of Pope Martin II as far back as 942. The terms of the University's first charter were dictated by Innocent III's Legate in 1214, and the relationship continued unbroken until the Reformation.

As an Archbishop I cannot remain indifferent to the honour which is being rendered to one of the greatest philosophers and theologians of all times, whom Great Britain, this *Alma Parens*, this devoted Mother of valiant men, by every right claims as her own.

This evening I propose to weld this dual personality into one and to speak to you with single heart and mind.

After five centuries this noble citadel of learning, "the finest City of the world" as John Keats called it, is about to resound again with the tones of a language which once kept the surrounding air in constant vibration. Scholastic theology ranked here as the supreme science, inspiring all available knowledge. The very *raison d'être* of the University was the building up and defence of the grand medieval synthesis, in which the whole range of thought and activity centered in a common religious conviction. The chief aim of study was to reconcile the growing demands of knowledge with the solid heritage of the Christian tradition, and thus find a solution to the audacious and intricate problems aroused

by the progress of learning. Even today this tradition survives in widely changed conditions. Though expressing itself in forms quite different from the past, it continues to exercise a strong influence on the life and teaching of this University which John Henry Newman in his day described as "the most religious University of the world".

The venerable Church of St. Mary the Virgin, which has extended so gracious a hospitality to us this evening, was the centre of the life of the University from its earliest infancy. In this meeting-place the young students and their professors would assemble for worship as well as for academic exercises. It is particularly significant that an International Congress honouring John Duns Scotus should be inaugurated in a church dedicated to the Blessed Mother of God, of whose Immaculate Conception, as a logical corollary to his doctrine of the Primacy of Christ, he was the intrepid and strenuous defender, in direct opposition to the greatest scholars of his time and six centuries before the definition of the dogma.

The choice of Merton College as the official seat of this Congress, is not without meaning. The College, founded shortly before Scotus' birth, soon became the most important of the earliest Colleges, and set a pattern of academic training in every discipline to all Europe. Its fellows acquired a reputation for bold speculation. Tradition associates Scotus' name with Merton but there is no evidence that he was a pupil or Fellow of that College.

The Franciscan Friars came to England in 1224. Whilst many of them, in the original spirit of their Founder, dedicated themselves to making religion intelligible and influential for the common people, here in Oxford, under the guidance and patronage of Robert Grosseteste, the Friars fascinated the intellects of scholars from all Europe and carried the learning of that age to unsuspected heights. Oxford owes its rapid advance to fame in the XIII century to the coming of the Friars. Great names among them commanded the respect of the intellectual world, as those of Adam Marsh (*Doctor Illustris*), Roger Bacon (*Doctor Mirabilis*), William of Ware (*Doctor Fundatus*), and Richard of Middleton (*Doctor Solidus*). The intuitive genius of John Duns Scotus (*Doctor Subtilis*) excels them all and shines like a most brilliant star in this numerous constellation.

This is neither the time nor the place — nor am I the best qualified speaker — to attempt a survey or assess an estimate of his encyclopaedic achievement. Duns Scotus — who left no autobiographical notes behind

— seems to elude every effort on the part of posterity to obtain a clear sight of his life's history and of his intimate character. But the simple epitaph engraved on his tomb at Cologne shortly after his death significantly epitomizes his whole story:

*Scotland begot me, England reared me,
France taught me, Cologne holds me.
Of justice a teacher, to clerics a guide,
To the cloister a light, of truth a trumpet.*

And how truly we can repeat of Oxford the words which are inscribed on the monument to be unveiled in his honour at Duns on the 17th of September: *Hic magni spirat imago viri!* The figure of this great man breathes here! For it was here that he taught with brilliance and built a world-wide reputation for himself. It was from here, where he wrote his chief work *Opus Oxoniense*, that his fame spread out to the whole world.

As an intellectual power, Scotus is not comparable with any other of his age. He was the Most Subtle Thinker, the last great figure of the golden era of Scholasticism, second only to St. Thomas Aquinas (*Doctor Communis*). Foremost a logician and metaphysician, he was possessed of a strong mathematical and scientific bent. Herein lies the key to his system of thought, which so abundantly enriches the philosophical and theological patrimony of his and of all times.

His troubled life and early death compelled him to leave his works unfinished. A number of these were lost, others were adulterated and many spurious ones were handed down under his label, causing a vituperation unequalled in the history of great thinkers. His rehabilitation started in 1610 when Pope Paul V decreed that "whatever clearly appeared to belong to Scotus, was to be kept intact and inviolate".

Another Paul — the Sixth — the 14th July 1966 issued an admirable Apostolic Letter known as "*Alma Parens*", of which my present talk is intended to be an unpretentious commentary. This is the first official papal document dedicated to the teachings of Scotus after three centuries and a half.

And now this Congress comes as an overdue act of reparation to the distorted memory of one of the greatest sons of Oxford. It was in this city, in fact, that Thomas Cromwell sent a Cambridge priest, Richard Layton, who was the central figure in the royal visitation of 1535, to destroy all documents and books pertaining to Scotus and to proscribe his teachings, though they were not a foreign imposition, but had been brought to flower on the fertile soil of his fatherland.

The many and heterogeneous works of Scotus offer numberless elements for a fruitful study and meditation, likely to be welcomed by our contemporary world. For in all its distraction, our present generation is stirred by the impelling urge to explore the realities of life and feels the need of a new intellectual synthesis, in which to retrieve the final answers to the questions that anguish its mind. There are many areas of modern thought where an enlightened understanding of Scotus' teachings may prove to be of vibrant interest and incalculable worth.

Following the peculiar trend of the Oxford School, Scotus showed great concern in the actual, the concrete and the individual. As Gerald Manley Hopkins puts it, he was "of reality the rarest-veined unraveller". In the exposition of his doctrine he made great use of positive arguments, persuaded as he was of their special value to keep the speculations of the pure reason living and fruitful. His system represents the most meaningful attempt at bringing out the harmony that exists between the natural and the supernatural and at conserving and further developing the Christian philosophical and theological patrimony, that constituted the medieval conception of life and the world.

He belongs to an age when the unity of western christianity was not yet broken up in diverse allegiances and Catholic teaching was not the monopoly of the continent. The fundamental orthodoxy of his doctrine, commonly taught in Britain for three centuries before the breach with the Apostolic See, and his love for authentic tradition offer a solid basis for dialogue between christians, and with the world at large.

More than ever, in this post-conciliar era, the domain of dialogue is in the forefront of human relationships. By dialogue we mean the establishing of friendly contacts, between differing groups with a view to serene study and mutual knowledge, brotherly understanding and sincere respect.

I wish to concentrate on Scotus more as a theologian than as a philosopher, but I cannot resist the temptation of putting him into relation with all modern and contemporary thought.

Towards the end of the XIX century and the beginning of the XX, it became customary to present the Subtle Doctor as the precursor of modern philosophy. On the one hand, because of the emphasis it puts on freedom and diversity, Scotism was invoked by some as a liberating force against an alleged cold logic of academic Thomism. On the other hand, gratuitous charges of pantheism, scepticism, subjectivism and modernism were lodged against Scotus. These were echoed two months

ago by the world of weary ignoramuses, when notice of the present Congress was given to the press. The critical edition of the complete works of the Subtle Doctor, which is one of the greatest achievements of our century in the field of textual criticism, and for which we are to thank Father Charles Balić in a special way, now allows Scotus to be read and appraised on his own merits.

In the philosophical system of Scotus the individual reigns supreme against the general trend of his age which gave pride of place to the universal and relegated the individual to the domain of the accidental and perishable. Medieval man thought and lived within the orbit of a deep collective consciousness; he was absorbed into a strong social structure where he easily lost awareness of his individuality and personal responsibility. Reacting to the common trend, St. Francis of Assisi emphasized the importance of the individual in his rule, leaving much to the inspiration and guidance of divine grace. Scotus who translated into metaphysical language "the most beautiful Franciscan ideal of perfection and the ardour of the Seraphic spirit" bases this integration on the principle of differentiation and individuation. He appreciates the human person as an individual in every phase of his system. His reflections are not restricted to the metaphysical order: he even gives amazing new and revolutionary glimpses into the social theories of the last three centuries. In his writings we can trace the beginnings of modern political and social science. Political authority, according to Scotus, may belong both to a single person or to the community as a whole; but in either case the legitimate sanction of authority is derived from the consent of the individuals who are governed.

By this exaltation of the human person with its psychological autonomy and basic rights, which we living in the free world of the XX century take quite for granted, Scotus at the very outset takes his stand against all totalitarian systems.

God is the First Being: from Him comes and to Him tends all creation, known to Him in every detail, which He loves and cares for, without falling from His eminent place. Endowed with the dignity of his individual personality, man does not lose his individuality, liberty, self-determination and spontaneity of the will, as he tends towards His Maker and Supreme End. Between God and man, Jesus Christ stands out in his own individuality, as the Beginning of all things, the Source and Justification of all existence, the Final Cause of all creation and the Sovereign of all the universe.

To fully evaluate Scotus' personality theory we must also understand his fundamental doctrine on the will, the primary faculty in his system, and on the pre-eminence of love over knowledge. The freedom of the will is an indispensable complement to personality, and since love pertains to the will, the whole creation is seen as a work of love on God's part. His first primordial act is to love Himself, for He is essentially love. He created other beings not out of necessity but because He willed to share His love with them in the highest degree. This could be attained only by the union of created nature with divine nature. He therefore willed and predestined Christ in the Incarnation before any other creature, and apart from any redemptive plan. He communicates Himself to man through grace, which is charity, whose final object is God. This final object cannot be attained unless it includes love of neighbour, for genuine love is not exclusive, and therefore must comprise all those loved by the loved one. Every man is the object of God's love and hence must be loved with Him, and in Him. Man's love of God becomes perfect as he gets others to join him as co-lovers of God. Thus God's kingdom of love is spread throughout creation. Christ gives us a supreme example of love, by taking the love of all angels and men into His own love of God. All creation is thus bound up in Christ and through Him to God in a marvellous synthesis of the universe, of which Love is the powerful keynote. There is here an echo of St. Paul's message to the Corinthians: "All things are yours . . . and you are Christ's and Christ is God's" (I, 3:22—23). There is also an impassioned call to that unity in Christ, to the attainment of which all Christians of good will are now seriously committed.

With admirable precision Scotus develops an ingenious philosophical demonstration of the existence and nature of the Supreme Being — God as First Principle. The parallel between his reasoning and that of Wittgenstein about simple objects is not without interest. His argumentation rests on the contingency and mutability of creatures, which imply a chain of causation, resulting ultimately in the First Cause, whose nature is infinite and perfect. His rigid demands of the qualifications required to prove a proposition make his arguments all the more attractive to the modern mind. In this sense Pope Paul says that he is "convinced that the valuable theological treasure of Duns Scotus can provide formidable weapons in the struggle to disperse the black cloud of atheism which hangs over our age."

At a time when theological debates no longer remain intramural it is interesting to note the relevance of Duns Scotus' thought to current

theological questionings, especially in the light of the Second Vatican Council. His thinking may appear bold for his time but it is certainly prophetic for ours.

There was much discussion at the Vatican Council on the relationship between Scripture and Tradition, nerve-point for ecumenical theology. The Council of Trent decree on this subject had for four centuries been interpreted in the sense of a two-fold font of revelation. In recent years a new line of thought developed in certain quarters maintaining the sufficiency of Scripture as the only font of revelation. The solution was found at the Council in a formulation that, whilst conserving the teachings of Trent and Vatican I, kept in mind the demands of ecumenical understanding. The Bible is declared to be the soul of theology, the basis of the Church. Tradition is more ample than Scripture, which it surpasses at least with regard to objective content, namely as a witness to the completeness of the canon and to the divine inspiration of the sacred books. The teachings of Scotus were often invoked during the discussion. According to the Subtle Doctor, all the general revelation is transmitted through Holy Scripture but some particular revealed truths such as Christ's descent into hell — which is not explicitly contained in the Gospel — were handed down to the Church through Tradition as articles of faith. The Magisterium of the Church is hence the guarantor and authentic interpreter of the Scriptures, as well as of Tradition.

Scotus' Christocentric concept of the Cosmos comes forth in the Council's presentation of the mystery of the Church, in relation to the "universal Primacy of Christ, the greatest of God's works, the magnifier of the Holy Trinity and Redeemer of the world; King in both the natural and supernatural orders." This Christocentrism permeates all the conciliar documents, which, in the words of Pope Paul VI, see Christ as "the end of human history, the point of convergence of the aspiration of history and civilization, the centre of the human race, the joy of all hearts and the fulfillment of their desires." No ancient theologian spoke in a more enlightened manner of the Primacy of Christ than the Subtle Doctor.

Some of the theological insights that follow from his emphasis on the Primacy and Finality of Christ in the Cosmos seem to be reflected today in the existential desire of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin to show how all created values find their ultimate fulfillment in Christ and serve God's glory. The enthusiasm with which Teilhard's vision of the unity underlying all things is espoused by his admirers may indicate a longing for the need of a synthesis similar to that which Scotus sought to achieve

in his theory of an ordered universe. In his view, Christ is the most perfect of creatures, fulfilling God's love-motive for creating an ordered universe, wherein all other creatures are patterned after Him, take their meaning from Him, are united with Him in His perfect love of the Father, and share in His glory.

It is all the more interesting to explore the Subtle Doctor's presentation of the unique, universal Primacy of Christ in view of the mariological claims issuing from traditional Franciscan scholarship. Such claims, as it appears at the very outset, are not directed to compromise in any way an authentic Christocentric theology. Here again Scotus can be a valuable aid to ecumenical understanding for those Christians who, expressing sincere reserves in this connection, insist on the importance of Christocentric convergence as a God-given sign for the achievement of Christian Unity.

Scotus was also a pioneer with regard to the conciliar decisions about the nature, function and power of Bishops in the Church. The classical masters of Scholasticism, including Peter Lombard, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas, had commonly denied the sacramental character of the episcopal order. In contrast, the Subtle Doctor taught that the episcopate is a true sacrament, impressing its own character, distinct from that of the priesthood. This doctrine gathered support over the centuries and eventually was sanctioned by Vatican II.

Scotus' teachings provided the key to the conciliar solution of the delicate question of Collegiality, that is the relationship between the Body of Bishops and its head, the Roman Pontiff. The Pope is for him the true Vicar of Christ, by particular, personal and unique delegation "*gerens ipsam personam Christi*". He thus enjoys the special assistance of the Holy Spirit promised by Christ in his prayer for Peter, and presides over the College of Bishops with true, universal jurisdiction and not only as a symbol of unity. In this sense the Second Vatican Council established that the College of Bishops "together with their head, the Roman Pontiff, and never without this head, is indeed the subject of supreme and full power over the whole Church, although this power cannot be exercised if the Roman Pontiff does not consent".

The Church in Council was eager to establish efficient means of contact with all men of good will. In his first encyclical, Pope Paul VI presented her to the world as the Church of Dialogue. The conciliar Decree "on Ecumenism" and the Pastoral Constitution "on the presence of the Church in the world" develop the theme of dialogue of the Church with the brethren of other allegiances and with the modern world, while

special Secretariats have been charged to establish lines of communication with other Christian and non-Christian believers as well as with those unbelievers who are men of good will. As Pope Paul has pointed out, the principles that were the soul of Scotus' critical method can offer a positive influence for the effectiveness of these contacts. Let us look at them very briefly.

- 1) "As humanity progressed, the knowledge of the truth has always increased", though the truth can never change. Lack of knowledge, laziness of the mind, ill will, or want of skill, Scotus comments, may vitiate the reasoning of men otherwise eminent. The discovery of truth is not a one-man-achievement. As Newman says, truth is of its very nature "the product of many minds working together."
- 2) Authority has only the value of the arguments it advances. Although everything it teaches with appropriate arguments is to be accepted, what it does not teach may also be true. Even some of the Fathers of the Church, wishing to combat error, "frequently have gone to excess in their mode of speaking". Though their authority is great in other matters, we would not follow them in this.
- 3) "To no author are we to posit or attribute a false opinion or an absurd one, except in the case where this is expressly clear from what he says, or openly follows from it." The mind of one's opponent is therefore to be interpreted with sympathy, from his own words and not from commentaries or hearsay.
- 4) "It is dangerous to adduce sophisms (to defend the faith) because one exposes the faith to derision . . . It is better actually to acknowledge one's ignorance than to pretend to be wise through sophisms". It is wrong therefore to think oneself able to know and prove all revealed truths with the intellect alone, for this is limited and weak.
- 5) "In matters of belief, nothing must be asserted unless it can be proved by what is already known to be true." "Nothing is to be held as of the substance of the faith unless it can be learned expressly from Sacred Scripture, or has been expressly declared by the Church, or unless it follows evidently from something contained plainly in Scripture or plainly decided by the Church." Sacred Scripture should be explained literally and ^{and}naturally as far as possible, making use of profane sciences as well, in order to reach a clearer understanding.
- 6) "If anyone taking the place of a doctor, asserts something new, nobody is bound to agree . . . but he is bound to consult the Church first and thus avoid falling into error."

I have spoken at the level of generality and with a certain shyness to a noble gathering of the highest scholarship of the world. I know I have your benevolent indulgence and thank you for having borne with me so long. I have endeavoured to contribute to the revaluating of John Duns Scotus and to re-establishing deference for him in the exceedingly lively scene of contemporary philosophy and theology. This may seem contrived and anachronistic to the superficial and the uninformed; but certainly not to you, whose very presence here at Oxford is a proof that the teachings of the Subtle Doctor, far from being dead, are still of pulsating actuality.

We do not, of course, advocate that Scotus has all the answers to the queries of our revolutionary age; but we do feel that he can take the place of honour, which is his due, in the ranks of modern thinkers. He has been rightly defined as "a Man for all times". His eager effort to reconcile the growing needs and demands of his age with the traditions of the Church, his sincere quest for the truth in the charity of Christ, his irenic, open and synthetic attitude to the problems he tackled — all this counts for his relevance as an ideal model for the dialogue in which all men of good will are now involved.

For these reasons Pope Paul VI expresses the hope that the teachings of John Duns Scotus, born and bred in these lands, which "he nobly represents with a fecund intelligence no less than with practical knowledge", may provide a suitable framework for a serious dialogue. It is his good wish and prayer that "a golden harvest may ripen in that naturally fertile soil and that from these learned and broad discussions and agreed conclusions, truth will flourish with renewed vigour, 'the truth that doth lift us so high'", and unite all men in God's one act of love.

ARCHBISHOP H. E. CARDINALE

THE PRIMACY OF CHRIST AND THE EXISTENCE OF THE NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS

A pessimistic view of mankind

My interpretation of the religious personality of Mohammed, of the religious personality of Islam, and of their relation to the religious attitude of St Francis, must be considered always within the framework of a universal history centered upon the mystery of Christ. To avoid misunderstandings an outline of the theological-historical background must first be studied, so that the mystery of Islam may be seen in its proper context.

Any endeavour to state adequately the problem of the survival of Judaism after the coming of Christ (or even the problem of the presence of non-Christian religions in the world) must take its start from St Paul, the apostle of the gentiles. Christ is king of history and in the light of the mystery of Christ we must try to interpret the permitted historical presence of great world religions that co-exist with Christianity.

St Paul got his rabbinical formation at the feet of Rabbi Gamaliel and thus was influenced by the apocalyptic pharisaism of the first century A. D. It is no longer fashionable, even among Protestant exegetes, to seek the origins of Pauline conceptions in hellenism. Paul's mind is always semitic, even if he sometimes uses Stoic terminology. During the first century B. C. even Palestinian Judaism was influenced by hellenism. We are safe in concluding that this was part of the divine plan for the later spreading of the gospel in the Graeco-Roman world. St Paul, as the leading apostle of the gentiles, is firmly convinced of this. His mode of thought in anthropology and morals is always based on the Old Testament, but he freely uses a hellenistic word or idea, preferably of Stoic origin, to express himself. We know that rabbis of the two centuries 100 B. C. to 100 A. D. engaged in debates on philosophy with the wise men of the Greek speaking world. Some of the surviving Hebraic literature of this period has an unmistakable note of pessimism (e. g. *The Book of Enoch*, *The Apocalypse of Baruch*, *The Apocalypse of Esdra*) although it does emphasize the anti-Sadducean doctrines of the resurrec-

tion of the body and the imminent coming of the Messiah-King. Of course, an air of intellectual pessimism pervaded the whole ancient Mediterranean world. The fourth book of Esdra has many terms taken from apocalyptic rabbinism. They form parallels with some terms in St Paul's *Epistle to the Romans*. The law cannot save sinners, but it is still Jahve's great gift to his people, Israel (4 Esd 3:19sq; Rom 3:20). "For a race addicted to sin, the promises of the law are a deception" (4 Esd 7:116—131). Throughout *Romans*, Paul sets in high relief this tragic situation of sinful humanity. The disasters set in motion by the sin of Adam are dramatically expressed in Rom 2:23 — "All men have sinned; they need God's glory." Surely this means that all men, Hebrews and gentiles, are guilty of sin and all have a desperate need of the glory of God.

By reason of Adam's sin a universal racial disaster affects all his descendants. They begin their natural life in a state of deprivation of supernatural life, in a state of inherited original sin. The rabbis did not use these Catholic terms, but they did understand and say that all men are born sinners. They took a pessimistic view of man's miserable earthly condition and some of them actually disputed the proposition that man's creation was a boon. In the first century A. D. political and social conditions under foreign oppression tended to weigh down the spirits of Palestinian Jews. St Paul's emphasis on sin in his *Epistle to the Romans*, particularly on the sin of Adam, reflects the "hopeless environment of Israel": he repeated the rabbinical doctrine of good and bad impulses in human beings, which, if not an explanation of the reasons behind sin, is at least a description of sin. St Paul, of course, added the clear revelation of the consequences of Adam's sin and this divine revelation gave the basic explanation of the miserable state of mankind.

The *Book of Genesis* had informed the Jews of the sin of the first man, but the religious conscience of Israel began to reflect on it deeply, under the guidance of prophetic inspiration, only after the return of the Jews from the Babylonian exile. The Fall had claimed some attention from Old Testament writers, but it became increasingly important during the period leading immediately up to the coming of Christ. Passages in Ezechiel and Job quite clearly show this new theme in biblical revelation. Rabbinical speculation in the first century A. D., certainly known to St Paul, made of Adam a kind of demi-god. He was created before the hills and had access to God's secrets. When he was created by God he was not like man as we know him, he had gigantic dimensions and marvelous form. He had been created immortal (4 Esd 3:7; 2 Bar 17:3, 23:4). One

day of his life corresponded to a thousand years (Book of Jubilees 2:23; 2 Peter 3:8). Adam had a glory deriving from God himself, so that his face shone. According to *Genesis Rabba* he was bisexual — an interpretation of Gen 1:27 "Male and female he created him" (the Vulgate reads "...he created them"). The angelic beings had to adore him because of his super-angelic wisdom.

The higher and the more glorious his primeval state, the greater must his wretchedness have become after his disastrous guilt.

First and second Adam

St Paul knew of all this speculation about the first man since rabbinical Judaism was deep in it. Perhaps it is fantastic, but the fact was that, in spite of the terrible fall, this rabbinical treatment was a kind of glorification of Adam. Philo, influenced by Platonism, distinguished two narrations of the events of creation, one concerning heavenly man, the image of God (Gen 2), the other concerning earthly man, made of dust. Some hermetic writings, Poimandras for example, gave prominence to the doctrine of the heavenly man even in the hellenistic Mediterranean world.

It is against this background of thought that St Paul's doctrine concerning the "second Adam" (I Cor 15:45—46) is to be viewed. If for Philo the heavenly man corresponded perhaps to the incorporeal, preexistent idea, or was perhaps derived from speculations on supermen which appeared in Persian, Babylonian and Indo-Aryan myths two centuries before Christ, for St Paul the "preexistent" Jesus, the heavenly man, is not an idea — he is the lord Jesus Christ. The first man, Adam, had introduced the order of intelligent life on the physical, earthly level. The second man, Jesus Christ, had introduced by his resurrection a new order of spiritual life on the level of the Holy Spirit. It may seem that St Paul in his *First Epistle to the Corinthians* (chap. 15) has reversed the scheme of Philo. But in fact he did not identify the heavenly man with the preexistent archetype or ideal prototype that chronologically would be previous to the earthly Adam of Genesis. Paul identifies him with Jesus Christ, who chronologically came into the world after Adam. For this reason he called him the second Adam, although he was pre-existent as the Lord of Heaven.¹

¹ For Philo, who was a Platonist, the ideas or archetypes pre-exist in heaven and have chronological precedence over the "real things" of this earthly world. Hence, for Philo, before the terrestrial Adam of the earthly paradise, there existed a celestial Adam who was an "idea", an archetype or prototype, of all human kind. For St Paul the heavenly man is not an

One must not forget that in the Old Testament the term "Adam" does not always stand for the name of a single first man, but is used generically to designate all mankind. And it must be noted that the rabbis used "Adam" as a name for the typical representative of mankind. In his *Epistle to the Romans* St Paul applies, in a parallel manner, the rabbinical doctrine of the consubstantiality of all men in Adam to illustrate the doctrine of the redemption of all men in Christ. Paul found no difficulty in transposing the term "Adam" (which meant both the first man and all mankind) as a parallelism with the term "Christ" — Jesus — which meant the second Adam, and then going on to greet a "new humanity" generated spiritually in Christ. Rabbinical speculations about Adam's body being formed out of dust collected from the four corners of the earth, and about its relationship with all mankind considered as forming "one body" with Adam's body, can sometimes appear fantastic or puerile, but they really did serve to prepare the climate of sentiment in which the profound revelations of the mystery of Christ as propounded by St Paul could be sympathetically received. When Saul, on the road to Damascus, had his first personal experience of a meeting with Christ, the words "Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?" brought up a familiar rabbinical picture to his mind. He could see the relationship between Christ and the Christians as being parallel to the relationship between Adam and his "body", mankind. Consequently, the Pauline epistles later expressed the unity of Christ with his Christians through a body concept. A new corporative personality was provided by the coming of Christ. Even in a physical sense Christians are all one in Christ. They are "Christ's Body".

St Paul is always basically of a Jewish mentality. When he uses the word "body" it is not in the Greek sense which connotes man as a body-soul composite. His anthropology being Semitic, he sees man as a single, animated, corporeal unit. Although he uses the Greek philosophical terms *psyche*, *sarx*, *soma*, etc., the words refer to Hebraic notions, to different aspects of one simple human being. Hence, his concept of the Body of Christ is developed according to the framework of Semitic, not hellenistic, thought forms. In the Jewish religious context the notion of body-person is applied to a community or nation. The Semites thought of tribal or national life as essentially collective. The community lived internally and manifested itself externally as a continuous whole,

idea or archetype in the Platonic sense, he is Jesus Christ who, coming into this world chronologically later than the Adam of Genesis, is called the "second Adam". But for St. Paul Jesus precedes Adam on God's level, because Jesus is the concrete archetype, not the abstract idea, on which God modelled mankind.

existing in an uninterrupted series. Its members past, present and future were deeply felt to be one individuality. From this peculiar mental attitude it is only natural that there should result an intriguing ambiguity in meaning, and an oscillation in speaking, between group and individual.

The Damascus experience and the new-found faith worked a far-reaching emancipation within the heart, and throughout the pessimistic, legalistic mind of Saul the Pharisee. He began to breathe the air of freedom, to realize that a series of great liberations had been made available by the Messiah: a liberation from the dominion of sin, which Christ alone could effect (Rom 8:3); a liberation from the salvationally futile old Law (Rom 10:3; Gal 3:13); a liberation from the oppression of invisible powers of evil (Rom 8:15; Collos 2:15; Eph 6:10—16). Christ alone had freed him from all that blocks man's path toward God. St Paul thereafter never tired of presenting antithetic images and parallelisms which would express in the Semitic manner all that Christ had done to liberate Israel and the whole human race.

He set the "new man", created by the redemptive achievement of Christ, in contrast against the "old man", who had been crucified along with Christ. He set Christ-given liberty which makes men free sons of God, in contrast against "bonds of the law", which had held the sons of Abraham in slavery. The life of the spirit was contrasted with the life of the flesh. Men were seen as freed from the bondage of the powers of darkness and taken to the kingdom of the Son of God, or again as liberated from this present world of evil to enter a new era. It may be true that St Paul did not particularly like frequent use of the expression "the kingdom of God", although we find it so often in the Synoptic gospels where our Lord is shown as habitually using the phrase to an audience of Palestinian Jews. In the ambience and mentality of such listeners the expression was rich in prophetic-biblical overtones, all perfectly religious. But St Paul was addressing Christians who for the most part came from paganism and lived in the Roman Empire. To such an audience the phrase would smack strongly of politics.

St Paul presents the action of the new Adam as taking place in the Church founded by Jesus. The action of the new Adam is proper to the new Israel, in contrast to the old Israel where, according to rabbinical ideology, the first Adam lived, moved and had his being. Paul's parallelism required that against the solidarity of all mankind with the sinful first Adam, there should appear, in contrast, a solidarity of the new mankind with the Lord Jesus Christ. A race newly born in Christ must be seen as strikingly different from the old race born of Adam's seed.

Old and new Israel, and the destiny of the Gentiles

Into an ideological context of Christ seen as a second Adam, St Paul inserted his vision of universal Christianity. Of course, his personal experience of the action of Christ in him at Damascus enlightened Paul concerning the efficacy of the grace of God received in Jesus. Christ's action for mankind had no limits of race, sex or nation, since the human race is pre-eminently Christ's possession. The universal influence of Adam's sin, which had held sway both in Israel and the gentile world, was balanced by the universal divine mercy, bringing an all-embracing reconciliation. (Rom 1:18sq, 2:7)

In the development of Israel's religion one can observe something like an internal tension between a universalistic conviction that God operated also amid the gentiles, and a strictly national conviction that limited his action to Israel alone, abandoning the gentiles to their destiny of perdition. The wider, universalistic tradition is the stronger. It is found in the Deutero-Isaias,² in Jeremias, and in the books of Ruth and Jonas. The nationalistic, exclusivist spirit is found in the books of Ezechiel, Maccabees, and especially in apocryphal works such as *The Book of Jubilees*, *The Fourth Book of Esdra*, and *The Apocalypse of Baruch*.

Narrow nationalism was shown in an anti-pagan spirit among the contemporaries of Jesus — in Rabbi Hillel, for instance. It developed more strongly in the Jewish world of the years following the destruction of the Temple (70 A. D.), and notably after the tragic Jewish persecutions of Hadrian's reign (135 A. D.). For many Jewish rigorists there is no hope for the pagan world. All pagans are corrupt. Most gentiles will be lost, very few saved. (4 Esd 7:62sq, 8:41, 9:21) The first chapter of Romans draws this pessimistic picture. The only hope for a possible salvation of the gentiles that remained to a faithful or pious Israelite was a proselytism which would bring individual pagans into the "people of God" (Mt 23:15), and it seemed that even this method was not considered licit or feasible by all rabbis. Various theories had been worked out by rabbinical Judaism to show that gentiles as well as Jews had been given an opportunity of salvation, and that the gentiles were therefore responsible for their own perdition. One tradition held that represen-

² Today the majority of Scripture scholars, Catholic experts included, admit two authors of the *Book of Isaias*. Some admit three. 1) Isaias the prophet (pre-exilic, Chapters 1-39). 2) The Deutero-Isaias — not a Pseudo-Isaias — who was of the school of Isaias the prophet (post-exilic, Chapters 40-46).

tatives of pagan peoples had been called by Jahve to Sinai to receive the Mosaic law. Besides these, God had sent certain prophets to the gentiles — Balaam, for instance — just as Moses had been sent to the Jews. Some rabbis even taught that Balaam was superior to Moses. God had already given six commandments to all men: 1) not to adore idols 2) not to blaspheme God's holy name, 3) to set up tribunals of justice, 4) not to kill, 5) not to commit adultery, 6) not to steal. After the Deluge, God had added a seventh commandment when he made his pact with Noah concerning mankind (i. e. concerning the "nations" descending from Noah). This seventh precept obliged all men to abstain from the flesh of unbled animals. But the gentiles had rejected it.

The idea of a God-given opportunity for salvation for the gentiles was particularly acceptable to those who held the universalism of the Deutero-Isaias. The tradition preferred by some rabbis, holding that God also sent prophets to the gentiles, is significant, because it provided certain elements of a solution to the problem of the gentiles which were accepted by Judaism in the time of Christ.

St Paul and the Gentile World

Born in Tarsus, a pagan city, Saul was a Roman citizen (Acts 21:39). He grew up from infancy in a pagan world saturated with Graeco-Roman culture. His rabbinical training in Jerusalem attached him more strongly to his own race, the Chosen People. He became totally addicted to the rigorist teachings of Rabbi Shammai, although he was a pupil of the milder Rabbi Gamaliel who appears to have kept an open mind even to New Testament doctrines (Acts 5:33sq). Saul was an ardent Jew. He cultivated the devotion and zeal for the Law proper to a pious and strictly observant Pharisee (Acts 9:1—2; Gal 1—13; 2 Cor 11:22). He may have had, as some of his Jewish companions had, an admiration for Graeco-Roman culture. He surely felt the attraction, the seduction, of that pagan civilisation into which he had been born. But he was a devout believer in the Law and looked eagerly to the inheritance and hope of Israel, so he must have felt, at least to some little extent, an interior struggle, an ambivalence toward conflicting loyalties. After all, he was both Jewish and Roman.

Saul's conversion to Christianity took his inner conflict to a new level on which universalism meant something vaster than it could ever mean in the older Jewish tradition. Paul knew now, by divine revelation, that it is not the Law that can save a man. The new Israel of God grafts men into Christ by faith and baptism and thus breeds a new "people

of God". All men, without distinction of Jew and gentile, are invited to join (Rom 3:21sq, 10:12; Gal 3:26—29, 5:1, etc.).

St Paul sees the saving acceptance of Christ as a universal, God-given plan: Jesus has chosen him as "apostle of the gentiles" (Acts 9:1sq, 22:4—16, 26:12—18). Faith in Christ is now substituted for obedience to Mosaic law as the way of salvation. The Law had made Judaism what it was in history, but now it is superseded, having attained its purpose of preparation for Christ. The death of Jesus had finished and definitely closed the Old Alliance. By his resurrection Jesus had given life to a new Israel (Rom 9:30, 2:28—29). St Paul had given a new interpretation to the idea of Israel, in the spirit of Isaias 4:3—5 (Mal 3:16—17, Dan 7:13—14, 22—27). Among Paul's contemporaries the Jewish conscience found rectitude in a continued desire for a reunion of all the dispersed sons of the people of God. This messianic hope would be fulfilled, they expected, by a return of the scattered nation to the newly-liberated promised land. After the Babylonian exile a belief in the resurrection of the body had been introduced into the Israelite treasury of truths of faith. Progressive divine revelation had made it clear that the body would be raised from death and reunited with its former animating spirit to form a "new man". This belief differed from the Greek desire for immortality of the soul. Actually, the typically Jewish sense of unity of the people of Israel had somewhat retarded the full affirmation of individual immortality, because considerations on the future life were determined by a sense of national-racial solidarity. Individual aspirations received less prominence than they did in the Greek world. An individual Jew existing independently outside his own people, outside the family of God, was unthinkable for the Hebrew mentality. Persons could reach their full stature only within and by means of the community. It was on the basis of this Semitic thought that the rabbis constructed their notions of the future "community of the resurrection". Each patriarch will arise at the head of his tribe. That is the teaching of *The Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs*, and the resurrection will be an event that will prove the solidarity of Israelites past, present and to come. The destined blessing reserved by Jahve for his elected people will have exercised a beneficial effect toward the salvation of the pagan nations, for Israel shall have been the saviour of the other nations, through the mercy of Jahve.

Many aspects of this Jewish mode of thought are distinguishable in the Pauline vision of the new Israel born from the resurrection of Christ. When the earlier rationalism and modernism moved some critics to seek the "sources of Pauline thought" concerning the resurrection of Jesus

(and the resurrection of all men) in pagan mystery religions, these learned men were really side-tracked. St Paul's doctrines on resurrection, baptismal rebirth through the death of Christ, and other similar themes, actually presupposed the historical truth of the resurrection of Jesus. Paul accepted the historical fact, understood it in the light of the Old Testament prophecies and interpreted it in the context of contemporary Hebraic thought forms.

Writing to the Romans, Paul appealed to the prophets in support of his universalism. Ancient Israel had been a compact, unified community because of its "fleshly" descent from Abraham and because of the covenant of Sinai. These two factors were a providential preparation for a new covenant with a new Israel. The new children of Abraham would include in their "people of God", and embrace in a new pact, all those Jews or gentiles reborn in Christ through the baptism of faith. St Paul clearly saw Israelite universalism extended to encompass all of mankind within a new "existence in Christ" (1 Cor 12:12; Gal 1:15). Existence in Christ has for Paul a collective meaning, a community significance. That individuals acting alone could have private, personal access to Christ and communion with him without the Church, the Body of Christ, and in total isolation from it, was unthinkable to St Paul — he always maintained the community context. The two sacraments that effect the grafting in Christ and enable a man to participate in Christ's death and resurrection are Baptism and Eucharist, both of them essentially community mysteries. The Semitic concept of belonging to a community (tribe, people) involved the sharing of an identical "life" which spread to each member. The life of the first Adam, communicated to all the members of the human race, involved mankind in the sinfulness of Adam's fall. The life of Abraham, Father of Jewish believers, continued in the descendants of his seed, the Israelites. Analogously, the supernatural life introduced by the second Adam, Jesus, was passed on and diffused to Christians: "I am crucified with Christ on the cross . . . I make up what is lacking in the sufferings of Christ . . ." (Gal 2:20; Rom 8:17; Phil 3:10; 2 Cor 1:5)

All this St Paul knew from the revelation of Christ himself. As apostle of the gentiles Paul felt the pressure of Christ's command to his apostles: "Go, then, and teach all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you" (Mt 28:19—20). These words became the program of St Paul's life. Jesus had selected him as an instrument to bring his name to the gentiles as well as to the kings and sons of Israel

(Acts 9:15). Writing to the Corinthians he later outlined how much he had suffered in obeying Christ's command: weariness, imprisonments, whippings, mortal dangers, stonings, shipwrecks . . . "dangers from assassins, from my own nationals, from gentiles: dangers in cities, dangers in the countryside, dangers by sea, dangers from false brethren. In fatigue and misery, in sleeplessness and hunger, in thirst, in frequent fasting, in cold and insufficient clothing."

That the conversion of the pagan world was dear to St Paul's heart we can see from his earlier letters. He could still dream, in those days, that the whole wide gentile world might accept God's gift just because the Jewish world in general had refused to take it, had failed to recognise Christ. The first *Epistle to the Thessalonians* shows us some facets of St Paul's great hope of seeing the gospel spread everywhere (1 Thess 1:7—10). Writing to the Romans he first of all gives thanks to God that the Christian faith is announced to all the world (Rom 1:8). His shining hope to see the Graeco-Roman world bodily converted to Christ could as yet overcome the pessimistic view of the world situation confronting him.

The highest revelation of Christ's mystery

It was probably in the winter of 57—58 that Paul wrote to the Romans. Between that time and his final Roman imprisonment, during which he wrote his "captivity epistles", grace wrought spiritual maturity in his heart. Exegetes and theologians today join in admitting that his outlook underwent a progressive development. Something really deep transformed his soul, touching in a special manner his view of divine intervention in history. The *Epistle to the Romans* presented a universal salvific history managed by God so that a preparation for Christ's coming was provided spiritually in the progressive divine revelation made to Israel. This maintained the Traditional attitude so plainly shown in the Old Testament. God is creator of the universe. He created man, Adam; but Adam's sin impeded God's plan until "when the fullness of time came, God sent his Son, born of a woman, born under the Law, that we might receive the adoption of sons (Gal 4:4). Jesus is always presented as the second Adam working to repair the havoc caused by sin. History, given chronologically, concentrates on salvific achievements of Christ that embrace the entire human race.

After the apparition on the road to Damascus, St Paul, for the rest of his life, fixed his gaze on the person and the actions of Christ. The captivity epistles were written when he found himself deserted by most of his faithful disciples. Writing to St Timothy (2 Tim 4:16) he complains:

“At my first defence no one came to my support, but all deserted me.” Exegetes discern a new style in his writings of this period, and some find it so remarkably different from the earlier epistolary manner of Pauline style that they deny the authenticity of the captivity letters, conjecturing that they may be taken from ancient liturgical prayers and hymns produced under hellenistic influences of Gnosticism. But Christian tradition has always respected St Paul’s affirmations concerning his own special supernatural experiences, for instance, that he was caught up into heaven where, in ecstasy, he shared the beatific vision (2 Cor 12:1—4). Concentrating too much on Paul’s apostolic activities and preaching journeys, the critics tend to neglect the intensive contemplative life he led day by day in intimate union with Christ. In the solitude of his prison, sitting in chains, his love for Jesus must have grown until, approaching martyrdom, the highest revelation of Christ’s mystery came to him.

What St Paul received from Christ by direct revelation did not come to him all at once. The supernatural illumination of his intelligence, like the daily “growing in Christ”, was elaborated gradually within him. This continuous traction toward supreme transformation in Christ is described when he writes from captivity to the Philippians (3:8—12): “. . . I count everything loss in comparison with the supreme advantage of knowing Christ Jesus, my Lord. For his sake I have suffered the loss of all things, and I count them as rubbish that I may gain Christ and be found united to him . . . I would know Christ and what his resurrection can do. I would also share in his sufferings . . . Not that I have already attained this ideal, or have already been made perfect but I press on, hoping that I may lay hold of it, since Christ has laid hold of me.

St Paul has here reached the stage of an ecstatic who ceaselessly fixes his spirit in his lord Jesus. More than elsewhere, this state is evident in the captivity epistles. Mystics call it the “prayer of praise and thanksgiving”. It is while he is in this state that God, in recognition of his fidelity, gives him particularly high revelations of messianic mysteries. Through St Paul the “saints” (Christians) learn of the mysteries of Christ.

“By revelation this mystery was made known to me” (Eph 3:3)

What is “this mystery”? St Paul goes on to say in the next verse: “If you read this statement you can perceive how well versed I am in this mystery relative to Christ, which in former ages was not made known to mankind,” and as we read further we must see (as the commentators

say) that he is referring to "a plan which associates pagans with the people of Israel". This plan must locate the mystery of their vocation to the faith. Some commentators think that the revelation mentioned is particularly the revelation made on the road to Damascus. To me it seems that the Apostle's expressions should be taken literally. The mystery in question is the same mystery of Christ which Paul had briefly mentioned in the preceding verses. And he goes on to say in verse 6: "The mystery is this, that the gentiles are joint heirs and fellow members of the same body, and joint partakers in Christ Jesus of the promise by means of the preaching of the Good News."

It seems to me that the revelation alluded to is not the one given on the road to Damascus. It is the full knowledge of the mysterious identity and function of Jesus as expounded in Ephesians, Colossians and Philipians. "To me, the very least of all the saints, this grace was given to announce among the gentiles the good news of the unfathomable riches of Christ, and to enlighten all men as to what is the wonderful plan, that mystery which has been hidden from eternity in God, who created all things. The purpose of this plan was that now the manifold wisdom of God, in keeping with his eternally established decree at present realized in Christ Jesus our Lord, may be made known by the Church to the Principalities and the Powers in heaven" (Eph 3:8—11). The eternal design mentioned here had been carefully explained in Eph 1:3—14 and Coloss 1:15—20.

Exegetes have very frequently been tempted to seek the sources of St Paul's vocabulary and ideas in hellenism and Gnosticism. His peculiar use of the prepositions *en*, *dià*, *eis* led critics to see him referring to exemplary cause, efficient cause, instrumental cause, etc. But these are modes of Greek thought unknown to the Semitic mentality of the typical young rabbi, Paul. Forty years ago there appeared a short exegetical-philological study by an English biblical scholar, G. F. Burney: "Christ as the APXH of Creation" (*Journal of Theological Studies*, vol 28, Jan 1926, p. 160) which seems to have escaped the attention of Catholic theologians and biblical scholars. Burney had found a discussion of the text of *The Book of Proverbs* in the great "midrash" commentary on Genesis named "Bereshit Rabba". Although this is of the third century A. D., it follows the traditional rabbinical method in exegetical interpretation of texts. The discussion in question dealt with Prov 8:30 "I was at his side, a master-workman, my delight increasing with each day, as I made play before him all the while," a text commonly thought to refer to the Law. The commentary of Rabbi Hoshaiah recorded a tradi-

tional, classical interpretation of Prov 8:22 which could have originated in the first or second century B. C., and therefore could have been known to St Paul: "Jahve created me as the beginning of his designs . . ." Now, the term *reshit* means beginning. With the preposition *bi* it forms *bereshit*, the first word in the Bible and was therefore considered a key word. The preposition *bi* could have three meanings: in, by means of, and by (as an end). *Reshit* could have four meanings: beginning (commencement), sum total (totality), head (capital), and first (firstborn, first-fruits). Rabbinic exegesis, according to its method, consequently attributed seven functions to the Law in relation to creation. Christian revelation sees Christ as the perfect fulfillment of the Law. The ancient Torah (Law), personified in rabbinic tradition, was replaced by the personality and actions of Christ, the Lord, the Wisdom of God. Actually, for the New Covenant, it is not alone the word of Christ that constitutes the New Law (the perfection of the Old Law), but it is the very person of Christ Jesus (more than that of Moses the lawgiver) that constitutes the Law that regulates Christian lives. St Paul emphasized the necessity of imitating Christ: "Follow my example as I have followed Christ's example" (1 Cor 11:1; 1 Thess 1:6). In rabbinic Judaism the Law was always associated with light and life (Ps 118:105; Prov 6:23). It was the sum total of all that God had made known about himself, about his relations with mankind, and about the obligations he imposed on men. But Christ was the self-declared Light, Way, Truth and Life. Whoever knew him entered into true knowledge of his Father, and that constituted eternal life. Therefore Paul put Christ in the centre of his life and transferred to him everything that he formerly as a rabbi had attributed to the Law.

With all this in mind we can understand how the Christological text Coloss 1:15—20, so much discussed by exegetes, should be interpreted as a presentation of the mystery of Christ (who is the New Law according to rabbinic terminology), according to the seven different facets of the Hebrew word that begins the first sentence of the Bible: *bereshith*

1. *Be*, meaning *in*, is translated into Greek as *en* (ἐν). „In him all things were created, those which are terrestrial, visible and invisible.”
2. *Be*, meaning *by means of*, is translated into Greek as *dia* (διὰ). „All things were created by means of him.”
3. *Be*, meaning *by* (as an end), Gk *eis* (εἰς): “all was created for him”

The Douay-Rheims version translates Coloss 1:16 “For in him were all things created.” Knox translates it: “Yes, in him all created things took their being.” The commentator in *New Testament Reading Guide*

(vol. 9) says: "the verb is in the perfect tense to express the continued relation of the Creator to creation; the preposition may be locative and mean 'with and in Christ', or instrumental and mean 'by Christ'."

4. *Reshith*, meaning beginning or commencement, Gk *autós estin pro pantón* (αὐτός ἐστιν πρὸ πάντων) Coloss 1:17 "He exists before all things."
5. *Reshith*, meaning sum total, totality, basis, Gk *ta panta en auto sunesteken* (τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκεν) "and all things are summed up in him." Reference to the Aramaic and Hebrew use gives the sense of "recapitulation" found in Eph 1:9—10 where *anakephalaaiosasthai* is translated by Kleist and Lilly as "put into effect" (in Christ).
6. *Reshith*, meaning head, capital, Gk *e kefale tou somatos* (ἡ κεφαλὴ τοῦ σώματος) "He is the head of the body, that is, the Church."
7. *Reshith*, meaning first, firstborn, first-fruits. "He, the beginning, the firstborn from among the dead."

After these seven applications, according to rabbinic exegesis, comes the conclusion that results from the over-all understanding of the combined senses that *reshith* can have: "thus he holds the universal primacy" (Coloss 1:18). Kleist and Lilly translate it: "so that he may have pre-eminence over every creature." Knox has: "thus in every way the primacy was to become his." NEB: "He is . . . to be in all things alone supreme."

Meditating on the origins and attributes of God's Wisdom, St Paul sees, in the light of the new revelation, the whole mystery of Christ, sees the mystery now in different dimensions from those shown in *Romans* and *Galatians*. In *Romans*, Paul is still on the level of Judaic escatology, and therefore considerations of Adam, the first man, the destroyer of God's plan by sinfulness, remains to limit the main lines of his presentation of the mystery of Christ. He sees Christ as a second Adam, head of the new mankind that participates in the life of God, and so on. Christ is essentially a redeemer, destined to repair the consequences of the first Adam's sin. Creation, according to Genesis (1:26, 28—30), is put at man's service by God. But sin has brought discord and disorder even in the field of man's relations with nature — and nature will benefit from the redemption effected by the second Adam in favour of man. "All creation awaits with eager longing the manifestation of the sons of God. For creation was made subject to vanity, not by its own choice, but by the will of him who made it subject, yet with the hope that creation itself would be delivered from its slavery to corruption, to enjoy the freedom that comes with the glory of the children of God. For we know

that all creation groans and travails in pain until now." (Rom 8:19—22) This may appear to be a mystical, poetical conception, but St Peter and St John tell us that there will be "a new heaven and a new earth" (2 Pet 3:13; Apoc 21:1).

Thomistic Christology sees the Incarnation as ordained exclusively for the repair of the sin of Adam, and such a system of theology finds much support from St. Paul's earlier writings, but the captivity epistles contain none of it. They see the mystery of Christ in a dimension that is outside the simple arrangement of chronological earthly history. Here Christ is not the second Adam willed by God merely as one who repairs Adam's sin. Christ is the center of God's plan. He is willed by God for his own sake, because of his intrinsic worth, and for his sake all the universe is willed, all men and all angels: "These blessings correspond to his choice of us in Christ before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blemish in his sight. Out of love he predestined us for himself to become through Jesus Christ his adopted children, conformably to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of his resplendent grace, with which he has adorned us in his beloved Son . . . making known to us in keeping with his good pleasure, the mystery of his will. And this good pleasure he decreed to put into effect in Christ when the designated period of time had elapsed, namely to gather all creation in heaven and on earth under one head, Christ." (Eph 1:4—6, 9—10)

Jesus, king of history and nations

St Paul's dominant theme in *Romans* is the restoration of a humanity fallen through the first Adam's sin, saved by the second Adam. The new prison revelation forcibly affirms the absolute supremacy of Christ over all creation — angels (heavenly powers), men, and the whole cosmos — so that the Messiah is no longer seen only as a redeemer whose function it is to remedy the disaster of Adam and Adam's children. It is a completely new vision of the Christological significance of the work of God described in *The Book of Genesis*. Rabbinic theology had seen this inner meaning of God's actions narrated in the Torah, and had interpreted it by personifying the Wisdom of God. Paul's eyes now see, beyond the personification of the Law, the figure of the Lord Jesus. It is as the Lord of Glory that he appears; he is "the visible image of the invisible God", the reason for all of God's external activity. This Pauline conception and presentation of Christ in Ephesians and Colossians was pondered by the genius of John Duns Scotus. He knew how to transpose the visionary words of St Paul into the language of scholastic theology. He put

it this way: Christ, God-Man, is the first Predestined One who, with his mother the Immaculate Virgin, is the first to share in the life of God, One and Three. For the sake of the supreme glory of Christ, willed as peerless Adorer and Lover of the Trinity, God willed and created angels and men so that they might participate, in Christ and through Christ, in the divine life. The system of theology that sees the Incarnation as independent of the sin of Adam is typically Franciscan. It is more widely appreciated nowadays than in the past, but it is not sufficiently used as a point of departure for theological reflections on the problem of the relations between Christianity and the other world religions. The unity of the cosmos and of all mankind in Christ is not an abstraction produced by some process of human thought, it is fundamental reality. Scotistic theory of the Incarnation permits us, better than any other theological theory, to penetrate into the real-ontological aspect of the deep unity of the universe.

Christ is the foundation, not alone of the "static" ontological reality, but also of the dynamic and vital aspect of reality: Christ is the foundation of the historic aspect of the unfolding of reality, especially of persons — angels and men. It is quite common to find men thinking that God, who guides the history of mankind, changed his plan after the sin of Adam. The idea seems to be that God rearranged history in relation to Christ and limited his action to special intervention, first in Israel and later in the Catholic Church. Pope Pius XII said: "Does it not seem that the will of powerful and influential beings rules the destinies of men and directs things and events? But instead, this is in God's hands: nothing can be withdrawn from his strong and paternal providence." (May 1, 1953)

If God, as St Paul affirms, "wishes that all men be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth," (I Tim 2:4) and if, in fact, all mankind is included, before and after the Incarnation, in the divine salvific plan, then it is our duty to try to discover the phases in universal history on which salvific history hinges. Up to today the history of salvation has been commonly treated within the limits of Bible and ecclesiastical history.

But the God of revelation is the God of history. The unfolding of human history according to the supernatural plan centered in Christ is not to be limited solely to the development, first of Jewish history and later of Christian history. Once God's external activity, willed and orientated essentially toward Christ, had begun with creation, it continued through all the progress and vicissitudes of humanity, governing

the evolutionary process. All men are willed and created in the image of Christ the Man. Each individual person is essentially linked into the continuous series of persons coming before and after him, and mankind is based on Christ. The insertion of each person into the universal network (concatenation) of angels and men is not achieved solely through the sacred humanity of Jesus. Each single human being is installed in and structurally joined to a cosmic totality that, in its essence, is designed to accommodate man in his natural-supernatural life. "Everything is for you, whether it be Paul or Apollo or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or the present, or the future; it is all for you, and you for Christ, and Christ for God." (1 Cor 4:22—23)

In the Pauline and Scotistic view of Christ, Christ is recognized as being much more than the central figure of history. To limit his scope as fulcrum and pivot of the human race solely to the activity of divine, preparatory intervention (worked out instrumentally in the course of Bible and ecclesiastical history) is to unduly shrink the reigning function of Christ in history. It is imperative that we should take into account the entire religious history of mankind, in so far as its records are available to theologians. No human activity, no event, must be thought alien to the all-pervading influence of the Incarnation. In our times, knowledge of the grandeur and complexity of the material world has been astoundingly extended, so that man might be in danger of seeing himself as an insignificant thing, lost amid the myriad things of atoms and galaxies. The "scientific" vision of Father Teilhard de Chardin does not try to exempt man from the material evolution of the universe. On the contrary, it interprets the evolution of the material and biological universe from the standpoint of man. The universe is orientated toward man. St Paul's revelation points to the fact that this entire man-centered cosmic reality exists for and is centered upon Jesus. God's salvific will develops its activity along the Christocentric lines of salvation history and, as Father Karl Rahner, S.J., says, is co-extensive in time and space with that one, integral whole that is human history.

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SOURCES FOR OCKHAM'S PROLOGUE TO THE SENTENCES — II

In the first part of this article (*Franciscan Studies*, 1966) we presented the texts of John of Reading and Richard of Conington, two authors cited in the third and fifth questions of the *Prologue* of Ockham's *Commentary on Book I of the Sentences*. In the present article we will publish the texts of Robert Cowton and William of Alnwick. Cowton and Alnwick are cited in the eleventh and twelfth questions of Ockham's *Prologue*¹.

ROBERT COWTON

C. Balić has estimated that the Oxford Franciscan Master Robert Cowton wrote his *Commentary on Book I of the Sentences* between 1303-1308². Robert cites the *Lectura prima* of Scotus but not his *Ordinatio*. Dom O. Lottin has indicated the complicated interplay between the *Commentary on Book III* of Cowton and the various redactions of Scotus' *Book III*, and has suggested that Robert's *Commentary* is posterior to the oral teaching of Scotus but anterior to the *Ordinatio*. Cowton, according to Lottin, is a faithful echo of the oral teaching of Scotus and is therefore a valuable representative of the new-born Scotistic school³.

Parts of Cowton's *Commentary* have already been edited. H. Schwamm has published Distinctions 38 and 39 of Book I⁴. T. Graf has edited the first question of Distinction 33 of Book III⁵. M. Schmaus and O. Lottin have also provided many citations from various areas of Cowton's works⁶.

¹ Guillelmus de Ockham, *Scriptum in I Sententiarum*. Opera theologica (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1967) I, 277—279 (Robert Cowton); 325—328 (William of Alnwick).

² According to a letter quoted by O. Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, t. VI (Gembloux), p. 426.

³ O. Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale . . .*, t. VI, pp. 440—441.

⁴ H. Schwamm, *Robert Cowton O.F.M. über das göttliche Vorherwissen* (Philosophie und Grenzwissenschaften 3, 5), Innsbruck, 1931.

⁵ T. Graf, *De subiecto psychico gratiae et virtutum*, pars I (Studia Anselmiana, 3—4), Rome, 1935.

⁶ M. Schmaus, *Der Liber propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie im Mittelalter, 29, 1), Münster, 1930; O. Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale . . .*, t. VI, pp. 425—441.

The text cited by Ockham has never been edited. It concerns the nature of *praxis*. This subject, however, is treated within the discussion of the nature of theology. In the seventh question of his *Prologue to Book I of the Sentences* Cowton examines the position of Scotus regarding the practical character of theology and rejects the Subtle Doctor's teaching that theology is a practical science. For Cowton theology is a speculative science. A speculative science deals with necessary and eternal things, whereas a practical science is concerned with contingent things. *Praxis* is an action dealing with contingent things or things which are means to an end. It is an action which passes over into the powers below the intellect and will. Here too Cowton differs from Scotus who did not specify that the act of an inferior power is necessary for *praxis*. According to Scotus it is sufficient that the act be done by a power different from the intellect but not necessarily by a lower power. On both these points we find then that Cowton is at odds with the Subtle Doctor.

Many manuscripts of Cowton's *Sentences* exist in both their original form and in the abbreviated form given them by Richard Snetisham⁷. For our edition we have used the text of Merton *ms.* 93⁸ (ff. 24 va—28 vb) as the basic text and where necessary we employed the Balliol *ms.* 199⁹ (ff. 45 va—53 ra) for corrections of evident faults and omissions. Both manuscripts are of excellent quality and come from the fourteenth century. We will use the letter M to signify the Merton manuscript and the letter B to indicate the Balliol text. We filled in the minor evident omissions of the Merton text only when justified by the Balliol manuscript and we employed brackets to show that they are not in the Merton text.

(Roberti Cowton Commentarium in I Sent., Prol., q. 7)

Utrum habitus theologiae sit speculativus vel practicus.

Quod sit practicus:

Probatur, quia ille habitus est formaliter practicus qui est directivus bonae actionis, sicut patet ex VI *Ethicorum*¹; hic est talis; quare etc.

⁷ For the list of manuscripts see F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, t. I (Würzburg, 1947), p. 357—359 and the Supplement to Stegmüller's work by V. Doucet. The only addendum we can add to this list is Peterhouse *ms.* 100. This manuscript is not the work of Thomas Aquinas indicated by the manuscript catalogue but contains Robert Cowton's *Commentary on the Sentences*.

⁸ See the description of this manuscript given by F. M. Powicke, *The Medieval Books of Merton College*, Oxford, 1931, p. 189.

⁹ See the description of this manuscript given by R.A. B. Mynors, *Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Balliol College*, Oxford, pp. 197—198.

¹ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139 a 34—35).

Minor probatur per Augustinum, *De vera innocentia*², qui dicit "inutiliter legem Dei meditatur qui laborat ut memoria teneat quod actione non implet". Igitur haec lex Dei est propter actionem.

Item, ille habitus qui est in nobis ut boni fiamus est simpliciter practicus; iste est talis; quare etc. Maior probatur secundum Philosophum, II *Ethicorum*, cap. 2³: scientia moralis distinguitur contra speculativam, quia non est contemplationis gratia sed ut boni fiamus. Minor probatur per illud Iac. 1⁴: *Estote factores verbi, et non auditores tantum*; et II Tim. 3⁵: *Omnis scriptura divinitus inspirata utilis <est> ad docendum, arguendum, corripiendum, erudiendum in iustitia, ut perfectus sit homo Dei ad omne opus bonum*. Quare haec scientia erit practica.

Item, illa scientia propriissime est practica cuius per se finis est ipsa praxis, quia scientia speculativa et practica differunt fine, ex II *Metaphysicae*⁶; sed illa est talis; quare etc. Minor probatur, quia ipsa operatio voluntatis est formaliter praxis. Sed haec est finaliter propter ipsam operationem voluntatis, secundum Augustinum, *De doctrina christiana*, libro II, cap. 3⁷, qui dicit "omnis divinarum Scripturarum studiosus nihil in eis aliud invenit quam diligendum esse Deum et proximum propter Deum".

Oppositum. Boethius, libro *De Trinitate*⁸: tres sunt partes scientiae speculativae: naturalis, mathematica et theologica. Et quod loquitur ibi de nostra theologia et non solum de theologia naturali, scilicet metaphysica⁹, probatio: nam illius theologiae de qua loquitur ponit Deum esse subiectum, ibidem, quia theologia ipsa est "abstracta et separabilis, quia Dei substantia et materia et motu caret". Deus autem non est subiectum in metaphysica, ut supra patet; quare etc.

Item, Augustinus, XIV *De Trinitate*, cap. 1¹⁰: haec scientia est propriissime sapientia; sed sapientia est supremus habitus speculativus, secundum Philosophum, X *Ethicorum*¹¹ et VI¹²; quare erit propriissime habitus speculativus.

² Ps.-August. (Prosper. Aquit.), *De vera innocentia*, n. 24 (PL 45, 1861).

³ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, II, c. 2 (1103 b 26—28).

⁴ Iac. I, 22.

⁵ II Tim. 3, 16.

⁶ Aristot., *Metaph.*, II, c. 1 (993 b 20—21).

⁷ August., *De doctr. christ.*, II, c. 7, n. 10 (PL 34, 39).

⁸ Boethius, *De Trinit.*, c. 2 (PL 64, 1250; ed. Peiper, 152, 4—13).

⁹ scilicet metaphysica/inv. M.

¹⁰ August., *De Trinit.*, XIV, c. 1, n. 3 (PL 42, 1037).

¹¹ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, X, c. 7 (1177 a 12 — 1177 b 1); c. 8 (1178 b 7—32; 1179 a 22—32).

¹² Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 7 (1141 b 2—3).

<Opinio tenens theologiam esse scientiam practicam>

Circa istam quaestionem sunt plures modi dicendi: duo extremi et medii multi. Una opinio¹³ est quae ponit quod haec scientia est simpliciter practica, quia pro fine proprio habet operationem bonam voluntatis quae est praxis; et a fine proprio habet scientia denominari practica; quare etc. Maior probatur, quia sicut est in habitibus factivis qui habent aliquid extra pro fine, sic suo modo est in habitibus activis qui habent aliquid intra pro fine. Sed in factivis ita est quod nunquam dicitur aliquis habitus factivus nisi propter opus operatum extra, quod est aliud a factione, non autem propter factionem ipsam, ut patet VI *Ethicorum*, cap. 6 'De actione'¹⁴. Igitur consimiliter nunquam dicitur aliquis habitus activus cum vera ratione actionis nisi propter operationem intra, quae sit aliud ab operatione intellectus sicut opus est aliud a factione. Cum igitur ille habitus theologiae non habeat nec habere possit aliquem actum immediate consequentem ipsum pro proprio fine, sequitur quod finis proprius eius erit actus alterius potentiae, scilicet dilectio voluntatis. Et cum illa sit praxis, ab ea dicitur ille habitus simpliciter practicus.

Item, actus intelligendi nullam rationem praxis habet ex se sed ex hoc quod extensibilis est ad opus, quia actus seu habitus intellectus, si non extendatur ad opus, est pure speculativus. Quare cum ista scientia non stet in puro speculari sed habet dilectionem Dei pro fine ad quem ordinatur, sequitur quod haec scientia ex tali extensione ad actum dilectionis est pure practica.

Item, in omni genere est aliquod primum ex quo omnia posteriora dicuntur talia, sicut ratio primi calidi in omnibus calidis secundis, ex II *Metaphysicae*¹⁵. Ratio igitur practici convenit omnibus practicis ex illo cui primo convenit practicum esse. Sed hoc est opus ut distinguitur contra actum intellectus. Igitur ab actu proprio intellectus non dicitur habitus practicus. Cum igitur ille habitus non stet nude in considerari et speculari sed ipsum ordinat ad effectum, iste dicitur practicus ab actu voluntatis sicut a proprio fine.

<Opinio Scoti>

Alii sunt qui ponunt habitum theologiae practicum, sed ipsi per viam aliam incedunt¹⁶. Et dicunt quod est practicus, primo, ab ipso obiecto sive

¹³ Pro auctoribus tenentibus theologiam esse scientiam practicam videbis: Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum*, Prooem., sec. 3 (ed. E. M. Buytaert, I, 220—222).

¹⁴ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.* VI, cc. 7—8 (1141 b 2—23).

¹⁵ Aristot., *Metaph.*, II, c. 1 (993 b 23—25).

¹⁶ Scotus, *Lectura*, I, Prol., p. 4, qq. 1—2, nn. 164—179 (ed. Vaticana, XVI, 54—60).

subiecto, scilicet Deo. Quod probatur, quia non est alia causa prior ab ipso habitu a quo potest habere quod sit practicus nisi obiectum et ipse intellectus. Sed ab intellectu non est practicus habitus, quia intellectus de se indifferens est ad practicum et speculativum, ita quod intellectus, ut intellectus est, neutrum est. Sequitur igitur quod habitus primo dicitur practicus ab obiecto. Unde dicunt quod quia Deus est talis naturae quod ab ipso causatur¹⁷ habitus practicus — quia est finis respectu cuius non potest esse habitus speculativus — et quia Deus ipse est formaliter obiectum practicum, omnis habitus recipiens ipsum pro subiecto primo necessario est practicus.

Item, sicut principium se habet in speculabilibus ita finis in moralibus sive practicis, ex II *Physicorum*¹⁸; sed ex principio speculabili necessario deducitur conclusio speculativa et ex illa derelinquitur scientia speculativa; quare ex principiis sumptis a fine deducitur conclusio practica et per consequens derelinquitur scientia practica. Igitur cum principia huius scientiae sumantur a Deo qui est finis, impossibile est quod conclusio sequens sit speculativa. Dicunt igitur isti quod theologia est habitus practicus ab obiecto, quia cum obiectum¹⁹ praesens fuerit mediante habitu isto surgit dilectio illius obiecti, quae dilectio est formaliter praxis nata conformiter elici ipsi considerationi practicae ex regulis practicis sumptis a fine elicto.

Item, quod haec scientia sit practica proprie arguitur per auctoritatem Commentatoris super I *Ethicorum*, commento 39²⁰, ubi dividit vitam in tres vitas famosas, scilicet voluptuosam, politicam et contemplativam. Dicit Commentator: "Tertiam vitam et supremam, scilicet speculativam" etc. "Neque enim conveniens erit de operationibus et operativis dicere proponentem relinquere practicarum perfectissimam vitam, quae purgativa est, coordinare autem his secundum disciplinas speculativam". Ergo per vitam speculativam, de qua loquitur Philosophus, VI *Ethicorum*²¹, intelligit, ut videtur, practicam scientiam nobilissimam.

Item, Commentator, VI *Ethicorum*, commento 17²²: "Scientifica quidem mens finem habet invenire veritatem et ultra nihil apponit; practica quidem invenit ipsam veritatem, non autem usque ad hoc stat

¹⁷ causatur/causetur M.

¹⁸ Aristot., *Physica*, II, c. 9 (200 a 19—24).

¹⁹ cum obiectum/inv. M.

²⁰ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, I (ed. P. F. Mercken, pp. 51—52, lin. 15—24).

²¹ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139 a 5—9).

²² Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, VI (versio Roberti Grossatesta iuxta cod. Vat. Urb. lat. 222, f. 107 va).

sed opus est et ipsi operatione ut attingat appetibile, de quo et scientifica est". Cum ergo haec scientia non stet in nuda consideratione veri sed regulet et dirigat actionem, sequitur quod ipsa erit per se practica et non speculativa.

⟨Contra opinionem tenentem theologiam esse scientiam practicam⟩

Contra opinionem primam quae ponit quod habitus ille dicitur practicus ex extensione ad actum voluntatis sicut ex fine proprio sunt multae auctoritates expresse.

Commentator, I *Ethicorum*, commento 68²³, dicit sic: "Unaquaeque ars proprium finem habet".

Item, Commentator, *Caeli et mundi*, libro I, commento 29²⁴: "habens actionem est per suam actionem"; et est propositio vera.

Item, Commentator, IX *Metaphysicae*, commento 16²⁵: "Entia conveniunt in hoc quod complementum et perfectio est in operatione propria". Igitur proprius finis habitus est operatio elicitā ab habitu, non operatio alterius potentiae. Patet igitur quod finis et perfectio secunda cuiuslibet habitus et potentiae consistit in acto proprio tamquam in fine proprio.

Item, Commentator, in fine VI *Ethicorum*²⁶, dicit quod habitus speculativus invenit verum, practicus finem habens huius directionem²⁷. Igitur finis proprius habitus practici est actus directivus operationum virium inferiorum.

Dicis ad omnes auctoritates quod actus directivus non est proprius finis habitus practici nisi quatenus cedit in idem cum bona actione voluntatis, ubi unum propter aliud et utrobique unum. Contra: unius rei per se est unus finis proprius et proximus; sed ex actu directivo intellectus et actu voluntatis nunquam fit unum per se; ergo non possunt ambo esse unus per se et proprius finis unius simplicis habitus perficientis intellectum.

Item, habituum per se²⁸ specie differentium non est idem finis proprius; sed huiusmodi sunt habitus theologiae et caritatis; sed dilectio Dei est proprius finis caritatis; quare non est proprius finis habitus theologiae perficientis intellectum.

²³ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, I (ed. P. F. Mercken, p. 89, lin. 35—36).

²⁴ Averroes, *In Aristot. De coelo et mundo*, I, com. 19 (ed. Iuntina, V, Venetiis, 1550, f. 7 vb).

²⁵ Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.*, IX, com. 16 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, Venetiis 1552, f. 114 ra).

²⁶ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, VI (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urbin. lat. 222, f. 138 va).

²⁷ directionem/directivum M.

²⁸ habituum/habitui M.

Respondent ipsi: verum est sub eadem ratione; sed dilectio est finis voluntatis et caritatis ut actum principiantis, sed est finis intellectus practici et habitus ut consulentis et dirigentis. Contra: tu bene ponis differentiam inter potentiam intellectivam et habitum perficientem ipsam <et volitivam et habitum perficientem ipsam²⁹>, in quantum intellectus dirigit et voluntas elicit. Sed nullam ponis differentiam in ipso simplici actu voluntatis. Et ideo stat argumentum, cum diversarum potentiarum et habituum specie, immo genere, non possit esse idem finis proprius, nam simplex actus non potest esse finis utriusque.

Item, actus voluntatis ut principiat a voluntate est effectus voluntatis et voluntas efficiens. Sed effectus sub ratione effectus, et maxime aequivocus est imperfectior efficiente. Sed finis ut finis perfectior est eo quod est ad finem. Quare opus voluntatis non est finis voluntatis ut ab ipsa.

Item, dilectio ut principiata non addit supra seipsam absolute nisi respectum ad principium. Sed respectus, cum non sit perfectionis, non potest esse formalis ratio quare dicatur per se finis nisi sine qua non. Igitur.

Item, effectus ut effectus est causatum et non causa respectu eius a quo est. Sed finis ut finis est per se causa illius cuius est finis. Quare, cum dilectio ut principiata sit effectus voluntatis, ipsa ut sic non est causa seu finis eius, sed magis ut perficit voluntatem.

Item, eodem modo potest argui de intellectu et actu eius quod illud quod dirigit perfectius est ut sic eo quod dirigitur. Sed actus voluntatis dirigitur ab intellectu, secundum te. Igitur ut sic est imperfectior actu dirigente et ipsa potentia, sed ut finis perfectior est vel aequae perfectus. Igitur actus voluntatis ut sic directus ab intellectu non est finis intellectus practici. Nec est verum quod dicunt prudentiam habere pro fine proprio actus illarum virtutum, puta temperantiae, quod dirigit circa materiam earum, quia hic actus sunt imperfectiores actu proprio directivo; et ideo proprius actus est finis, sicut dicit Commentator³⁰ supra.

Item, impossibile est finem proprium alicuius rei inesse nisi illud insit cuius est finis proprius actu vel habitu seu potentia propinqua. Sed dilectio potest esse sine habitu theologiae, ut patet in multis simplicibus. Quare etc.

Item, finis proprius habitus non potest esse communis habenti habitum et non-habenti, quia proprius finis requirit semper secum illud quod

²⁹ et . . . ipsam/om. M; marg. B.

³⁰ Supra, scilicet nota 25.

est ad ipsum. Sed caritativa dilectio est in non-habente habitum theologiae, et e converso in habente non est vel potest non esse. Quare etc.³¹

Item, impossibile est rem esse in rerum natura cum actuali opposito sui finis. Sed habitus theologiae potest inesse cum actuali aversione ab ipso Deo, et per consequens cum opposito gratuita dilectionis Dei. Igitur dilectio non est proprius finis habitus theologiae, quod concedit.

Item, si habitus sit practicus ex extensione ad dilectionem Dei quae est praxis ipsa, aut propter aptitudinalem extensionem aut actuaalem. Non propter actuaalem, quia tunc medicus nolens operari non haberet habitum practicum, quod falsum est, ut patebit in sequenti quaestione; tunc enim dormiens haberet habitum theologiae alterius rationis quam vigilans qui actu extendit habitum. Si propter aptitudinalem extensionem, cum nulla aptitudo insit uni et alteri repugnet nisi ex natura rei — sicut patet de propria passione respectu subiecti — et quia in eo est talis natura et in alio non, sequitur quod non extensione voluntatis sit habitus practicus solum sed ex natura rei.

Item, si actio voluntatis in ratione finis facit habitum intellectus dici practicum, aut ergo ut elicit a potentia operante aut ut considerata ab intellectu antequam elicitur a voluntate. Non primo modo, quia sicut est posterior habitu in intellectu ita causa debet esse prior, maxime quando non est causatus ab eo cuius est. Item, in illo priori, quaero qualis est habitus theologiae; oportet quod vel sit practicus vel speculativus. Si practicus, tunc non ab operatione voluntatis. Si ut considerata et intellecta, sic est obiectum; igitur ab obiecto, qui Deus est, habitus est practicus, quod ipsi negant.³²

<Contra opinionem Scoti>

Contra opinionem secundam quae ponit hanc scientiam esse practicam ab obiecto qui Deus est, quia nullo modo de tali subiecto posset haberi scientia speculativa, cum sit finis simpliciter, quia quaelibet natura ex seipsa formaliter habet quod sit causa habitus speculativi vel practici determinate, non utriusque. Contra: Philosophus, I *Ethicorum*, cap. 10 et 11³³, dicit quod "textor et geometra differenter inquirunt rectam", scilicet lineam. "Hic enim in quantum utilis est ad opus. Hic autem quid vel quale quid. Speculator enim est veri". Vult igitur Philosophus quod linea sit practica scientia textoris et speculativa geometrae. Igitur similiter potest de Deo esse utraque scientia.

³¹ Totum hoc argumentum repetit M in imo folio.

³² Ultima duo argumenta Robertus sumpsit a Duns Scoto, *Lectura*, I, Prol., p. 4, qq. 1—2, nn. 147—148 (ed. Vaticana, XVI, 50).

³³ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, I, c. 7 (1098a 29—31).

Item, ad hoc est Commentator, II *Ethicorum*, commento 99³⁴: “Est enim et scientias invenire” etc. Et non probat hoc, quia ex dicto suo potest haberi quod diversae potentiae, ut intellectus et voluntas, respiciunt idem obiectum et differunt tamen ex diverso modo habendi se circa idem; per simile de potentia ad obiectum et scientiae ad subiectum.

Item, Commentator, II *Physicorum*, commento 18³⁵, dicit quod diversae scientiae sunt de eadem re, et exemplificat.

Item, Philosophus, II *Ethicorum*, cap. 2, in principio³⁶, dicit: “Quoniam igitur praesens negotium non contemplationis gratia — quemadmodum alia — et non ut sciamus quid est virtus scrutamur, sed ut boni efficiamur.” Patet igitur quod considerare virtutem definitive est considerare eam speculative, et tamen ipsa virtus secundum se et rationem sui est quid morale et practicum. Igitur de aliquo in se practico potest esse scientia speculativa dummodo non consideratur practice, applicando scilicet ad opus.

Item, si de fine non potest esse scientia speculativa, quia non determinatur ad hoc ex natura, sed quod sit solum subiectum practicae scientiae pro eo quod est obiectum practicum formaliter, igitur nec de aliquo quod est ad finem, cum omne tale essentialiter ordinatur in ipsum ultimum et participet naturam illius. Vel si sic, illud quod est ad finem esset virtualius unum existens, possibile causare speculativam scientiam et practicam in intellectu quam ipse finis qui hoc non potest; quod est absurdum dicere. Item, si sic, tunc omnis consideratio metaphysici de Deo esset consideratio mere practica et non speculativa, cuius oppositum dicit Philosophus, VI *Metaphysicae* ante medium³⁷: “Si vero immobile aliquid sit separabile et sempiternum, palam est quia theoricæ est illud nosse.” Eo igitur ipso quod Deus est abstractus a motu et materia et <ens> sempiternum, simpliciter cadit sub consideratione habitus speculativi et non practici.

Item, quidquid causalitatis effectivæ reperitur in causa secunda hoc eminenter reperitur in causa prima. Sed aliquid citra Deum in intellectu in ratione obiecti potest causare habitum speculativum. Igitur et ipse Deus potest hoc; non igitur est talis naturæ ut solum esset in cognoscente habitum practicum, ut ipsi dicunt.

³⁴ Commentator, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, II (ed. P. F. Mercken, p. 192, lin. 22—26).

³⁵ Averroes, *In Aristot. Physicam*, II, com. 18 (ed. Iuntina, IV, Venetiis 1550, f. 26rb).

³⁶ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, II, c. 2 (1103b 26—28).

³⁷ Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 1 (1026a 10—11).

Item, supposito significato termini 'Deus' ut significet "illud quo maius cogitari non potest", secundum Anselmum³⁸; vel sic: "<illud>³⁹ quod quilibet omnibus aliis anteponit", secundum Augustinum⁴⁰, sequitur quod prius natura habeat formari de ipso complexo scientia speculativa quam practica; quare prius natura ex condicione rei habet causare habitum speculativum quam practicum. Probatio consequentiae, quia supposito obiecto significato sequitur statim quod Deus est, et ultra: si Deus est, summe est, et si summe est, omne aliud a participatione sui esse est. Ex quibus concludimus esse ultra trinum et unum quae in propria sui ratione non includunt aliquam rationem practicam sed pure speculativam. Falsum est igitur quod de ipso non potest haberi notitia speculativa.

Item, quod dicunt isti 'scientia practica est ab obiecto primo effective non ab intellectu' etc.; haec contradicunt sibi ipsis, nam alibi⁴¹ dicunt notitiam gigni ab utroque, scilicet cognoscente et cognito. Cum igitur ante habitum generatum, immo actum, sit obiectum praesens potentiae in ratione memoriae et dicitur potentia practica, obiectum est practicum, quia potentia intellectiva dicitur practica ab obiecto, ut prius apparebat, sequitur quod scientia effective est practica ab intellectu sicut ab obiecto.

Item, intellectus speculativus est prior practico, quia practicus se habet per additionem ad obiectum mere speculabile. Sed intellectus divinus sub prima ratione eius, puta absolutae Deitatis, est primum obiectum huius scientiae, ut supra patet. Et hoc isti ponunt. Sed prima ratio obiecti sub qua est cognoscibile ab intellectu non est ratio practica, quia tunc intellectus practicus esset universaliter prior intellectu speculativo et simplicior eo, et obiectum practicum esset prius et simplicius obiecto speculabili; quod est inconveniens. Igitur sub prima ratione sui et sub ratione absolutissima quae prius potest de eo apprehendi sequitur quod sit habitus speculativus et non practicus.

<Opinio auctoris>

Ideo ad quaestionem istam aliter dico quod habitus theologiae est simpliciter speculativus, et si aliquo modo dicatur practicus hoc est secundum quid tantum et non simpliciter, nec per se sed per accidens. Circa quod dicendum sic procedo: primo, danda est differentia inter

³⁸ Anselm., *Proslog.*, c. 5 (PL 158, 229; ed. Schmitt I, 104).

³⁹ *illud/om.* M.

⁴⁰ August., *De libero arbitrio*, II, c. 6 (PL 36, 1248), c. 8 (1251 s), c. 10 (1256), c. 12 (1259).

⁴¹ Scotus, *Lectura*, I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1—2, n. 26 (ed. Vaticana, XVI, 234).

speculativum et practicum; secundo, videndum est quae sit illa operatio quae formaliter dicitur praxis, a qua operatione intellectus practicus posset dici a fine suo quodammodo; et tertio, ex his declaratis concludam principale propositum.

〈Articulus Primus〉

De primo patet secundum Philosophum, VI *Ethicorum*, cap. 2⁴², ubi dividit rationem habens in duo, quorum uno "speculamur talia entium quorum principia non contingit aliter se habere"; alia autem particula animae speculamur contingentia. "Ad ea enim quae genere altera et animae particularum alterum genere." Vult igitur expresse Philosophus quod pars animae scientifica seu speculativa est necessariorum et aeternorum; pars ratiocinativa seu practica <est>⁴³ respectu contingentium operabilium a nobis. Unde et Commentator, commento 8⁴⁴, ex intentione movet quaestionem quomodo differunt scientificum et ratiocinativum seu speculativum et practicum, quae pro eodem habet. Et determinat eam ex intentione quod differunt penes objecta quae sunt necessarium et contingens, ita quod intellectus practicus respicit contingentia et solum illa, speculativus necessaria et aeterna et solum illa. Sed ne aliquis credat quod ipse velit ponere realem differentiam intellectus speculativi a practico sicut complete differt potentia a potentia, sicut videtur dicere in commento supra dicto solvendo quaestionem, ideo redit super eandem materiam in ultimo commento VI¹ libri *Ethicorum*⁴⁵, ubi docet quod sunt eadem potentia et differunt solum per respectum ad diversa objecta sic: "Circa universalia igitur negotians intellectus speculativus nominatur et sunt ipsi subiecta speculabilia et scibilia. Circa autem singularia studia faciens intellectus dicitur practicus et subiecta sibi operabilia et sensibilia. Unum quidem igitur secundum substantiam ut una pars vel una potentia animae. Dividitur autem ut in duas particulas, speculativam et practicam, et aliud ens in speculari universalia et supra sensum et aliud perscrutari singularia et quae sensui subiacent." Haec ille. Et post iterum dicit quod non differunt secundum substantiam sicut nec homo idem licet medicus et naturalis.

Item, istam eandem distinctionem inter speculativum et practicum seu scientificum et ratiocinativum dat Philosophus, III *De Anima*,

⁴² Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139a 5—9)

⁴³ est/om. M.

⁴⁴ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, VI (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urb. lat. 222, f. 103vb—104ra).

⁴⁵ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, VI (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urb. lat. 222, f. 318rb—va).

cap. "De movente"⁴⁶, ubi vult quod intellectus practicus respicit bonum agibile.

Item, VI *Metaphysicae*, parum post principium⁴⁷, dividens speculativas scientias a practicis habitibus, dicit quod habitus practicus est circa agibile vel scibile, et subdit: "Idem enim agibile et eligibile".

Similiter, Avicenna, II *Metaphysicae* suae, cap. 9⁴⁸, distinguit speculativam a practica per hoc quod una, scilicet speculativa, est "de rebus quae non sunt opera nostra nec nostrae dispositionis"; practica vero "de rebus quae sunt opera nostra" et nostrae dispositionis "ut perveniat perfectio veritatis practicae in moribus".

Item, sic videtur loqui Augustinus de portione superiori et inferiori, XII *De Trinitate*, cap. 3 et 4⁴⁹, ubi dicit quod ratio geminatur secundum officia. Et dicitur superior portio ut intendit incommutabilem veritatem et inferior secundum quod disponit de istis inferioribus operibus ad ministrandum. Haec est sententia Augustini, non verba. Quod igitur Augustinus vocat portionem superiorem Philosophus vocat speculativum vel scientificum, et quod ipse portionem inferiorem Philosophus vocat practicum intellectum seu ratiocinativum. Nec ponuntur distingui a Philosopho nisi penes obiecta sicut nec ab Augustino. Hoc de primo articulo.

<Articulus Secundus>

De secundo videndum quae sit illa actio per quam distinguit Philosophus speculativam a practica: et tamquam per finem practici intellectus, de quo opere dicit, II *Metaphysicae*⁵⁰, quod "theoricae finis est veritas, practicae opus", et III *De anima*, cap. 'De movente'⁵¹, dicit quod "intellectus qui propter aliquid ratiocinatur et qui practicus est differt a speculativo, scilicet secundum finem". Circa quod videndum quod cum iam ex declaratis pateat quod intellectus practicus respicit contingentia operabilia a nobis, opus quod huiusmodi intellectus habet pro fine necessario est opus circa contingentia. Sic enim accipiunt omnes auctores actionem, scilicet prout transit super agibile vel factibile quae subiecta sunt intellectui practico et electioni et penes quae distinguunt vitam activam et contemplativam seu speculativam.

⁴⁶ Aristot., *De anima*, III, c. 10 (433a 26—30).

⁴⁷ Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 1 (1025b 18—28).

⁴⁸ Avicenna, *Metaph.*, I, c. 1 (ed. Venetiis, 1508, f. 70ra).

⁴⁹ August., *De Trinit.*, XII, c. 4, n. 4 (PL 42, 1000).

⁵⁰ Aristot., *Metaph.*, II, c. 1 (993b 20—21).

⁵¹ Aristot., *De anima*, III, c. 10 (433a 14—15).

Propter quod dicit Philosophus, VI *Ethicorum*, cap. 3⁵², quod iste est rectus ordo a parte practici intellectus, quod intellectus practicus, qui versatur circa contingentia, inquit quid prosequendum, quid fugiendum, quid eligendum, quid respuendum. Quo facto, sequitur electio voluntatis <eligentis>⁵³ bonum propositum, distinguens a suo contrario, scilicet malo. Electio autem est principium actionis; principium, dico, unde motus, scilicet effectivum. Et haec actio, cuius electio est principium effectivum, est formaliter praxis, quia postquam voluntas prae-tulerit unum alteri de ostensis sibi ab intellectu practico, aut imperat viribus inferioribus et etiam intellectui practico ut adinveniat media per quae illud quod eligit consequatur, aut imperat aliis viribus ut obediant et exsequantur. Et illud imperium voluntatis est actio transiens in vires inferiores, et est praxis formaliter sive actio secundum virtutem moralem qua aliquis moderat suas passiones. Et illa actio est finis extra practici intellectus, non autem amor quo aliquis diligit Deum per voluntatem: illa enim operatio nec est actio nec factio sed operatio consequens speculationem summi boni. Secundum quod expresse patet per Philosophum et Commentatorem, X *Ethicorum*⁵⁴, et Commentator, ibidem, de hac materia pulchre, ut infra patebit, quando agetur de frui, quaestione prima ad quintum argumentum pro opinione prima Thomae et Godefridi⁵⁵. Potest etiam quaelibet operatio secundum virtutem moralem praxis dici. Igitur circa illud proprie est actio circa quod est electio; electio autem est eorum quae sunt ad finem, contingentium. Igitur et actio quae praxis dicitur non est respectu finis, sicut nec electio, sed eorum quae ad finem tantum. Haec est expresse sententia Philosophi, VI *Ethicorum*, cap. 3⁵⁶, dicentis: "Actus quidem igitur principium electio, unde motus. Electionis autem principium appetitus, et ratio, quae gratia alicuius", scilicet actionis sequentis electionem, eadem quae appetibile sequatur. Et Commentator, libro VI, commento 15⁵⁷, ponit sententialiter totum ordinem praedictum supra. Quod autem practicis habitibus perficientibus intellectum practicum et appetitum debeat attendi actio proprie dicta, dicit Commentator, commento 25

⁵² Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139a 3—31).

⁵³ eligentis/om. M.

⁵⁴ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, X, c. 8 (1178b 21—23); Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, X (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urb. lat. 222, f. 210vb).

⁵⁵ Robertus Cowton, *In I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 3 "Utrum fruitio sit formaliter hominis beatitudo?", ad 6 (cod. Merton 93, f. 35ra—b).

⁵⁶ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139a 31—33).

⁵⁷ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, VI (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urb. lat. 222, ff. 105vb—106ra).

et 37⁵⁸: "A practica autem et factiva habituum nomina; actio autem et factio motionum ab habitibus." Haec ille. Omnis ergo factio et actio circa agibile et factibile, igitur contingens, et pro tunc aliter se habere, secundum quod dicit fine VI¹, commento 45⁵⁹: "Omne agibile aliter contingit se habere, scibile autem non". Ita concludit scientiam non esse prudentiam.

Item, Gregorius, *Super Ezechielem*, parte 1, hom. 3⁶⁰: "Virtus operis est sub volatu contemplationis".

Ecce quod semper auctoritates ponunt actionem circa contingentia agibilia vel factibilia in quibus nunc exercemur. Non autem actionem dicunt respectu aeternorum et speculabilium nisi homo velit aequivoce accipere actionem. Sed operatio non est respectu aeternorum et necessariorum sed speculatio sive contemplatio.

<Articulus Tertius>

Ex istis ultra concludo principale propositum: quod haec scientia est simpliciter speculativa, quia illa scientia est simpliciter speculativa quae est de obiecto per se et non agibili et factibili. Haec est talis, quia de Deo qui est simpliciter aeternum quid et speculabile et non contingens agibile vel factibile. Quod sit de Deo, patet supra. Quod Deus non sit agibilis vel factibilis, patet de se.

Item, omnis habitus simpliciter practicus perficit intellectum practicum. Haec est manifesta de se, quia acquiritur ex actibus intellectus practici, mediante obiecto practico. Si igitur theologia sit habitus simpliciter practicus, sequitur quod perficit intellectum practicum. Sed habitus perficiens intellectum practicum non potest habere aliud pro obiecto quam illud quod respicitur a potentia quam perficit, quia habitus non est maioris ambitus subiective quam potentia. Sed intellectus practicus est contingentium solum; ergo et hic habitus. Omne autem contingens contingit aliter se habere; quod non convenit Deo. Igitur hic habitus non esset de Deo. Consequens falsum, igitur et antecedens ex quo sequitur scilicet quod non perficit intellectum practicum. Igitur perficit intellectum speculativum, et per consequens est habitus speculativus.

Item, habitus intellectualis perfectissimus est perfectio intellectus nobilissima ratione sui et respectu nobilissimi obiecti. Et talis est habitus

⁵⁸ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, VI (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urb. lat. 222, f. 111rb).

⁵⁹ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, VI (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urb. lat. 222, f. 138va).

⁶⁰ Gregorius, *Super Ezechielem*, I, hom. 4, n. 9 (PL 76, 809 B).

theologiae respectu intellectus speculativi, non autem respectu practici. Et tale obiectum est Deus ipse qui non est obiectum intellectus practici sed speculativi. Ergo etc. Ratio Thomae, I—IIae, q. 3, art. 5 in pede⁶¹.

Item, quod actio dicatur finis huius scientiae, et ideo dicatur, ut dicunt alii, quia illud proprie et per se debet dici finis huius scientiae per quod differimus ab aliis animalibus et convenimus cum Deo et angelis. Sed hoc est per contemplationem puram, quod alia animalia aliquid communiunt cum homine in actione quamvis imperfecte, secundum Augustinum, I *De Trinitate*, cap. 4⁶², loquens de beatitudine aeterna: "Haec enim contemplatio nobis promittitur omnium actionum finis atque aeterna perfectio gaudiorum". Ecce quod ponit hic actionem pro statu isto cui succedit contemplatio finis.

Item, si habitus theologiae est simpliciter practicus, perficit intellectum practicum, ut prius, tunc sic: nobiliori perfectibili potest correspondere nobilior perfectio. Sed intellectus speculativus est nobilior particula animae quam intellectus practicus. Igitur intellectui speculativo nobilior perfectio potest correspondere. Cum igitur habitus ille, si sit practicus, perficit intellectum practicum, posset aliquis habitus theologiae perficere intellectum speculativum vel remanebit perfectibile sine hoc quod potest perfici. Et ita sequitur quod habitus theologiae non esset habitus perfectissimus intellectualis possibilis homini. Quod autem intellectus speculativus sit perfectior practico et per consequens habitus perficiens intellectum speculativum sit perfectior habitu perficiente intellectum practicum patet manifeste per Philosophum et Commentatorem, penultimo commento, VI *Ethicorum*, ubi dicit Commentator⁶³ sic: "Neque melioris particulae animae prudentia est virtus quam sapientia. Si quidem sapientia speculativi intellectus habitus et virtus, prudentia autem practici, melior est speculativus intellectus practico, quemadmodum utique et speculatio melior actione".

Item, Commentator dicit in prologo I *Ethicorum*⁶⁴ quod ultima perfectio hominis et vita aeterna est perfici per scientias speculativas.

Item, arguo ex fine huius scientiae quod sit speculativus: habitus intellectualis nobilissimus debet habere nobilissimum finem, quia non omne ultimum est finis sed optimum, ex II *Physicorum*⁶⁵; sed speculatio

⁶¹ Thomas, *S. theol.* I—II, q. 3, a. 5, corp.

⁶² August., *De Trinit.*, I, c. 8, n. 17 (PL 42, 831).

⁶³ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, VI (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urb. lat. 222, f. 138rb).

⁶⁴ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, I (ed. P. F. Mercken, pp. 5—7, lin. 9—64).

⁶⁵ Aristot., *Physica*, II, c. 3 (195a 24—25).

sive contemplatio est nobilior actione; igitur finis huius scientiae est speculari et non agere — finis, dico, ultimus. Quod contemplari seu speculari sit melior actione patet per Commentatorem⁶⁶.

Item, sicut moralis habitus speculatur verum sed non nisi propter opus, et ideo dicitur practica scientia et non speculativa, sic ista scientia, licet dirigat actionem, quia tamen hoc non facit nisi propter contemplationem sive propter quietem contemplationis in patria, ubi cessabunt actio et vita activa, ideo simpliciter dicitur speculativa.

Item, sicut habitus practicus ordinatur ad speculativum et universaliter vita activa ad contemplativam, sic quod in ista scientia est actionis, in hoc quod dirigit actiones, ordinatur ad illud quod est in ea speculationis et contemplationis. Propter quod dicit Commentator, X *Ethicorum*, commento 14a⁶⁷ quod speculativa felicitas finis est omnium practicarum et speculativarum virtutum. Nec per hoc quod dico istam scientiam habere pro fine proprio speculationem seu contemplationem excludo actum voluntatis quo coniungimur Deo sive in via sive in patria, ut patebit ad argumenta.

Teneo igitur quod ille habitus est simpliciter speculativus et quod perficiat optimam particulam animae, scilicet intellectum speculativum, qui est melior practico. Et loquor hic de rationem habente, quod distinguitur in practicum et speculativum, non de voluntate. Et si quaeratur hic a quo habet dici speculativus habitus, dico quod efficaciter ab ipso obiecto et intellectu. Et si quaeratur a quo in genere causae formalis, dico quod ex propria natura qua nata est inclinare intellectum in actum simpliciter speculativum, et hoc simpliciter et per se, quamvis possit per accidens dirigere actiones et passiones ut postea perfectius contempletur Deum. Si quaeratur a quo sicut a fine, dico quod ex proprio actu elicito qui est perfectio habitus. Quamvis autem sit propter actum voluntatis quo coniungitur fini ultimo sicut per finem, tamen non dicitur propter hoc habitus practicus, quia illa operatio voluntatis non est practica sed consequitur actum pure speculativum ipsius intellectus respectu Dei beatificantis. Et sicut intellectus existens una potentia secundum essentiam habet duos actus quodammodo respectu diversorum obiectorum, ut dicatur speculativus et practicus, sic voluntas una existens habet duplicem actum et duplex obiectum: et Deum et aeterna et ista agibilia et factibilia. Respectu contingentium dicitur activa; et

⁶⁶ Cf. Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, X (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urbin. lat. 222, f. 210vb).

⁶⁷ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, X (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urbin. lat. 222, f. 210vb).

respectu aeternorum, et maxime respectu ultimi finis, dicitur contemplativa, non quia videat, sed sicut dicitur activa quia sequitur intellectum practicum respectu contingentium, sic dicitur contemplativa sive speculativa quia sequitur intellectum speculativum respectu Dei et aeternorum.

〈Ad argumenta principalia〉

Ad primum argumentum principale dico quia hoc dicit Augustinus non quia haec scientia sit factiva propter actionem ut sic dicatur simpliciter practica, sed quia non nisi mediante actione et exercitio laboris devenitur ad quietem contemplationis. Propter quam contemplationem finaliter exercitatur hic, sicut ipsemet Augustinus dicit alibi⁶⁸ sic: "Tota operatio nostra in hac vita est sanare oculum mentis unde videatur Deus. Ad hoc sacrosancta mysteria celebrantur, ad hoc sermo Dei praedicatur", et alia multa quae dicit ibi. Et si obiciatur quod haec visio ordinatur ad amorem Dei, concedatur; sed ex hoc non tollitur sibi ratio speculativi habitus, quia ille amor non est actio sed otium et quietatio ab actione, et ideo talis amor non distrahit intellectum a puro speculari.

Ad secundum, cum arguitur quod 'illa scientia quae est ut boni fiamus et non contemplationis gratia est practica', conceditur si universaliter sit propter actionem virtuosam qua boni fiamus bonitate monastica, politica et morali, et hoc circa ista contingentia operabilia a nobis. Et ad minorem, cum accipitur quod haec est talis, nego; sed solum dirigit actionem propter quietem contemplationis et speculationis; et ideo secundum quid est practica, simpliciter autem speculativa.

Ad tertium, cum arguitur quod 'illa scientia est simpliciter practica cuius finis est praxis' etc., conceditur. Ad minorem, cum dicitur quod haec scientia et eius operatio est finaliter propter actionem voluntatis quae est formaliter praxis, respondeo quod est finaliter propter operationem et bonum voluntatis, scilicet fruitionem Dei, sicut propter finem sub ultimo fine. Et non propter hoc debet dici habitus practicus, quia duplex est operatio voluntatis: una imperativa quam in aliud extendit ut aliquod bonum per actionem consequatur, verum vel apparens, sibi ipsi vel alteri potentiae; alia est operatio qua seipsam perficit, per quam fini ultimo se unit. Prima operatio est bene practica et non secunda. Prima pertinet ad scientiam practicam, quia in ipsa est speculatio ut actionem dirigat, quod proprie practicae scientiae est, scilicet dirigere actionem. Secunda vero operatio voluntatis pertinet ad scientiam supremam speculativam, quia in ipso est speculatio solum, ut obiectum

⁶⁸ August., *Sermo* 88, c. 5, n. 5 (PL 38, 542).

voluntati ostendatur, ut in perfecta quietatione quiescat, nunc distanter, in patria coniuncte, ut se in obiectum beatificum immergat per amorem. Et si ergo haec scientia dirigat primam operationem voluntatis, quae actio dicitur circa ea quae sunt ad finem, quia hoc non facit nisi propter secundam operationem voluntatis quae non distrahit a speculatione, immo est finis speculationis, ideo illa scientia est simpliciter speculativa, secundum quid autem practica. De hoc in *Summa* Henrici, art. 8, q. 3, ad tertium argumentum⁶⁹. Nec omnis extensio notitiae ad affectum facit eam practicam, alioquin cum metaphysicus consideraret Deum et intelligentias, ut Deus est ens perfectum et simpliciter primum est in entibus, et per consequens non excludat a consideratione sui bonitatem Dei sicut nec veritatem nec unitatem, sequitur quod ex tali consideratione Dei esset habitus practicus, cum voluntas sibi complaceat non solum in notitia Dei sed in re nota, aliter non haberet notitiam perfectam naturalem de Deo ut res cognita placeret, sicut docet Augustinus, IX *De Trinitate*, cap. 10⁷⁰.

〈Ad argumenta primae opinionis〉

Ad primum argumentum pro opinione prima quod probat scientiam practicam esse ex actione voluntatis tamquam ex proprio fine per simile de habitibus factivis et activis, respondeo quod non est simile, quia ex praedeterminatione Philosophi, I *Ethicorum*⁷¹ et VI⁷²: differentia est inter habitus activos et factivos in hoc quod factivus habet praeter operationem propriam pro fine ulteriori opus operatum, sed activus cum ea ratione qua activus praeter operationem propriam non habet finem ulteriorem. Propter quod dicit Commentator, VI *Ethicorum*, commento ultimo⁷³, habitus speculativus "invenit verum", practicus "finem habens huius directionem".

Item, esto quod habitus practicus perficiens intellectum practicum haberet actionem aliam a propria ratione a qua finaliter diceretur practicus habitus, illa non est quaecumque operatio voluntatis sed actio tendens in agibile, cuius operatio non est dilectio finis, scilicet Dei. Et ideo, quamvis theologus habeat huiusmodi operationem pro fine extra, genus scientiae ab illa non dicitur practica, quia illa dilectio immediate consequitur, si perfecta est, actum intellectus speculativi.

⁶⁹ Henr. Gand., *Summa*, a. 8, q. 3, ad 3 (I, ed. Parisiis, 1520, ff. 65 Y—66 Y)

⁷⁰ August., *De Trinit.*, IX, c. 10 (PL 42, 968—969).

⁷¹ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, I, c. 1 (1094a 1—18).

⁷² Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, cc. 7—8 (1141b 2—23).

⁷³ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, VI (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urbin. lat. 222, f. 138va).

Ad secundum, cum dicitur 'actus intelligendi nullam rationem practici actus habet ex se sed solum ex extensione ad opus', respondeo quod si intelligitur formaliter, de se falsum est, quia unumquodque est formaliter aliquale propter formam simpliciter. Si intelligitur effective, falsum est similiter, sed actus est effective practicus ab obiecto practico agibili et factibili et ab intellectu practico qui practicus dicitur ab obiecto. Similiter, quando dicit quod 'actus intelligendi nullam rationem praxis habet nisi <ex> extensione ad opus', si intelligat finaliter, verum est, sed illud opus non est quaecumque operatio voluntatis sed quae dicta est supra saepe.

Ad tertium, cum dicitur quod 'ratio praxis convenit aliis omnibus per illud cui convenit primo', concedo. Et quando dicitur quod illud est opus, nego: sed illud est obiectum practicum agibile vel factibile, quod obiectum praesupponitur intellectui, actui et habitui practico, a quo primo habuit quod fuit practicus intellectus. Et esto quod primo haberet dici practicus ab actione bona, quia illa actio esset elicitata circa agibile vel factibile, quale obiectum non est Deus.

<Ad argumenta Scoti>

Ad primam opinionem Duns, concedo secum quod prima ratio practica quae ponitur in actu et habitu est ab obiecto, quia ante actum et habitum nihil est unde possent actus et habitus dici practici nisi potentia et obiectum. Sed quando dicit quod solum ab obiecto, nego, quia obiectum factibile vel agibile prius est praesens ipsi intellectui a quo dicitur intellectus practicus, secundum Commentatorem supra⁷⁴, quam actus eliciatur. Ut habitus practicus generetur, tam actus quam habitus est effective ab utroque, intellectu scilicet practico et obiecto practico. Et quando dicitur ultra quod 'Deus est talis naturae quod de eo non potest causari nisi habitus simpliciter practicus', nego, quia ut concurrat cum ratione obiecti ad causalitatem habitus cum potentia intellectiva, dico quod causat habitum speculativum per se sicut ipse per se speculabilis est, quia aeternum et abstractum, non contingens agibile vel factibile. Non tamen nego quin aliqua efficientia possit efficere habitum talem in aliquo intellectu creato qualem acquireret ex obiecto contingenti. Unde posset influere domificativam intellectui meo et similiter prudentiam practicam; sed talis habitus semper inclinaret in actum tendentem in agibile vel factibile.

Ad secundum argumentum, quando dicit quod 'sicut principium in

⁷⁴ Supra, scilicet nota 73.

speculabilibus ita finis in moralibus seu practicis', dico quod quantum ad hoc est simile, quod sicut per principia speculabilia dirigimur in conclusiones speculativas, sic ex principiis sumptis a fine dirigimur in his quae sunt ad finem, secundum Augustinum, IX *De Trinitate*, cap. 6⁷⁵, ubi vult quod sunt quaedam regulae incommutabiles supra mentem nostram quibus ratione improbamus aliquid vel approbamus. Sed quando dicit quo 'principia sumpta a fine sunt pure practica', hoc nego, sicut nec obiectum ipsum est practicum sed speculativum. Hoc enim est speciale in hac scientia quod per regulas quae sunt pure speculativae dirigimur in illa quae sunt actionis. Quanto enim est aliquis habitus excellentior et actualior, tanto unus in se existens in plura se extendit. Unde licet dirigat actionem, quia tamen ibi non stat sed ex tali directione tendit in finem ipsum speculabilem et contemplabilem ad quem cum perveniremus cessabit omnis actio et manebit pura contemplatio, — *Maria enim optimam partem elegit, quae non auferetur ab ea*⁷⁶ —, ideo ille habitus est simpliciter speculativus, secundum quid tamen est practicus ex tali directione. Et ex illa solvuntur rationes Iohannis contra hanc viam, quia cognitio finis et eorum quae sunt ad finem est eiusdem rationis, quia simpliciter speculativa quando ex cognitione diriguntur ea quae sunt ad finem in ipsum finem, sed aliquo modo practica secundum quid et pro tempore et pro statu viae quo diriguntur. Quando autem ea quae sunt ad finem aggenerant habitum ex propria consideratione eorum, tunc talis cognitio potest esse simpliciter practica, quamvis cognitio finis sit simpliciter speculativa. Et si obiciatur quod illa quae sunt ad finem ut contingentia operabilia a nobis non movent intellectum nisi in virtute finis, per Philosophum⁷⁷; si igitur illa movent practice, ita finis maxime movebit practice, et ita maxime causabit scientiam practicam, quia primum movens maxime influit: respondeo quod finis potest dupliciter movere intellectum: vel ad cognitionem sui in se et sic movet speculative sicut ipse speculabilis est; vel ad cognitionem aliorum a se in quantum contingentia sunt eligibilia a nobis bene vel male, et isto modo movet practice, hoc est ad effectum practicum generandum in nobis. Primo modo finis movet intellectum in hac scientia, quia ad ipsum in se primo. Et sic non est, sed alio modo, practicus. Ad hunc habitum adquirendum accedit secundo modo in aliis cognitionibus practicis adquirendis habitus practicus.

⁷⁵ August., *De Trinit.*, IX, c. 6, n. 9 (PL 42, 965—966).

⁷⁶ Luc. 10, 42.

⁷⁷ Pro rationibus Scoti contra Henr. Gand. videsis *Lectura*, I, Prol., p. 4, qq. 1—2, nn. 156—160 (ed. Vaticana, XVI, 52 s.). Cf. Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 8 (1141b 8—33).

Similiter, argumentum, si valet, est ad oppositum. Si enim Deus, qui est finis, semper movet intellectum practice, cum in omni motione intellectus ab aliquo obiecto moveat ipse principaliter, omnis habitus generatus in nobis esset practicus, quia omnia alia movent in virtute ipsius; quod est falsum. Unde ad argumentum aliter potest dici quod finis ille, de quo quidem loquitur Philosophus, non est ipse Deus, aliter omne principium quod Philosophus sumpsisset de Deo fuisset practicum, et ita omnis consideratio eius de Deo fuisset practica; quod non est verum. Sed loquitur de fine agibilibus et factibilibus. Unde si aliquis vult proprie aliquid agere vel facere primo intendit finem aliquem actionis vel factionis suae, et fine praestituto, accipit principia de fine et syllogizat quo modo et per quem modum poterit magis devenire et convenientius in finem illum. Et habitus sic generatus est pure practicus et perficit intellectum practicum. Principia autem sumpta de Deo sive in lumine supernaturali vel naturali sunt speculativa pure. Hoc patet de credibilibus quibus succedet visio Dei et de principiis in metaphysica.

Ad tertium quod arguitur per auctoritatem Commentatoris, I *Ethicorum*⁷⁸, potest dici quod per 'practicarum nobilissimam' intelligit mediam vitam, scilicet politicam, et tunc glossatur ly 'autem' sequens per 'sed', ita quod 'coordinare autem' non cadit sub negatione praecedente cum dicit: "Neque enim" etc. 'autem' pro 'sed' "coordinare etc." Aliter, quod accipit hic vitam contemplativam non pro aliqua vita intellectuali proprie dicta sed pro vita morali excellentissima quae habetur per virtutes morales purgati animi, quae virtutes distinguuntur contra seipsas, ut politicae, notatur; et illa media est practicarum perfectissima. Sed de felicitate speculativa quae consistet in actuali speculatione et dilectione summi boni tractat in decimo, et ibi dicit quod felicitas huiusmodi est pure speculativa. Et secundum intellectum illius auctoritatis iam datum videtur loqui Commentator, I libro, commento 125 — et est super 17 cap. Philosophi, commento 3 illius capituli⁷⁹. Propter quod dicit Commentator, super X *Ethicorum*, commento 15, in principio rationis⁸⁰: "in primo libro dixit de politica felicitate secundum quam politicus felix adornat deteriora ratione" vel alibi "dicit de speculativa felicitate et eo qui secundum ipsam" est felix, quae felicitas

⁷⁸ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, I (ed. P. F. Mercken, p. 52, lin. 21—24.

⁷⁹ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, I (ed. P. F. Mercken, pp. 156—157, lin. 39—64.

⁸⁰ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, X (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urbin. lat. 222, f. 210vb).

secundum eum praesupponit politicam. Quod autem felicitas ultima consistit in pura speculatione eo modo quo Philosophus loquitur de speculatione, XI *Metaphysicae*⁸¹, secundum translationem Commentatoris, et quod de ea sic loquitur X *Ethicorum*⁸², patet expresse per Commentatorem, commento 17⁸³ et cap. 10 per Philosophum in principio capituli⁸⁴. Et est notabile et contra aliquos qui dicunt Philosophum non loqui de ea in X *Ethicorum*, cap. 10, sed quod loquitur de quadam vita excellentiori politica practica. Tamen Commentator ibi hunc intellectum excludit. Sic enim ostendit beatitudinem nostram ultimam in speculatione consistere sicut Dei beatitudo non consistit in actione vel factione vel politica, quia in eo non sunt virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones, sicut ibidem diffuse exprimit Commentator⁸⁵.

Ad ultimam auctoritatem dico quod magis est ad oppositum, quia habitus practicus est propter actionem vel opus operatum et circa agibile vel factibile. Habitus autem theologiae invenit veritatem aeternam et nihil ultra appetit, quia non dirigit actionem vel factionem nisi per actus et propter aliud, ut propter quietem contemplationis, ad quam cum perventum fuerit perfecte, cessabit actio et exercitium laboris vitae activae et stabit speculatio et fruitio perfecta. Et ideo theologia est simpliciter speculativa, quamvis secundum quid sit practica, in quantum pro statu isto dirigit actionem.

Ex quo patet quid veritatis habent opiniones mediae quae dicunt quod est practica et speculativa; verum est: simpliciter speculativa, secundum quid practica. Illa autem quae dicit illam affectivam recedit a communi modo determinandi et denominandi scientiam, cuius denominatio debet esse infra genus scientiae et non extra. Si autem aliquis velit concedere omnino quod sit practica simpliciter propter hoc quod ostendit voluntati suum obiectum et quia habet dilectionem Dei in via et in patria pro fine sub fine ultimo, bene placet. Dico tamen pro me quod nescio sic dicendo prohibere quin metaphysica sit practica, nec scio salvare processum Philosophi in VI *Ethicorum*⁸⁶ et X⁸⁷, et ideo magis intelligo viam aliam.

⁸¹ Aristot., *Metaph.* XI, c. 7 (1064a 28—b 14).

⁸² Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, X, c. 8 (1178b 21—23).

⁸³ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, X (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urb. lat. 222, f. 210vb).

⁸⁴ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, X, c. 9 (1179a 20—32).

⁸⁵ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, X (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urb. lat. 222, f. 210vb).

⁸⁶ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139a 3—31).

⁸⁷ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, X, c. 7 (1177a 12—1177b 1); c. 8 (1178b 7—32); 1179a 22—32).

WILLIAM OF ALNWICK

M. Grabmann, back in 1926, urged scholars to study William of Alnwick if they wished to understand the character of later scholasticism¹. His advice has been heeded to some extent, with the result that William has received greater attention than the three authors we have considered so far. M. Schmaus edited and studied the text of William's thirteenth *determinatio*, concerning God's knowledge of future contingents². In 1937 A. Ledoux edited Alnwick's *Quodlibet* and *Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili*, and in his introduction to the edition he sketched William's life and described his writings³. A Maier, in 1949, examined his doctrine of the soul as contained in the fifth, sixth and seventh *determinationes*⁴; and more recently F. Prezioso has edited and studied the texts of Alnwick's sixth and tenth *determinationes*, which treat of the immortality of the soul and the Aristotelian position regarding the eternity of the world⁵. Most recently O. Wanke has completed a thorough study concerning Alnwick's teaching on the divine ideas⁶.

The general impression received from these studies is summarized in the formula of Ledoux which calls Alnwick "an independent Scotist"⁷. T. Barth's study on the univocity of being among Scotus' followers also indicated Alnwick's slightly independent spirit⁸. Miss Maier likewise underscored the point that Alnwick opposes the position of Scotus on the question of the immortality of the soul⁹, and Prezioso, studying the same problem, similarly points out the differences between Alnwick and the Subtle Doctor¹⁰. Finally, in the passages cited by Ockham in his

¹ M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, I, Munich, 1926, p. 43.

² M. Schmaus, "Uno sconosciuto discepolo di Scoto intorno alla pre-scienza di Dio" in *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* (Milan) 24 (1932), pp. 327—355.

³ Guillelmi Alnwick, *Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili et de Quodlibet* (ed. A. Ledoux), Quaracchi, 1937.

⁴ A. Maier, "Wilhelm von Alnwick's Bologneser Quaestionen gegen den Averroismus (1323)" in *Gregorianum* 30 (1949), pp. 265—308.

⁵ F. Prezioso, *L'eternità Aristotelica del mondo in una "quaestio" inedita di Guglielmo Alnwick (1333)*, Padua, 1962; idem, *Il Problema dell' immortalità dell' anima in Duns Scoto e in Guglielmo Alnwick*, Padua, 1964. See also the treatment of voluntarism in Prezioso's *L'evoluzione del volontarismo da Duns Scoto e in Guglielmo Alnwick*, Naples, 1964.

⁶ O. Wanke, *Die Kritik Wilhelms von Alnwick an der Ideenlehre des Johannes Duns Scotus*, Bonn, 1965.

⁷ A. Ledoux, in Guillelmi Alnwick, *Quaestiones disputatae* . . . , p. IX.

⁸ T. Barth, "De argumentis et univocationis entis natura apud Ioannem Duns Scotum" in *Collectanea Franciscana*, XIV (1944), p. 52.

⁹ A. Maier, "Wilhelm von Alnwick . . .", p. 279.

¹⁰ F. Prezioso, *Il Problema dell' immortalità* . . . , pp. 33—35.

*Prologue*¹¹, where Alnwick treats of the speculative character of theology, he once again sets himself against his former teacher. We must conclude then that, even though he was Scotus' pupil and, according to Ledoux¹², should be considered as one who knows and interprets Scotus best, still in the many questions so far studied Alnwick has showed a decided independence.

In his discussion of the speculative nature of theology Alnwick begins with the position of his Master. For Scotus theology is a practical science since it orders the will toward its proper object, God. Alnwick refuses, however, to characterize a science as practical unless it limits itself to contingent objects. God, Who is the object of theology, is not a contingent being. Theology, therefore, cannot be considered a practical science. Giles of Rome also rejected the practical character of theology, yet he did not hold that theology was speculative. He contended that theology was interested in the *enjoyment* or *love* of God. Now a practical science is interested in work and a speculative science is interested in truth, so we must admit some middle ground for theology and call it an affective science. Alnwick, however, argues that there is no need for a middle ground. Objects either are within our control or are beyond human power; they are sought either for themselves or for something else. Those within our control and sought as means fall under the jurisdiction of the practical intellect; those which are beyond our power and are ends in themselves are related to the speculative intellect. Theology then is not an affective science but either speculative or practical. Perhaps it is both, Godfrey of Fontaines might argue, since theology considers seriously both *agibilia et speculabilia*. Alnwick, however, disagrees. First, this would destroy the unity of theology, since theology would not have a single object. Certainly God could not be the object of theology, in Godfrey's sense, for God is not an *agibile*. The object of theology then would have to be man's acts, but this would make theology into ethics or politics. William prefers to stay with the opinion of Alexander of Hales and Henry of Ghent that theology is a speculative science whose object is God, a science whose object not only illumines our minds but inflames our wills.

Ockham, in quoting from the very lengthy *quaestio secunda* of William's *Prologue to Book I of the Sentences*, has summarized the arguments in behalf of Alnwick's position. He presents them accurately

¹¹ Guillelmus de Ockham, *Scriptum in I Sententiarum*. Opera theologica (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1967) I, 325—328.

¹² A. Ledoux, in Guillelmi Alnwick, *Quaestiones disputatae* . . . , p. IX.

in the succinct formulas he employs. Our edition of Alnwick's question is taken from *cod. Assisi, Biblioteca comunale, 172* (ff. 11v—20v). V. Doucet has described this manuscript in great detail and has argued most convincingly against M. Schmaus that it is authentic work of William of Alnwick¹³. The first two books of Alnwick's *Sentences* are also found in *cod. Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, 291*. We have used only the Assisi manuscript for this edition and employ the letter A to indicate it.

<Guillelmi de Alnwick Commentarium in I Sent., Prol., q. 2>

Secundo quaero utrum theologia sit scientia speculativa vel practica.

Quod sit practica:

Videtur quia omnis habitus intellectus qui per se ordinatur ad dilectionem boni, non tantum ad speculationem veri, est habitus practicus; sed theologia est huiusmodi; ergo. Maior patet, quia "finis practicae est operatio", ex II *Metaphysicae*¹; et etiam secundum Augustinum, VIII *De civitate Dei*, cap. 6²: "Activa vita ad agendum, id est instituendos mores, pertinet"; mores autem instruuntur per operationem boni. Minor probatur, Matth. 22³: *In his duobus*, scilicet dilectione Dei et proximi, *tota lex pendet et prophetae*, id est ad haec duo ordinantur, referuntur, et ibi finem habent, secundum *Glossam*⁴; et secundum Augustinum, I *De doctrina christiana*, cap. 7⁵: Id est, "Christianae legis et omnium scripturarum plenitudo et finis est dilectio Dei, rei qua fruendum <est> et rei quae nobiscum ea frui potest"; diligere autem Deum et proximum est operatio bona et virtuosa; ergo.

Secundo sic: Philosophus, II *Ethicorum*, cap. 2⁶, ostendit quod scientia moralis est practica per hoc, quia non tantum est contemplationis gratia ut sciamus sed ut boni fiamus; sed theologia fidelium maxime ordinatur ad hoc ut boni et perfecti efficiamur, II Tim. 3⁷: *Omnis scriptura divinitus inspirata utilis est ad docendum, ad arguendum, ad corripiendum, ad erudiendum in iustitia, ut perfectus sit homo Dei ad omne opus bonum*; ergo.

¹³ V. Doucet, "Descriptio codicis 172 Bibliothecae Communalis Assisensis" in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 25 (1932), pp. 257—274; 502—524.

¹ Aristot., *Metaph.*, II, c. 1 (993b 20—21).

² August., *De civ. Dei*, VIII, c. 4 (PL 41, 228; CSEL 40, p. 1, 359).

³ Matth. 22, 40.

⁴ *Glossa sacrorum librorum*, in Matth., XXII, 40 (Antwerpiae 1634, vol. V, pp. 377—378).

⁵ August., *De doct. christ.*, c. 35, n. 39 (PL 34, 34).

⁶ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, II, c. 2 (1103b 26—28).

⁷ II Tim. 3, 16.

Tertio sic: scientia practica est illa quae est “de rebus quae sunt opera nostra”, secundum Avicennam, I *Metaphysicae*⁸; sed theologia est huiusmodi, quia tractat pro maiori parte sui de agibilibus et moribus humanis, ut patet intuenti; ergo.

Quarto sic: omnis habitus intellectus cuius finis est “veritas confesse se habens ad appetitum rectum” est practicus, quoniam secundum Philosophum, VI *Ethicorum*⁹: Omnis intellectivae partis finis est veritas sed differens, quoniam speculativi intellectus finis est speculatio veri absolute sed practici intellectus finis est verum confesse vel concorditer se habens ad appetitum rectum; huiusmodi enim veritas est bonum intellectus practici. Sed cognitio veritatis in theologia confesse et consonanter se habet ad appetitum rectum, nam veritatis theologiae consideratio in intellectu ordinatur ad inflammationem caritatis in affectu, dicente Augustino, *De laude caritatis*¹⁰: “Ille tenet quidquid latet, quidquid patet in divinis sermonibus qui caritatem servat in moribus”; ergo.

Contra. Ad idem genus speculativi vel practici pertinet habitus principiorum et conclusionum, quia ex principiis practicis non sequitur conclusio speculativa, nec e converso; sed fides quae est habitus principiorum theologiae est habitus speculativus et non practicus: tum quia eius obiectum est verum sub ratione veri, sicut enim caritas respicit bonum sub ratione boni et per ipsam diligitur, ita fides respicit verum sub ratione veri et per ipsam cognoscitur; tum quia visio Dei quae est speculatio succedit notitiae fidei sicut praemium merito; ergo.

Secundo sic: omnis habitus practicus est circa contingens ut circa suum obiectum agibile vel factibile, ex III *De anima*¹¹, VI *Metaphysicae*¹², VI *Ethicorum*¹³; obiectum autem huius scientiae non est contingens sed summum necessarium; ergo.

Tertio sic: omni scientia practica est aliqua speculativa nobilior, ut patet ex I *Metaphysicae*¹⁴, ubi probat Philosophus eam quae speculativa est esse nobilissimam; VI etiam *Metaphysicae*¹⁵ dicit quod scientiae theoriae sunt considerabiliores et nobiliores aliis, scilicet practicis; sed theologia nostra est scientia honorabilissima et nobilissima; igitur ipsa est speculativa.

⁸ Avicenna, *Metaph.*, I, c. 1 (ed. Venetiis, 1508, f. 70ra.)

⁹ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139a 29—31).

¹⁰ August., *Sermo 350, De caritate*, II, n. 2 (PL 39, 1534).

¹¹ Aristot., *De anima*, III, c. 10 (433a 26—30).

¹² Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 1 (1025b 18—28).

¹³ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139a 3—15).

¹⁴ Aristot., *Metaph.*, I, c. 2 (982a 14—16, 25—28).

¹⁵ Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 1 (1026a 22—25).

Quarto sic: Aristoteles, VI *Metaphysicae*¹⁶, dicit quod si aliquid est sempiternum, non mobile, abstractum, manifestum est quod cognitio eius erit in scientia speculativa; sed subiectum theologiae est ens huiusmodi; ergo.

Circa istam quaestionem sunt quattuor opiniones in genere: duae extremae et duae mediae, quarum una est quod theologia est simpliciter practica, secunda quod est simpliciter speculativa, tertia quod est simpliciter practica et simpliciter speculativa, quarta quod nec est practica nec speculativa.

⟨Opinio Scoti⟩

Tenentes opinionem primam primo declarant quid sit praxis vel quae operatio dicitur praxis ad quam cognitio extensa dicitur practica; secundo, ex hoc concludunt quod theologia sit simpliciter practica¹⁷.

Quantum ad primum dicunt quod "praxis ad quam cognitio practica extenditur est actus alterius potentiae quam intellectus, naturaliter posterior intellectione, natus conformiter elici rationi rectae ad hoc quod sit rectus".

Prima condicio patet, quia, secundum Philosophum, III *De anima*¹⁸, intellectus extensione ad praxim fit practicus; intellectus autem non extenditur nec extra se tendit nisi prout actus eius respicit actum alterius potentiae, quia stando praecise in intellectione nulla fit extensio intellectus. Igitur praxis ad quam cognitio practica extenditur est actus alterius potentiae quam intellectus.

"Secunda condicio patet, quoniam actus non habentes ordinem respectu actus intellectus, ut actus potentiae vegetativae, aut actus naturaliter praecedentes intellectionem, ut actus potentiae sensitivae apprehensivae vel appetitivae in quantum praecedunt, non dicuntur praxes nec ad eos ut sunt priores extenditur notitia practica. Sic enim communes sunt nobis et brutis. Non enim respectu istorum actuum est aliqua cognitio practica nisi quia est aliquo modo moderativa et regulativa illorum. Sic autem sequuntur intellectionem moderativam ut per ipsam moderati." Igitur oportet quod praxis ad quam extenditur cognitio practica sit posterior actu intelligendi.

Tertia condicio patet, quoniam operatio quae est praxis est actus voluntatis elicitus vel imperatus. Hoc enim sequitur ex praecedentibus. Si enim praxis est actus alterius potentiae quam intellectus et posterior

¹⁶ Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 1 (1026a 10—11).

¹⁷ Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, Prol., p. 5, qq. 1—2, n. 228 ss. (ed. Vaticana, I, 155 ss).

¹⁸ Aristot., *De anima*, III, c. 10 (433a 14—15).

naturaliter intellectione, cum nullus alius actus ab intellectione sit naturaliter posterior intellectione nisi actus voluntatis elicitus vel imperatus, sequitur quod praxis sit actus voluntatis elicitus vel imperatus. Secundo¹⁹ patet hoc ex alio, quoniam praxis est operatio quae est in potestate nostra, aliter practicans non egeret virtute rectificante et regulante praxim; sed nihil est in potestate voluntatis nisi actus eius elicitus vel imperatus; ergo ut prius. Sed huiusmodi operatio, ad hoc ut sit recta, requirit rationem rectam cui conformiter eliciatur, quia omnis operatio voluntatis discordans a ratione recta est vitiosa. Igitur omnis praxis, ad hoc ut sit recta, nata est elici conformiter rationi rectae. Sic igitur patet primum.

Ex hoc probatur secundum, quod est principale propositum, sic: illa cognitio est practica quae est conformis volitioni rectae prior ea naturaliter; sed cognitio theologica est conformis actui voluntatis rectae quo diligitur Deus; ergo. Maior patet ex praecedentibus, quoniam illa cognitio est practica quae extenditur ad praxim cui conformatur; omnis autem praxis est actus voluntatis elicitus vel imperatus, ut probatum est. Imperatus autem non est primo praxis sed quasi per accidens, quia ut prius probatum est, praxis est operatio naturaliter posterior intellectione nata elici conformiter rationi rectae; sed actus a voluntate imperatus non est primo naturaliter posterior intellectione nec primo natus elici conformiter rationi rectae. Has enim condiciones non habet nisi per actum voluntatis imperantem. Igitur operatio a voluntate elicitur est primo praxis. Tunc arguitur ulterius: quidquid coniunctum cum alio est primo aliquale, si posset separari ab illo adhuc esset tale; igitur si actus voluntatis potest separari ab actu alterius potentiae, ille separatus erit praxis. Separatur autem circa quodcumque obiectum voluntatis circa quod non potest esse actus potentiae sensitivae; cuiusmodi sunt immaterialia omnia; igitur actus voluntatis ut actus diligendi debet verissime esse praxis; igitur cognitio conformis actui diligendi est vere practica.

Hoc etiam probatur ex intentione Philosophi, III *De anima*, cap. 'De movente'²⁰, ubi inquit quomodo appetitus est unum principium movens. Et dicit quod in habentibus simul intellectum et sensum quandoque appetitus rationalis et appetitus sensitivus sunt contrarii, eo quod sensus iubet prosequi bonum apparens, a quo ratio iubet retrahere. Idem autem non est sibi ipsi contrarium. Appetitus ergo non est unum principium movens numero sed specie. Unde concludit quod debet poni quasi unum movens specie, quia duobus appetitibus commune

¹⁹ Secundo/tertio A.

²⁰ Aristot., *De anima*, III, c. 10 (433b 5—20).

est ratio speciei mediae, scilicet ratio appetitus. Vult ergo Philosophus quod sicut appetitus sensitivus cum sensu et phantasia habet rationem motivi, ita voluntas cum intellectu et ratione habet rationem principii motivi. Ergo sicut actus appetitus sensitivi sine quocumque transitu ad extra est vere praxis quando sequitur actum intellectus, ita actus voluntatis, quae ponitur esse principium motivum, erit vere praxis quando sequitur semper actum intellectus. Et hic solus — sine actu imperato, immo cum actu in appetitu sensitivo contrario illi quem imperaret, quia ipsa ut habens appetitum illum quandoque contrarium — est principium motivum et operativum cuius operatio est praxis." Sic igitur patet maior, quod cognitio conformis actui elicitō vel imperato est practica. Minor etiam probatur, quod cognitio theologica est huiusmodi, quia primum obiectum theologiae quod ponitur Deus est conforme virtualiter volitioni rectae qua diligitur Deus; ergo quia a ratione eius sumuntur principia rectitudinis in illa volitione, unde illud obiectum determinat intellectum ad notitiam rectitudinis volitionis qua diligitur Deus; ergo ex primo obiecto theologiae sequitur conformitas ipsius ad volitionem et ita extensio ad praxim a qua notitia dicitur practica.

Confirmatur, quia primum obiectum theologiae est eius finis ultimus. Principia vero sumpta a fine ultimo sunt principia practica; ergo principia theologiae sunt practica; igitur et conclusiones, quia a principiis practicis sequuntur conclusiones practicae.

⟨Impugnatio opinionis Scoti⟩

Contra dictam opinionem arguo multipliciter; et primo, contra condiciones quas ponit de praxi. Videtur enim quod nulla illarum sit vera nisi tertia. Prima non, quia dicit quod praxis ad quam extenditur cognitio practica est universaliter actus alterius potentiae quam intellectus. Omnis enim operatio circa quam intellectus se habet recte vel non-recte in dirigendo et voluntas bene vel male in operando est praxis. Sed operatio intellectus est huiusmodi, vel potest esse. Ergo.

Maior probatur, quoniam intellectus recte vel non-recte dirigens voluntatem vel bene vel male operantem est intellectus practicus, quia "eius veritas confesse se habet appetitui recto", ex VI *Ethicorum*²¹. Intellectus autem non est practicus nisi quia extenditur ad praxim; ergo illa operatio erit praxis circa quam intellectus dirigit voluntatem imperantem operationem illam. Confirmatur, quia secundum Aristotelem, VI *Ethicorum*, cap. 3²², duo sunt in anima dominativa praxis

²¹ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139a 29—31).

²² Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139a 17—18).

sive actus humani, scilicet intellectus et appetitus: intellectus quidem in indicando et dirigendo, appetitus sive voluntas in imperando vel eligendo. Unde Commentator, ibidem, commento 10²³: "Omne dominium actionis intellectus habet et appetitus; hic quidem indicans et inveniens eligibile ex consiliatione, appetitus autem factivus illius quod intellectus esse melius concludebat". Ergo illa operatio est praxis respectu cuius intellectus et voluntas dominantur, hic in dirigendo et illa in operando vel imperando. Praeterea, Philosophus, ubi prius²⁴, dicit quod electio est principium actus sive praxis. Ratio autem et appetitus sunt principium electionis, ut dicit ibidem; ergo intellectus et appetitus sunt principium praxis, licet mediante electione quae complectitur directionem intellectus et motionem voluntatis. Ergo, ut prius, illa operatio est praxis circa quam intellectus est directivus et voluntas imperativa. Et sic patet maior.

Minorem probo, quoniam ostenso voluntati per intellectum aliquo bono delectabili, puta pulchritudine alicuius mulieris, voluntas potest inordinate imperare intellectui considerationem morosam in illa, ut delectetur et fruatur ea, et etiam ordinate, ut scilicet ex ea surgat in laudem creatoris. Intellectus etiam potest dirigere voluntatem imperantem, ut propter hunc finem vel illum imperet considerationem illius. Igitur intellectus circa operationem suam in dirigendo voluntatem imperantem illam intellectus potest se habere recte et non-recte. Hoc etiam probatur per Philosophum, VI *Ethicorum*²⁵, dicentem quod "prudencia est habitus cum vera ratione activus circa hominis bona et mala", ut scilicet hoc attingat, illa autem fugiat. Sed bonum hominis et malum non solum consistunt in actibus partis sensitivae imperatis a voluntate sed etiam in cogitationibus partis intellectivae in quantum sunt inperatae a voluntate, et eo magis quo ratio verius pertinet ad condicionem hominis in quantum homo quam sensus. Propter quod beatus Augustinus, XV *De Trinitate*²⁶ in fine, petit a Deo liberari a cogitationibus inordinatis, dicens: "Libera me, Domine, Deus meus, a multiloquio quod patior intus in anima mea, misera . . . Non enim cogitationibus taceo etiam tacens vocibus. Et si quidem non cogitarem nisi quod placeret tibi, non utique rogarem ut me ab hoc multiloquio liberares. Sed multae sunt cogitationes meae, quales tu nosti, cogitationes hominum, quoniam vanae sunt. Dona mihi non eis consentire, et si

²³ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, VI (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urbin. lat. 222, f. 106ra).

²⁴ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139a 31—33).

²⁵ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 5 (1140b 22—24).

²⁶ August., *De Trinit.*, XV, c. 28, n. 51 (PL 42, 1098); citatio incompleta est apud Robertum.

quando me delectant, eas nihilominus improbare, nec in eis velut dormitando immorari". Et sic malum hominis consistit in cogitationibus inordinatis quae dicuntur vanae, lubricae et libidinosae quibus, quia malae sunt, docet Hieronymus resistere, in *Epistola ad Eustochium*²⁷, dicens: "Ille laudatur, ille praedicatur beatus, qui cum coeperit cogitare sordida, interficit cogitatus, et allidit eos ad petram: *Petra autem erat Christus*"²⁸. Igitur prudentia dirigit non solum circa actus partis sensitivae sed intellectivae; non dirigit autem nisi circa praxim, cum sit habitus practicus; igitur praxis potest consistere in actu intellectus. Praeterea, ratio practica requiritur ut directiva voluntatis circa obiectum et actum in quo potest inordinate delectari et complacere; sed voluntas potest immoderate delectari et complacere in consideratione alicuius conclusionis geometricae et notitiam eius magis amare quam oportet; ergo requiritur ratio practica dirigens voluntatem in amore et complacentia cognitionis intellectivae sicut in complacendo actui appetitus sensitivi. Igitur actus intellectus potest habere rationem praxis in quantum imperatus a voluntate sicut et actus appetitus sensitivi.

Sed contra hoc potest obici primo, quia tunc videtur quod notitia pure speculativa sit praxis. Si enim notitia imperata a voluntate et in qua voluntas potest delectari sit praxis, cum hoc possit accidere circa notitiam speculativam, sequitur quod speculatio sit praxis; quod videtur inconveniens, cum distinguantur ex opposito.

Praeterea, si unus actus intellectus directivus circa alium sit practicus, tunc logica esset practica, quia dirigit in actibus discurrendi et universaliter circa actus aliarum scientiarum, sicut dicit Commentator, VII *Metaphysicae*²⁹.

Ad primum istorum dicendum quod licet speculatio secundum praecisam rationem speculationis non sit praxis, tamen ut cadit sub electione et imperio voluntatis potest habere rationem praxis, quemadmodum actus appetitus sensitivi, licet non sit praxis secundum se et ut praecedit actum intellectus et voluntatis, ut tamen imperatur a voluntate praxis est. Unde dicit Philosophus, I *Ethicorum*³⁰, quod politica quae est practica praeordinat quas disciplinarum debitum est esse in civitatibus. Non solum enim praecipit practicis scientiis sed etiam speculativis quantum ad usum, licet non quantum ad determinationem operis. Ordinatur enim practica qui et quales doceant vel addiscant geometriam,

²⁷ Hieronymus, *Ad Eustochium*, n. 6 (PL 22, 398).

²⁸ I Cor. 10, 4.

²⁹ Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.*, VII, com. 2, 42 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, Venetiis, 1552, ff. 72vb, 91va).

³⁰ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, I, cc. 1—2 (1094a 28—b27).

licet non ordinet quod de triangulo concludatur in geometria. Et ita habitus practicus intellectus potest esse directivus circa usum speculationis, et per consequens usus speculationis vel speculatio ut imperatur a voluntate praxis est. Unde Thomas³¹, exponendo auctoritatem praedictam I¹ *Ethicorum*, dicit quod actus scientiarum speculativarum in quantum sunt voluntarii pertinent ad materiam moralem et sunt ordinabiles ad finem vitae humanae. Et sic non solum requiritur prudentia dirigens voluntatem circa actus appetitus sed etiam intellectus ut moderate delectetur et complaceat in actibus intellectus³². Unde licet cognitio qua scio conclusionem aliquam geometricam non sit practica, tamen cognitio qua scio illam mihi esse delectabilem vel utilem practica est.

Ad secundum dicendum quod non ex hoc praecise quod aliquis habitus est directivus circa actus intellectus est practicus, sed ex hoc quod est directivus circa illos ut sunt voluntarii. Et ideo sicut requiritur logica dirigens circa actus speculativos ut sunt speculativi, ita requiritur prudentia dirigens circa actus speculativos, ut voluntarii sunt, cadentes sub imperio et electione voluntatis.

Per dicta patet responsio ad argumentum praedictae opinionis quantum ad istum articulum. Extenditur enim actus directivus circa actus intellectivos ad appetitum in quantum actus intellectus sunt voluntarii et a voluntate imperati.

Contra secundam conditionem qua dicitur quod 'praxis est operatio naturaliter posterior intellectione' potest argui ex dictis, quia si aliqua operatio intelligendi possit habere rationem praxis et nihil est naturaliter posterius se ipso, sequitur quod praxis non sit operatio naturaliter posterior omni actu intelligendi.

Praeterea, operatio appetitus sensitivi praecedens actum intelligendi et volendi est eiusdem speciei cum operatione eiusdem sequente huiusmodi actus: tum quia sunt in eadem potentia et respectu eiusdem obiecti sub eadem ratione obiectiva; tum quia intellectus et voluntas non tribuunt speciem naturae actibus appetitus sensitivi, licet tribuant speciem moris, quia speciem naturae non habent nisi a suis causis essentialibus, quae sunt appetitus et obiectum appetibile, quae manent eadem post actum intelligendi et volendi sicut ante illos. Sed quando aliqua sunt unius speciei naturae unum non potest esse posterius alio naturaliter. Igitur licet operatio appetitus sensitivi sit praxis, non tamen sequitur quod praxis sit operatio naturaliter posterior actu intelligendi.

³¹ Thomas, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, I, lect. 2.

³² intellectus/sicut et in actibus intellectus *add.* A.

Unde verum est quod operatio appetitus sensitivi non est praxis nisi prout sequitur intellectus iudicium et voluntatis imperium a quibus habet speciem moris; non tamen propter hoc est essentialiter vel naturaliter posterior actus actu intelligendi sed solum accidentaliter.

Tertia condicio, scilicet quod praxis sit actus 'natus elici conformiter rectae rationi ad hoc quod sit rectus', concedenda est, quia secundum Philosophum, VI *Ethicorum*³³, oportet rationem veram esse et appetitum rectum ad hoc quod electio sit studiosa. Praxis autem est electio vel consequens electionem ut effectus causam suam. Ideo ad hoc quod praxis sit bona moraliter, oportet rationem veram esse cui conformiter eliciatur.

Contra totam descriptionem praxis simul arguitur sic: praxis est operatio circa obiectum contingens vel operatio contingens imperata a voluntate; sed aliquis actus alterius potentiae quam intellectus naturaliter et posterior intellectione natus elici conformiter rationi rectae non est circa obiectum contingens sed circa obiectum necessarium, nec est operatio imperata a voluntate; igitur huiusmodi actus non est praxis. Maior probatur, quoniam secundum Commentatorem, I *Ethicorum*, commento 1³⁴, praxis est "operatio hominis secundum electionem". Operatio autem secundum electionem vel est circa contingens, vel si est circa obiectum necessarium imperata, est tamen a voluntate tamquam operatio contingens, quia electio tantum est circa contingens. Est enim electio appetitus consiliativus, ex III³⁵ et VI *Ethicorum*³⁶. Consilium autem est tantum circa contingens, ubi prius³⁷. Nullus enim consiliatur de necessariis aut de impossibilibus; igitur praxis est operatio tantum circa contingens vel contingens operatio secundum electionem. Minor patet de actu directivo voluntatis respectu obiecti necessarii. Et sic patet quod illa descriptio praxis est insufficiens.

Ex dictis patet quod ratio adducta pro proposito principali non concludit. Non enim est ratio practica ex hoc quod est conformis cuilibet volitioni, utpote volitioni quae est circa necessarium, sed solum ex hoc quod est conformis electioni quae est circa contingens, quoniam electio est principium praxis.

Contra principale arguitur ex dictis sic: obiectum primum et adaequatum habitui activo est aliquid agibile sicut obiectum habitus factivi adaequatum sibi est aliquid factibile; sed Deus qui supponitur

³³ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139a 32—35).

³⁴ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, I (ed. P. F. Mercken, p. 11, lin 68—69)

³⁵ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, III, c. 5 (1113a 10—11).

³⁶ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139a 31—32).

³⁷ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, III, c. 5 (1112a 21—22, 30—31; 1112b 8—9).

esse obiectum habitus theologici non est quid agibile, quia nullum aeternum est agibile, quia sic non esset aeternum sed contingens, quoniam omne agibile est eligibile secundum Philosophum, VI *Metaphysicae*³⁸, et omne tale est contingens; igitur theologia non est habitus activus. Et constat quod non factivus; igitur nullo modo est practicus, et per consequens est habitus speculativus, quoniam secundum Philosophum, VI *Metaphysicae*³⁹, omnis scientia est activa aut factiva aut theorica.

Confirmatur ratio per auctoritates. Philosophus, VI *Metaphysicae*⁴⁰, distinguit scientiam practicam a speculativa per hoc quod rerum activarum et factivarum principium quarum est scientia practica est in agente aut faciente, rerum autem speculativarum principium non est in natura. Et Commentator ibidem, commento 1⁴¹: "Principium rerum activarum est in agente et in nobis . . . ; non est principium faciens naturalia". Et subdit quod "per istum sermonem videtur dare quasi differentiam inter scientias speculativas et operativas". Ex quo patet quod obiectum proprium habitus practici est operabile a nobis. Cum igitur obiectum theologiae non sit tale, sequitur quod theologia non sit habitus practicus.

Praeterea, Philosophus, III *De anima*, in fine capituli 'De principio motivo secundum locum'⁴² dicit quod intellectus speculativus nihil dicit de fugibili aut prosequibili. Intellectus autem practicus habet dictare quid sit fugibile et prosequibile. Tale autem est contingens et non necessarium.

Praeterea, Philosophus, VI *Ethicorum*⁴³, distinguens scientificum a ratiocinativo, intelligens per hoc speculativum et practicum, dicit quod scientificum vel speculativum est circa necessaria, ratiocinativum sive practicum circa contingentia. Et ibidem dicit Commentator, commento 8⁴⁴, quod ratiocinativum est circa sola contingentia et quod proprium est scientifici ex necessariis syllogizare necessaria. Igitur obiectum intellectus practici et eius habitus est solum contingens.

Praeterea, Avicenna, I *Metaphysicae*, cap. 1⁴⁵, assignans differentiam inter scientias speculativas et practicas, dicit quod scientiae speculativae sunt "de rebus quae non sunt opera nostra nec nostrae disposi-

³⁸ Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 1 (1025b 24).

³⁹ Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 1 (1025b 20—26).

⁴⁰ Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 1 (1025b 22—23).

⁴¹ Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.*, VI, com. 1 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, Venetiis, 1552, f. 68va).

⁴² Aristot., *De anima*, III, c. 9 (432b 26—433a 3).

⁴³ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139a 3—15).

⁴⁴ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, VI (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urb. lat. 222, f. 104ra).

⁴⁵ Avicenna, *Metaph.*, I, c. 1 (ed. Venetiis, 1508, f. 70ra).

tionis". Practicae vero sunt "de rebus quae sunt opera nostra". Quae autem sunt opera nostra aut dispositionis nostrae sunt contingentia; igitur omnis scientia practica est de obiecto contingenti. Obiectum autem theologiae primum non est contingens; igitur non est scientia practica.

Praeterea, Augustinus, XII *De Trinitate*, cap. 3⁴⁶, dividit mentem rationalem in portionem animae qua contemplatur aeterna et in portionem qua inclinatur ad temporalia agenda quae insistit actioni temporalium, intelligens per has portiones quod nos intelligimus per speculativum et practicum. Et sic patet quod intellectus practicus et eius habitus universaliter respicit obiectum contingens et per consequens theologia quae non est de obiecto contingenti non est practica.

Instantia et Responsiones

Dicitur ad rationem et auctoritates praecedentes quod contingens circa quod est scientia practica est finis vel est ad finem. Finis vero ultimus in agibilibus est actio, secundum Philosophum, VI *Ethnicorum*⁴⁷. Contingentia igitur actionis elicite sufficit ad obiectum scientiae practicae, licet obiectum sit in se necessarium. Unde vult dicere quod in habitibus factivis obiecta sunt opera nostra et contingentia, et principium eorum est in faciente. In habitibus autem activis non oportet obiectum esse productum per actionem nostram sed operationem elicitam. Respectu talis obiecti oportet esse a nobis respectu cuius operationis dicitur intellectus et habitus eius esse practicus:

Contra: hoc non solvit, quoniam scientia speculativa et practica distinguuntur non solum finibus sed etiam obiectis, ut patet per praecedentia. Igitur non solum contingentia finis sufficit ad distinctionem ipsarum, sed requiritur contingentia obiecti in se. Oportet enim obiectum intellectus activi esse agibile sicut obiectum intellectus speculativi speculabile. Omne autem agibile est contingens, quia agibile vel eligibile idem sunt, secundum Philosophum, VI *Metaphysicae*⁴⁸. Unde secundum ipsum ibidem⁴⁹, oportet principium agibile esse in agente sicut principium factibile in faciente, et per consequens obiectum agibile est contingens sicut et obiectum factibile.

Confirmatur, quoniam secundum istos principalis distinctio speculativi et practici est per obiecta eorum et non per fines. Prius ergo distinguuntur per obiecta quam fines. Igitur oportet obiectum scientiae

⁴⁶ August., *De Trinit.*, XII, c. 4, n. 4 (PL 42, 1000).

⁴⁷ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 8 (1141b 16).

⁴⁸ Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 1 (1025b 24).

⁴⁹ Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 1 (1025b 22—24).

practicae esse prius distinctum ab objecto speculativae quam intelligatur actio terminari ad ea. Non ergo contingentia actionis et finis sufficit ad contingentiam objecti scientiae practicae, sed prius requiritur contingentia objecti in se per quam primo distinguitur practica a speculativa.

Praeterea, si contingentia finis et actionis sufficit ad objectum scientiae practicae et ad distinctionem eius a speculativa, cum finis scientiae speculativae sit contingens, scilicet actus sciendi, speculativa non distingueretur a practica; igitur contingentia finis non sufficit ad objectum scientiae practicae, quia in hoc conveniunt objecta scientiae speculativae et practicae.

Praeterea, cognitum per medium necessarium de quocumque non concluditur per intellectum practicum sed per speculativum, dicente Commentatore, VI *Ethicorum*, commento 8⁵⁰, quod "scientifici proprium est ex necessariis syllogizare et necessaria habere quae ad posita sequuntur. Ratiocinativi autem ex contingentibus et contingentia". Sed quidquid convenit Deo ad intra convenit sibi per medium necessarium. Ergo respectu nullius scibilis de Deo ad intra potest haberi scientia practica.

Si dicatur aliter ad auctoritates et rationes praecedentes, concedendo quod scientia est practica circa contingens vel respectu necessarii ut inducit rationem contingentis, Deus autem licet in se sit ens necessarium, ut tamen est a nobis diligibilis est contingens; theologia autem extenditur ad Deum ut est a nobis diligibilis, quia ordinat et dirigit nos in dilectionem Dei:

Hoc non solvit, quia Deus sub ratione deitatis est subiectum theologiae, et non sub ratione diligibilitatis: tum quia ratio deitatis est prima ratio includens omnes alias; theologia autem est de Deo sub eius ratione priori, aliter esset de Deo alia scientia sub eius ratione priori quae esset prior ista; tum quia ratio diligibilitatis est ratio relativa et respectus rationis, quia Dei ad creaturam non est relatio realis sed rationis tantum. Haec autem scientia est de Deo sub eius ratione absoluta et reali, aliter non esset prima nec realis. Cum igitur Deus sub ratione deitatis non sit diligibilis nec contingens, theologia quae est de Deo non erit practica.

Praeterea, ista scientia aut extenditur ad Deum ut actu diligitur aut ut est diligibilis; non primo modo, quia tunc non esset habitus practicus quando Deus non diligitur, et sic esset aliquando habitus practicus et aliquando non. Si secundo modo, tunc cum Deus sit necessario diligibilis, quia necessario bonus, igitur adhuc scientia ista exten-

⁵⁰ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, VI (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urbin. lat. 222, f. 104ra).

ditur ad obiectum ut necessarium et non ut contingens; et sic idem quod prius.

Dicitur aliter quod Philosophus⁵¹, dicens scientiam practicam esse respectu obiecti quod potest aliter se habere, loquitur de scientia practica quae extenditur ad praxim exterioriorem vel ad actum alterius potentiae a voluntate, ut ad actum potentiae sensitivae vel motivae, et non de illa quae ad solum actum voluntatis extenditur:

Contra: cum ratio scientiae speculativae et practicae sumantur a Philosopho distinguente eas sufficienter per obiecta et fines earum, et nusquam invenitur quod ponat scientiam practicam respectu obiecti necessarii sed semper respectu obiecti contingentis, ut patet VI *Ethicorum*⁵² et III *De anima*⁵³, sequitur quod secundum intentionem Philosophi non est scientia practica circa obiectum necessarium.

Praeterea, VI *Ethicorum*⁵⁴, Philosophus distinguit practicum secundum totum suum genus a speculativo per hoc quod practicum est circa contingens et speculativum circa necessarium. Ponere igitur aliquam scientiam practicam circa obiectum necessarium est expresse contradicere Philosopho. Unde Commentator⁵⁵ dicit ibi quod "ratiocinativum sive practicum est circa sola contingentia. Hoc etiam concludit ratio praedicta, nam hoc est per se notum quod obiectum habitus activi est agibile, et tale est contingens; ergo.

Praeterea, contra opinionem praedictam arguitur ostendendo quod habitus intellectivus non dicatur practicus per extensionem ad actum voluntatis quo diligitur Deus, quoniam habitus intellectivus non dicitur practicus nisi propter extensionem eius ad praxim; sed volitio vel dilectio Dei non est praxis; ergo. Minor probatur, quoniam praxis est electio vel operatio posterior, cuius electio est principium, quia secundum Philosophum, VI *Ethicorum*, cap. 3⁵⁶: "Actus sive praxis principium est electio, non cuius gratia sed unde motus", id est non causa finalis sed principium effectivum. Igitur ad hoc quod sit praxis necessario concurrat electio. Sed dilectio Dei non est electio: tum quia electio non est ipsius finis sed eius quod est ad finem; tum quia electio est respectu contingentis, quia est cum consilio, quod non est nisi de contingente. Igitur dilectio Dei non est praxis.

⁵¹ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 1 (1139a 3—15).

⁵² Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 1 (1139a 3—15).

⁵³ Aristot., *De anima*, III, c. 10 (433a 26—30).

⁵⁴ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139a 3—15).

⁵⁵ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, VI (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urbin. lat. 222, f. 104ra).

⁵⁶ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139a 31—32).

Confirmatur per Commentatorem exponentem praedictam auctoritatem Philosophi, VI *Ethicorum*⁵⁷, ubi dicit quod electio est causa actus, id est praxis, non finalis sed factiva. "Ex electione enim actus generatur. Eligentes enim quod a mente demonstratum est bonum, operamur et agimus ut attingamus ipsum". Et sic patet quod praxis non est nisi cum electione; ergo.

Praeterea, Commentator, VI *Ethicorum*, commento 17⁵⁸: practica mens post veri inventionem operationem expetit, et movet ad ipsam electionem ut aliquem attingat finem, et per consequens ratio practica extenditur ad electionem.

Praeterea, Commentator, I *Ethicorum*, commento 1⁵⁹: "Praxis, quam consueverunt transferre in *actum*, est secundum electionem hominis operatio". Sive autem ibi 'secundum' sit nota causae efficientis sive formalis, semper electio concurret ad hoc ut sit praxis, et per consequens, actus quo diligitur Deus non est praxis, cum non sit electio nec electionis effectus.

Praeterea, Philosophus et Commentator, III *De anima*⁶⁰, dicunt quod cum intellectus consideraverit aliquod agibile et non dictat nec praecipit fugere aut prosequi, non est practicus; sed extendente se intellectu et dictante hoc esse prosequendum aut fugiendum tunc est practicus cum tali extensione. Cum igitur ratio dictans Deum esse diligendum aut laudandum non dicat aliquid de fugibili aut prosequibili, sequitur quod ratio propter extensionem ad dilectionem Dei non erit practica.

Praeterea, Philosophus, III *De anima*⁶¹ et VI *Ethicorum*⁶², dicit quod intellectus et voluntas sunt unum principium operationis practicae sive ipsius praxis, ita quod non sufficit intellectus sine voluntate nec e converso; igitur illa operatio quae tantum sequitur actum intellectus non est praxis. Cum igitur actus voluntatis non praecedat se nec sit reflectio, sequitur quod intellectus non dicetur practicus propter extensionem ad actum voluntatis nisi ille actus voluntatis natus sit imperare alium actum; igitur cum dilectio Dei sit actus solius voluntatis, non ordinatus ad alium actum propter extensionem ad ipsam, non dicetur intellectus practicus.

⁵⁷ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, VI (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urbin. lat. 222, f. 106vb).

⁵⁸ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, VI (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urbin. lat. 222, f. 107va).

⁵⁹ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, I (ed. P. F. Mercken, p. 11, lin. 68—69).

⁶⁰ Aristot., *De anima*, III, c. 9 (432b 26—433a1); Averroes, *In Aristot. De anima*, III, com. 46 (ed. F. S. Crawford, p. 514).

⁶¹ Aristot., *De anima*, III, c. 10 (433a 14—25).

⁶² Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139a 21—b5).

Praeterea, ratio habet causalitatem, licet partialem, respectu praxis respectu cuius dicitur practica, ut patet per Philosophum, III *De anima*⁶³, VI⁶⁴ et VII⁶⁵ *Ethicorum*. Unde dicit in VII⁰ quod si ratio universalis practica maior concurrat cum minori practica, sequitur operatio; ut si ratio universalis dictet quod 'omne dulce est gustandum' et minor sit 'hoc est dulce', tunc 'necesse est hoc gustare'. Quod verum est, si praemissae accipiantur ut practicae, includentes assensum voluntatis. Cum ergo actus intellectus non habeat causalitatem super actum voluntatis, ut supponitur etiam secundum sic opinantes, propter extensionem ad actum voluntatis simplicem et absolutum, non dicitur ratio practica.

Praeterea, praxis respectu cuius cognitio intellectiva dicitur practica, oportet quod sit ab intellectu praecognita. Sed qui speculatur conclusionem theologicam, ut quod 'Deus sit trinus et unus, et infinitus, et aeternus' non oportet praecognoscere dilectionem Dei. Ergo dilectio Dei non est praxis respectu cuius dicitur cognitio intellectiva esse practica. Maior probatur, quoniam intellectus practicus ratiocinatur propter aliquid ut propter praxim tamquam propter finem, ex III *De anima*⁶⁶. Sed omne agens per cognitionem propter finem praecognoscit finem, aliter adepto fine, ignoraret ipsum esse adeptum. Igitur praxis propter quam ratiocinatur intellectus practicus, oportet ut sit praecognita; aliter enim non posset dirigere ea quae sunt ad finem in finem nisi praecognosceret finem qui est praxis.

Confirmatur, quia in practicis est contrarius ordo in cognoscendo et in operando, nam ultimum in consideratione intellectus practici est primum in actione, et e converso primum in consideratione est ultimum in actione, sicut docent⁶⁷ Philosophus⁶⁸ et Commentator⁶⁹, VII *Metaphysicae*, de sanitate, quam medicus primo intendit et cognoscit, et ultimo inducit, arguens quod si sanitas sit talis naturae et debet induci, oportet praexistere extenuationem corporis et hanc praecedere potionem, et sic usque ad ultimum cognitum, a quo est primo incipiendum in agendo. Praxis igitur, quae est finis in agibilibus, cognoscitur primo ab intellectu practico; igitur oportet praxim esse praecognitam, respectu cuius intellectus vel habitus dicitur practicus.

⁶³ Aristot., *De anima*, III, c. 10 (433a 14—25).

⁶⁴ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139a 21—31).

⁶⁵ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VII, c. 5 (1147a 28—31).

⁶⁶ Aristot., *De anima*, III, c. 10 (433a 14—15).

⁶⁷ docent/docet A.

⁶⁸ Aristot., *Metaph.*, VII, c. 7 (1032b 4—17).

⁶⁹ Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.*, VII, com. 23 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, Venetiis, 1552, f. 82ra).

Contra hoc quod dicitur quod 'habitus theologiae est practicus eo quod est conformis volitioni rectae tamquam praxi, quia obiectum theologiae includit virtualiter conformitatem ad praxim, quam dicunt esse volitionem rectam', haec, inquam, ratio non concludit, quia intellectus speculativus verius cognoscit quidditatem obiecti necessari quam practicus, quia iste in quantum huiusmodi non cognoscit quidditatem⁷⁰ rei nisi propter opus. Speculativus autem cognoscit quidditatem rei in se. Si ergo in ratione obiecti includatur virtualiter praxis et conformitas ad praxim, obiectum ut cognoscitur ab intellectu speculativo includit conformitatem ad praxim, qua intellectus dicitur esse practicus. Et sic intellectus in quantum speculativus et similiter habitus eius in quantum huiusmodi erit practicus; quod est falsum.

Confirmatur ratio per illud Philosophi, III *De anima*⁷¹: cum intellectus considerat aliquod agibile, nisi dictet illud esse fugiendum aut prosequendum, non est practicus. Igitur solum obiectum non includit praxim nec conformitatem ad praxim quantum est ex se; sed hoc habet aliunde, ut ex dictamine intellectus et imperio voluntatis.

Praeterea, si in ratione deitatis ut primi obiecti includatur conformitas ad volitionem rectam, aut hoc est praecise in ratione deitatis in quantum deitas est, aut in quantum trina in personis. Non praecise secundo modo, quia ratio diligibilitatis, sicut et bonitatis, est eadem in tribus personis, scilicet essentia divina. Nec primo modo, quia tunc quicumque consideraret Deum et essentialia quae conveniunt Deo in quantum Deus, consideraret Ipsum in conformitate ad dilectionem. Et si talis conformitas facit scientiam esse practicam, metaphysica esset practica. Sic ergo videtur quod praedicta opinio multipliciter peccet et deficiat.

<Opinio Aegidii>

Est autem alia opinio⁷² quae, videns quod praxis non consistit in dilectione Dei, negat hanc scientiam esse practicam, videns etiam quod haec scientia extenditur ad affectionem boni et non sistit in speculatione veri, negat eam esse speculativam. Et ita dicunt ipsam esse nec proprie speculativam nec practicam sed affectivam, quia sicut scientia practica dicitur cuius consideratio extenditur ad opus, et speculativa cuius consideratio terminatur ad verum, sic dicitur scientia affectiva cuius consideratio extenditur ad affectum et ad praecisam operationem affectus,

⁷⁰ quidditatem/veritatem? A.

⁷¹ Aristot., *De anima*, III, c. 9 (432b 26—433a 3).

⁷² Aegidius Romanus, *In I Sent.*, Prol., p. I, q. I (ed. Venetiis, 1521, ff. 7P—8C).

quia unumquodque denominatur a solo proprio fine. Theologia autem extenditur ad affectum et eius perfectionem, quia finis eius est caritas sive dilectio, Rom. 13⁷³: *Plenitudo legis est dilectio*; ipsa ergo est affectiva.

Haec opinio, si poneret scientiam affectivam esse sapientiam et per consequens speculativam, vere poneret, quoniam secundum Augustinum, XII *De civitate Dei*⁷⁴: “Quemadmodum ab ‘esse’ vocatur ‘essentia’ sic a ‘sapere’ dicitur ‘sapientia’”. Ex hoc ergo quod haec scientia extenditur ad Dei saporem et dilectionem, vere dicitur sapientia et per consequens speculativa. Sed quia ex ipsa positione apparet quod negatur scientiam affectivam esse proprie speculativam vel practicam, ideo ipsa non habet veritatem, quoniam omnis intellectus vel est speculativus vel practicus, ut patet III *De anima*⁷⁵ et VI *Ethicorum*⁷⁶. Sed omnis scientia et omnis habitus intellectus est perfectio intellectus. Igitur vel speculativi vel practici, et per consequens omnis scientia est vel practica vel speculativa et nulla est neutra.

Praeterea, VI *Metaphysicae*⁷⁷, probans scientiam naturalem esse theoricam vel speculativam, dicit quod omnis scientia est activa vel factiva vel theorica. Sed prima duo continentur sub practica, igitur omnis scientia est practica vel speculativa. Igitur scientia affectiva est practica vel speculativa. Nec valet dicere quod illa divisio scientiae comprehendit solum scientias naturali lumine adquisitas, quia licet miraculose caecus reciperet visum, tamen habito visu, naturaliter videt sicut alius habens visum naturaliter. Ergo similiter, licet theologia adquiratur in quodam lumine supernaturali, ipsa tamen habita in intellectu viatoris, oportet quod naturaliter aliquem actum scientialem habeat: aut igitur actum cognoscendi practicum aut speculativum.

Praeterea, sicut in lumine supernaturali acquiritur theologia de Deo quae extenditur ad dilectionem Dei supernaturalem, ita in lumine naturali potest adquiri scientia de Deo quae extenditur ad dilectionem Dei naturalem, nam voluntas indiget cognitione directiva ipsius in diligendo Deum naturaliter, — sicut in diligendo Ipsum supernaturaliter —, quo modo philosophi sequentes rectum iudicium rationis Deum ex puris naturalibus dilexerunt. Talis autem scientia non est practica, quia, secundum eos, non extenditur ad praxim, et est adquisita lumine naturali. Ergo est speculativa, et tamen extenditur ad dilectionem Dei. Ergo scientia affectiva est speculativa.

⁷³ Rom. 13, 10.

⁷⁴ August., *De civ. Dei*, XII, c. 2 (PL 41, 350; CSEL 40, p. 1, 569).

⁷⁵ Aristot., *De anima*, III, c. 10 (433a 14—15).

⁷⁶ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139a 27—31).

⁷⁷ Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 1 (1025b 25).

Praeterea, Philosophus, I *Metaphysicae*⁷⁸, dicit quod scientia theoria sive speculativa est sui gratia; activa vero vel practica est non sui gratia sed alterius. Cum igitur inter habitum qui est sui gratia et qui alterius non sit habitus medius, sequitur quod nec inter speculativum et practicum.

Praeterea, Avicenna, I *Metaphysicae*⁷⁹, dicit quod scientia speculativa est de non-operabilibus a nobis; practica de operabilibus a nobis. Sed omne ens vel est operabile a nobis vel non-operabile a nobis. Igitur omnis scientia est speculativa vel practica.

Praeterea, qua ratione scientia cuius consideratio extenditur ad operationes appetitus vel affectus rationalis dicitur affectiva, eadem ratione scientia moralis, ethica, cuius consideratio extenditur ad operationes appetitus sensitivi dicetur affectiva, quia eadem ratio est utrobique, quoniam unusquisque habitus denominatur suo proprio fine. Sed non obstante quod scientia moralis sic vere possit dici affectiva vel appetitiva, ipsa tamen est habitus practicus et non medius inter speculativum et practicum. Ergo similiter, licet theologia vere dicatur affectiva, ipsa tamen erit practica vel speculativa.

Praeterea, omne ens quod natum est cadere sub consideratione intellectus vel est tale quod intellectus est eius tantum considerativus et non causativus, vel est respectu eius utrumque. Si primo modo, tunc habitus per quem intellectus considerat tale ens est speculativus tantum; si secundo modo, tunc respectu talium entium intellectus est practicus. Cum igitur non sit medium inter entia quae sic cadunt sub consideratione intellectus, sequitur quod non sit habitus medius inter habitum speculativum et practicum.

<Opinio Godefridi>

Est alia tertia opinio⁸⁰ quae ponit quod theologia est simpliciter practica et simpliciter speculativa, eo quod principaliter considerat tam agibilia quam speculabilia. Ex hoc concludunt secundo, quod non est simpliciter una scientia sed plures, aliquo tamen modo una propter connexionem in ultimo fine.

Primum sic ostendunt: illa scientia quae considerat moralia et agibilia a nobis propter alium finem quam sit speculatio possibilis haberi in vita ista, et illa consideret etiam si de speculabilibus non consideraret,

⁷⁸ Aristot., *Metaph.*, I, c. 2 (982a 14—16).

⁷⁹ Avicenna, *Metaph.*, I, c. 1 (ed. Venetiis, 1508, f. 70ra).

⁸⁰ Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* 13, q. 1 (ed. J. Hoffmans, *Les Philosophes Belges*, V, pp. 169—184).

est scientia simpliciter et principaliter practica; et e converso illa scientia quae considerat speculabilia solum, non agibilia a nobis, propter se, etiam si de agibilibus non intenderet, est speculativa. Sed theologia sacra in canone tradita est huiusmodi. Ergo est simpliciter practica et simpliciter speculativa. Maior est evidens, quoniam illa scientia est principaliter practica quae principaliter intendit opus vel operationem, et illa est simpliciter speculativa quae principaliter intendit speculationem, ut patet II *Metaphysicae*⁸¹ et III *De anima*⁸². Minor probatur quoad utramque partem sui, et primo quod consideret moralia principaliter et non solum ad habendum perfectiorem speculationem viae, quia de moralibus tractatur in theologia ut per opera virtutum moralium mereatur quis vitam aeternam quae consistit in nuda speculatione divinae essentiae, iuxta illud Matth. 19⁸³: *Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata*. Si autem moralia de quibus tractat theologia ordinarentur solum ad habendum perfectiorem cognitionem et speculationem viae, tunc non ordinarentur per se ad vitam aeternam.

Praeterea, quandocumque notitia aliquorum et consideratio per se ordinantur ad notitiam alicuius cognoscibilis, distincta notitia eorum ordinatur per se ad distinctam notitiam illius obiecti, ut quia in speculabilibus notitia principii per se ordinatur ad notitiam conclusionis, ideo distincta notitia principii ordinatur ad distinctam notitiam conclusionis; et in practicis similiter, ut quia principium cognoscendi ea quae sunt ad finem sumitur a fine, ideo distincta notitia finis ducit in distinctam notitiam eorum quae sunt ad finem. Si igitur consideratio moralium et agibilium a nobis per se ordinatur in theologia ad speculationem Dei et divinorum quae potest haberi in vita ista, distincta notitia eorum per se ordinaretur ad distinctam notitiam speculativam divinorum. Sed hoc videtur falsum, quia dato quod in theologia, ultra fidem quam fideles communiter habent, non tractaretur de credibilibus speculabilibus in speciali secundum eius proprietates speciales sed in generali prout eorum notitia generalis potest sufficere ad salutem, nihilominus esset tradenda notitia praeceptorum et agibilium moralium multum in speciali per quae posset homo vitam aeternam promereri. Ergo in theologia non tractatur de his quae pertinent ad mores solum propter speculationem divinorum in vita ista consequendam sed propter se.

Praeterea, notitia virtutum moralium ex puris naturalibus adquisitionum quibus sedantur passiones non minus est necessaria ad specula-

⁸¹ Aristot., *Metaph.*, II, c. 1 (993 b 20—21).

⁸² Aristot., *De anima*, III, c. 10 (433 a 14—15).

⁸³ Matth. 19, 17.

tionem perfectam substantiarum separatarum, quae per scientias speculativas habetur et quae ponitur a philosophis ultimus finis, quam consideratio virtutum moralium consideratarum in theologia ad speculationem divinorum consideratorum in theologia, quia sicut per virtutes morales de quibus tractat theologia serenatur intellectus, ut serenatus limpidior fiat ad intelligendum de Deo quae pertinent ad fidem, sic per virtutes morales de quibus tractat philosophus moralis sedantur passiones quibus sedatis anima intellectiva roboratur et vigoratur ad perfectius intelligendum ea quorum notitia traditur in scientiis speculativis humaniter acquisitis; anima enim sedendo et quiescendo fit prudens et sciens, VII *Physicorum*⁸⁴. Sed non obstante utilitate virtutum moralium adquisitionum respectu scientiarum speculativarum, est distincta scientia de moralibus a scientiis speculativis. Ergo similiter non obstante quod virtutes morales de quibus tractat theologia sint necessariae ad contemplationem divinorum et specialium conclusionum theologicarum, tamen distincta erit theologia de virtutibus moralibus ab illa quae est de divinis et speculabilibus. Et hoc est sic arguere: philosophus moralis tractat de virtutibus faciendo specialem tractatum de eis et distinctum a tractatu de speculabilibus quorum speculationem posuit finem humanae vitae, ut speculationem substantiarum separatarum de quibus tractat finaliter in metaphysica; sed non minus, immo plus, theologus dicitur considerare principaliter moralia quam philosophus: tum quia theologus perfectiori et eminentiori modo debet virtutes morales habere et illis perfectius uti quam philosophus; tum quia moralia fidelium sunt eminentiora quam philosophorum et ordinant hominem ad finem excellentiorem ut ad speculationem perfectam vitae aeternae. Igitur theologus debet magis principaliter tractare de moralibus et non tantum secundario ut propter speculationem in vita praesenti. Et sic probatum est prima pars minoris.

Alia pars, scilicet quod theologia licet cum moralibus consideret speculabilia tamen considerat ea principaliter et propter se, probatur sic: quandocumque in aliqua scientia morali considerantur aliqua speculabilia quatenus eorum notitia est necessaria ad notitiam moralium, in alia scientia considerantur speculabilia illa principaliter et propter se. Exemplum: I *Ethicorum*⁸⁵ tractatur de potentiis animae non quidem principaliter et propter se sed ut per hoc verius cognoscatur natura virtutum et earum habitudo, id est distinctio ab invicem. et ideo earum ratio quidditativa complete traditur in alia scientia speculativa, ut in

⁸⁴ Aristot., *Physica*, VII, c. 3 (247b 17—18).

⁸⁵ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, I, c. 13 (1102a 23—1103a 3).

scientia naturali ad quam pertinet tractare de potentiis animae. Similiter in X *Ethicorum*⁸⁶ tractatur aliququaliter de felicitate contemplativa in generali, scilicet in quo est subiective, quia in nobilissima potentia secundum habitum et secundum actum nobilissimum et respectu nobilissimi obiecti; et hoc quidem fit ibi, non quod ad moralem philosophum pertineat principaliter considerare de felicitate speculativa sed ad metaphysicum qui de ipsa habet specialiter considerare, sed ut cognoscatur differentia inter felicitatem practicam vel civilem et speculativam, ut sic ipsa felicitas practica quae pertinet ad considerationem philosophi moralis verius et perfectius cognoscatur, et sic de multis aliis speculabilibus ibi tractatis. Et ideo consideratio talium per se pertinet ad alias scientias speculativas, a quibus accipit ea philosophus moralis. Ergo similiter non obstante quod in theologia cum moralibus considerantur aliqua speculabilia ut habeatur notitia generalis de fine ultimo et de illis quae conveniunt fini ultimo, oportet tamen quod in scientia speculativa specialiter pertractentur, alioquin esset minus sufficienter provisum fidelibus quantum ad scientiam. Illa autem scientia in qua speculabilia de Deo sic speculantur propter se non est nisi theologia. Igitur theologia quae est de Deo et de his quae sibi conveniunt est speculativa simpliciter et non secundario et secundum quid.

Praeterea, vita fidelium sicut et fide carentium dividitur in activam et contemplativam; ergo sicut alicuius scientiae fide carentium est considerare speculabilia principaliter et alterius scientiae agibilia quae pertinent ad vitam activam, sic alicuius scientiae fidelium est considerare principaliter ea quae sunt a fidelibus speculanda et cum hoc etiam considerare principaliter ea quae propter assequendam vitam futuram sunt agenda.

Praeterea, theologiae fidelium est considerare ea quae fide tenemus, ut ea aliquo modo intelligere et scire possimus. Hoc enim intendebant sancti doctores qui circa expositionem scripturae sacrae et declarationem eorum quae sunt fidei solliciti vigilaverunt. Unde dicit Augustinus, *Super Iohannem*, homilia 2⁸⁷: Omnino enim conari debemus ut sciamus verba Dei. Quare enim dicta sunt nisi ut scientur? Quare sonuerunt nisi ut audiantur. Quare audita sunt nisi ut intelligantur? Ex XIV *De Trinitate*, cap. 4⁸⁸: "Illud solum huic scientiaetribuendum est quo fides saluberrima gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, et roboratur, qua scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, licet polleant plurimum ipsa fide". Sed illa

⁸⁶ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, X, cc. 7—8 (1177a 12—1178b 32).

⁸⁷ August., *In Ioannis Evangelium*, tract. 1, n. 1 (PL 35, 1379).

⁸⁸ August., *De Trinit.*, XIV, c. 1, n. 3 (PL 42, 1037).

scientia quae considerat speculabilia ut sciantur, defendantur et intelligantur principaliter considerat speculabilia. Igitur theologia principaliter considerat speculabilia, et prius est ostensum quod principaliter considerat agibilia; igitur erit tam speculativa quam practica.

Ex his concludunt ulterius quod theologia non est simpliciter una sed simpliciter plures, quia subiecta eius sunt diversarum rationum, scilicet speculabile et operabile; aliquo tamen modo est una propter connexionem et ordinem ad finem extra, scilicet ad futuram beatitudinem ad quam ordinantur. Et ideo theologia est magis una quam metaphysica et etiam quod est magis speculativa quam practica, quia secundum quod est speculativa magis convenit cum fine patriae, qui est nuda visio speculativa essentiae divinae quam prout est practica.

<Impugnatio opinionis Godefridi quantum ad unitatem theologiae>

Contra hanc opinionem arguitur primo sic: de illo cognoscibili quod est verissime unum natura est primo haberi tantum una scientia, quia unius generis subiecti est tantum una scientia primo, II *Posteriorum*⁸⁹. Sed Deus est cognoscibile verissime unum. Igitur de ipso nata est primo haberi tantum una scientia. Cum igitur theologia secundum quod huiusmodi sit de Deo, sequitur quod ipsa est una scientia primo et non plures. Si enim ponatur alia scientia quae non sit de Deo, illa non est theologia, quoniam theologia secundum etymologiam nominis est sermo de Deo, secundum Hugonem, II *Didascaliorum*⁹⁰. Licet ergo concedatur quod in canone bibliae cum theologia, quae de Deo est, sit alia scientia quae principaliter considerat de moralibus, illa tamen non dicetur theologia. Theologia igitur in se considerata est una scientia, licet ut explicata in Biblia videatur misceri cum ipsa alia scientia.

Praeterea, in omni genere habente plures species ordinatas est status ad aliquam unam aliis eminentiorem, igitur et in genere scientiarum similiter. Illa autem non est nisi theologia quae est de primo subiecto theologiae.

Praeterea, theologia est scientia ultima ad cuius finem fines aliarum reducuntur. Finis autem ultimus diversorum ordinatorum ad unum semper est unus; igitur huius scientiae est tantum unus finis principalis et intrinsecus.

Praeterea, scientia habens plures fines quorum unus est propter alium est una; pluralitas enim finium quorum unus est propter alium non concludit pluralitatem scientiarum, alioquin nulla esset scientia una. Sed

⁸⁹ Aristot., *Anal. Post.*, I, c. 28 (87a 37—38).

⁹⁰ Hugo de Sancto Victore, *Erudit. Didascal.*, II, c. 3 (PL 176, 752).

finis theologiae, prout considerat de moralibus, est propter finem eius ut considerat de speculabilibus, quia finis theologiae primo modo acceptae est ut perfectus sit homo ad omne opus bonum, II Tim. 3⁹¹: *Omnis scriptura divinitus inspirata utilis est ad docendum, ad arguendum, ad corrigendum, ad erudiendum in iustitia, ut perfectus sit homo ad omne opus bonum*. Finis vero theologiae prout est de speculabilibus est ut serenetur oculus quo videatur Deus. Sed prior finis est propter istum secundum, quia “ad hoc agunt quidquid agunt divinae scientiae et litterae”, secundum Augustinum in *Sermone de Iacob et Esau*⁹². Igitur theologia, licet cum speculabilibus tractet de moralibus, ipsa tamen est una scientia propter unitatem finis principalis.

Praeterea, quando aliquid habet rationem medii inter duo extrema, si aliquid ordinetur ad attingendum extremum perfectius, oportet ut prius ordinetur ad attingendum medium, ut si color fuscus sit medius inter album et nigrum, quod natum est disponi per album prius virtualiter vel formaliter natum est disponi per fuscum. Exemplum in scientiabilibus: cognitio principiorum media est inter ignorantiam et scientiam; ideo quia notitia terminorum ordinatur ad scientiam, prius ordinatur ad notitiam principiorum habendam. Sed secundum sic opinantem et secundum veritatem speculatio divinorum quae supposita fide possibilis est haberi in praesenti est media inter speculationem patriae et nescientiam; et ideo transeundo de uno extremo ad aliud, conveniens est ut transeat per tale medium. Cum igitur secundum sic opinantes moralia et opera virtutum moralium caritate informatarum de quibus tractat theologia ordinentur ad vitam aeternam, oportet quod prius ordinentur ad acquirendam speculationem viae homini possibilem. Igitur theologia non considerat moralia principaliter et propter se.

Praeterea, si theologia practica sit scientia distincta a theologia speculativa, quaero quid est subiectum proprium theologiae practicae? Non Deus, quia non est a nobis operabilis; igitur oportet quod res pertinentes ad vitam hominum, actiones et operationes, sint subiectum theologiae practicae. Sed hoc est subiectum scientiae moralis, libri *Ethicorum* et *Politicorum*, secundum Commentatorem, I *Ethicorum*, commento 17⁹³. Igitur haec scientia non distingueretur ab ethica vel politica.

Praeterea, secundum dicta non videtur quod theologia sit magis una quam metaphysica et moralis philosophia, quia haec habent unum finem extrinsecum in quo connectuntur et ad quem ordinantur, quia

⁹¹ II Tim. 3, 16.

⁹² August., *Sermo* 88, c. 5, n. 5 (PL 38, 542).

⁹³ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*. I (ed. P. F. Mercken, p. 27, lin. 49—51).

secundum Avicennam, I *Metaphysicae* suae⁹⁴: omnes scientiae conveniunt in hac utilitate communi quae est praeparatio animae ad gloriam. Sed secundum dictam opinionem non magis connectuntur theologia speculativa et practica quam in communi fine extrinseco, scilicet in aeterna beatitudine futura. Ergo etc.

〈Opinio auctoris〉

Est opinio quarta, quod theologia secundum se considerata est scientia speculativa, quam ad praesens teneo. Ad cuius veritatem sunt duo videnda. Primo, quae operatio sit praxis ad quam habitus vel intellectus extensus dicitur practicus. Secundo, ex hoc apparebit quod theologia est scientia speculativa et non practica.

Quantum ad primum est sciendum quod duplex est operatio voluntatis: una propter quam voluntas fini ultimo se intime copulat; alia propter quam operationes aliarum potentiarum nec non et operationes exteriores virtutum moralium libere imperat. Prima operatio non videtur mihi quod sit praxis nec habitus intellectus ad eam extensus est vere practicus. Et hoc probatur non solum per rationes contra primam opinionem adductas sed etiam per alias. Et primo probatur hoc ex intentione Philosophi a quo habemus rationem practici et speculativi. Dicit enim XII *Metaphysicae*⁹⁵ quod primum movens movet caelum ut amatum et desideratum, et per consequens caelum movetur prout amat et desiderat assimilari primo moventi, intelligens per caelum totum compositum ex corpore caelesti et intelligentia motrice sibi appropriata. Intelligentia igitur movendo caelum amat et desiderat primum moventem et in hoc assimilatur sibi. Maxime autem assimilatur sibi per actum beatificum. Igitur actus dilectionis intelligentiae cadit sub actu eius beatifico. Sed secundum Aristotelem, X *Ethicorum*⁹⁶, beatitudo sive felicitas ultimata consistit in speculatione. Igitur Philosophus sub speculatione comprehendit actum dilectionis summi diligibilis respectu cuius actus intellectus speculativi extenditur.

Confirmatur per Commentatorem exponentem praedictam auctoritatem XII *Metaphysicae*, commento 37⁹⁷: "Primum movens movet primum motum ab eo, sicut movet primum amatum primum amans. Primum enim caelum movetur a primo motore ut assimiletur ei secundum posse, sicut amans movetur ut assimiletur suo amato". Amans

⁹⁴ Avicenna, *Metaph.*, I, c. 3 (ed. Venetiis, 1508, f. 71rb).

⁹⁵ Aristot., *Metaph.*, XII, c. 7 (1072a 23—b4).

⁹⁶ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, X, cc. 7—9 (1177a 12—b1; 1179a 22—32).

⁹⁷ Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.*, XII, com. 37 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, Venetiis, 1552, f. 150va).

autem in quantum huiusmodi maxime assimilatur suo amato per actum dilectionis et amoris, quia per hoc transformatur amans in amatum. Est enim amor virtus unitiva, secundum Dionysium, cap. 4, *De divinis nominibus*⁹⁸. Igitur per actum dilectionis assimilatur intelligentia primo motori. Maxime autem sibi assimilatur per actum beatificum. Ergo sequitur idem quod prius.

Dicitur ad hoc quod Philosophus poneret amare illud inesse voluntati intelligentiae necessitate naturali, ita quod circa illum actum non contingeret ipsam errare et recte agere, et per consequens respectu illius actus notitia in angelo esset tantum ostensiva obiecti et non directiva, quo modo nunc sentiunt theologi de actu dilectionis voluntatis increatae respectu Dei in particulari. Contra: saltem conceditur quod sub cognitione speculativa continetur dilectio ultimi finis, et per consequens non est praxis, quia praxis nullo modo continetur sub speculatione, cum dividantur ex opposito.

Praeterea, circa dilectionem ultimi finis in generali ostensi non contingit viatorem errare; omnes enim diligunt bonum. Si ergo dilectio finis non sit praxis nisi quando circa eam contingit voluntatem errare et recte agere, sequitur quod notitia finis intellectus extensi ad dilectionem finis in universali non sit notitia practica; quod est propositum.

Praeterea, eodem modo poneret Philosophus quod dilectio Dei se habet ad felicitatem sapientis sicut se habet ad felicitatem intelligentiae, cum sapiens in quantum huiusmodi potius ducat vitam angelicam quam humanam. Cum igitur ad notitiam speculativam intelligentiae concurrat dilectio Dei, ut probatum est, igitur et ad felicitatem speculativam sapientis concurret dilectio Dei. Sed sapiens non solum habet notitiam finis in generali sed etiam in speciali. Igitur sub speculatione finis in particulari continetur dilectio Dei ad quam extenditur.

Praeterea, si non requiritur scientia practica directiva nisi ubi potest esse error, igitur scientia beatorum non est practica; igitur nec theologia nostra, cum non sit nisi quaedam derivatio ab illa, et non videtur differre ab ea nisi sicut imperfectum a perfecto.

Praeterea, agens per se intendit inducere formam, per accidens autem remotionem contrarii. Si ergo respectu dilectionis Dei natus sit esse habitus practicus, ille per se erit directivus illius actus dilectionis Dei, si dilectio Dei nata sit in aliquo esse praxis.

Praeterea, illa notitia est conformis volitioni rectae naturaliter prior ea, et talis notitia secundum eos est practica per definitionem quam dant de praxi; ergo.

⁹⁸ Ps. Dionysius, *De div. Nom.*, c. 4, n. 17 (PG 3, 714).

Secundo, probatur idem ex intentione Philosophi sic: nam X *Ethicorum*⁹⁹ dicit quod felix, qui et sapiens, maxime secundum intellectum operans est Deo amantissimus. Sed Deus plus amat illum a quo plus amatur, aliter non esset verus amicus. Igitur felix secundum quod huiusmodi maxime est Dei amativus. Igitur felicitas extenditur ad dilectionem Dei. Cum igitur felicitas secundum Philosophum consistat in speculatione, sequitur speculationem extendi ad Dei dilectionem, quae speculatio est secundum habitum sapientiae.

Confirmatur per Commentatorem, ibidem, commento 8¹⁰⁰, ubi dicit quod felix est Deo amantissimus, quia secundum intellectum Deo cognatissimus. Dicit quod felix est cognatus Dei non tamen secundum substantiam sed per conversionem eius ad Deum et extensionem in diligendo ipsum. Igitur felicitas et cognatio sapientis extenditur usque ad dilectionem Dei; non ergo dilectio Dei est praxis.

Confirmatur secundo, quia certum est secundum Philosophum, X *Ethicorum*¹⁰¹, quod ultimata felicitas hominis non est practica sed speculativa, sicut probat ibi. Sed sub felicitate comprehendit Philosophus non solum actum intellectus sed potius actum voluntatis. Unde dicit ibi quod felicitas est "optima operatio et optimi. Sive intellectus sit hoc, sive aliud, quod secundum naturam videtur principari et dominari". Potentia autem quae maxime principatur et dominatur in regno animae est voluntas, quia secundum Philosophum, VII *Politicorum*, cap. 9¹⁰²: animae potentia qua eligimus principans est et quod liberrimum ab hac potentia exit omnibus invincibilis est. Igitur patet ex intentione Philosophi quod speculatio in qua ipse posuit felicitatem supremam extenditur ad dilectionem summi obiecti, scilicet Dei. Ergo dilectio Dei non est praxis.

Praeterea, hoc idem probatur ex intentione Augustini, qui XII *De Trinitate*, cap. 3 et 4¹⁰³, distinguit mentem rationalem in portionem superiorem contemplativam qua contemplatur aeterna et in portionem inferiorem activam qua disponit temporalia, et in utraque ponit trinitatem, sed in superiori ponit imaginem trinitatis increatae, sed in inferiori trinitatem sed non Dei. Item, sapientiam quae est circa aeterna ponit in portione superiori, scientiam vero activam in inferiori. Ex his arguitur sic: si in portione superiori sit imago trinitatis increatae, igitur pars

⁹⁹ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, X, c. 9 (1179a 22—32).

¹⁰⁰ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, X (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urb. lat. 222, f. 218rb).

¹⁰¹ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, X, c. 7 (1177a 12—b 1).

¹⁰² Aristot., *Politica*, VII, c. 9 (1328b 33—1329a 2).

¹⁰³ August., *De Trinit.*, XII, c. 4, n. 4 (PL 42, 1000).

contemplativa superior continet intelligentiam, memoriam et voluntatem, et per consequens actus contemplativus extenditur ad voluntatem et eius actum.

Praeterea, si sapientia sit in parte animae contemplativa in qua etiam ponitur actus voluntatis respectu Dei, cum sit ibi imago trinitatis, igitur sapientia extenditur ad amorem Dei. Igitur cum pars animae contemplativa sit speculativa, quia distinguitur contra activam quae est practica, et sapientia, secundum Philosophum, VI¹⁰⁴ et X *Ethicorum*¹⁰⁵, sit habitus supremus speculativus et extenditur ad dilectionem Dei qua felix maxime coniungitur cum suo obiecto beatifico, sequitur quod dilectio Dei non sit praxis.

Confirmatur per Augustinum, XII *De Trinitate*, cap. 14¹⁰⁶, qui dicit quod Apostolus, cum dicit "*Nunc cognosco ex parte; tunc cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum*"¹⁰⁷, sapientiam scientiam nuncupavit, quam scientiam profecto contemplationem Dei vult intelligi, quod sanctorum summum erit praemium". Sed praemium beatorum continet non solum Dei visionem sed eius fruitionem et dilectionem. Igitur speculatio ad Dei amorem extenditur.

Praeterea, Augustinus, ibidem, cap. 14¹⁰⁸, exponens illud Job: *Pietas est sapientia; abstinere autem a malitia scientia est*¹⁰⁹, dicit quod "pietatem hic posuit loco divini cultus". "Et quid est cultus Dei nisi amor eius quo nunc desideramus eum videre, credimus et speramus nos esse viros". Ecce quod sapientia qua Deum cognoscimus ad amorem extenditur.

Praeterea, ratione probatur sic: si dilectio Dei esset praxis et notitia ad ipsam extensa esset practica, metaphysica esset practica magis quam theologia fidelium. Consequens falsum, igitur et antecedens. Probatio consequentiae: in Deo ratio terminandi dilectionem non est nisi essentialia et non personale; licet enim personae terminent actum voluntatis creatae, scilicet dilectionem, hoc tamen est ratione alicuius essentialis et non ratione alicuius personalis, alioquin esset aliqua ratio diligibilitatis in una persona quae non esset in alia, et per consequens nulla persona beatificaretur in seipsa, cum non habeat omnem rationem diligibilitatis; quae omnia sunt falsa. Sed theologia nostra, licet consideret de essentia-

¹⁰⁴ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 7 (1141b 2—3).

¹⁰⁵ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, X, cc. 7—8 (1177a 12—b 1; 1178b 9—33; 1179a 22—32).

¹⁰⁶ August., *De Trinit.*, XII, c. 14, n. 22 (PL 42, 1009).

¹⁰⁷ I Cor. 13, 12.

¹⁰⁸ August., *De Trinit.*, XII, c. 14, n. 22 (PL 42, 1010).

¹⁰⁹ Job 28, 28.

libus et personalibus, sibi tamen est magis proprium considerare de personalibus, quia per considerationem personalium distinguitur a metaphysica, et in consideratione essentialium conveniunt, quia metaphysicus considerat multa essentialia de Deo. Igitur magis proprium est metaphysico considerare rationem diligibilitatis in Deo quam theologo. Sed non potest considerari ratio diligibilitatis in Deo nisi considerando quomodo a voluntate est diligibilis. Si ergo propter extensionem ad dilectionem Dei esset theologia practica, verius esset metaphysica practica.

Praeterea, considerans finaliter aliquod obiectum habet praecipue considerare proprietates illius. Sed consideratio metaphysicae terminatur finaliter ad cognitionem Dei et substantiarum separatarum, secundum Avicennam, I *Metaphysicae*, cap. 3¹¹⁰. Igitur metaphysici erit praecipue considerare proprietates essentielles Dei. Sed inter illas et rationes attributales ratio bonitatis est nobilissima, quia maxime habet rationem finis; igitur ad metaphysicam praecipue pertinet considerare bonitatem divinam. Sed ratio diligibilitatis et bonitatis sunt eadem. Igitur ad metaphysicam praecipue pertinet considerare Deum ut est a voluntate diligibilis. Igitur si propter extensionem ad diligibilitatem dicatur scientia practica, metaphysica erit praecipue practica.

Praeterea, Deus est in triplici genere causae, secundum Commentatorem, II *Metaphysicae*¹¹¹, scilicet formalis, efficientis, et finalis. Finis autem movet metaphorice, ut dicitur in libro *De generatione*¹¹²; movet enim ut amatum. Igitur Deus qui est finis considerationis metaphysici movet ipsum ut amatum, et per consequens metaphysicus, in quantum huiusmodi, respicit Deum ut amans respicit suum amatum. Si ergo scientia extensa ad dilectionem Dei sit practica, sequitur quod metaphysica sit practica.

Praeterea, sicut theologia est scientia directiva circa dilectionem Dei supernaturaliter quae habetur mediante caritate, ita possibile est homini acquirere scientiam directivam circa dilectionem Dei naturaliter, qualem habuerunt philosophi ex puris naturalibus Deum diligentes. Aut igitur talis scientia est speculativa aut practica: si speculativa, habetur propositum quod scientia speculativa extenditur ad dilectionem Dei. Si practica, igitur aliqua scientia practica naturaliter adquisita est melior omni scientia speculativa naturaliter adquisita, quod est contra Philo-

¹¹⁰ Avicenna, *Metaph.*, I, c. 3 (ed. Venetiis, 1508, f. 71rb—va).

¹¹¹ Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.*, II, com. 5—13 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, Venetiis, 1552, ff. 15ra—16vb).

¹¹² Potius Aristot., *Metaph.*, XII, c. 5 (1072b 3).

sophum, I *Metaphysicae*¹¹³ et VI¹¹⁴ et X *Ethicorum*¹¹⁵. Ponit enim sapientiam esse habitum nobilissimum et felicitatem secundum actum illius habitus et non in aliquo actu practico. Consequentia probatur, quia sicut dilectio Dei supernaturalis est nobilior quam cognitio Dei supernaturalis quemadmodum caritas est nobilior fide, ita dilectio Dei super omnia ex puris naturalibus procedens est perfectior operatio quam cognitio Dei speculativa possibilis ex naturalibus. Igitur habitus cognitivus habens dilectionem Dei pro fine est nobilior habitu habente nudam speculationem Dei pro fine ex puris naturalibus. Igitur ille habitus qui est directivus voluntatis circa dilectionem Dei est nobilior illo habitu qui speculatur Deum, et est solum propter speculativam cognitionem Dei. Si ergo ille habitus directivus circa dilectionem Dei sit practicus, sequitur quod aliquis habitus practicus naturaliter adquisitus sit nobilior omni habitu speculativo naturaliter adquisito.

Praeterea, habitus fidei est speculativus et non practicus: tum quia respicit aeterna et est per consequens in portione superiori contemplativa et non activa, quia articuli fidei ut 'Deum esse trinum et unum' et 'Filium procedere a Patre per generationem et Spiritum Sanctum ab utroque per spirationem' et 'Filium genitum esse Patri coaeternum' et huiusmodi, non sunt agibilia a nobis; tum quia visio beata quae succedit fidei non est notitia practica, quia non est directiva circa obiectum circa quod contingit errare et recte agere. Sed fides et eius operatio conformiter se habet volitioni finis et dilectioni Dei, quia fides quae per dilectionem non operatur mortua est¹¹⁶. Igitur propter extensionem ad dilectionem non dicetur habitus practicus.

Praeterea, opus contemplationis est magis meritorium quam opus actionis, sicut vita contemplativa est eligibilior quam vita activa. Unde contemplatio Mariae est magis meritoria quam actio Marthae¹¹⁷. Sed contemplatio non est meritoria nisi extendatur ad dilectionem Dei, quia omne meritum a voluntate est. Igitur contemplatio quae est speculatio suprema ad Dei dilectionem ordinatur et extenditur. Et per consequens dilectio Dei non est praxis.

Secundo, videndum est an secunda operatio voluntatis, scilicet elicit a voluntate et imperativa operationum aliarum potentiarum, qua videlicet imperat potentiae sensitivae ad apprehendendum et appetitivae

¹¹³ Aristot., *Metaph.*, I, c. 2 (982a 14—17).

¹¹⁴ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 7 (1141b 2—3).

¹¹⁵ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, X, cc. 7—8 (1177a 12—b 1; 1178b 9—33; 1179a 22—32).

¹¹⁶ Iac. 2, 17.

¹¹⁷ Luc. 10, 42.

ad appetendum et qua imperat operationes virtutum moralium, cuiusmodi est electio, sit praxis; an operatio a voluntate imperata, cuiusmodi est operatio virtutis exterior, dicatur verius praxis.

Et videtur quibusdam¹¹⁸ quod praxis proprie dicitur operatio virtutis imperata a voluntate et non electio quae est principium illius operationis, quia praxis sequitur electionem, quod probatur per auctoritates supra positas. Dicit enim Philosophus, VI *Ethicorum*, cap. 3¹¹⁹, quod "principium actus, id est praxis, est electio non cuius gratia sed unde motus", id est, non est causa finalis ipsius praxis sed effectiva. Causa autem effectiva praecedit effectum. Igitur praxis sequitur electionem, et per consequens non est praxis sed eius principium.

Praeterea, per rationem sic: Philosophus, VI *Metaphysicae*¹²⁰, dicit quod "in activis principium est in agente, quia est proheresis, id est electio. Idem enim est agibile et eligibile". Igitur videtur quod praxis quae dicitur ipsum agibile et eligibile non sit electio sed effectus eius.

Praeterea, habitus practicus generatur ex praxibus sicut habitus speculativi ex actibus speculativis. Sed habitus practicus generatur ex actibus sequentibus electionem, quia secundum Philosophum, II *Ethicorum*, cap. 2¹²¹, "ex consuetudine recedendi a voluptatibus efficimur temperati et ex consuetudine sustinendi terribilia efficimur fortes", et sic de praxibus aliarum virtutum. Igitur actus sequentes electionem, cuiusmodi sunt operationes exteriores virtutum, sunt praxes.

Videtur tamen mihi quod licet operatio virtutis exterior et operatio universaliter a virtute imperata possit aliquo modo dici praxis, verius tamen et proprius electio dicitur praxis. Quod probatur primo sic: praxis ad quam extenditur scientia practica est finis eius; finis enim habitus practici est praxis, sicut finis habitus speculativi est speculatio. Sed operatio voluntatis manens in agente, utpote electio, verius habet rationem finis quam operatio exterior virtutis, quia finis scientiae practicae est perfectio ipsius scientis, sicut finis scientiae speculativae est perfectio speculantis. Igitur electio verius est praxis quam operatio virtutis exterior.

Praeterea, quaecumque operationes sic se habent quod una est principium alterius, prima non est propter secundam sed secunda propter primam. Prima enim est mensura secundae et non e converso, sicut operatio est causa delectationis, ideo operatio non est propter delecta-

¹¹⁸ E. g. Robertus Cowton, *In I Sent.*, Prol. q. 7, a. 2, supra edito.

¹¹⁹ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2, (1139a 31—32).

¹²⁰ Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 1 (1025b 23—24).

¹²¹ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, II, c. 2 (1104a 33—b 3).

tionem sed e converso, ut docet Commentator, X *Ethicorum*¹²². Sed si operationes virtutum manentes in agente sunt principium et causa operationum quae transeunt exterius, sicut electio qua quis eligit libere dare alteri est principium liberae dationis, si adsit facultas, igitur operatio virtutis interior, ut electio, non est propter operationem exteriorem, et per consequens electio est potius finis et praxis virtutis practicae quam operatio exterior imperata.

Praeterea, habitus ex eisdem actibus generatur in quos inclinatur, II *Ethicorum*¹²³. Sed habitus moralis inclinatur per se in electionem rectam, quia virtus moralis est habitus elicited. Igitur virtus moralis per se generatur ex electionibus. Cum igitur non generetur nisi ex praxibus, sequitur quod electio propriissime sit praxis.

Confirmatur, quia electio non est recta sine ratione recta et habitu morali, VI *Ethicorum*¹²⁴. Igitur virtus moralis per se requiritur ad electionem rectam. Non per se autem requireretur si esset generata ex actibus posterioribus electione, quia posterius numquam per se requiritur ad esse prioris.

Praeterea, virtus moralis potest per se generari et adquiri ex solis electionibus sine exercitio operationum virtutum moralium exterius a voluntate imperatarum. Sed non potest adquiri nisi ex praxibus nec inclinare nisi in praxim. Igitur electio potest esse praxis sine operatione exteriori imperata a voluntate. Probatio maioris: si alicui non habenti pecunias presententur pecuniae in phantasmate potest ex libertate voluntatis eligere illas liberaliter distribuere, si facultas adesset. Huiusmodi autem electio frequenter elicitur sine habitatione pecuniae nata est inducere quandam dispositionem ad sic faciliter agendum sicut si haberet pecuniam, quia electio posita in esse necessario derelinquit dispositionem inclinantem appetitum ad ipsam. Igitur ex solis electionibus sine actibus exterioribus potest virtus generari, et per consequens electio potest esse praxis vere sine exteriori operatione virtutis.

Confirmatur per Philosophum, VI *Ethicorum*¹²⁵, qui probat quod electio non est sine ratione recta et habitu morali, quia sine istis non est actio bona. Quae consequentia non valeret nisi electio esset bona actio et eupraxia, immo verius est electio eupraxia quam operatio virtutis exterior imperata a voluntate, quia ista non est bona nec meritoria nisi quatenus informatur et regulatur operatione interiori, et per consequens

¹²² Cf. Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, X, c. 2 (1172 b 20—23).

¹²³ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, II, c. 1 (1103 a 32—b 22).

¹²⁴ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139 a 32—35).

¹²⁵ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139 a 32—35).

prius est electio actione bona et eupraxia quam operatio voluntatis exterior vel quaecumque alia operatio imperata. Et ideo illud II¹ *Metaphysicae*¹²⁶, 'finis practicae est operatio' debet intelligi de operatione manente in agente, cuius voluntas est immediatum principium, et non tantum de illa quae transit exterius.

Concedo igitur quod electio est primo praxis. Et si operatio virtutis exterior dicatur praxis, hoc est secundario, in quantum scilicet est imperata a voluntate a qua habet bonitatem suam.

Concedatur ergo auctoritas illa Philosophi¹²⁷ quod electio est principium effectivum actus et praxis, quia actus ab ipsa imperatus est moralis, et per consequens praxis, sed secundario. Unde non sequitur quod solus ille actus sit praxis, immo electio praecedens prius est praxis, propter quam operatio virtutis exterior est eupraxia.

Per idem patet ad illud VI¹ *Metaphysicae*¹²⁸, "principium activorum est proheresis, id est electio".

Ad illud Commentatoris¹²⁹ quod praxis est operatio secundum electionem, dicendum quod si definitio ista debet esse convertibilis cum definito, ly 'secundum' non debet esse praecise nota causae efficientis, quia sic electio non esset praxis; nec praecise causae formalis, quia sic operatio imperata a voluntate non esset praxis. Ideo ly 'secundum' debet reduplicare vel specificare causam efficientem vel formalem.

Ad rationem cum dicitur quod 'virtus moralis sive habitus practicus generatur ex praxibus', concedatur et sumatur ista minor: sed virtus moralis generatur ex electionibus etiam sine operatione imperata a voluntate, ut patet in exemplo supra posito. Quia tamen voluntas, si frequenter eligit, nec imperat actus exteriores quando non adest facultas, quia quod non creditur possibile alicui aut non vult aut tenuiter vult, secundum Augustinum¹³⁰, ideo communiter non generatur habitus practicus qui est virtus sine actibus vel praxibus imperatis sequentibus electionem. Non tamen generatur primo ex illis sed ex electionibus in quibus est formaliter bonitas moralis, et in illis sed materialiter. Unde si illi actus virtutum exteriores non essent conformes interioribus vel electionibus, ut in hypocritis, non generaretur virtus moralis ex illis.

Ex praedictis patet quomodo praxis ad quam cognitio extensa dicitur practica non est operatio qua diligitur Deus, sed est electio voluntatis

¹²⁶ Aristot., *Metaph.*, II, c. 1 (993 b 20—21).

¹²⁷ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, VI, c. 2 (1139 a 31—32).

¹²⁸ Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 1 (1025 b 23—24).

¹²⁹ Videsis supra, notam 119.

¹³⁰ August., *De Trinit.*, X, c. 1, n. 2 (PL 42, 973).

vel operatio ex electione procedens, et electio primo, sed huiusmodi operatio imperata secundario.

Secundo, ex praedictis concluditur propositum principale, scilicet quod theologia non sit practica sed speculativa, nam si esset practica aut hoc esset propter extensionem ad operationem elicitam secundum electionem aut dilectionem Dei. Non propter primum, quoniam habitus practicus intellectus habens operationem elicitam secundum electionem pro fine principali, habet operabile contingens pro obiecto suo formali, quia omnis talis habitus habet eligibile pro obiecto. Omne autem eligibile est agibile, VI *Metaphysicae*¹³¹, et omne agibile est contingens. Cum igitur obiectum theologiae non sit operabile a nobis sed ipse Deus, sequitur quod theologia non est propter operationem secundum electionem elicitam ut sunt opera virtutum et misericordiae quae sunt opera meritoria. Nec propter secundum, quia probatum est prius multipliciter quod dilectio Dei non est praxis, et per consequens cognitio ad ipsam extensa non est practica, nam speculatio ista quae ordinatur ad dilectionem Dei speculatur Deum secundum omnes perfectiones suas attributales a nobis cognoscibiles, ut ipsum perfecte ostendat voluntati ut sic voluntas excitata ex perfectionibus eius magnificis et laudabilibus in ipsum perfecte tendat, quod est proprium supremae scientiae speculativae, quae cognitionem extendit in amorem. Et secundum hoc opera virtutum meritoria procedentia ex electione non sunt finis huius scientiae sed tantum finis sub fine. Sed eius finis est dilectio Dei ad quam alia opera ordinantur. Et secundum hoc ista scientia appropriat sibi nomen sapientiae, ut dicatur sapientia a sapore, quia non solum illuminat aspectum in cognitione summi veri sed inflamat affectum in fruitione summi boni.

Praedicta autem opinio videtur esse magistri Alexandri de Alys¹³² et non solum magistri Henrici de Gandavo¹³³. Dicit enim Alexander in *Summa*, p. 1, q. 1, quod theologia est sui gratia, et per consequens theoretica sive speculativa. Et tamen dicit quod est sapientia, a sapore, movendo ad bonum. Unde dicit quod est scientia perficiens cognitivam secundum veritatem et movens affectum ad bonitatem. Prima est ut cognitio secundum visum, et ideo dicitur scientia absolute; secunda est ut scientia secundum gustum, et ideo debet dici sapientia a sapore affectionis, secundum quod dicitur Eccles. VI¹³⁴: *Sapientia doctrinae secundum nomen est eius*. Theologia igitur perficit animam secundum affectionem movendo ad bonum, et ideo est principaliter scientia". Haec ille.

¹³¹ Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 1 (1025b 24).

¹³² Alexander de Hales, *Summa*, p. 1, q. 1 (I, ed. Quaracchi 1924, 2).

¹³³ Henr. Gandav., *Summa*, a. 8, q. 3 (I, ed. Parisiis 1520, f. 65 T).

¹³⁴ Eccles. 6, 23.

Pro parte ista arguitur sic: aut de Deo potest haberi aliqua scientia speculativa aut tantum practica. Non secundo modo: tum quia secundum Philosophum, VI *Metaphysicae*¹³⁵: "Si sit aliquod ens immobile, sempiternum et separatum, palam quod theoricæ est illud noscere et considerare"; tum quia 'Deus est quo maius cogitari non potest'¹³⁶, ex quo sequitur quod Deus summe est; ex hoc sequitur ulterius quod omne aliud a Deo sit per participationem actus essendi ab eo; sed constat quod talis consideratio de Deo non est practica, quia in ea nulla apparet praxis sed pure consequentiae speculativæ; tum quia istae propositiones 'Deus est trinus', 'Pater generat' et huiusmodi non sunt practicae, sed pure speculativæ; veritas enim talium non est practica, quia non extenditur ad opus. Quod si dicatur quod sunt practicae, quia veritas ipsarum extenditur ad dilectionem Dei et includit virtualiter rectitudinem dilectionis, — si enim Deus sit trinus in personis, igitur una persona sine alia diligere non debet —, sic dicerem quod haec 'aurum est ens finitum et limitatum' est propositio practica, et quaecumque talis, quia includit virtualiter rectitudinem dilectionis auri, quia si aurum sit ens finitum, igitur non debet diligere propter se, sed propter aliud. Si autem de Deo possit haberi aliqua scientia speculativa, igitur includit aliquam notitiam speculativam, ex illa virtuali conformitate primi obiecti ad praxim non sequitur theologiam esse practicam, cum speculabile non includat conformitatem ad praxim. Confirmatur: si de Deo possit haberi scientia speculativa, igitur aut secundum essentialia aut secundum notionalia. Si secundo modo, sequitur quod conclusiones pure theologicae sint speculativæ et per consequens theologia erit speculativa. Si primo modo, non minus cognitio Dei secundum essentialia includit conformitatem ad praxim quam secundum notionalia, cum sic sit maxime diligibilis. Non enim est minus Deus diligibilis in quantum bonus, sapiens, omnipotens, quam in quantum generat aut spirat aut est innascibilis. Igitur propter conformitatem ad dilectionem non erit practica.

Praeterea, scientia Dei quam habet Deus de seipso aut est speculativa aut practica: si speculativa et sua scientia est propter dilectionem, cum beatitudo sua attendatur principaliter penes suam fruitionem quam cognitionem, igitur propter conformitatem ad dilectionem non erit scientia practica; sua enim scientia maxime est conformis appetitui recto. Nec potest dici quod scientia Dei de seipso sit practica, propter duo: primo, quia notitia practica est regulativa et directiva potentiae practican- tis in practican- do aliunde quam a se rectificabilis; voluntas

¹³⁵ Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 1 (1026a 10—11).

¹³⁶ Anselm., *Proslog.*, c. 5 (PL 158 229; ed. Schmitt I, 104).

autem divina non est aliunde quam a se regulabilis in operatione sua. Secundo, quia cognitio Dei de contingentibus non est practica; igitur multo minus cognitio sua de seipso. Consequentia patet, quia cognitio Dei de operabilibus videtur magis extendi ad opus quam cognitio eius de seipso. Unde absurdum est dicere primam, quae est de contingentibus, esse speculativam et secundam, quae est de necessariis, non. Antecedens probo, quia intellectus practicus dictat et sententiat de operabilibus an sit operandum vel non-operandum. Sed intellectus divinus ante actum voluntatis non intelligit aliquid esse operandum vel producendum, licet intelligat ipsum operabile, quia si sic, aut voluntas divina necessario conformatur dictamini et sententiae intellectus, et tunc quidquid a Deo producit necessario producit, quia quidquid a Deo cognoscitur necessario cognoscitur si cognoscitur ante actum voluntatis; aut non necessario conformatur sententiae intellectus, quod non contingit, quia tunc voluntas posset errare et contraire iudicio rationis.

Praeterea, subiectum et passio pertinent ad eundem habitum sicut etiam ad eandem potentiam cognitivam. Sed ratio Deitatis continet in se omnes rationes in divinis tamquam pelagus infinitum¹³⁷, et ita est pure speculativa, magis quam aliquod aliud obiectum. Magis enim angelus, homo, aurum est obiectum practicum quam Deus, cum sint agibilia vel factibilia, et non Deus. Igitur omnes passionem quae de Deo concluduntur non practice sed speculative concluduntur.

Praeterea, perfectionis est in inferiori attingere suum superius, VII *Politicorum*¹³⁸. Unde sensitiva hominis est nobilior sensitiva bruti, quia attingit intellectivam ad quam ordinatur, nec in hoc cadit a propria perfectione sed eam perfectius habet. Actus autem voluntatis est perfectior actu scientifico intellectus, ut nunc supponitur, etiam secundum illos qui dicunt eam esse practicam. Igitur perfectionis est in scientia speculativa quae est perfectio intellectus quod attingat actum voluntatis respectu nobilissimi obiecti. Non ergo propter conformitatem ad actum voluntatis circa Deum erit scientia non-speculativa.

Praeterea, omni scientia practica est aliqua speculativa nobilior, et ideo concludit Philosophus, I *Metaphysicae*¹³⁹ ipsam esse nobilissimam. Sed theologia est nobilissima scientia. Ergo. Dicitur ad hoc quod Philosophus non posuit actum voluntatis circa finem esse praxim sed quandam motorem simplicem naturalem, et ideo non posuit aliquam scientiam esse conformem praxi voluntatis, et ideo dicit quod omni practica scientia

¹³⁷ Ioannes Damascenus, *De fide orth.* I, c. 9 (PG 94, 835 A—B).

¹³⁸ Aristot., *Politica*, VI, c. 14 (1333a 21—22).

¹³⁹ Aristot., *Metaph.*, I, c. 1 (981b 4—10).

est aliqua speculativa nobilior. Si tamen posuisset praxim circa finem non negasset scientiam practicam respectu illius esse nobiliorem omni speculativa. Contra: isti dicunt quod apprehenso ultimo fine voluntas non necessario fruitur illo et hoc probare nituntur ex principiis Philosophi: tum quia, II *Physicorum*¹⁴⁰, potentia activa sua primaria divisione dividitur in activam naturalem et liberam vel a proposito, cuiusmodi est voluntas, et ideo concludit quod voluntas non necessario tendit in finem; tum quia agens quod necessario agit et naturale eadem necessitate removel prohibens; et sic si voluntas necessario et naturaliter tenderet in ultimum finem, semper teneret intellectum in consideratione ultimi finis. Sive rationes istae concludant sive non, oportet istos dicere quod intentio Philosophi erat quod voluntas non necessario tendit in ultimum finem, sed libere. Igitur si actus voluntatis respectu finis ultimi esset praxis, Philosophus haberet dicere quod esset praxis.

Praeterea, Philosophus non negat voluntatem esse liberam respectu finis. Dicit enim III *Ethicorum*¹⁴¹ quod "voluntas respectu finis, electio autem respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem", ita quod ut est libera tendit in finem, ut autem arbitrio libera in ea quae sunt ad finem, quorum est electio. Eadem enim potentia non movetur modo naturae et modo libero, etiam respectu diversorum obiectorum, quia tunc respectu illorum non esset una potentia, quia tunc sicut dicitur potentia libera, quia libere fertur in illud quod est ad finem, ita et verius diceretur potentia naturalis, quia modo naturae tendit in finem qui est eius primum et principale obiectum. Igitur Philosophus posuit voluntatem libere moveri et non motione naturali in finem ultimum, et tamen non posuit actum voluntatis respectu finis ultimi esse praxim, ut concedunt isti. Ergo propter conformitatem ad actum voluntatis respectu ultimi finis non erit scientia practica.

Dicitur aliter, glossando dictum Philosophi, quod ipse intellexit de scientia practica respectu exteriorum et inferiorum a Deo, quia dicit quod practica non est gratia sui sed propter usum. Similiter dicit quod est propter necessaria vitae, speculativa vero, necessariis habitis, est propter fugam ignorantiae. Omni ergo tali scientia practica est aliqua scientia speculativa nobilior, non tamen practica respectu ultimi finis. Contra: aut Philosophus poneret actum voluntatis respectu ultimi finis esse praxim aut non. Si non, et tamen ponit actum voluntatis respectu ultimi finis esse liberum licet forte necessarium, igitur propter conformitatem scientiae ad huiusmodi actum non erit scientia practica,

¹⁴⁰ Aristot., *Physica*, II, c. 8 (198b 10—199b 33).

¹⁴¹ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, III, c. 7 (1113b 3—4).

quia non conformatur praxi. Si sic, tunc praeter metaphysicam speculativam haberet ponere aliam metaphysicam practicam nobiliorem quae sit directiva in dilectione Dei quae potest haberi ex puris naturalibus; quod est falsum, quia dividens sufficienter, VI *Metaphysicae*¹⁴², scientias in practicas et speculativas non ponit aliquam metaphysicam practicam, immo contrarium, cum dicat quod de ente immobili et separato a materia est scientia praecise speculativa.

Praeterea, ista propositio 'omni scientia practica est aliqua scientia speculativa nobilior' probatur sic: illa forma in actu primo est perfectior cuius actus secundus est perfectior, quia actus secundus sequitur perfectionem actus primi. Sed actus secundus scientiae est scire et considerare. Igitur illa scientia est perfectior in genere scientiarum quae perfectius docet scire. Huiusmodi autem est speculativa respectu practicae, quia speculativa docet dividere, definire, demonstrare et cognoscere quidditatem rei; non sic autem scientia practica, in quantum huiusmodi, sed solum per accidens quatenus sufficit ad opus, sicut moralis philosophus per accidens considerat de potentiis animae quatenus sunt subiecta virtutum, de quibus per se considerat propter opus. Ex quo igitur huiusmodi actus scientifici potissimi sunt proprii scientiae speculativae et accidentales scientiae practicae, sequitur quod in genere scientiarum scientia speculativa sit perfectior practica.

Praeterea, nobilissimus habitus est in nobilissimo subiecto et respectu nobilissimi obiecti; sed intellectus speculativus in quo est scientia speculativa est universaliter et simpliciter perfectior in quantum huiusmodi intellectu practico, secundum Commentatorem, VI *Ethicorum*¹⁴³, cap. penultimo, ubi dicit quod "melior est intellectus speculativus practico quemadmodum speculatio nobilior est actione". Igitur scientia speculativa est simpliciter perfectior quam practica.

Dicendum est ergo ad quaestionem quod theologia non est practica sed speculativa, quia non est circa obiectum conveniens habitui practico quod est contingens, nec etiam extenditur ad operationem quae est praxis, eo quod dilectio Dei ad quam ordinatur non est praxis, ut est multipliciter ostensum.

Ad argumenta principalia

Ad primum argumentum principale cum dicitur quod 'habitus intellectus ordinatus ad operationem boni est practicus', dicendum quod

¹⁴² Aristot., *Metaph.*, VI, c. 1 (1026a 10—19).

¹⁴³ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, VI (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urbin. lat. 222, f. 138va).

operatio bona duplex est, scilicet vel respectu finis vel respectu eius quod est ad finem. Et prima non est praxis nec actio nec factio, ut praecostensum est, sed fruitio. Et ideo habitus intellectus ordinatus ultimate in talem finem practicus est, sicut prudentia. Talis autem habitus intellectus non est theologia, quae ultimate ordinatur ad Dei fruitionem.

Per idem patet ad secundum. Cum enim dicitur quod illa scientia est practica quae est ut boni efficiamur, dicendum quod aliquis dicitur bonus moraliter secundum virtutes morales humanitus acquisitas et actiones earum, et scientia quae principaliter ordinatur ad talem bonitatem est practica. Qualis non est theologia, quia non docet operari bonum et bene agere nisi ut mundetur oculus quo videatur Deus¹⁴⁴ et disponatur¹⁴⁵ ad contemplationem. Aliter dicitur esse aliquis bonus secundum virtutes theologicas quae non sunt virtutes practicae, quia non sunt primo respectu operabilium a nobis sed sunt virtutes ad contemplationem pertinentes, et scientia quae ordinatur ad talem bonitatem non est practica sed contemplativa et sapientia dicta a sapore, quia docet non solum illuminare intellectum sed inflammare affectum.

Ad tertium, cum dicitur quod haec scientia est de operabilibus a nobis et talis est practica, dicendum quod illa scientia quae est de operabilibus a nobis principaliter practica est. Qualis non est ista; haec enim non est de operabilibus a nobis nisi ut per illam disponamur ad Dei dilectionem et contemplationem, propter quam docet quid agere et quid fugere debemus.

Ad quartum, cum dicitur quod finis practici intellectus est veritas confesse se habens ad appetitum rectum, dicendum quod appetitus rectus ad quem extenditur veritas practica est appetitus qui recte se habet in eligendo, in quo consistit praxis, ut praecostensum est, quia secundum Philosophum electio est principium praxis non autem appetitus rectus respectu ultimi finis, quia tunc sapientia esset habitus practicus, quia extenditur ad amorem voluntatis, cum dicta sit a sapore.

<Ad argumenta opinionis Scoti>

Ad primum primae opinionis, cum dicitur quod theologia est habitus practicus quia extenditur ad dilectionem Dei, neganda est consequentia quia dilectio Dei non est praxis, ut ostensum est. Et cum probatur quia actus voluntatis imperatus non est primo praxis sed elicited, et quod convenit alicui primo coniuncto cum alio cui convenit secundo — si potest separari ab illo adhuc conveniet sibi —, dicendum quod esse

¹⁴⁴ August., *Sermo* 88, c. 5, n. 5 (PL 38, 542).

¹⁴⁵ disponatur/disponitur A.

praxis non convenit primo actui voluntatis elicitio, tunc enim conveniret cuicumque tali actui, sed solum convenit primo actui voluntatis qui est electio, ut dictum est. Et concedatur quod electio sit praxis quando separatur ab actu potentiae inferioris, ut patet de non-habente pecunias qui eligit distribuere illas quando oportet et sicut oportet si facultas adesset. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod actus voluntatis respectu finis ultimi sit primo praxis, quia ille non est electio.

Per hoc patet ad confirmationem, cum dicitur quod actus appetitus sensitivi est praxis sine transitu ad extra quando sequitur actum intellectus, igitur similiter actus voluntatis erit praxis sine actu imperato; concedatur si est electio. Electio enim potest esse in voluntate licet non sequatur usus alterius potentiae. Sed actus respectu ultimi finis non est electio, ideo non est praxis.

Praeterea, probatio minoris illius rationis peccat. Cum enim dicunt quod obiectum theologiae, scilicet Deus, includit virtualiter conformitatem ad praxim, si hoc esset verum, scientia speculativa esset practica, quia verius cognoscit rationem quidditativam obiecti quam practica, ut prius argutum est contra rationem istam.

Ad secundum, cum dicitur quod subiectum huius scientiae, quod est Deus, est finis eius et a fine sumuntur principia practica, dicendum quod finis a quo sumuntur principia practica in agendis aut operandis est aliquod agibile a nobis, quia talis movet efficientem ut inquirat de his quae sunt ad finem. Secundum enim condicionem talis finis inquit per quae media potest devenire in finem, et talis finis se habet in operabilibus sicut principium in speculabilibus. Sed huiusmodi finis non est Deus; propter quod non est finis practicae sed speculativae scientiae.

Contra: secundum Philosophum¹⁴⁶, voluntas est ipsius finis, electio autem respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sed ex fine sumuntur principia respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem. Igitur ex actu voluntatis qui est respectu finis sumuntur principia respectu electionis eorum quae sunt ad finem, et per consequens ex actu dilectionis Dei sumuntur principia electionum per quae poterimus pertingere ad Dei dilectionem. Cum igitur secundum dicta electio sit praxis et ex principio speculativo non sequatur conclusio practica, videtur quod actus voluntatis respectu ultimi finis sit praxis a qua sumuntur principia practica.

Responsio: quando actus voluntatis est respectu talis finis in quem immediate ordinatur electio eorum quae sunt ad finem, sicut contingit de fine operabili, tunc verum est quod actus voluntatis respectu talis

¹⁴⁶ Aristot., *Metaph.*, I, c. 2 (982a 14—16).

finis est praxis et principia sumpta a tali fine sunt practica. Sed quando electio non immediate ordinatur in actum voluntatis tendentis in finem nisi per hoc quod electio et bona opera meritoria disponunt ad mundationem oculi mentalis quo videatur Deus¹⁴⁷, tunc talis finis non est practicus sed speculativus, et tunc ex tali fine speculativo sequentur principia sive regulae speculativae respectu operandorum. Unde ex principiis speculativis possunt mediate sequi conclusiones practicae. Et ideo aliter est in lege divina et humana, quia humana ex regulis pure practicis docet operanda; lex autem divina, cuiusmodi est theologia, docet operanda ex regulis divinis et speculativis. Et ideo lex humana est pure practica, lex autem divina est speculativa.

<Ad argumenta opinionis Aegidii>

Ad argumenta secundae opinionis, patet per praedicta.

<Ad argumenta opinionis Godefridi>

Ad primum tertiae opinionis, cum dicitur quod ista scientia principaliter considerat moralia et non propter speculationem perfectiorem viae sed propter vitam aeternam consequendam, dicendum quod unus istorum finium non excludit alium sed ordinatur ad ipsum. Cognitio Dei enim et contemplatio ordinatur ad vitam aeternam sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, et ideo licet notitia moralium et eorum operatio mereatur vitam aeternam, ordinatur tamen ad contemplationem in via sicut ad finem sub fine, ut sedatis passionibus per virtutes morales intellectus limpidius caelestia contempletur¹⁴⁸; intellectus enim sedendo et quiescendo fit prudens et sciens¹⁴⁹.

Ad secundum dicendum quod ex isto non sequitur quin distincta notitia moralium ordinetur ad distinctam notitiam credibilium, quia habens distinctam notitiam moralium est magis aptus et dispositus ad perfectam notitiam credibilium acquirendam et intelligendam quandoque traditur et in scriptura explicatur, sicut qui perfectius cognoscit principium est magis dispositus ad intelligendam veritatem conclusionis distinctae, licet veritas illius tantum in generali sibi explicetur.

Ad tertium dicendum quod non est simile propter duo: primo, quia notitia moralium theologorum magis ordinatur ad finem theologiae quam notitia virtutum moralium humanitus adquisitionum ordinetur

¹⁴⁷ August., *Sermo* 88, c. 5, n. 5 (PL 38, 542).

¹⁴⁸ Cf. August., *Sermo* 88, c. 5, n. 5 (PL 38, 542).

¹⁴⁹ Aristot., *Physica*, VII, c. 3 (247 b 17—18).

ad speculationem veritatis quae est finis philosophiae, quoniam finis theologiae est dilectio Dei caritativa quae non potest haberi sine dilectione proximi et observatione praeceptorum decalogi, quorum observatio magis ordinatur ad dilectionem Dei quam virtutes morales ad speculationem veritatis, quia carens una virtute morali vel pluribus potest speculari veritatem physicae sed odiens proximum vel transgrediens minimum praeceptum non potest diligere Deum caritative dum est in tali statu.

Item, moralia tradita in theologia habent maiorem connexionem cum speculabilibus in theologia quam moralia philosophica cum speculabilibus philosophicis, quia ista scientia respectu aeternorum docet temporalia et agibilia dirigere. Hoc enim est perfectionis in hac scientia quod in ipsa per ea quae sunt speculationis diriguntur ea quae sunt actionis. "Quanto enim virtus est altior tanto ad plura unico simplici se extendit", ut habetur in *Libro de causis*¹⁵⁰, in quo scientia ista assimilatur scientiae divinae qua Deus notitia purae speculationis omnia operabilia cognoscit et dirigit.

〈Instantiae et Responsiones〉

Contra praedicta arguitur sic: in quocumque actu contingit voluntatem errare ibi est necessaria notitia practica directiva, ne sit error. Sed in dilectione ultimi finis prout pertinet ad theologum contingit voluntatem errare et recte agere. Igitur necessaria est notitia practica directiva in dilectione Dei vel finis ultimi; igitur theologia quae est directiva in diligendo ultimum finem est practica. Maior videtur manifesta. Minor etiam patet, quia finis theologiae proprius non est bonum in universali, quia illud pertinet ad metaphysicam, sed bonum in particulari, scilicet ipse Deus circa cuius dilectionem voluntas potest errare, ut si postponat dilectionem Dei dilectioni creaturae et utatur eo et non summe ipsum diligit. Igitur voluntas potest errare in dilectione Dei secundum quod est finis theologiae.

Praeterea, ad idem genus praxis pertinent principia et conclusiones, quia conclusiones practicae resolvuntur in principia practica et non in speculativa sicut nec conclusiones speculativae in principia practica. Cum igitur cognitio finis sit directiva circa ea quae sunt ad finem et cognitio eorum quae sunt ad finem sit cognitio conclusionum practicarum, cognitio finis erit cognitio practica.

Tertio sic: illa operatio est vere praxis ad quam inclinatur virtus appetitiva, quia quaecumque talis virtus est habitus electivus, ex

¹⁵⁰ *Libro de causis*, par. 16 (ed. O. Bardenhewer, p. 179).

II *Ethicorum*¹⁵¹. Electio autem est vere praxis, ut patet ex dictis; sed ad dilectionem Dei vel ultimi finis inclinatur non tantum caritas sed amor acquisitus qui est virtus appetitiva, quia est habitus acquisitus consonus rectae rationi; igitur dilectio Dei est vere praxis.

Praeterea quarto, aut actus voluntatis est praxis ut est quidam actus absolutus et quaedam perfectio absoluta, aut in ordine ad actum aliquem imperatum potentiae inferioris, puta appetitus sensitivi vel potentiae motivae. Non primo modo: cum inter omnes perfectiones absolutas dilectio Dei sit maior perfectio voluntatis, ipsa maxime erit praxis. Non secundo modo, quia ille ordo non potest esse nisi ut causae ad causatum; sed causa est naturaliter prior suo effectui; igitur habet quidquid perfectionis convenit sibi sine habitudine ad effectum, cum causa nihil perfectionis adquirat ex effectui. Igitur volitio et dilectio est praxis vel non-praxis prius natura quam comparetur ad effectum vel actum potentiae inferioris.

Quinto sic: omnis actus vel operatio qui est in potestate hominis tamquam vere actus humanus est speculatio vel praxis. Sed dilectio ultimi finis est vere in potestate hominis ut actus humanus. Igitur est speculatio vel praxis. Sed constat quod non est speculatio; igitur est vere praxis.

Sexto sic: ille habitus cuius finis non est nuda speculatio veritatis non est habitus speculativus sed practicus, quia habitus speculativus et practicus conveniunt in veritate tamquam in fine communi sed differunt per fines proprios, quia finis habitus speculativi est veritas in se, practici autem veritas in ordine ad opus. Cum igitur finis theologiae sit veritas protensa ad opus voluntatis, ut dictum est, sequitur quod theologia sit habitus practicus et non speculativus.

Confirmatur per Commentatorem, VI *Ethicorum*, commento 17¹⁵², ubi dicit quod "scientifica mens finem habet invenire veritatem et nihil ultra apponit". Cum igitur scientia ista ultra speculationem Dei apponat dilectionem Dei ipsa non erit speculativa.

Item, I *Ethicorum*, commento 39, Commentator¹⁵³, distinguens cum Philosopho vitam humanam in vitam voluptuosam, civilem et contemplativam, dicit sic de vita contemplativa: "Non physiologicam ait contemplativam vel mathematicam vel theologicam sed eam quae

¹⁵¹ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, II, c. 2 (1103b 26—34).

¹⁵² Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, VI (versio Roberti Grossatesta, cod. Vat. Urbini. lat. 222, f. 107va).

¹⁵³ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, I (ed. P. F. Mercken, pp 51—52, lin. 17—24).

per mundationem a passionum sorde ad contemplationem festinat, quae rescindens materiam et hanc carnalem nebulam et velamen Deo et divinis per impassibilitatem coniungitur. Neque enim erat conveniens de operationibus et operativis virtutibus dicere proponentem relinquere practicarum vitarum perfectissimam, quae est purgativa". Haec ille. Igitur respectu Dei et divinorum est vita practica nobilissima, quae dicitur contemplativa, quae nulla est scientiarum speculativarum.

Consequentur dicendo praedictis, ad primum istorum, cum dicitur quod necessaria est notitia practica directiva voluntatis in actu in quo potest errare et recte agere, dicendum quod hoc non dicit Philosophus, sed III *De anima*¹⁵⁴ dicit quod intellectus practicus est directivus voluntatis in prosequendo aut fugiendo. Prosequibile autem aut fugibile est contingens. Ideo illa est notitia practica quae est directiva voluntatis in operando aliquod operabile circa quod potest errare et recte agere. Respectu autem voluntatis in operatione qua tendit in ens sempiternum et divinum non dirigit notitia practica, sed sapientia quae respicit causas altissimas secundum actus quibus illis coniungimur. Coniungimur autem illis non per solum actum intellectus sed etiam per actum voluntatis. Ed ideo sapientia, quae secundum Philosophum est habitus speculativus, est directiva voluntatis in diligendo Deum.

Ad secundum dicendum quod quando finis est limitatus existens de genere operabilium tunc conclusiones practicae reducuntur in principia practica quae sumuntur a tali fine. Sed quando finis est omnino illimitatus in quem ordinantur tam speculabilia quam agibilia, et agibilia ordinantur ad speculabilia et eorum cognitionem, tunc ex principiis illimitatis et speculativis sumptis a tali fine concluduntur conclusiones practicae circa operabilia. Talis autem finis est proprius huius scientiae, et ideo, ut dictum est, perfectionis est huius scientiae quod per ea quae sunt speculationis diriguntur ea quae sunt actionis.

Ad tertium dicendum quod non omnis virtus in appetitu est habitus electivus, quia caritas est in voluntate et tamen non est habitus electivus, quia electio non est respectu finis. Caritas autem inclinat in dilectionem ultimi finis. Et ideo Philosophus, II *Ethicorum*¹⁵⁵, definit solum virtutem appetitivam quae est respectu alicuius operabilis: illa enim sola in medietate consistit, non autem caritas respectu Dei, proprie loquendo de medio, quia in vita ista non habet terminum.

Ad quartum dicendum quod praxis est operatio quae est perfectio absoluta voluntatis, non tamen quaecumque, sed electio quam concomi-

¹⁵⁴ Aristot., *De anima*, III, c. 10 (433a 14—b 10).

¹⁵⁵ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, II, c. 2 (1103b 26—34).

tatur respectus ordinis respectu alterius actus imperandi, quia ad electionem voluntatis sequitur opus exterius virtutis, si adsit possibilitas materiae, ut eligens dare pecunias dat eas si adsit facultas.

Ad quintum dicendum quod maior est falsa, quia fruitio est perfectissimus actus humanus, et tamen non est speculatio sed finis eius, nec praxis, quia omnis praxis est actio vel factio quae praecise respiciunt temporalia et contingentia quantum talia solum sunt agibilia et factibilia. Fruitio autem non est respectu rei temporalis nisi cum peccato. Ideo probatio illa simpliciter est falsa.

Ad sextum dicendum quod finis speculativae est veritas non relata ad actionem vel factionem, sed est vel veritas absolute ut in scientiis mathematicis vel ordinata ad fruitionem, cuiusmodi est veritas sapientiae, quae extensio non repugnat habitui speculativo, ut praecostensum est, quia illa non est praxis cum non sit respectu operabilis.

Ad auctoritatem primam Commentatoris dicendum quod speculativa ultra veritatem non apponit praxim sicut practica. Quia tamen omnis contemplatio terminatur ad fruitionem, — aliter esset vana —, ideo ultra speculationem oportet speculativam tendere ad fruitionem.

Ad secundam dicendum quod non bene allegatur. Non enim vult quod contemplativa sit practica, quia dicit ibidem, loquens de hac vita¹⁵⁶: "Tertiam ait vitam supremam, scilicet speculativam". Et ideo hoc quod postea dicit¹⁵⁷ quod "non est inconveniens proponentem de operativis virtutibus relinquere practicarum vitarum perfectissimam" non debet referri ad vitam tertiam, scilicet contemplativam, sed ad secundam vitam, scilicet politicam, quae secundum Commentatorem, I *Ethicorum*¹⁵⁸, est nobilissima practicarum. Hoc etiam patet per Lincolniensem¹⁵⁹, in conclusione sexta super dictum locum dicentem quod tractatum de contemplativa vita suspendit usque ad decimum librum. Constat autem quod Philosophus, in X, ponit felicitatem in vita speculativa, sicut patet per Averroem, in prologo super III *Physicorum*¹⁶⁰ et per Philosophum, I *Ethicorum*, cap. 6¹⁶¹, ubi loquens de

¹⁵⁶ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, I (ed. P. F. Mercken, p. 51, lin. 15—16).

¹⁵⁷ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, I (ed. P. F. Mercken, p. 52, lin. 21—24).

¹⁵⁸ Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, I (ed. P. F. Mercken, p. 52, lin. 23).

¹⁵⁹ Pro statu quaestionis quoad conclusiones Lincolnienensis videsis S. Harrison Thomson, "The 'Notulae' of Grossetest on the Nichomachean Ethics" in *Proceedings of the British Academy* 19 (1933), pp. 195—218.

¹⁶⁰ Potius Averroes, *In Aristot. Physicam*, I (ed. Iuntina, IV, Venetiis, 1550, f. 2 ra).

¹⁶¹ Aristot., *Ethica Nicom.*, I, c. 6 (1096a 4—5).

hac vita tertia dicit: "Tertia autem vita est contemplativa, de qua perscrutationem in sequentibus faciemus". Quod exponens Commentator, commento 9 illius capituli¹⁶², dicit sic: "*Vita est speculativa, de qua perscrutationem in sequentibus faciemus*. In decimo enim praesentis negotii de hac tractat". Haec ille.

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¹⁶² Eustratius, *In Aristot. Ethicam*, I (ed. P. F. Mercken, p. 58, lin. 97—99).

REGESTUM CHRONOLOGICUM VITAE SANCTI BERNARDINI SENENSIS EX CHRONICA ORDINIS FR. ALEXANDRI DE RITIIS

In perdocta de chronologia S. Bernardini elucubratione, quam in peculiari Universitatis Catholicae Mediolanensis volumine *San Bernardino da Siena*, Milano, Vita e Pensiero 1945, pp. 445—463, publici iuris fecit P. Dionysius Pacetti, asseritur: “sono necessarie ancora diligenti ricerche per dissipare incertezze cronologiche e per riempire non poche lacune della vita dinamica del grande Apostolo Senese”.

Qua in re ut aliquid conferamus, notum facimus Regestum chronologicum ex opere *Chronica Ordinis Minorum* fratris Alexandri de Ritiis († 1497), quondam in “Biblioteca Provinciale” nunc vero in “Archivio di Stato” civitatis Aquilae, signato S. 73, quod nos apud *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 20 (1927) 320 copiese descripsimus.¹

Notamus quod Regestum non est integrum. Quae exstant verbotenus referimus ex quodam summario positio infra cc. 89—92, cum relativa auctoris citatione foliorum ubi de eodem argumento fit mentio magis diffusa. Quae autem post annum 1438 subsequuntur ex aliis locis eorundem Chronicorum adiecimus, prout infra.

1. Anno Domini 1380 natus est Sanctus Bernardinus M. M., ut infra fol. 200.²

2. Anno Domini 1384 . . . obiit illa domina Nera mater Sancti Bernardini, prout infra fol. 200.

3. In anno 1386 animam suam Tollus suo Creatori restituit, fol. 200.

4. Anno Domini 1387, murtuo Tollo Sancti Bernardini patre, domina Diana, soror matris Sancti Bernardini, cepit habere curam de ipso puero tunc septem annorum. . . . Et in isto anno cepit mittere Bernardinum ad scholas. Fol. 201.

5. Anno domini 1388 Bernardinus in scholis cepit proficere quia tam parvulus magni intellectus et capacitatis erat. Fol. 201.

¹ Idem accurate describit Salvator Piacentino, *Fonti Bernardiniane nell' Archivio di Stato di Aquila*, in “Buletino Abruzzese di Storia Patria”, an. 1950, pp. 47 ss.

² Haec et subsequentes notitiae circa iuventutem S. Bernardini dantur a de Ritiis iuxta vitam dicti Sancti exaratam a Leonardo Benvoglienti, dicatam S. Joanni de Capistrano anno 1446; quaeque edita est a P. F. Van Ortoy in *Analecta Bollandiana*, 21 (1902) 53—80.

6. Anno Domini 1389 usque 1391 ita in scolis in grammaticalibus studiis proficiebat quod nullus ei cohetaneus superare posset, prout hic in fol.201 habetur.

7. Anno Domini 1391 Bernardinus venit Senas sub cura Christofori de Albicescis et eius uxoris, ut hic fol. 201.

8. Anno Domini 1392 Bernardinus predicabat scholaribus, faciabat altaria et similia. Unde ab aliis dicebatur quod iste erit devotus sacerdos, ut hic fol. 201, 202.

9. Anno Domini 1393 Bernardinus percussit pugno quemdam civem inhonestum, inhonesta requirens ab ipso Bernardino, ut infra 202.

10. Anno 1394 Bernardinus adolescens speculum honestatis, molestus ab alio ribaldo cive senensi, congregavit alios sotios suos et lapidibus et vocibus contra illum ex civitate extraxerunt cum magno vituperio audientium et videntium dictos pueros irruentes in illum. Fol. 202.

11. Anno 1395 complevit suum studium in grammaticis ed morali philosophia, ut fol.202 et 203.

12. Anno 1396 Bernardinus dedit se studio sacrorum canonum et sacre scripture, in quo studio valde profecit in tribus annis. Fol. 203.

13. Anno 1397 Tobia de 3° Ordine, soror matris Sancti Bernardini, curam singularem ac amorem habebat ad juvenem Bernardinum, sicut et ipse eam diligebat. Fol. 203.

14. Anno 1398 Bernardinus declaravit Tobie quod ipse philocaptus esset amore sue amasie, scilicet Beate Virginis Marie depicte super portam Camollie. Fol. 203 et 204. (con schizzo a penna di Porta Camollia).

15. Anno 1399 Bernardinus fuit receptus in societate disciplinatorum. Ex qua societate multi sancti viri exierunt qui fuerunt principium aliorum ordinum, puta Montis Oliveti, Carthusiensis et huiusmodi. Et de penitentia, ieiunio, oratione, disciplinis ipsius Bernardini. Fol. 205.

16. Anno 1400 sanctus iuvenis Bernardinus tempore crudelissime pestis, post multos defunctos, in hospitali maiori senensi cum 12 sociis se ad serviendum infirmis occupavit. Fol. 206.

17. Anno 1401 post predictam pestem ipse Bernardinus infirmatus est quasi ad mortem, sed tandem Deus eum eripuit et liberavit a dicta infirmitate quia ad maiora eum vocare volebat. Fol. 207.

18. Anno 1402 spiratus a Domino ut Deo serviret in aliqua religione, sed serviendo cuidam sue consanguinee, domine videlicet Benedicte, quasi centum annorum, et confortatus ab illa ut intraret in ordinem sancti Augustini, quia ipsa erat de 3° Ordine Sancti Augustini, tandem recipere voluit habitum Seraphici Patris Francisci in conventu senensi, de manu religiosissimi viri Fr. Joannis Ristorii, prout fol. 207 et 208.

19. Anno 1403 in die nativitatis Virginis Marie, Bernardinus fecit profexionem in Ordine cum magna devotione in loco devotissimo Columbarie prope Florentiam ubi manebant fratres de Observantia, ad quem locum missus fuit de familia ab ipso fratre Joanne de Ristoro. Fol. 208.

20. Anno 1404 in festo nativitatis Virginis Marie, in quo indutus fuit, profexionem fecit, primam Missam celebravit, et sic solemniter cepit ferventissime predicare; et sua predicatione habuit a domino de dicto hospitali locum extra Senas ut ibi edificaret locum scilicet Capriole, quod et devotissime fecit. Fol. 209.

21. Anno 1405 Bernardinus a Reverendissimo Patre Generali confirmatus fuit ut populo predicaret. Fol. 209.

22. Anno 1406 cepit tam mirabiliter predicare quod per triginta miliaria confluebant populi ad suam predicationem; et quamvis innumeralis populus stetisset ad suam predicationem, tamen ex senoritate sue vocis ab omnibus audiebatur. Fol. 209.

23. Anno 1407. Non solum fideles populi convertebantur ad sermonem et predicationem ipsius Bernardini sed etiam judei, relicto suo cecitatis errore, baptismi gratia sunt adepti. Fol. 209.

24. Anno 1408. Heretici ad hortodoxe incitabantur catholiceque fidei dogma, abscissa quacumque nefaria oppinione, per auditionem dicti Bernardini predicatoris ducuntur. Fol. 209.

25. Anno 1409. Per predicationem Bernardini meretrices, pudore reiecto, nuptui cum honore traduntur. Fol. 209.

26. Anno 1410. Quamplurimi seculares fideles, relicto seculari habitu atque de mundialibus curis egressi, ad Minorum Ordinem ingressi habitum sancte religionis predicatione ipsius Bernardini assument. Fol. 209.³

27. Anno predicto (1422) sanctus pater Bernardinus predicavit Padue et Deus benedictus per illum magnum ostendit miraculum. Fol. 218.

28. Anno 1424 Sanctus Bernardinus predicavit in civitate Luce. Apparuit in aere quedam facula ardens; quod fuit omnibus adstantibus manifestum. Fol. 218 et 219.

29. Anno 1425. Beatus pater Sanctus Bernardinus predicans in uribus Italiae sepe predicabat devotissime de nomine Jesu, quod nonnullis emulis suis displicebat. Fol. 209.

30. Anno Domini 1426. Beatus pater Sanctus Bernardinus predicans in urbe Viterbii, ad cuius predicationem adstabant quidam emuli ordinis Predicatorum qui iniuste accusabant illum apud papam Martinum V; cuius precepto dimisit predicationem ut Romam pergeret, quem ipse

³ Exinde desunt folia citata 209—212.

papa radarguit ad credulitatem emulorum. Sed finaliter, in omnibus ipse patiens, venit Fr. Joannes de Capistrano cum tabula in qua depictum erat Nomen Jesu. Et in disputatione fuerunt convicti emuli et sanctus Bernardinus exaltatus. Fol. 209 et infra.

31. Anno Domini 1433 Sanctus Bernardinus incusatus est a suis emulis coram Eugenio IV. Fol. 211.⁴

32. Anno Domini 1438 Eugenius IV confirmavit Sanctum Bernardinum Vicarium Generalis Ministri, prout ipse minister (Gulielmus de Casale) ordinaverat. Fol. 237.⁵

33. Item anno Domini 1438 Sanctus Bernardinus predicavit in planitie Collis Madii extra Aquilam, ubi adfuit Rex Renatus; et apparuit stella super caput Sancti Bernardini, illamque vidit totus populus qui stabat ad ipsam predicationem. Et predicatio illa fuit in nativitate Virginis gloriose de 12 stellis quibus coronata est Virgo Maria, mystice declaratis. Require in Chronicis Aquile sub anno 1436.⁶

34. (cc. 238—39) A. D. 1440. Constitutiones facte per Fr. Nicolaum de Auximo et confirmate per generalem Ministrum Gulielmum de Casoli instituentem dictum Fr. Nicolaum suum Vicarium in provincia S. Angeli 1439; sed postea per Sanctum Bernardinum Vicarium Generalem, scilicet Ministri Generalis, predicto anno Domini 1440 [revisae], possunt dici Constitutiones Sancti Bernardini. [Incipiunt]: *Volens mihi commissorum* etc. Apud S. Damianum de Asisio 1440, iulii ultima.⁷

35. (cc. 240—41) 1441. Copia littere Sancti Bernardini responsive Fr. Joanni de Capistrano 1441. — *Jam decreveram mittere ad vos duos fratres* etc. Ex loco Capriole 14 februarii 1441.⁸

36. (c. 241^v) 1441. Item copia alterius littere Sancti Bernardini Beato Joanni de Capistrano Ord. Minorum predicatori famoso Mediolani in loco S. Angeli. *Quia officii mei debitum requirit* etc. Ex loco Capriole extra Senas sub die 18 maii 1441.⁹

37. (c. 209^r) 1444. Hic posset poni mors Beati Bernardini, qui obiit Aquile die 20 Maii in die vigilie Ascensionis circa horam vespertinam,

⁴ Cf. E. Longpé in *Archivum Franc. Historicum*, 29 (1936) 161—168; et *Bullettino di Studi Bernadiniani* VI, 155—161.

⁵ Iterum in c. 237. Bulla Eugenii IV Fratrum Ordinis Minorum diei 1 sept. 1438 legitur apud Wadding, ad ann. 1438, n. VI et in *Bull. Franc.* (N.S.) I, 385.

⁶ Hic de Ritiis citat *Cronaca Aquilana dell' anno 1363 al 1485 di Francesco d'Angeluccio di Bazzano*, cuius autem editio apud Muratori, *Antiq. Ital.*, VI, 883, incipit acephala ab an. 1442.

⁷ De praedictis Constitutionibus iam egimus in cit. AFH, an. 1928, p. 94, nota 3.

⁸ Edita l. c. p. 92 s.

⁹ Et haec littera impressa est in *Archivio* cit. p. 94.

quando in choro S. Francisci, ubi obiit, cantabatur antiphona illa: *Pater manifestavi Nomen tuum hominibus*, in anno Domini 1444. De cuius vita, morte et miraculis dicam infra in anno Domini 1450, in quo fuit canonizatus. Ideo in illo anno mihi congruum visum est ponere legendam ipsius sancti. Ideo querant infra in dicto anno 1450, sub quo scribentur que acta sunt de illo ab ipsius die mortis usque ad dictum annum Jubilej.¹⁰

38. (cc. 359—62) 1450. Copia bulle canonizationis S. Bernardini, quam prefatus S. P. Nicolaus V suo proprio intellectu suaque propria manu primitus exaravit.¹¹

39. (cc. 436) 1451. Copia bulle pro capiendi loco S. Bernardini in Aquila.¹²

40. (cc. 441—43) 1454. Copia litterarum B. Joannis de Capistrano ad cives Aquilanos pro capiendi loco S. Bernardini.¹³

41. (cc. 443—44) 1454. Responsiva R. P. Fr. Jacobi de Marchia ad optimum seniore Fr. Joannem de Capistrano postquam inceptus fuit locus S. Bernardini in Aquila.¹⁴

42. (c. 582) 1472. In Anno Domini 1472 fuit facta translatio S. Bernardini de Conventu [S. Francisci] ad ecclesiam novam, et prius describenda est bulla que est in S. Bernardino.¹⁵

43. (c. 598) 1477. Copia gratiarum 12 Cardinalium ponentium indulgentiam in ecclesia S. Bernardini . . . in quatuor festivitibus.¹⁶

44. (c. 648) 1490. Copia brevis pro indulgentia plenaria S. Bernardini confirmantis bullam supradictam ad beneplacitum Sancte Sedis, concessio ab Innocentio 8.¹⁷

(†) P. ANICETUS CHIAPPINI, O. F. M.

¹⁰ Revera sub praedicto anno 1450, post bullam canonizationis S. Bernardini, sequitur tantummodo (cc. 363—392) enarratio 2507 miraculorum iuxta *Librum miraculorum SS. Bernardini Senensis et Ioannis a Capistrano* auctore Fr. Conrado de Freyenstat, de quo agit P. F. Delorme in cit. *Archivo Franciscano*, II (1918) 399—441.

¹¹ Bulla *Misericordias Domini*, Romae 24 maii 1450, legitur apud Wadding ad an. 1450 n. II, et in *Bull. Franc.* (N. S.) I, 700 ss.

¹² Bulla *Inter cetera*, 22 sept. 1451, apud Wadding, ad an. 1451, n. XXXVIII, et in *Bullar.* cit. p. 758.

¹³ Legitur apud N. F. Faraglia, *La Chiesa primitiva ed il monastero di S. Bernardino nell'Aquila*, Frani 1912, pp. 23 ss., et apud P. Vittorino Facchinetti, *S. Bernardino da Siena*, Milano 1933, pp. 540—44.

¹⁴ Edita cum epistola praecedenti l. c.

¹⁵ Bulla Sixti IV *Licet dum militans* diei 1 maii 1472, adest in Wadding sub anno, n. XIII, et in *Bull. Franc.* (N. S.) III, 94. De ipsa translatione fusius in *Chronica Civitatis Aquilae*, fol. 198, et in cit. *Archivo*, 1927, p. 323.

¹⁶ Quorum exemplar legitur apud Wadding sub an. 1472, n. XIV, desumptum a de Ritiis, *Chronica Ordinis*, fol. 598.

¹⁷ Breve Innoc. VII *Concessimus alias plenariam indulgentiam* diei 16 ianuarii 1490, etiam in cit. *Archivo Franciscano*, 1928, p. 299 s.

EINTEILUNG UND ANLIEGEN DER LEGENDA MAIOR S. FRANCISCI BONAVENTURAS

ÜBERSICHT

1. Die Einteilung der *Legenda maior* S. Francisci
 - a. Ihre Kompositionsmethode
 - b. Die Einteilung der Kapitel
 - c. Die Einteilung der „*Miracula post mortem ipsius ostensa*“
 - d. Die Hauptteile der Legende
2. Das Anliegen der *Legenda maior* S. Francisci
 - a. Die Franziskusregel durch Gott gutgeheißen
 - b. Sein heiliges Leben vom Himmel bezeugt
 - c. Seine Sendung im Heilsplan Gottes
 - d. Sein Beitrag zur Kirchenreform

Die vorherrschende Meinung über Bonaventuras *Legenda maior* S. Francisci (LegMai), die um das Jahr 1262 geschrieben wurde, behauptet, sie sei aus den bereits vorliegenden Franziskuslegenden zusammengeschrieben und besitze daher wenig Wert für den Historiker und Hagiographen¹; dabei verkennt man keineswegs ihre hohe Sprachkunst, ihre einer Hagiographie anstehende und religiöse Ausdrucksform und ihre Sicht dieses Heiligenlebens im Heilsplan Gottes². Die Anordnung des Stoffes oder die Einteilung dieser Legende, die auf den ersten Blick nicht erkennbar sind, hat man bisher nur zum Teil beachtet³, ja, sogar meist gar nicht berücksichtigt, obschon sie untrennbar mit dem Anliegen dieser Legende und ihrem „Sitz im Leben“ zusammenhängt. Daher sollen in diesem Beitrag zuerst der äußere Aufbau dieser Legende, ihre Einteilung und ihre einzelnen Perikopen zur Sprache kommen, damit man erkennen kann, welche Kapitel der Seraphische Lehrer mehr als andere heraushebt. Sodann untersucht dieser Beitrag das Anliegen, das Bonaventura mit seiner neuen Franziskuslegende verfolgte und das

¹ W. Goetz, *Die Quellen zur Geschichte des hl. Franz von Assisi*, Gotha 1904, 243—257; M. Bihl, *Praefatio*, in: *AnalFranc* X, LXVI—LXVIII.

² M. Bihl, *Praefatio*, LXVIII f.

³ S. Clasen, *Franziskus, der Engel des sechsten Siegels. Sein Leben nach den Schriften des heiligen Bonaventura* (FranzQuellenschriften 7), Werl/W. 1962, 194—204; *ders.*, *S. Bonaventura S. Francisci Legendae maioris compiler*, in: *ArchFrancHist* 54 (1961) 249—272; 55 (1962) 3—58; 89—314.

sich aus dem Sitz dieser Legende im Leben erschließen läßt. Diese Untersuchung stützt sich auf die kritische Ausgabe, die *M. Bihl* in den *Analecta Franciscana*, Ad Claras Aquas 1941, Band X. veröffentlicht hat; nach ihr sind Kapitel, Perikopen, Seiten und u. U. auch Zeilen angegeben.

1. Die Einteilung der *Legenda maior S. Francisci*

a. Ihre Kompositionsmethode

Der Seraphische Lehrer verwendet in der ganzen Franziskuslegende durchweg dieselbe Methode der Stoffanordnung. Zunächst gibt er in einem Rahmenvers (RV) ganz allgemein den Inhalt des Kapitels oder des Abschnitts eines Kapitels an, ehe er seine eigentliche Erzählung beginnt. Erst dann bringt er die einzelnen Berichte, die er schlicht und ohne Überleitung aneinander reiht. Diese Aufzählung der verschiedenen Fakten, die die generelle Aussage im RV belegen, macht Bonaventura im allgemeinen mit irgendeiner Konjunktion oder einem Adverb kenntlich: *enim*, *etenim* in I 1 (560, 7); II 1 (563, 5); III 1 (567, 6); V 1 (577, 6); 7 (579, 3); 10 (581, 1); VI 6 (584, 4); VII 7 (589, 2); 10 (590, 1); VIII 7 (594, 1); IX 1 (597, 5); 4 (599, 2); XI 1 (605, 6); XII 7 (613, 3); XIII 8 (618, 4); ferner *namque*, *nam* in IV 7 (574, 4); IX 5 (599, 6); X 6 (604, 2); XI 3 (606, 3); 7 (608, 1); 11 (609, 1); XII 8 (613, 8); XIII 1 (615, 5); 6 (617, 1); XV 1 (623, 9); ferner *quidem*, *siquidem* in IV 11 (576, 3); VI 1 (582, 4); X 1 (602, 6); 2 (602, 1); ferner *autem* in III 8 (569, 4); IV 1 (571, 5); XI 14 (610, 1); ferner *quoque* in IV 5 (573, 4); X 6 (604, 2); ferner *idcirco*, *qua de re* in VI 1 (583, 3); XII 1 (610, 5); ferner *igitur*, *itaque* in XII 3 (612, 1); XIII 3 (616, 1); XIV 3 (621, 1); Mir I 1 (627, 7); ferner *proinde* in VII 3 (588, 1); XIII 4 (617, 4); XIV 1 (620, 5); ferner *-que* in II 7 (566, 4); VIII 1 (592, 8); XV 6 (625, 7); schließlich *hanc* in VII 1 (587, 5), *ubi* in X 3 (602, 4), *vere* in XIII 10 (620, 1) und *quippe* in Mir X 8 (651, 1).

Nachdem dann Bonaventura die einzelnen Erzählungen unter das Thema des RV gestellt und aufgeführt hat, schließt er diese Aufzählung im Kapitel oder im Abschnitt eines Kapitels wiederum mit einem Rahmenvers, der noch einmal kurz zusammenfaßt oder auch nur das Kapitel oder den Abschnitt beendet (RVE).

Diese Art, seinen Stoff zu ordnen, wendet Bonaventura, wie schon angedeutet wurde, auch für den Aufbau der einzelnen Abschnitte innerhalb der Kapitel an, mögen diese Untergliederungen in der Überschrift der Kapitel aufgeführt sein oder nicht. Jeder Teilabschnitt eines Kapitels ist in derselben Weise gegliedert und durch einen RVE abgeschlossen.

Wo die Gliederung im Titel des Kapitels angegeben ist, wird sie bei der folgenden Analyse als „Teil“, wo sie nicht angegeben ist, als „Abschnitt“ bezeichnet. Nicht selten, zumal bei Untergliederungen, ist der RV am Ende eines Teiles oder Abschnittes zugleich Abschluß für das Vorhergehende und zugleich Einleitung zum Folgenden; doch läßt sich m. E. dann im Rahmenvers immer der abschließende und einleitende Teil des RV trennen. Schließlich fiel auch die Tatsache auf, daß Bonaventura, der die Kapitel V—XII einschließlich als Einschub bezeichnet (IV 11[577, 26 f.]), sonst stets im RVE am Ende eines Kapitels irgendwie auf den Inhalt des nächsten hinweist; darum sind solche Hinweise im Folgenden durch Kursivdruck kenntlich gemacht. Doch in jenem Einschub über die Tugenden des Franziskus fehlen diese Hinweise am Ende dieser Kapitel V—XI, während er am Ende des Kapitels IV nur generell sagt, er berichte von der Bestätigung der endgültigen Franziskusregel durch Christus *post suarum enarrationem virtutum*.

Diese Kompositionstechnik, bei der der RV die allgemeine Aussage voranstellt, ehe er sich den einzelnen Geschehnissen zuwendet, entspricht zwar der Denkform des Menschen um Dreizehnhundert⁴; doch hat man darin wohl eher einen Beweis für Bonaventuras biblisches Denken zu erblicken, daß er sich auch der Kompositionstechnik des Neuen Testaments bedient, wie er ja auch gern sich der Sprache der Heiligen Schrift bedient, um religiöse Gedanken darzulegen⁵.

b. Die Einteilung der Kapitel

Seiner Franziskuslegende hat Bonaventura einen unvergleichlich schönen und sprachlich meisterhaften Prolog vorangestellt, der am Ende auch kurz die einzelnen Kapitel der Legende nebst ihren Titeln aufführt. Diesem Prolog entspricht am Ende der „*Miracula ipsius post mortem ostensa*“ ein Epilog (Mir X 8 f., 651 f.), der bisher nicht als solcher erkannt worden ist; er schließt sowohl den Bericht über die Wunder des Franziskus nach seinem Tod als auch die ganze Franziskuslegende ab. Sieht man also von Prolog und Epilog ab, so ergibt sich folgender Aufbau der einzelnen Kapitel der Franziskuslegende Bonaventuras:

Kapitel I: { *De conversatione sancti Francisci in habitu saeculari*
RV: *Vir erat in civitate Assisii, Franciscus nomine, cuius memoria*

⁴ F. Siebert, Der Mensch um Dreizehnhundert im Spiegel deutscher Quellen. Studien über Geisteshaltung und Geistesentwicklung (HistStud 206), Berlin 1931, 11—13.

⁵ Th. Soiron, Das Evangelium als Lebensform des Menschen (KathGedanke 11), München-Rom 1925, 4—27.

in benedictione est, pro eo quod Deus ipsum in benedictionibus dulcedinis benigne praeveniens, et de praesentis vitae periculis clementer eripuit et caelestis gratiae donis affluenter implevit (560, 4—7). Zur Erläuterung dieser Erklärung führt er an: 1) Franziskus gibt dem Drängen des Fleisches nicht nach (I 1, 560, 6—11); 2) er besitzt eine Vorliebe für die Armen (I 1, 560, 11—22); 3) und vornehmes Benehmen, weshalb ein einfältiger Mann aus Assisi ihn zu ehren pflegte (I, 1, 560, 23—31); 4) Gott nimmt Besitz von ihm (I 2, 561); 5) Franziskus schaut im Traum einen herrlichen Palast (I 3, 561); 6) er wendet sich betend an Gott (I 4, 561 f); 7) er überwindet sich und küßt einen Aussätzigen (I 5, 562, 1—9); 8) der Gekreuzigte erscheint ihm (I 5, 562, 9—18); 9) er dient den Aussätzigen (I 6, 562, 1—7); 10) er gibt den Armen Almosen (I 6, 562, 7—10); 11) er ehrt die Priester (I 6, 562, 10—12); 12) er bringt zu Rom einen Tag bei den Bettlern zu (I 6, 562, 12—20).

RVE: Agebat autem haec omnia vir Dei Franciscus *nondum habitu vel convictu sequestratus a mundo* (I 6, 563, 20 f).

Kapitel II: De perfecta conversione eius ad Deum et de reparatione ecclesiarum

Teil I: De perfecta conversione eius ad Deum

RV: Quoniam autem servus Altissimi doctorem non habebat aliquem in huiusmodi nisi Christum, addidit adhuc ipsius clementia eum in gratiae visitare dulcedine (II 1, 563, 3 f). — Dann folgen folgende Erzählungen: 1) das Kreuzbild von San Damiano spricht zu ihm (II 1, 563); 2) Franziskus wird von seinem Vater eingekerkert (II 2, 564); 3) und von seiner Mutter befreit (II 3, 564); 4) er verzichtet vor dem Bischof auf sein Erbe (II, 4 564 f); 5) er gerät unter die Räuber (II 5, 565); 6) er erhält zu Gubbio von einem Freund ein Gewand (II 6, 565, 1—4); 7) er dient den Aussätzigen (II 6, 565, 4—9); 8) er heilt einen Aussätzigen (II 6, 565, 9—18).

RVE: Nescio, quod horum magis sit merito admirandum, an humilitatis profunditas in osculo tam benigno, an virtutis praeclaritas in miraculo tam stupendo (II 6, 565, 18 f).

Teil II: De reparatione ecclesiarum

RV: Fundatus iam in Christi humilitate Franciscus ad memoriam reducit obedientiam sibi a cruce iniunctam de Sancti Damiani ecclesia reparanda et tamquam verus obediens Assisium rediit, ut saltem mendicando voci divinae pareret (II 7, 566, 1—3). — Dann folgen: 1) er bettelt für die Kirche San Damiano (II 7, 566, 3—6); 2) er stellt auch die Kirche San Pietro wieder her (II 7, 566, 6—9); 3) und die Portiunkulakirche (II 8, 566, 1—21).

RVE: Nam instar reparatae triplicis fabricae ipsius sancti viri ducatu, secundum dato ab eo formam, regulam et doctrinam Christi triformiter renovanda erat Ecclesia trinaque triumphatura militia salvandorum, sicut et nunc cernimus esse completum (II 8, 566, 21—24).

Kapitel III: De institutione Religionis et approbatione Regulae

Teil I: De institutione Religionis

RV: In ecclesia igitur Virginis Matris Dei moram faciente servo ipsius Francisco et apud eam quae concepit Verbum plenum gratiae et veritatis, continuis insistente gemitibus, ut fieri dignaretur advocata ipsius, meritis Matris misericordiae concepit ipse ac peperit spiritum evangelicae veritatis (III 1, 567, 3—6). — Dann berichtet er: 1) Franziskus hört die Aussendungsrede Christi (III 1, 567, 6—16); 2) und predigt Buße (III 2, 567); 3) er gewinnt als ersten Gefährten Bernhard von Quintavalle (III 3, 567 f); 4) ihm folgen weitere Gefährten (III 4, 568); 5) Silvester schließt sich ihm an (III 5, 568 — 6, 568, 1—3); 6) er erlangt Verzeihung aller Sünden und schaut die Zukunft seiner Bruderschar (III 6, 568 f); 7) er sendet seine Gefährten zur Predigt in die vier Himmelsrichtungen (III 7, 569, 1—22).

RVE: Illis quoque diebus quattuor sibi adhaerentibus viris honestis, ad duodenarium numerum excreverunt (III 7, 569, 22 f).

Teil II: De approbatione Regulae

RV: Cernens autem famulus Christi, paulatim accrescere numerum fratrum scripsit sibi et fratribus suis simplicibus verbis formulam vitae, in qua, sancti Evangelii observantia pro fundamento indissolubili collocata, pauca quaedam alia inseruit, quae ad uniformem vivendi modum necessaria videbantur (III 8, 569, 1—4). Dann berichtet er: 1) Franziskus sieht im Traum einen hohen Baum (III 8, 569, 4—14); 2) er hat Audienz beim Papst (III 9, 570) mit einer Erweiterung durch weitere Einzelzüge (III 9 a, 570 1—13)⁶; 3) Gleichnis von der armen Frau (III 10, 572, 1—12); 4) Gesicht von der einstürzenden Laterankirche (III 10, 571, 12—19).

RVE: Approbavit regulam, dedit de poenitentia praedicanda mandatum et aliis fratribus omnibus, qui servum Dei fuerant comitati, fecit coronas parvulas fieri, ut verbum Dei libere praedicarent (III 10, 571, 19—21).

Kapitel IV: De profectu Ordinis sub manu ipsius et confirmatione regulae prius approbatae

Teil I: De profectu Ordinis

Abschnitt 1: Sein Leben nach dem Evangelium (facere)

RV: Fretus exinde Franciscus superna gratia et auctoritate papali, cum fiducia multa versus vallem Spoletanam iter arripuit, ut Evangelium

⁶ Vgl. AnalFranc X, 570 Anm. 2.

Christi faceret et doceret (IV 1, 571, 3 f) — Dann folgen: 1) Franziskus überlegt mit den Gefährten, wie sie das Evangelium befolgen können (IV 1, 571, 5—16); 2) sein Leben im Spoletotal (IV 2, 572); 3) sein Leben in Rivotorto (IV 3, 572); 4) Franziskus erscheint den fernen Brüdern (IV 4, 572, 1—21).

RVE: Cumque patefaceret plurima, quae sensum transcendebant humanum, vere cognoverunt fratres, super servum suum Franciscum Spiritum Domini in tanta plenitudine quievisse, quod post ipsius doctrinam et vitam erat eis proficisci tutissimum (IV 4, 572, 21—23).

Abschnitt 2: Seine Lehre nach dem Evangelium (docere)

RV: Post haec pusilli gregis pastor Franciscus ad Sanctam Mariam de Portiuncula duodenarium illum fratrum, superna gratia praeunte, deduxit, ut ubi meritis Matris Dei Minorum sumpserat Ordo initium, ipsius illic susciperet auxiliis incrementum (IV 5, 573, 1—4). Dann folgen: 1) seine Predigt (IV 5, 573, 4—9); 2) seine Predigt gewinnt die Pönitenten (IV 6, 573, 1—7); 3) ferner Klara von Assisi (IV 6, 573, 7—9)

RVE: Haec nunc glorificata in caelis, ab Ecclesia digne veneratur in terris, quae filia fuit in Christo sancti patris Francisci pauperculi et mater Pauperum Dominarum (IV 6, 573, 9—11)

Abschnitt 3: Das Wachstum seiner Bruderschar

RV: Multi etiam non solum devotione compuncti, sed et perfectionis Christi desiderio inflammati, omni mundanorum vanitate contempta, Francisci vestigia sequebantur, qui quotidianis succrescentes profectibus, usque ad fines orbis terrae celeriter pervenerunt (IV 7, 574, 1—4). — Dafür folgende Einzelberichte: 1) die Armut der Brüder (IV 7, 574, 4—14); 2) ein Sarazene hat Mitleid mit ihrer Armut (IV 7, 574, 14—23); 4) Bekehrung des Kreuzherrn Morikus (IV 8, 574 f); 5) Vision und Bekehrung der Pazifikus (IV 9, 575, 1—18); 5) das Tau-Zeichen (IV 9, 575, 18—22); 6) Die Generalkapitel (IV 10, 575, 1—7); 7) die Provinzkapitel (IV 10, 575, 7—10); 8) das Provinzkapitel zu Arles (IV 10, 575, 10—19).

RVE: Credendum sane, quod omnipotens Dei virtus, quae Ambrosium, sacrum Antistitem, tumulationi gloriosi concessit interesse Martini, ut pium pontificem pio veneraretur officio, etiam servum suum Franciscum praedicationi praesentavit veracis sui praeconis Antonii, ut approbaret veritatis eloquia, praecipue crucis Christi, cuius erat baiulus et minister (IV 10, 575, 19—23).

Teil II: De confirmatione Regulae prius approbatae

RV: Cum autem, dilatato iam Ordine, vivendi formam per dominum Innocentium approbatam disponeret per successorem ipsius Honorium in

perpetuum facere roborari, huiusmodi fuit a Deo revelatione commonitus (IV 11, 576, 1—3). — Dann folgen: 1) Vision von den Brotkrumen (IV 11, 576, 3—11); 2) Niederschrift der endgültigen Regel (IV 11, 576, 12—21)

RVE: Ad cuius observantiam fratres frequenter inducens, dicebat, se nihil ibi posuisse secundum industriam propriam, sed omnia sic scribi fecisse, sicut sibi fuerant divinitus revelata. Quod ut certius constaret testimonio Dei, paucis admodum evolutis diebus, impressa sunt ei stigmata Domini Iesu digito Dei vivi tamquam bulla summi Pontificis Christi ad confirmationem omnimodam regulae et commendationem auctoris, sicut *post suarum enarrationem miraculorum* suo loco inferius describetur (IV 11, 576, 21—27).

Kapitel V: De austeritate vitae et quomodo creaturae praebebant ei solatium

Teil I: De austeritate vitae

Abschnitt 1: De disciplinae rigiditate

RV: Cum igitur cerneret vir Dei Franciscus suo exemplo ad crucem Christi baiulandam ferventi spiritu plurimos animari, animabatur et ipse tamquam bonus dux exercitus Christi ad palmam victoriae per culmen invictae pervenire virtutis (V 1, 577, 3—5). — Dann folgen: 1) Strenghheit in Speise, Trank und Schlaf (V 1, 577, 5—22); 2) Strenghheit in der Kleidung und im Lager (V 2, 577 f); 3) Selbstzucht (V 3—4, 578 f); 4) Strenghheit gegen Vertraulichkeiten mit Frauen (V 5, 579); 5) und gegen den Müßiggang (V 6, 579).

RVE: Licet autem viribus ad vitam austeram fratres induceret (V 7, 579, 1 f)

Abschnitt 2: De visceribus pietatis

RV: non tamen ei placebat distractionis severitas, quae pietatis non induit viscera nec est discretionis sale condita (V 7, 579, 2 f) — Hierfür folgen die Beispiele: 1) sein Erbarmen mit den Brüdern (V 7, 579 f, 3—13); 2) sein Mitleid mit dem Leidenden Herrn (V 8, 580);

RVE: Malebam siquidem corporalis visus lumen amittere quam lacrimas, quibus oculus mundatur interior, ut Deum videre valeat, repressa devotione spiritus impedire (V 8, 580, 11—13)

Teil II: Quomodo creaturae praebebant ei solatium

Abschnitt 1: Mirabilis coctura (V 9, 580)

RVE: Quia enim ad tantam pervenerat puritatem, ut caro spiritui et spiritus Deo harmonia mirabili concordarent (V 9, 581, 16—18)

Abschnitt 2: De creaturis ei deservientibus

RV: divina ordinatione fiebat, ut creatura Factori suo deserviens, voluntati et imperio eius mirabiliter subiaceret (V 9, 581, 18 f). — Dann

folgen: 1) der wunderbare Trank (V 10, 581); 2) das wunderbare Lautenspiel (V 11, 581); 3) das wunderbare Licht vom Himmel (V 12, 581, 1—11).

RVE: Perpende, quam mirandae fuerit vir iste munditiae, quanta virtutis, ad cuius nutum suum ignis ardorem contemperat, aqua saporem commutat, angelica praebet melodia solatium et divina lux ducatum, ut sic sanctificatis viri sancti sensibus omnis probetur mundi machina deservire (V 12, 581 f, 11—15).

Kapitel VI: De humilitate et obedientia et de condescensionibus divinis sibi factis ad nutum

Teil I: De humilitate

RV: Omnium virtutum custos et decor humilitas, copiosa virum Dei ubertate repleverat (VII 1, 582, 3 f). — Hierfür bringt er an Einzelheiten: 1) seine Selbstverachtung (VI 1, 582, 4—20); 2) seine Selbstbeschämung (VI 2, 582 f); 3) das Verbergen seiner Tugenden (VI 3, 583).

RVE: Ut autem pluribus modis negotiator hic evangelicus lucraretur ac totum praesens tempus confluret in meritum (VI 4, 583, 1 f).

Teil II: De obedientia

RV: non tam praeesse voluit quam subesse, nec tam praecipere quam parere (VI 4, 583, 2 f). — Dann bringt er als Beispiele hierfür 1) seine Bitte um einen Guardian (VI 4, 583, 3—18); 2) seine Bereitschaft, von der Leitung der Brüder zurückzutreten (VI 5, 584, 1—8); 3) der Name „Minderbrüder“ (VI 5, 584, 8—14); 4) seine Weigerung, daß seine Brüder Bischöfe werden (VI 5, 584, 15—21).

RVE: Et quoniam humilitatem tam in se quam in subditis cunctis praeferebat honoribus (VI 6, 584, 1 f)

Teil III: De condescensionibus divinis sibi factis ad nutum

RV: amator humilium Deus altioribus ipsum dignum iudicabat fastigiis, secundum quod uni fratri, viro virtutis et devotionis praecipuae, visio caelitus ostensa monstravit (VI 6, 584, 2—4). — Es folgen dann folgende Wunder: 1) Vision von dem Engelsthron (VI 6, 584 f, 4—19); 2) die wunderbare Übertragung der Reliquien (VI 7, 585); 3) seine Demut, die den Bischof von Imola überwindet (VI 8, 585); 4) seine Macht über die bösen Geister (VI 9, 585 f); 5) sein Sieg über sie zu Rom (VI 10, 586); 6) Wunder der Kapuze, die im Feuer nicht verbrannte (VI 11, 586, 1—12).

RVE: Digne itaque sectanda est Francisci humilitas, quae tam miram in terris etiam dignitatem obtinuit, ut Deum inclinaret ad votum et hominis immutaret affectum, daemonum protervitatem suo iussu propelleret et flammaram voracitatem solo nutu refrenaret. Revera haec est,

quae possessores suos exaltans, dum omnibus reverentiam exhibet, ab omnibus promeretur honorem (VI 11, 586 f, 12—17)

Kapitel VII: De amore paupertatis et mira suppletionem defectuum

Teil I: De amore paupertatis

Abschnitt 1: De paupertate Ordinis fundamento

RV: Inter cetera charismatum dona, quae a largo Datore Franciscus obtinuit, praerogativa quadam speciali promeruit in divitias simplicitatis excrescere per altissimae paupertatis amorem (VII 1, 587, 3—5). Dann folgen als Belege hierfür: 1) die Armut Jesu (VII 1, 587, 5—12); 2) die Armut Mariens (VII 1, 587, 12—19); 3) Verzicht auf Gelehrsamkeit (VII 2, 587, 1—5); 4) Pilger und Fremdlinge auf Erden (VII 2, 587, 5—10); 5) Armut der Häuser (VII 2, 587 f, 10—12).

RVE: Hanc sui dicebat Ordinis fundamentum (VII 2, 588, 13)

Abschnitt 2: De eversione paupertatis ac desponsatione

RV: cui substrato primarie sic omnis structura religionis innititur, ut ipsius firmitate firmetur et eversione funditus evertatur (VII 2, 588, 13 f). — Hierfür bringt er folgende Einzelheiten: 1) der Verzicht zugunsten der Armen (VII 3, 588); 2) Verzicht auf die Güter der Eintretenden (VII 4, 588); 3) die Gefahren des Geldes (VII 5, 588 f); 4) die Erscheinung der drei Frauen (VII 6, 589)

RVE: Propter sanctae paupertatis amorem (VII 7, 589, 1)

Abschnitt 3: De amore mendicitatis

RV: omnipotentis Dei famulus eleemosynis ostiatim quaesitis utebatur multo libentius quam oblatis (VII 7, 589, 1 f). — Dann folgen: Franziskus erbittet selbst Almosen (VII 7, 2—13); 2) und ermahnt auch die Seinen dazu (VIII 8, 590); 3) er erscheint als Pilger und bittet um Almosen (VII 9, 590, 1—7)

RVE: Et quoniam in petendis eleemosynis non quaestus agebatur cupidine, sed spiritus liberate (VII 9, 590, 8 f)

Teil II: De mira suppletionem defectuum

RV: Pater pauperum Deus specialem de ipso curam gerere videbatur (VII 9, 590, 9). — Dann folgen einige Wunder: 1) die Ritter in seiner Begleitung leben von Almosen (VII 10, 590); 2) das Haus des Arztes wird vor dem Einsturz bewahrt (VII 11, 591); 3) ein Bauer wird vor dem Verdurstenden errettet (VII 12, 591); 4) Gott vermehrt die Lebensmittel (VII 13, 591, 1—6)

RVE: Procul igitur a pauperibus Christi diffidentia omnis abscedat. Si enim paupertas Francisci adeo copiosae sufficientiae fuit, ut subvenientium sibi defectus tam mira virtute suppleret, quod nec cibus nec potus nec domus deesset, cum pecuniae et artis et naturae facultas defecerat:

multo magis illa merebitur, quae usitato divinae providentiae ordine communiter conceduntur. Si, inquam, petrae siccitas ad pauperis vocem abundans poculum sitiendi propinavit pauperculo, nil iam inter omnia suum denegabit obsequium iis, qui pro Auctore omnium omnia reliquerunt (VII 13, 591 f, 6—12)

Kapitel VIII: De pietatis affectu et quomodo ratione carentia videbantur ad ipsum affici

Teil I: De pietatis affectu

RV: Pietas vera, quae secundum Apostolum ad omnia valet, adeo cor Francisci repleverat ac penetraverat viscera, ut totum videretur virum Dei in suum dominium vindicasse. Haec est, quae ipsum per devotionem sursum agebat in Deum, per compassionem transformabat in Christum, per condescensionem inclinabat ad proximum et per universalem conciliationem ad singula refigurabat ad innocentiae statum (VIII 1, 592, 3—7). — Es folgen: 1) sein Erbarmen mit den Seelen (VIII 1, 592, 8—16); 2) Rettung der Seelen ist Aufgabe des Predigers (VIII 2, 592); 3) seine Freude über jene, die gutes Beispiel geben (VIII 3, 592, 1—6); seine Trauer über schlechtes Beispiel (VIII 3, 593, 6—18); 5) sein Abscheu vor Verleumdern (VIII 4, 593); 6) sein Mitleid mit Armen und Elenden (VIII 5, 593 f); 7) seine Liebe zur vernunftlosen Schöpfung (VIII 6, 594, 1—16)

RVE: Advertat igitur humana impietas, quali poena sit ferienda finaliter, si tam horrenda morte percussa est ferocitas bestialis (VIII 6, 594, 594, 16 f)

Teil II: Quomodo ratione carentia videbantur ad ipsum affici

RV: perpendat et fidelis devotio, quam in servo Dei pietas fuerit admirandae virtutis et copiosae dulcedinis, ut ei applauderet suo modo etiam natura brutorum (VIII 6, 594, 17—19). Dann folgen als Beispiele hierfür: 1) die Lämmer (VIII 7, 594 f); 2) die Hasen, Kaninchen, der Flußvogel, der Fisch im See von Perugia (VIII 8, 595); 3) die Vögel (VIII 9, 595 f, 1—10); 4) Die Zikade (VIII 9, 596, 10—21); 5) der Fasan (VIII 10, 596, 1—9); 6) die Vögel auf dem La Verna (VIII 10, 596, 9—14); 7) der Falke (VIII 10, 596, 14—23); 8) Heimsuchung Greccios durch Wölfe und Hagelschlag (VIII 11, 597, 1—16).

RVE: Pie igitur sentiendum de pietate viri beati, quae tam mirae dulcedinis et virtutis fuit, ut domaret ferocia, domesticaret silvestria, mansueta doceret et brutorum naturam homini iam lapso rebellem ad sui obedientiam inclinaret. Vere haec est, quae cuncta sibi creaturas confoederans, valet ad omnia, promissionem habens vitae, quae nunc est et futurae (VIII 11, 597, 16—20).

*Kapitel IX: De fervore caritatis et desiderio martyrii**Teil I: De fervore caritatis**Abschnitt 1: seine Liebe*

RV: Caritatem ferventem, qua sponsi amicus Franciscus ardebat, quis enarrare sufficiat? Totus namque quasi quidem carbo ignitus divini amoris flamma videbatur absorptus (IX 1, 597, 3—5). — Dann schildert die Legende 1) seine Liebe zu Gott (IX 1, 597 f, 5—18); 2) zu Christus (IX 2, 598); zur Gottesmutter (IX 3, 598, 1—5); 4) zu den Engeln (IX 3, 598, 5—10); 5) zu den Apostelfürsten (IX 3, 598, 10—19).

RVE: Sic autem eum caritatis excessiva devotio sursum in divina ferebat (IX 4, 599, 1)

Abschnitt 2: Sein Seeleneifer

RV: ut eiusdem affectuosa benignitas ad naturae consortes et gratiae dilataret (IX 4, 1 f). — Dann handelt sie von der Liebe zu den unsterblichen Seelen (IX 4, 599, 2—11)

RVE: Dicebat enim: Si linguis hominum loquar et Angelorum, caritatem autem in meipso non habeam et proximis virtutum exempla non monstrem, parum prosum aliis, mihi nihil (IX 4, 599, 11—13)

Teil II: De desiderio martyrii

RV: Ferventi quoque caritatis incendio gloriosum sanctorum Martyrum aemulabatur triumphum, in quibus nec amoris flamma exstingui, nec fortitudo potuit infirmari. Desiderabat propterea et ipse, illa perfecta caritate succensus, quae foris mittit timorem, per martyrii flammam hostiam Domino se offerre viventem, ut et vicem Christo pro nobis morienti rependeret et ad divinum amorem ceteros provocaret (IX 5, 599, 1—5). — Dann folgen sein Missionsversuch 1) in Syrien (IX 5, 599, 6—25); 2) in Marokko (IX 6, 600); 3) bei dem Sultan von Babylon (IX 7—9, 600 f).

RVE: Sic utique factum est, ut ignis ille divinus adhuc perfectius ipsius aestuaret in corde, ut post patentius evaporaret in carne. O vere beatum virum, cuius caro, etsi tyrannico ferro non caeditur, occisi tamen agni similitudine non privatur! O, inquam, vere ac plene beatum, cuius animam, etsi gladius persecutoris non abstulit, palmam tamen martyrii non amisit' (IX 9, 601, 6—11).

*Kapitel X: De studio et virtute orationis**Abschnitt 1: Die Notwendigkeit des Gebetes*

RV: Sentiens servus Christi Franciscus corpore se peregrinum a Domino, cum iam ad terrena foris desideria per Christi caritatem totus esset insensibilis factus, ne foret absque consolatione Dilecti, sine intermissione orans, spiritum Deo contendebat exhibere praesentem (X 1,

602, 3—6). Dann folgen: 1) sein Beispiel (X; 602, 6—10); seine Lehre (X 1, 602, 10—13).

RVE: Nam ambulans et sedens, intus et foris, laborans et vacans, orationi adeo erat intentus, ut illi videretur non solum quid erat in eo cordis et corporis, verum etiam operis et temporis dedicasse (X 1, 602, 13—15).

Abschnitt 2: Seine Beschauung

RV: Solitus erat nullam visitationem Spiritus cum negligentia praeterire (X 2, 602, 1). — Dann folgen 1) seine häufige Beschauung (X 2, 602, 1—7); 2) Beispiel dafür (X 2, 602, 7—16)

RVE: Et quia in oratione perceperat, sancti Spiritus desideratam praesentiam tanto familiarius se offerre precantibus (X 3, 602, 1 f)

Abschnitt 3: seine Liebe zur Einsamkeit

RV: quanto plus invenit elongatos a strepitu mundanorum, ideo loca solitaria quaerens, ad solitudines et ecclesias derelictas oraturus nocte pergebat (X 3, 602, 2—4). — Dann folgen: 1) sein Kampf mit den bösen Geistern (X 3, 602 f, 4—12); 2) sein Beten (X 4, 603); 3) die Kraft seines Gebetes erfahren der Bischof von Assisi (X 5, 603 f, 1—8); 4) und der Abt von Santa Giustina (X 5, 604, 8—17)

RVE: Maiore proinde circa Ordinem semper amore flagravat multisque factum pro miraculo retulit (X 5, 604, 17 f).

Abschnitt 4: Sein Stundengebet

RV: Solitus erat vir sanctus horas canonicas non minus timorate Deo persolvere quam devote (X 6, 604, 1 f). — Dann folgen: 1) seine Andacht und Ehrfurcht beim Stundengebet (X 6, 604, 2—8); 2) seine Furcht vor Zerstreuung (X 6, 604, 8—11); 3) hierfür ein Beispiel (X 6, 604, 11—15).

RVE: Psalmos cum tanta mentis et spiritus attentione dicebat, quasi Deum praesentem haberet (X 6, 604, 15 f)

Abschnitt 5: Seine Ehrfurcht vor dem Namen Gottes

RV: et cum nomen Domini in ipsis occurreret, prae suavitatis dulcedine labia sua lingere videbatur (X 6, 604, 16 f). — Dann folgen: 1) seine Ehrfurcht vor dem geschriebenen Namen Gottes (X 6, 604, 17—21); 2) und vor dem Namen Jesu (X 6, 604, 21—23); 3) Beispiel der Weihnacht zu Greccio (X 7, 604 f, 1—15).

RVE: Hanc quidem devoti militis visionem non solum videntis sanctitas credibilem facit, sed et designata veritas comprobatur, et miracula subsequuta confirmant. Nam exemplum Francisci consideratum a mundo, excitativum est cordium in fide Christi torpentium, et foenum praesepii reservatum a populo mirabiliter sanativum brutorum languentium et

aliarum repulsivum pestium diversarum, glorificante Deo per omnia servum suum sanctaeque orationis efficaciam evidentibus miraculorum prodigiis demonstrante (X 7, 605, 15—21).

Kapitel XI: De intelligentia Scripturarum et spiritu prophetiae

Teil I: De intelligentia Scripturarum

RV: Ad tantam autem mentis serenitatem indefessum orationis studium cum continua exercitatione virtutum virum Dei perduxerat, ut, quamvis non habuerit sacrarum litterarum peritiam per doctrinam, aeternae tamen lucis irradiatus fulgoribus, Scripturarum profunda miro intellectus scrutaretur acumine (XI 1, 605, 3—6). — Dann folgen: 1) sein heiliges Wissen von Gott (XI 1, 605 f, 6—18); 2) Beispiel hierfür (XI 2, 606, 1—6); 3) seine Unkenntnis in der Wissenschaft (XI 2, 606, 6 f).

RVE: Nec absonum, si vir sanctus Scripturarum a Deo intellectum acceperat, cum per imitationem Christi perfectam veritatem ipsarum descriptam gestaret in opere et per sancti Spiritus unctionem plenariam, Doctorem earum apud se haberet in corde (XI 2, 606, 7—10).

Teil II: De spiritu prophetiae

RV: Adeo in ipso claruit spiritus prophetiae, ut et praevideret futura et cordium contueretur occulta, absentia quoque velut praesentia cerne-
ret et se praesentem absentibus mirabiliter exhiberet (XI 3, 606, 1—3).

Abschnitt 1: Franziskus sagt Zukünftiges voraus, nämlich: 1) die Niederlage der Kreuzfahrer bei Damiette (XI 3, 606, 3—17); 2) den Tod eines Ritters aus Celano (XI 4, 606 f); 3) die Strafe des Pfründners Gedeon (XI 5, 607); 4) die Bekehrung eines Ehemannes (XI 6, 607, 1—11).

RVE: Miranda certe in viro Dei spiritus prophetiae virtus, qua et membris iam arentibus restituebat vigorem et duris imprimebat cordibus pietatem, quamquam non minus eiusdem sit stupenda limpeditas, qua sic futurorum praegnoscebat eventum (XI 6, 607 f, 11—14)

Abschnitt 2: er kennt die Herzensgeheimnisse

RV: ut etiam conscientiarum scrutaretur arcanum, quasi alter Eliseus duplicem Eliae spiritum assecutus (XI 6, 608, 14—16). Dann folgen: 1) er kennt den Seelenzustand eines Ordensmanns (XI 7, 608); 2) er spricht mit Leonhard von Assisi über dessen verborgene Gedanken (XI 8, 608); 3) er weiß von dem stillen Wunsch zweier anderer Brüder (XI 9, 608 f); 4) und von der Heuchelei eines andern Bruders (XI 10, 609, 1—10)

RVE: Multorum quoque per hunc modum, qui stare videbantur, ruinam, sed et plurium perversorum conversionem ad Christum immobili veritate praenuntians, appropinquasse videbatur ad aeternae lucis speculum contemplandum (XI 10, 609, 10—13)

Abschnitt 3: er sieht Fernes gegenwärtig

RV: cuius fulgore mirabili absentia corporaliter, tanquam si essent praesentia, mentis eius cernebat obtutus (XI 10, 609, 13 f) — Er sieht nämlich: 1) den Ungehorsam eines Bruders (XI 1, 609); 2) jene Gefährten, die gern seinen Segen hätten (XI 12, 609); 3) das Verhalten zweier Brüder während der Reise (XI 13, 609 f, 1—8).

RVE: Simulque duo in una illius claruere ruina: aequitas scilicet divinae iustitiae et perspicacitas spiritus prophetiae (XI 13, 610, 8 f)

Abschnitt 4: er erscheint den fern von ihm weilenden Brüdern

Qualiter autem absentibus se praesentem exhibuit, divina faciente virtute, evidenter ex superioribus innotescit, si revocetur ad mentem, qualiter absens in curru igneo fratribus transfiguratus apparuit⁷, et quomodo se Arelatensi capitulo in crucis effigie praesentavit⁸ (XI 14, 610, 1—4).

RVF: Quod factum esse divina dispositione credendum est, ut ex praesentiae corporalis apparitione mirabili patenter claresceret, quam praesens et pervius spiritus eius luci sapientiae foret aeternae, quae omnibus mobilibus mobilior est et ubique attingens propter sui munditiam, per nationes in animas sanctas se transfert et Dei amicos et prophetas constituit. Simplicibus enim et parvulis sua pandere solet mysteria Doctor excelsus, sicut prius apparuit in David, prophetarum eximio, et post in Apostolorum principe Petro et tandem in pauperculo Christi Francisco. Hi enim, cum essent litterarum imperitia simplices, facti sunt sancti Spiritus eruditione illustres: is quidem pastor, ut gregem pasceret Synagogae de Aegypto eductum; iste piscator, ut sagenam repleret Ecclesiae multiformitate credentium; hic autem negotiator, ut margaritam emeret evangelicae vitae, venditis et dispersis omnibus propter Christum (XI 14, 610, 4—15).

*Kapitel XII: De efficacia praedicandi et gratia sanitarum**Teil I: De efficacia praedicandi**Abschnitt 1: seine Zweifel*

RV: Fidelis revera famulus et minister Christi Franciscus, ut cuncta fideliter et perfecte perageret, illis potissime virtutum exercitiis intendebat, quae, sacro dictante Spiritu, Deo suo magis placere cognoverat (XII 1, 610, 3—5). Dann folgen: 1) seine Zweifel (XII 1, 610 f, 5—24); 2) Befragung göttlichen Willens (XII 1, 611, 25 — 2, 611, 6); 3) die Antwort (XII 2, 611, 6—14).

⁷ LegMai IV 4, 572 f.

⁸ A.a.O. 10, 575 f.

RVE: Revertentibus itaque fratribus et Dei, iuxta quod acceperant, indicantibus voluntatem, exurgens continuo succinxit se, nullaue prorsus contracta mora, iter aggressus est (XII 2, 611, 14—16).

Abschnitt 2: seine Predigtstätigkeit

RV: Ibat autem cum tanto fervore, ut divinum exsequeretur imperium, tamque celeriter percurrerat, ac si, facta manu Domini super eum, novam induisset e caelo virtutem (XII 2, 611, 17 f). — Dann folgen: 1) die Vogelpredigt (XII 3, 612); 2) die Predigt zu Alviano (XII 4, 612); 3) die Erzählung von der Schwalbe zu Parma (XII 5, 612); 4) die Schiffspredigt zu Gaeta (XII 6, 612 f, 1—9).

RVE: Quis igitur tam obstinatae mentis esset et impiae, quod praedicationem Francisci contemneret, cuius miranda fiebant virtute, ut non solum carentia ratione disciplinam susciperent, verum etiam inanimata corpora praedicanti servirent? (XII 6, 613, 9—12).

Abschnitt 3: die Wirkung seiner Predigt

RV: Aderat equidem servo suo Francisco, ad quaecumque pergeret, is qui eum unxerat et miserat, Spiritus Domini et ipse Dei virtus et sapientia Christus, ut sanae doctrinae verbis afflueret et magnae potentiae miraculis coruscaret (XII 7, 613, 1—3). — Dann folgen: 1) seine Predigtweise (XII 7, 613, 3—6); 2) seine Predigt vor dem Papste (XII 7, 613, 6—13); 3) seine Predigt durch Tun und Lehren (XII 8, 613, 1—5).

RVE: Omnis aetas omnisque sexus properabat virum novum mundo caelitus datum et cernere et audire (XII 8, 613, 5 f).

Teil II: De gratia sanitatum

RV: Ipse vero per diversas regiones progrediens, evangelizabat ardentem, Domino cooperante et sermonem confirmante sequentibus signis (XII 8, 613, 6 f). — Dann folgen: 1) das Wunder seiner Predigt (XII 8, 613, 8—11); 2) Heilungen zu Toscanella (XII 9, 613, 1—5); 3) zu Narni (XII 9, 613 f, 5—7); 4) zu Rieti (XII 9, 614, 7—10); 5) zu Orte (XII 9, 614, 10—13); 6) zu Gubbio (XII 10, 614, 1—5); 7) zu Bevagna (XII 10, 614, 5 f); 8) zu Narni (XII 10, 614, 7 f); 9) zu Bologna (XII 10, 614, 8—13); 10) zu San Gemini (XII 10, 614, 13—17); 11) zu Città di Castello (XII 10, 614, 17—19); 12) Heilung eines kranken Bruders (XII 11, 614, 1—9); 13) Errettung bei schwerer Geburt (XII 11, 614 f, 9—15); 14) Heilung durch den Strick des Heiligen (XII 11, 615, 15—19); 15) und durch von ihm gesegnete Brote (XII 11, 615, 19—21).

RVE: Cum hiis et aliis multis miraculorum prodigiis praeco Christi praedicans coruscaret, attendebatur his quae dicebantur ab eo, ac si Angelus Domini loqueretur. Excellens namque in ipso praerogativa virtutum, prophetiae spiritus, efficacia miraculorum, oraculum de prae-

dicando caelitus datum, obedientia creaturarum ratione carentium, vehemens immutatio cordium ad verborum ipsius auditum, eruditio eius a Spiritu sancto praeter humanam doctrinam, praedicandi auctoritas a Summo Pontifice non sine revelatione concessa, insuper et Regula, in qua forma praedicandi exprimitur, ab eodem Christi vicario confirmata, *summi quoque Regis signacula per modum sigilli corpori eius impressa* tanquam testimonia decem toti saeculo indubitanter affirmant, Christi praeconem Franciscum et venerandum officio et doctrina authenticum et admirabilem sanctitate, ac per hoc tamquam vere Dei nuntium Christi Evangelium praedicasse (XII 12, 615).

Kapitel XIII: De stigmatibus sacris

Abschnitt 1: seine Gleichförmigkeit mit Christus

RV: Mos erat angelico viro Francisco numquam otiari a bono, quin potius instar spirituum supernorum in scala Iacob aut ascendebat in Deum, aut descendebat ad proximum (XIII 1, 615, 3—5). — Dann folgen: 1) sein Verlangen nach der Einsamkeit (XIII 1, 615, 5—10); 2) seine Michaelsfasten zu La Verna (XIII 1, 615 f, 10—18); 3) Befragung des Willens Gottes (XIII 2, 616, 1—10).

RVE: Excreverat quidem in eo insuperabile amoris incendium boni Iesu in lampades ignis atque flammaram (XIII 2, 616, 11 f)

Abschnitt 2: die Einprägung der Wundmale

RV: ut aquae multae caritatem eius tam validam exstinguere non valerent (XIII 2, 616, 12 f). — Dann folgen: 1) die Erscheinung des Seraphs (XIII 3, 616, 1—11); 2) die Verwunderung des Heiligen (XIII 3, 616, 12—18); 3) die Wundmale (XIII 3, 617, 19—26).

RVE: Cernens autem Christi servus, quod stigmata carni tam luculenter impressa socios familiares latere non possent (XIII 4, 617, 1 f)

Abschnitt 3: Zweifel des Heiligen

RV: timens nihilominus publicare Domini sacramentum, in magno positus fuit dubitationis agone, utrum videlicet quod viderat diceret, vel taceret (XIII 4, 617, 2—4). — Dann folgen: 1) sein Gespräch mit Bruder Illuminatus (XIII 4, 617, 4—14); 2) die verborgenen Worte des Seraphs (XIII 4, 617, 14 f); 3) Franziskus dem Moses vergleichbar (XIII 5, 617, 1—16).

RVE: Et quoniam sacramentum Regis abscondere bonum est, ideo secreti regalis vir conscius signacula illa sacra pro viribus occultabat (XIII 5, 617, 6 f).

Abschnitt 4: die Offenbarung der Wundmale durch Wunder

RV: Verum quia Dei est ad gloriam suam magna revelare, quae facit, Dominus ipse, qui signacula illa secrete impresserat, miracula quaedam

aperte per ipsa monstravit, ut illorum occulta et mira vis stigmatum pateret claritate signorum (XIII 5, 617, 7—10). — Dann folgen: 1) Wunder zu Rieti (XIII 6, 617 f); 2) Befreiung von Hagelschlag (XIII 7, 618, 1—6); 3) Wunderbare Erwärmung eines frierenden Bauern (XIII 7, 618, 6—18).

RVE: Certis itaque constat indiciis, sacra illa signacula illius impressa fuisse virtute, qui operatione seraphica purgat, illuminat et inflamat, cum ipsa forinsecus expurgando a peste salutem, serenitatem et calorem corporibus efficacia mira conferrent, sicut et post mortem evidentioribus est demonstratum prodigiis suo loco posterius adnotatis (XIII 7, 618, 18—21)

Abschnitt 5: Zeugen seiner Wundmale

RV: Ipse vero, licet thesaurum inventum in agro multa diligentia studeret abscondere, latere tamen non potuit, quin aliqui stigmata manuum viderent ac pedum, quamquam manus quasi semper portaret contactas et pedibus ex tunc incederet calceatis (XIII 8, 618, 1—4). — Dann folgen: 1) die Zeugen der Wundmale an Händen und Füßen (XIII 8, 618 f, 4—16); 2) die Zeugen der Seitenwunde (XIII 8, 619, 17—29); 3) die Bedeutung der Wundmale (XIII 9, 619, 1 f).

RVE: Iam per haec signa certissima, non duobus vel tribus testibus ad sufficientiam, sed quam plurimis ad superabundantiam comprobata (XIII 9, 619, 7—9)

Abschnitt 6: die Wundmale als Krönung des Franziskuslebens

RV: testimonia Dei in te et per te credibilia facta nimis omne tollunt infidelibus excusationis velamen, dum credentes in fide stabiliunt, spei fiducia sursum agunt et igne caritatis accendunt (XIII 9, 619 f, 9—11). — Dann folgen die sieben Zeichen des Kreuzes im Franziskusleben (XIII 10, 620, 1—16).

RVE: Ecce, iam septem apparitionibus crucis Christi in te et circa te secundum ordinem temporum mirabiliter exhibitis et monstratis, quasi sex gradibus ad istam septimam, in qua finaliter requiesceres, pervenisti. Christi namque crux in tuae conversionis exordio tam proposita quam assumpta et dehinc in conversationis progressu per vitam probatissimam baiulata in te ipso continue et in exemplum aliis demonstrata, tanta certitudinis claritate ostendit *evangelicae perfectionis apicem te finaliter conclusisse*, ut demonstrationem hanc christianae sapientiae in tuae carnis pulvere exaratam nullus vere devotus abiciat, nullus vere fidelis impugnet, nullus vere humilis parvipendat, cum sit vere divinitus expressa et omni acceptione digna (XIII 10, 620, 16—25).

*Kapitel XIV: De patientia ipsius et transitu mortis**Teil I: De patientia ipsius*

RV: Christo igitur iam cruci confixus Franciscus tam carne quam spiritu, non solum seraphico amore ardebat in Deum, verum etiam sitiēbat cum Christo crucifixo multitudinem salvandorum (XIV 1, 620, 3—5). — Dann folgen: 1) sein ungebrochener Eifer (XIV 1, 620, 5—16); 2) seine „Schwestern“ Krankheiten (XIV 2, 621, 1—7); 3) seine Geduld (XIV 2, 621, 7—17)

RVE: Videbatur propterea fratribus, quod quasi alterum Iob viderent, cui, cum languor cresceret carnis, crescebat simul et vigor mentis (XIV 2, 621, 17 f).

Teil II: De transitu mortis

RV: Ipse autem obitum suum longe ante praescivit, dieque transitus imminente, dixit fratribus sui corporis tabernaculum deponendum in proximo, quemadmodum sibi fuerat revelatum a Christo (XIV 2, 621, 18—21). — Dann folgen: 1) die Rückkehr nach Portiunkula (XIV 3, 621 f); 2) seine Liebe zur Armut im Tode (XIV 4, 622, 1—9); 3) sein letzter Auftrag (XIV 4, 622, 9—17); 4) seine letzten Mahnungen (XIV 5, 622, 1—11); 5) Lesung des Johannesevangeliums (XIV 5, 622, 11—15); 6) sein Heimgang (XIV 6, 623, 1 f); 7) Gesichte vom Heimgang des Heiligen (XIV 6, 623, 2—18)

RVE: Alaudae aves, lucis amicae et crepusculorum tenebras horrescentes, hora transitus sancti viri, cum iam esset noctis secuturæ crepusculum, venerunt in multitudine magna supra tectum domus et diu cum insolita quadam iubilatione rotantes, *gloriae Sancti, qui eas ad divinam laudem invitare solitus erat, tam iucundum quam evidens testimonium perhibebant* (XIV 6, 623, 19—23)

*Kapitel XV: De canonisatione et transitu ipsius**Teil I: (De sepultura Sancti)⁹*

RV: Franciscus igitur, servus et amicus Altissimi, Ordinis Minorum Fratrum institutor et dux, paupertatis professor, poenitentiae forma, veritatis praeco, sanctitatis speculum et totius evangelicae perfectionis exemplar, superna praeventus gratia, ordinato progressu ab infimis pervenit ad summa. Hunc virum mirabilem, utpote paupertate prae-divitem, humilitate sublimem, mortificatione vividum, simplicitate

⁹ In der handschriftlichen Überlieferung ist der Titel des cap. XV von einzelnen Handschriften verschieden überliefert, und auch der Titel dieses Kapitels in der Edition stimmt mit dessen Inhalt nicht überein; darum wurde er bei der Gliederung der einzelnen Teile des Kapitels ergänzt.

prudentem omnique morum honestate conspicuum, quem in vita Dominus mirabiliter effecerat clarum, in morte fecit incomparabiliter clariorem (XV 1, 623, 3—9). — Dann folgen: 1) die vorweggenommene Herrlichkeit am Leibe des Toten (XV 1, 623, 9—14); 2) die Verehrung seiner Wundmale (XV 2, 624); 3) das Aussehen seines Leibes und seiner Wundmale (XV 3, 624); 4) die Verehrung der Bürger für den Toten (XV 4, 624, 1—5); 5) die Zweifel Hieronymus (XV 4, 624, 5—12); 6) sein Begräbnis (XV 5, 624 f).

RVE: Transiit autem venerabilis Pater ex huius mundi naufragio anno dominicae Incarnationis millesimo ducentesimo vigesimo sexto, quarto nonas Octobris, die sabbati in sero, sepultus in die dominico (XV 6, 625, 1—3).

Teil II: De canonisatione et translatione ipsius

RV: Coepit autem vir beatus continuo, divinae faciei superirradiante respectu, magnis et multis coruscare miraculis, ut sublimitas sanctitatis eius, quae, ipso vivente in carne, ad morum directionem per exempla perfectae iustitiae innotuerat mundo, illo iam regnante cum Christo, ad omnem fidei firmitatem per miracula divinae potentiae comprobaretur e caelo (XV 6, 625, 3—8). — Dann folgen: 1) die Einleitung seiner Heiligsprechung (XV 6, 625, 8—12); 2) die Heiligsprechung (XV 7, 625); 3) seine Überführung in die neue Grabeskirche (XV 8, 626).

RVE: Porro, sicut vir iste beatus miraculis, virtutum signis, in vita claruerat, sic et *a die transitus sui usque in praesens per diversas mundi partes praeclaris miraculorum prodigiis, divina se potentia glorificante, coruscat. Nam caecis et surdis, mutis et claudis, hydropicis et paralyticis, daemoniacis et leprosis, naufragis et captivis ipsius meritis remedia conferuntur, omnibusque morbis, necessitatibus et periculis subvenitur. Sed et multis mortuis per ipsum mirifice suscitatis, innotescit fidelibus mirificans Sanctum suum magnificentia virtutis Altissimi, cui est honor et gloria per infinita saecula saeculorum. Amen* (XV 9, 626).

c. Die Einteilung der „Wunder nach seinem Tode“

Bevor Bonaventura sein Großes Franziskusleben abschließt und in einem Epilog¹⁰ noch einmal dessen Anliegen unterstreicht, behandelt er noch jene Wunder, die der Heilige nach seinem Tode gewirkt hat. Dieses Wunderverzeichnis Bonaventuras unterscheidet sich von jenen, die uns Thomas von Celano hinterlassen hat¹¹ dadurch, daß Bonaventura

¹⁰ Mir X 8 f, 651 f.

¹¹ 1 Celano 119—150, in: AnalFranc X, 94—114; 3 Celano (TractMir), a.a.O. 271—329.

die Wunder, die Franziskus zu seinen Lebzeiten wirkte, bereits vorher behandelt und in den Kapiteln V bis XII seinen verschiedenen Tugenden zugewiesen hat, und daß er sich hier auf jene beschränkt, die sich nach seinem Tode ereignet haben. Allerdings gründet sich Bonaventura auf jenes amtliche Wunderverzeichnis, das Gregor für die Heiligsprechung hatte anlegen lassen¹² und das schon vorher Thomas von Celano nach dem damaligen Stand der Aufzeichnungen unter dem Ordensgeneral Johannes von Parma in den Jahren 1250—53 neu redigiert hatte¹³, und hat daraus seine Auswahl getroffen. Daraus erklärt sich übrigens auch die Feststellung, daß der Wunderzusatz Bonaventuras im Gegensatz zum Großen Franziskusleben auf weite Passagen mit der Vorlage wortwörtlich übereinstimmt.

Diese Darstellung hat aber Bonaventura offensichtlich als einen Zusatz oder Anhang zum Großen Franziskusleben angesehen. Das legt schon sein Inhaltsverzeichnis am Ende des Prologs nahe, wo er die Überschriften der einzelnen Kapitel aufgeführt hat (Prol 5, 559, 16 f) und schließlich sagt: „Zuletzt fügen wir einige von jenen Wundern bei, die er nach seinem seligen Heimgang wirkte.“ Ferner hat Bonaventura diese Wunder zwischen dem Großen Franziskusleben und seinem Epilog eingeordnet¹⁴; endlich haben auch die niederländischen und deutschen Übersetzungen des bonaventurianischen Franziskuslebens diese Wunderberichte so angesehen und deren verkürzte Form als Kapitel XVI. bezeichnet. Daraus ergibt sich aber eindeutig und klar, daß dieser ganze Zusatz von Bonaventura als ein geschlossenes Ganzes angesehen und behandelt wurde, was wir auch durch dessen Aufbau bestätigt finden; dieser sieht folgendermaßen aus:

(*Überschrift*): Incipiunt quaedam de Miraculis ipsius post mortem ostensis.

Teil I: Et primo de virtutibus sacrorum stigmatum (627, 7—630)

RV (zum ganzen Zusatz): Ad omnipotentis Dei honorem, et gloriam Beati Patris Francisci post glorificationem ipsius in caelis, aliqua ex approbatis conscripturus miracula, ab illo praecipue censui sumendum fore initium, in quo crucis Iesu virtus ostenditur et gloria innovatur (Mir I 1, 627, 4—7).

¹² I Celano 123, 99, 17 f; 125, 100 f, 15 f.; 127, 104, 4—7: „Jesu Christi Domini nostri suppliciter gratiam invocantes, ad excitandam praesentium amplectendam devotionem, et futurorum corroborandam fidem, miracula quae coram domino papa Gregorio, ut dictum est, perfecta sunt et populo nuntiata, Christo duce, breviter sed veraciter conscribemus“.

¹³ M. Bihl, Praefatio, XXXVIII.

¹⁴ Mir I 1—X 7, 627—651.

Teil II: De mortuis suscitatis (II, 630—633)

Teil III: De iis quos a mortis periculo liberavit (III, 633—636)

Teil IV: De naufragis liberatis (IV, 636—638)

Teil V: De liberatis a vinculis et carceribus (V, 638—640)

Teil VI: De liberatis a periculis partus (VI, 640 f)

Teil VII: De caecis illuminatis (VII, 642—644)¹⁵

Teil VIII: De liberatis a variis morbis (VIII, 644—646)

Teil IX: De non servantibus festum et inhonorantibus Sanctum (IX, 647 f)

Teil X: De quibusdam aliis miraculis diversimodi generis (X, 1—6, 648—651)¹⁶.

Bei dem zuletzt erwähnten Wunder war auch die Rede von dem Tau-Buchstaben, den Franziskus wegen der Ähnlichkeit mit dem Kreuz besonders liebte und gern unter seine Briefe setzte.

RVE (des Zusatzes über die Wunder): Sed, ecce, dum per diversa miracula gloriosi Patris Francisci mens narrationis varietate distracta decurrit, promerente *ipso crucis glorioso signifero*, in signum salutis Thau non sine divina directione pervenit, ut ex hoc possimus advertere, quod *sicut crux militanti post Christum fuit sublimitas meriti ad salutem sic et triumphanti cum Christo facta est firmitas testimonii ad honorem*, (Mir X 7, 651).

d. Die Hauptteile der Legende

Die Haupteinteilung seines Werkes erwähnt der Seraphische Lehrer dreimal in seinem Werk: im Kapitel XIII (10, 620, 3; 6; 12) nennt er diese Hauptteile, indem er Franziskus anredet: In principio tuae conversionis . . . in tuae conversationis progressu . . . denique circa finem. Ebenso finden wir diese drei Hauptteile wiederum im Epilog wieder (Mir X 8, 651, 6—10): in suae conversionis principio . . . in conversationis progressu . . . in consummatione. Nicht mit derselben Klarheit umschreibt Bonaventura auch im Prolog (1, 557, 18—21): Primum supernae gratiae praeventus donis, dehinc virtutis invictae auctus meritis. . . ut vir hierarchicus curru igneo sursum vectus.

Diese drei Hauptteile lassen sich tatsächlich in der Großen Franziskuslegende unschwer auffinden. Denn deren Kapitel I., das von seinem Wandel in der Welt, und Kapitel II, das von seiner vollkommenen Bekehrung zu Gott und der Wiederherstellung dreier Kirchen handelt, berichten in der Tat, wie Franziskus „mit dem Kreuze angefangen“ hat;

¹⁵ Vgl. Anm. 6.

¹⁶ Vgl. Anm. 6.

die Kapitel XIV., das von seiner Geduld und seinem Heimgang berichtet und Kapitel XV. mit dem Bericht über sein Begräbnis, seine Heiligsprechung und seiner Übertragung in die Grabeskirche (mit dem Zusatz über die Wunder nach dem Tode) zeigen sodann, wie er sein Leben „im Kreuze vollendet“ hat. Die dazwischen liegenden Kapitel jedoch weisen nach, wie „er nach der Regel des Kreuzes vorangeschritten“ ist (Epilog, Mir X 9, 652, 1—3).

Somit bilden, nachdem Kapitel I. und II. gleichsam die Einführung und Kapitel XIV. und XV. den Abschluß enthalten, die elf Kapitel des mittleren Teiles den Hauptteil der Legende. Von diesen Kapiteln jedoch behandelt Bonaventura jene Kapitel, die von den Tugenden des Heiligen handeln, als eine Art Einschub, denn am Ende des Kapitels VI (II, 577, 23—27) erklärt er: *Impressa sunt ei (Francisco) stigmata Domini Iesu Christi digito Dei vivi tamquam bulla summi Pontificis Christi ad confirmationem omnimodam regulae et commendationem auctoris, sicut post suarum enarrationem virtutum suo loco inferius describetur*. Sieht man also von diesem Einschub mit den Berichten über die Tugenden des Franziskus ab, so bleiben die Kapitel III. über die Gründung des Ordens und die Gutheiung seiner Regel, Kapitel IV. über das Wachstum des Ordens und die Bestätigung der früher gutgeheienen Regel sowie Kapitel XIII. über die Einprägung der Wundmale als jene Kapitel übrig, auf die Bonaventura besonderen Nachdruck legt.

Somit ergibt sich folgender Aufbau:

A. *Prolog* (1—5, 557—599). — Während aber der letzte Teil der Prologs sich mit mehr methodischen und persönlichen Dingen befat, umreißt Bonaventura in dessen 1. Teil (1 f, 557 f) das besondere Anliegen seiner Franziskuslegende mit folgenden Worten: *Apparuit gratia Dei Salvatoris nostri in diebus istis novissimis in servo suo Francisco omnibus vere humilibus et sanctae paupertatis amicis, qui superaffluentem in eo Dei misericordiam venerantes, ipsius erudiuntur exemplo, impietatem et saecularia desideria funditus abnegare, Christo conformiter vivere et ad beatam spem desiderio indefesso sitire. In ipsum namque, ut vere pauperculum et contritum, tanta Deus excelsus benignitatis condescensione respexit, quod non solum de mundialis conversationis pulvere suscitavit egenum, verum etiam evangelicae perfectionis professorem, ducem atque praeconem effectum in lucem dedit credentium, ut testimonium perhibendo de lumine, viam lucis et pacis ad corda fidelium Domino praepareret. Hic etenim quasi stella matutina in medio nebulae, claris vitae micans et doctrinae fulgoribus, sedentes in tenebris et umbra mortis irradiatione praeifulgida direxit in lucem, et tamquam*

arcus refulgens inter nebulas gloriae, signum in se dominici foederis repraesentans, pacem et salutem evangelizavit hominibus, existens et ipse Angelus verae pacis, secundum imitatoriam quoque similitudinem Praecursoris destinatus a Deo, ut viam parans in deserto altissimae paupertatis, tam exemplo quam verbo poenitentiam praedicaret. Primum supernae gratiae praeventus donis, dehinc virtutis invictae adauctus meritis, prophetali quoque repletus spiritu nec non et angelico deputatus officio incendioque seraphico totus ignitus et ut vir hierarchicus curru igneo sursum vectus, sicut ex ipsius vitae decursu luculenter apparet, rationabiliter comprobatur venisse in spiritu et virtute Eliae. Ideoque alterius amici Sponsi, Apostoli et Evangelistae Ioannis vaticinatione veridica sub similitudine Angeli ascendentis ab ortu solis signumque Dei vivi habentis adstruitur non immerito designatus. Sub apertione namque sexti sigilli vidi, ait Ioannes in Apocalypsi (6, 12), alterum Angelum ascendentem ab ortu solis habentem signum Dei vivi.

Hunc Dei nuntium amabilem Christo, imitabilem nobis et admirabilem mundo servum Dei fuisse Franciscum, indubitabili fide colligimus, si culmen in eo eximiae sanctitatis advertimus, qua, inter homines vivens, imitator fuit puritatis angelicae, qua et positus est perfectis Christi sectatoribus in exemplum. Ad quod quidem fideliter sentiendum et pie, non solum inducit officium quod habuit, vocandi ad fletum et planctum, calvitium et cingulum sacci signandique Thau super frontes virorum gementium et dolentium signo poenitentialis crucis et habitus cruci conformis; verum etiam irrefragabili veritatis testificatione confirmat signaculum similitudinis Dei viventis, Christi videlicet crucifixi, quod in corpore ipsius fuit impressum, non per naturae virtutem vel ingenium artis, sed potius per admirandam potentiam Spiritus Dei vivi.

B. Legenda maior S. Francisci

1. Einführung: a cruce incipiens

Kapitel I: De conversatione ipsius in habitu saeculari (*Überleitung* zum nächsten Kapitel: nondum habitu vel convictu sequestratus a mundo, I 6, 563, 20 f).

Kapitel II: De perfecta conversione eius ad Deum et de reparatione trium ecclesiarum (*Überleitung:* secundum datam ab eo formam, regulam et doctrinam Christi triformiter renovanda erat Ecclesia trinaque triumphatura militia salvandorum, II, 8, 566, 22 f).

2. Hauptteil: secundum crucis regulam procedens

Kapitel III: De institutione Religionis et approbatione Regulae (*Überleitung* zum folgenden Kapitel, das mit der Predigt des Heiligen beginnt: ut verbum Dei libere praedicarent, III 10, 571, 21)

Kapitel IV: De Ordinis profectu sub manu ipsius et confirmatione Regulae prius approbatae (*Überleitung* zu den eingeschobenen Kapiteln über die Tugenden: sicut post suarum enarrationem virtutum suo loco describetur, IV, 11, 577, 26 f).

Einschub:

Kapitel V: De austeritate vitae et quomodo creaturae praebebant ei solatium

Kapitel VI: De humilitate et obedientia et de condescensionibus divinis sibi factis ad nutum

Kapitel VII: De amore paupertatis et mira suppletionem defectuum

Kapitel VIII: De pietatis affectu et quomodo ratione carentia videbantur ad ipsum affici

Kapitel IX: De fervore caritatis et desiderio martyrii

Kapitel X: De studio et virtute orationis

Kapitel XI: De intelligentia scripturarum et spiritu prophetiae

Kapitel XII: De efficacia praedicandi et gratia sanitarum (*Überleitung* zum folgenden Kapitel über die Einprägung der Wundmale: summi quoque Regis signacula per modum sigilli corpori eius impressa, XII 12, 615, 9).

Kapitel XIII: De stigmatibus sacris (*Überleitung:* evangelicae perfectionis apicem te finaliter conclusisse, XIII 10, 620, 21 f).

3. *Abschluß:* tandem in cruce perficiens

Kapitel XIV: De potentia ipsius et transitu mortis (*Überleitung:* gloriae Sancti . . . tam iucundum quam evidens testimonium perhibebant, XIV 6, 623, 21—23).

Kapitel XV: De (sepultura et) canonisatione et translatione ipsius (*Überleitung* zum Zusatz über die Wunder nach dem Tode: sic et a die transitus sui usque in praesens per diversas mundi partes praeclaris miraculorum prodigiis . . . coruscat . . ., XV 9, 626, 1—8).

4. *Zusatz:* Quaedam de miraculis eius post mortem ostensis (*Überleitung* zum Epilog: promerente ipso crucis glorioso signifero, Mir X 7, 651, 2).

C. *Epilog* (Mir X 8—9, 651 f): Hoc quippe crucis mysterium magnum et mirum, in quo charismata gratiarum et merita virtutum et thesauri sapientiae et scientiae tam alta profunditate velantur, ut a mundi sapientibus et prudentibus sit occultum, tam plene fuit huic Christi parvulo revelatum, ut omnis vita ipsius non nisi crucis vestigia sequeretur, non nisi crucis dulcedinem saperet, non nisi crucis gloriam praedicaret. Vere namque in suae conversionis principio dicere cum Apostolo potuit: Mihi autem absit gloriari, nisi in cruce Domini nostri Iesu Christi.

Non minus etiam vere in conversationis progressu addere valuit: Quicumque hanc regulam secuti fuerint, pax super illos et misericordia; verissime autem in consummatione potuit subinferre: Stigmata Domini Iesu in corpore meo porto. Sed et illud nos quotidie desideramus ab ipso audire: Gratia Domini nostri Iesu Christi cum spiritu vestro, fratres. Amen.

Gloriare igitur iam secure in crucis gloria, Christi signifer gloriose, quoniam a cruce incipiens, secundum crucis regulam processisti, et tandem in cruce perficiens, per crucis testimonium, quantae gloriae sis in caelo, cunctis fidelibus innotescis. Secure iam te sequantur qui exeunt ex Aegypto, quia, per baculum crucis Christi mari diviso, deserta transibunt, in repromissam viventium terram, Iordane mortalitatis transmisso, per ipsius crucis mirandam potentiam ingressuri. Quo nos introducat verus populi ductor et Salvator, Christus Iesus crucifixus, per merita servi sui Francisci, ad laudem et gloriam unius Dei et trini, qui vivit et regnat in saecula saeculorum. Amen.

Aus den vorangehenden Ausführungen dürfte klar ersichtlich sein, mit welcher Meisterschaft Bonaventura sein Großes Franziskusleben angelegt und gegliedert hat. In jedem größeren oder wenigstens einheitlichen Stück legt er zunächst in einer allgemeinen Sentenz dar, was er dann im folgenden mit vielen Einzelberichten erläutert. Dasselbe ließ sich auch für die Hauptteile nachweisen, so daß seine ganze Legende straff gegliedert ist und ein in jeder Beziehung geschlossenes Werk bildet. Diese Art der Darlegung hat er wohl den Evangelisten abgeschaut, vor allem dem Evangelium des Johannes, mit dem sein Werk sich am ehesten vergleichen läßt. Wenn bei den angeführten Bonaventura-Texten die zahlreichen Zitate aus den heiligen Büchern des Alten und Neuen Testaments nicht verifiziert werden konnten, weil dies nicht direkt vom Thema her gefordert war und die Übersicht zu sehr verdunkelt hätte, so sei wenigstens darauf hingewiesen, daß Bonaventura auch mit Vorliebe sich der biblischen Sprache bedient hat, wie schon ein oberflächliches Durchblättern der kritischen Edition deutlich macht.

2. Das Anliegen der *Legenda maior S. Francisci*

a. Die *Franziskusregel* durch Gott gutgeheißen

Wenn jetzt von dem Anliegen des Großen Franziskusleben Bonaventuras die Rede sein muß, so handelt es sich um jenen Fragenkomplex, den man unter den Bibelexperten als „Sitz im Leben“ zu bezeichnen pflegt; darin liegt das besondere Anliegen begründet, wenn auch das Generalkapitel von Narbonne 1260 von seinem Ordensgeneral Bona-

ventura ein neues Franziskusleben gefordert hatte, das die Vielheit der Franziskusviten ersetze, Wiederholungen meide und auch dem tatsächlichen Stand des Ordens entspreche¹⁷. Diesen Wunsch hat Bonaventura durch sein Großes Franziskusleben so vollkommen erfüllt, daß sein Werk nicht allein die Gußheißung des Generalkapitels von 1263 zu Pisa fand, sondern sogar von dem nächsten Kapitel von 1266 zu Paris als alleiniges Franziskusleben vorgeschrieben wurde, während alle früheren Legenden vernichtet werden sollten¹⁸.

Wollen wir zu diesem „Sitz im Leben“ des Großen Franziskuslebens vordringen, müssen wir unsere besondere Aufmerksamkeit auf die Kapitel III., IV. und XIII. richten, die der Verfasser der Legende eigens hervorhebt; nachdem er von dem Wachstum des Ordens und der endgültigen Bestätigung seiner Regel berichtet hat, schließt er mit den Worten: *Ad cuius observantiam fratres ferventer inducens, dicebat, se nihil ibi posuisse secundum industriam propriam, sed omnia sic scribi fecisse, sicut fuerunt divinitus revelata. Quod ut certius constaret testimonio Dei, paucis admodum evolutis diebus, impressa sunt ei stigmata Domini Iesu digito Dei vivi tamquam bulla summi Pontificis Christi ad confirmationem omnimodam regulae et commendationem auctoris, sicut post suarum enarrationem virtutum suo loco inferius describetur* (IV 11, 577, 21—27). Mit diesen Worten verbindet Bonaventura zwei Berichte zu einem Ganzen, nämlich den Bericht darüber, wie Franziskus sich zur Niederschrift seiner Ordensregel auf einen Berg begibt, mit jenem andern, wie Franziskus nach Empfang der Wundmale vom Berg La Verna herabsteigt; allerdings ist dabei zu beachten, daß *M. Bihl*¹⁹ in beiden Berichten nicht erkannt hat, daß Bonaventura mit Absicht für sie auf eine und dieselbe Begebenheit der Heiligen Schrift anspielt, und deshalb diese Anspielung falsch verifiziert hat. Nach richtiger Angabe lautet der erste Bericht über die Abfassung der Ordensregel (IV 11, 576, 14—19): *in montem quemdam cum duobus sociis, Spiritu sancto ducente, conscendit ubi pane tantum contentus et aqua ieiunans* (Dt 9, 9), *conscribi eam fecit, secundum quod oranti sibi divinus Spiritus suggerebat* (vgl. Dt 9, 10). *Quam, cum, de monte descendens servandam suo vicario commisisset, et ille, paucis elapsis diebus, assereret per incuriam perditam, iterato sanctus vir ad locum solitudinis rediit eamque instar prioris* (vgl. Dt 10, 3), *ac si ex ore Dei verba susciperet* (vgl. Dt 10, 4), *illico reparavit . . .*“ Dasselbe gilt auch für den Bericht über die Rückkehr

¹⁷ *M. Bihl*, Praefatio, LXII.

¹⁸ A. a. O. I. XXII.

¹⁹ IV 11, 576, 14—21; XIII 5, 617, 1—6.

des Heiligen vom Berg La Verna nach dem Empfang der Wundmale (XIII 5, 617, 2—6): „*quadraginta dierum numero, iuxta quod decreverat, in solitudine consummato, superveniente quoque solemnitate Archangeli Michaelis, descendit* (Dt 9, 11) angelicus vir Franciscus *de monte* (Dt 9, 15), secum ferens (vgl. Dt 9, 15) Crucifixi effigiem, non in *tabulis lapideis* vel ligneis manu figuratam artificis, sed in carnis membris *descriptam digito Dei* (Dt 9, 10) *vivi* (Apoc 7, 2). — In beiden Schilderungen bedient sich also Bonaventura desselben heiligen Textes, der von Moses und von den Gottesgeboten handelt, die er von Gott auf dem Berg Sinai empfangen bzw. dort zum zweiten Male empfangen hat; damit will aber Bonaventura nachdrücklich unterstreichen, Franziskus habe seine Ordensregel und deren Vorschriften in ähnlicher Weise von Gott empfangen wie Moses, und Gott habe auch ihn in einem sichtbaren Zeugnis beglaubigt²⁰. Die Wundmale des Franziskus bilden nämlich nach Bonaventura ein neues und staunenswertes Wunder, wie es in vergangenen Zeiten nicht gewährt wurde (Mir I, 1, 627, 7 f): *excreverat quidem in eo insuperabile amoris incendium boni Iesu in lampades ignis atque flammaram, ut aquae multae caritatem tam validam exstinguere non valerent* (XIII 2, 616, 11—13), *ut verus Christi amor illum in eandem imaginem transformaret amantem* (XIII 5, 617, 1 f). Daher kommt er zu dem Schluß: *Certis itaque constat indiciis, sacra illa signacula illius impressa fuisse virtute, qui operatione seraphica purgat, illuminat et inflammat, cum ipsa forinsecus expurgando a peste salutem, serenitatem et calorem corporibus efficacia mira conferrent, sicut et post mortem evidentioribus est demonstratum prodigiis suo loco posterius adnotatis* (XIII 7, 618, 18—22).

Darum braucht es nicht zu verwundern, wenn Bonaventura sehr eingehend die verschiedenen Beweise behandelt, die dieses einzigartige Vorrecht seines Ordensgründers dartun. Zunächst legen für sie Zeugnis ab jene Wunder, durch die Gott sie als wahr erwiesen hat, da Franziskus *secreti regalis conscius signacula illa sacra pro viribus occultabat*. Vere, quia Dei est ad gloriam suam magna revelare, quae facit, Dominus ipse, qui signacula illa secrete impresserat, miracula quaedam aperte per ipsa monstravit, ut illorum occulta et mira vis stigmatum manifesta pateret claritate signorum (XIII 5, 617, 7—10). Zu diesen Wundern zu Lebzeiten des Heiligen kommen noch einige Erscheinungen des bereits verklärten: *Ad huius stupendi miraculi irrefragabilem firmitatem non solum videntium et palpantium testimonia per omnem modum credibilia, verum etiam apparitiones mirabiles et virtutes post ipsius obitum coruscantes*

²⁰ S. Clasen, Franziskus, der andere Moses, in: *WissWeish* 24 (1961) 200—229.

ad omne mentis effugandum nubilum suffragantur (Mir I 2, 627, 1—4). Ein anderes Zeugnis verdanken wir jenen Zeugen, die durch Tugenden und Heiligkeit ausgezeichnet sind: Ipse vero, licet thesaurum inventum in agro multa diligentia studeret abscondere, latere tamen non potuit, quin aliqui stigmata manuum viderent ac pedum, quamquam manus quasi semper portaret contactas et pedibus ex tunc incederet calceatis (XIII 8, 618, 1—4). Als letztes Argument für die Einprägung der Wundmale führt Bonaventura schließlich die theologische Angemessenheit ins Feld; denn sechs Begebenheiten seines Lebens, die er der Reihe nach kurz aufführt, geben uns „Glaubensgewißheit“ und „Zeugnis der Wahrheit“, daß der Heilige auf diesen sechs Stufen zu dieser siebten gelangt ist: Christi namque crux in tuae conversionis primordio tam proposita quam assumpta et dehinc in conversationis progressu per vitam probatissimam baiulata in te ipso continue et in exemplum aliis demonstrata, tanta certitudinis claritate ostendit evangelicae perfectionis apicem te finaliter conclusisse, ut demonstrationem hanc christianae sapientiae in tuae carnis pulvere exaratam nullus vere devotus abiciat, nullus vere fidelis impugnet, nullus vere humilis parvipendat, cum sit vere divinitus expressa et omni acceptione digna (XIII 10, 620, 18—25).

Nachdem Bonaventuras Gegner im Mendikantenstreit zu Paris Lebensweise und Regel des Franziskus als der menschlichen Vernunft und dem Evangelium Christi widersprechend bezeichnet hatten,²¹ erklärt es Bonaventura also als Verstoß gegen den Glauben, die Frömmigkeit und die Demut, wenn jemand leugnet, diese siebenfache Erscheinung des Kreuzes Christi habe durch ihre umgestaltende und übergroße Liebe des Heiligen ganzes Denken, Wollen und Handeln zum Bild des Gekreuzigten werden lassen (Mir I 1, 627, 18—20): per haec signa certissima, non duobus aut tribus testibus ad sufficientiam, sed quam plurimis ad superabundantiam comprobata, testimonia Dei in te et per te credibilia facta nimis, omne tollunt infidelibus excusationis velamen, dum credentes in fide stabiliunt, spei fiducia sursum agunt et igne caritatis accendunt (XIII 9, 619 f, 7—11).

Daher sieht sich Bonaventura zu der Schlußfolgerung berechtigt, die Regel des Franziskus sei nicht allein durch die Päpste gutgeheißen, sondern auch in Form der Wundmale durch die Bulle des allerhöchsten Priesters Christus bestätigt: Ad cuius observantiam fratres ferventer inducens, dicebat, se nihil ibi posuisse secundum industriam propriam, sed omnia sic scribi fecisse, sicut sibi fuerant divinitus revelata. Quod

²¹ Ders., Der hl. Bonaventura und das Mendikantentum (FranzForschungen 7), Werl/W. 1940, 34 f.

ut certius constaret testimonio Dei, paucis admodum evolutis diebus, impressa sunt ei stigmata Domini Iesu digito Dei vivi tamquam bulla summi Pontificis Christi ad confirmationem omnimodam regulae et commendationem auctoris . . . (IV 11, 577, 21—26).²² Da also Christus selbst die Lebensform und die Regel des Franziskus dadurch bestätigt hat, daß er ihm seine Wundmale einprägte, sind durch ihn auch jene Argumente, die die Gegner der Mendikanten damals gegen seine Lebensweise und Regel vorbrachten, widerlegt.

Sie behaupteten nämlich erstens, jene Armut, die auf jeden Besitz des einzelnen Ordensmannes und der klösterlichen Gemeinschaft verzichte, sei eine bloß menschliche Erfindung.²³ Bonaventura aber macht hiergegen geltend, und dabei spielt er auf das Testament des Heiligen an,²⁴ Franziskus habe nach seinen eignen Worten „nichts aus eigener Erfahrung hineingesetzt, sondern alles so aufschreiben lassen, wie es ihm von Gott geoffenbart worden sei, und diese Versicherung seines Ordensvaters habe Christus selbst beglaubigt, als er ihm die Wundmale einprägte (IV 11, 577, 22—26).

Als zweites und drittes Argument gegen diese Armut führten sie an, diese Armut sei eine „Neuerung“ und „sie übersteige die Kräfte des Menschen“²⁵. Bei der Widerlegung seiner Gegner kann sich Bonaventura auf jene Vorgänge berufen, die sich bei der Guttheißung der Lebensweise durch Papst Innozenz III. ereignet hatten. Damals hatte der Papst die Bitte um Bestätigung nicht sogleich erfüllt, weil diese Lebensweise „einigen Kardinälen als Neuerung und als zu schwer für menschliche Kraft erschien“. Diese Bedenken hatte damals Kardinal Johann von Santa Sabina zerstreut durch den Hinweis: „Wenn wir die Bitte dieses Armen als etwas zu schweres und als Neuerung ablehnen, obwohl er die Form des Lebens nach dem Evangelium bestätigt haben möchte, müssen wir uns hüten, daß wir uns nicht am Evangelium Christi versündigen. Denn wer behauptet, in der Beobachtung und dem Gelübde der evange-

²² Vgl. XIII 9, 619, 1—7: „Eia nunc, strenuissime miles Christi, ipsius fer arma invictissimi Ducis, quibus munitus insigniter, omnes adversarios superabis! Fer vexillum Regis altissimi, ad cuius intuitum omnes pugnatores divini exercitus animentur! Fer nihilominus sigillum summi Pontificis Christi, quo verba et facta tua tamquam inreprehensibilia et authentica merito ab omnibus acceptentur! Iam enim propter stigmata Domini Iesu, quae in corpore tuo portas, nemo tibi esse molestus, quin potius quilibet Christi servus omni esse tenetur affectione devotus..“

²³ S. Clasen, *Mendikantentum*, 32; vgl. IV Lateranense, can. 13, ed. H. Jedin, *Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta*, Freiburg/Br. 1962, 218.

²⁴ Testamentum S. Francisci v. 1, in: H. Boehmer, *Analekten zur Geschichte des Franziskus von Assisi*, Tübingen 1904, 36.

²⁵ S. Clasen, *Mendikantentum*, 32, 34.

lischen Vollkommenheit liege eine Neuerung, sie sei unvernünftig und unmöglich zu erfüllen, der lästert ohne Zweifel Christus, den Urheber des Evangeliums“ (III 9, 570). Daher gibt Bonaventura auch nicht zu, die franziskanische Armut übersteige die Kräfte des Menschen; wer nämlich so redet, bleibt in rein natürlichem Denken der Menschen befangen, während sich Franziskus voller Vertrauen der Fürsorge Gottes überantwortet hatte: „Ihr braucht keine Furcht zu haben, daß die Kinder und Erben des ewigen Königs vor Hunger umkommen, die von der armen Mutter durch die Kraft des Heiligen Geistes nach dem Bild des Königs Christus geboren sind und die durch den Geist der Armut in unserm armen Orden noch geboren werden. Denn wenn der König des Himmels denen, die ihm nachfolgen, das ewige Reich verspricht, um wieviel eher wird er das geben, was er ohne Unterschied den Guten und Bösen gewährt“ (III 10, 671, 6—10). Dies findet Bonaventura darin bestätigt, daß „Gott als Vater der Armen für ihn in besonderer Weise zu sorgen“ schien (VII 9, 590, 9), wofür er sogar eine Reihe von Beispielen anführen kann (VII 10—13, 590 f; IV 7, 574, 14—23). Deshalb ermuntert er seine Mitbrüder zu demselben Gottvertrauen mit dem Hinweis auf Franziskus: *Procul igitur a pauperibus Christi diffidentia omnis abscedat. Si enim paupertas Francisci adeo copiosae sufficientiae fuit, ut subvenientium sibi defectus tam mira virtute suppleret, quod nec cibus nec potus nec domus deesset, cum pecuniae et artis et naturae facultas defecerat: multo magis illa merebitur, quae usitato divinae providentiae ordine communiter conceduntur. Si, inquam, petrae siccitas ad pauperis vocem abundans poculum sitienti propinavit, nil iam inter omnia suum denegavit obsequium iis qui pro Auctore omnium omnia reliquerunt* (VII 13, 591 f, 6—12). Die Gegner dieser Armut aber tadelt Bonaventura scharf und wirft ihnen ihre unchristliche Denkweise vor, indem er das Beispiel eines Sarazenen vorhält, der während der Reise des Heiligen zu den Ungläubigen aus Mitleid ihnen alles Notwendige beschaffte: *O inaestimabilis pretiositas paupertatis, cuius miranda virtute mens feritatis barbaricae in tantam miserationis est immutata dulcedinem! Horrendum proinde ac nefarium scelus, ut hanc margaritam nobilem vir christianus conculcet, quam tanta veneratione extulit Sarazenus* (IV 7, 574, 20—23). Auch gesteht Bonaventura den Gegnern nicht zu, bei dieser Form der Armut handele es sich um etwas Neues in der Kirche, um eine Neuerung, die bisher in der Kirche unbekannt war; er betont vielmehr, daß Franziskus nur die Armut der apostolischen Zeit erneuert habe. Als nämlich Franziskus eines Tages jenes Evangelium hörte, „in dem Christus seine Jünger zur Predigt aussandte und ihnen

die Lebensform des Evangeliums gab, daß sie nämlich weder Gold noch Silber, noch Geld in ihren Gürteln, auch keine Tasche auf dem Weg und keine zwei Röcke haben und keine Schuhe und keinen Stab tragen sollten“, da empfing er selbst „den Geist des wahren Evangeliums und schenkte ihn der Welt“ (III 1, 567) und wurde selbst von da an „ein Eiferer für die Vollkommenheit des Evangeliums“ (III 2, 567, 1). Darum schrieb er auch für sich und seine Brüder eine Ordensregel, „bei der er die Befolgung des heiligen Evangeliums zur unumstößlichen Grundlage machte und nur wenig hinzufügte, was für eine einheitliche Lebensweise unerläßlich schien“ (III 8, 569, 2—4).

Gegen die apostolische Wanderpredigt, die Franziskus übte und die Seinen lehrte, wandten die Mendikantengegner ein, sie widerspreche dem Willen Gottes und der kirchlichen Ordnung; denn nur die Bischöfe, Priester und Diakone gehörten zu jenem kirchlichen Stand, dessen Aufgabe es sei zu reinigen, zu erleuchten und zu vollenden, während die Mönche, Gläubigen und Katechumenen als Objekt der Seelsorge der Reinigung, Erleuchtung und Vollendung bedürften²⁶. Diesen Einwand weist Bonaventura als unberechtigt zurück; denn als Franziskus jenes Evangelium von der Aussendung der Jünger zur Predigt gehört hatte, wandte er seinen ganzen Eifer auf, „wie er das Gehörte in die Tat umsetzen und das vorbildliche Leben der Apostel zur Richtschnur seines eigenen Lebens mache. Von da an begann der Mann Gottes unter dem Antrieb von oben ein Eiferer für die Vollkommenheit des Evangeliums zu sein und auch andere zur Buße einzuladen“ (III 1 f, 567). Später sandte er dann seine ersten sieben Gefährten zu zweit in die vier Himmelsrichtungen, um Buße zu predigen: „Geht, so sprach der gütige Vater zu seinen Söhnen, verkündet den Menschen den Frieden und predigt Buße zur Vergebung der Sünden“ (III 7, 569, 7 f). Schließlich hat dann Papst Innozenz III. diese Lebensweise bestätigt und ihm „den Auftrag gegeben, Buße zu predigen“ (III 10, 571, 19 f).

Daher fühlt sich Bonaventura zu dem Schluß berechtigt: „Auf ihn als wahrhaft Armen und Zerknirschten hat der erhabene Gott in so gütiger Herablassung herabgeschaut, daß er ihn . . . zum Lehrer, Führer und Herold der evangelischen Vollkommenheit bestellt, den Gläubigen zum Leitstern gegeben hat. Er sollte von dem Lichte Zeugnis geben und für den Herrn den Weg des Lichtes und des Friedens zu den Herzen der Gläubigen bereiten. Er hat nämlich gleich dem Morgenstern inmitten

²⁶ A.a.O. 77; *ders.*, Die Armut als Beruf: Franziskus von Assisi, in: Beiträge zum Berufsbewußtsein des mittelalterlichen Menschen, hersg. P. Wilpert (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 3), Berlin 1964, 73 f.

der Wolken strahlend im Glanz seines Lebens und seiner Lehre denen, die in Finsternis und Todesschatten wohnen, als helleuchtender Stern den Weg zum Licht gewiesen und gleich dem Regenbogen in den Wolken der Herrlichkeit als Zeichen des Gottesbundes und Engel des wahren Friedens den Menschen Frieden und Heil verkündet, . . . dazu bestimmt, durch Beispiel und Wort Buße zu predigen und so der allerhöchsten Armut in der Wüste den Weg zu bereiten“ (Prol. 1, 557, 7—18).

b. *Sein heiliges Leben vom Himmel bezeugt*

Die Gegner der Mendikantenorden kritisierten nicht allein die Franziskusregel, sondern auch sein heiliges Leben dadurch, daß sie geltend machten, Ordensleute seien zur Seelsorge einfach unfähig und hiervon gebe es keine Ausnahme, selbst dann nicht, wenn einer Zeichen und Wunder tue,²⁷ und Ordensleute, die anders handelten, seien falsche Apostel, falsche Prediger und solche, die ein nur scheinbar frommes Leben führen.²⁸

Wohl mit Rücksicht auf diesen Einwand betont Bonaventura, ehe er noch auf „seine machtvolle Predigt“ eingeht, Franziskus habe „als Christi getreuer Diener und Knecht vor allem jene Tugenden geübt, die er auf Eingebung des Heiligen Geistes als Gott besonders wohlgefällig erkannt hatte“ (XII 1, 610, 3—5). In diesem heiligen Verlangen liegt auch der Grund für jene bangen Zweifel, „ob er nur dem Gebete leben oder als Prediger umherziehen“ solle (XII 1, 610, 8); denn im Gebet sammle man reiche Gnaden, bei der Predigt teile man sie aus; sodann reinige das Gebet die Seele, einige sie mit Gott und stärke sie, die Predigt aber beflecke mit Erdenstaub, bringe vielfache Zerstreung und Lockung der Zucht mit sich; endlich erhebe das Gebet den Menschen zu Gott und lasse die Predigt ihn zu den Menschen herabsteigen. All diesem stehe jedoch das Beispiel des menschengewordenen Sohnes Gottes entgegen, der der Menschheit durch sein Vorbild und Wort den Weg des Heiles gewiesen hat (XII 1, 610 f, 10—22). Trotz allem habe Franziskus sich erst zum Predigtapostolat entschlossen, nachdem er Gottes Antwort durch Befragung zweier beschaulicher Menschen erkundet hatte (XII 1 f, 611). Weil aber der Heilige Geist und Christus, Gottes Kraft und Weisheit, mit ihm waren, „verfügte er über Worte voll rechter Lehre und glänzte durch Wunder voll erstaunlicher Gewalt“ (XII 7, 613, 1—3) und waren „jedes Alter und Geschlecht begierig, den neuen Menschen, den der Himmel gesandt hatte, zu sehen und zu hören“ (XII 8, 613, 5 f), ja, sogar

²⁷ *Ders.*, Die Armut als Beruf, 82.

²⁸ A.a.O. 81.

die vernunftlosen Geschöpfe standen Franziskus bei seiner Predigt zu Diensten (XII 3—4, 612 f.). Quis igitur tam obstinatae mentis esset et impiae, fragt daher Bonaventura (XII 6, 613, 9—13) seine Gegner, quod praedicationem Francisci contemneret, cuius miranda fiebat virtute, ut non solum carentia ratione disciplinam suscipere, verum etiam inanimata corpora tamquam animata praedicanti servirent? Schließlich weist er auch darauf hin, daß Gott selbst für Franziskus und sein Predigtapostolat durch Zeichen und Wunder, die es begleiteten, Zeugnis gab: Ipse vero per diversas regiones progrediens, evangelizabat ardentem, Domino cooperante et sermonem confirmante sequentibus signis. In virtute namque nominis eius praeco Franciscus eiciebat daemonia, sanabat infirmos, et quod maius est, sui sermonis efficacia obstinatorum mentes ad poenitentiam mollebat simulque sanitatem corporibus reddebat et cordibus, sicut aliqua comprobant operum eius, exempli gratia inferius adnotanda (XII 8, 613, 6—11)

Um dies alles noch eindringlicher darzulegen und einsichtiger zu machen, gehen der Schilderung seiner Predigtstätigkeit die übrigen Kapitel über die Tugenden des Franziskus voraus, wobei es Bonaventura weniger auf die Tugenden an sich ankommt als vielmehr auf jenes Zeugnis vom Himmel, mit dem Gott selbst diese Tugenden beglaubigt hat; diese Zeichen und Wunder sollen gleichfalls dartun, daß Gott selbst Franziskus als seinen Herold zu den Menschen gesandt hat. Durch sein strenges Leben erlangte er, wie verschiedene Beispiele zeigen, nicht allein die Siegespalme (V 1—9, 577—581), sondern wir können auch auf Grund jener vollkommenen Eintracht, in der auf Gottes Anordnung sich die Geschöpfe den Befehlen des Franziskus beugten, erschließen, welcher hohen Grad der Reinheit er durch sein strenges Leben erreicht hatte (V 10—12, 581): Quia enim ad tantam pervenerat puritatem, erklärt Bonaventura, ut caro spiritui et spiritus Deo harmonia mirabili concordarent, divina ordinatione fiebat, ut creatura Factori suo deserviens, voluntati et imperio eius mirabiliter subiaceret (V 9, 581, 16—19), und er fordert den Leser auf: Perpende, quam mirandae fuerit vir iste munditiae quantaque virtutis, ad cuius nutum suum ignis ardorem contemperat, aqua saporem commutat, angelica praebet melodia solatium, et lux divina ducatum, ut sic sanctificatis viri sancti sensibus omnis probetur mundi machina deservire (V 12, 581 f., 11—15). — Ferner besitzt der Heilige die Tugenden der Demut und des Gehorsams im höchsten Grade (VI 1—5, 582—584); den hohen Grad dieser Tugenden aber hat Gott wiederum bezeugt, und zwar zunächst durch das wunderbare Gesicht, das Bruder Pazifikus hatte: Et quoniam humilitatem tam

in se quam in subditis cunctis praefererat honoribus, amator humilium Deus altioribus ipsum dignum iudicabat fastigiis, secundum quod uni fratrum, viro virtutis et devotionis praecipuae, visio caelitus ostensa monstravit (VI 6, 584, 1—4), und ferner durch verschiedene außergewöhnliche Begebenheiten (VI 7—11, 585 f). Abschließend kommt auch hier Bonaventura zur Schlußfolgerung: Digne itaque sectanda est Francisci humilitas, quae tam miram in terris etiam dignitatem obtinuit, ut Deum inclinaret ad votum et hominis immutaret affectum, daemonum protervitatem suo iussu propelleret et flammaram voracitatem solo nutu refrenaret. Revera haec est, quae possessores suos exaltans, dum omnibus reverentiam exhibet, ab omnibus promeretur honorem (VI 11, 586 f, 12—17). — Ebenso geht es ihm nicht darum, die besondere Armuts-
 liebe des Franziskus, der lieber von erbettelten Almosen als von freiwilligen Gaben lebte, anschaulich zu schildern (VII 1—9, 587—590), sondern zu zeigen, daß Gott selbst diese Tugend empfohlen hat, indem er der Not seines Heiligen abhalf (VII 10—13, 590 f): Et quoniam in petendis eleemosynis non quaestus agebatur cupidine, sed spiritus libertate, Pater pauperum Deus specialem de ipso curam gerere videbatur (VII 9, 590, 8 f). Diese wunderbare Hilfe Gottes widerlegt alle Argumente der Gegner gegen die vollkommene Armut und die Bettelarmut, daß ihre Befolgung einem gesunden Armen unerlaubt sei und der vollkommene Verzicht auf allen irdischen Besitz Gott versuche.²⁹ Gegen solche Weltklugheit wendet sich Bonaventura mit gläubigem Vertrauen auf Gottes Vorsehung, zu dem besonders jene berechtigt sind, die aus Liebe zu Gott auf alles verzichten: Procul igitur a pauperibus Christi diffidentia omnis abscedat. Si enim paupertas Francisci adeo copiosae sufficientiae fuit, ut subvenientium sibi defectus tam mira virtute suppleret, quod nec cibus nec potus nec domus deesset, cum pecuniae et artis et naturae facultas defecerat: multo magis illa merebitur, quae usitato divinae providentiae ordine communiter conceduntur. Si, inquam, petrae siccitas ad pauperis vocem abundans poculum sitiendi propinavit pauperculo, nil iam inter omnia suum denegabit obsequium iis qui pro Auctore omnium omnia reliquerunt (VII 13, 591 f, 6—12). — Wenn er ferner des Heiligen innige Frömmigkeit schildert und an einzelnen Beispielen aufweist (VIII 1—6, 592—594), so legt er mit Nachdruck dar, wie Gott selbst auf so wunderbare Weise diese Tugend des Franziskus empfohlen hat, daß schon zu seinen Lebzeiten an ihm der selige Zustand vor Adams Sündenfall sichtbar wurde (VIII 7—11, 594—597): Pie igitur sentiendum, schließt Bonaventura seine Darlegung ab, de pietate

²⁹ Ders., Mendikantentum, 51—65.

viri beati, quae tam mirae dulcedinis et virtutis fuit, ut domaret ferocia, domesticaret silvestria, mansueta doceret et brutorum naturam hominiam lapso rebellem ad sui obedientiam inclinaret. Vere haec est, quae cunctas sibi creaturas confoederans, valet ad omnia, promissionem habens vitae, quae nunc est, et futurae (VIII 11, 597, 16—20). — Bonaventura preist Franziskus auch wegen seiner innigen Liebe und seines Verlangens nach dem Martyrium (IX 1—9, 597—601); hat Franziskus zwar das ersehnte Martyrium auf seinen drei Missionsreisen nicht erlangt, weil Gott ihn für ein anderes Martyrium ausersehen hatte, so ist er doch den Märtyrern ähnlich geworden, weil es ihm für das Martyrium nicht an inniger Liebe, sondern seiner innigen Liebe der Märtyrertod fehlte: Sic igitur Dei ordinante clementia, et sancti viri promerente virtute, misericorditer et mirabiliter factum est, quod Christi amicus mortem pro viribus totis exquireret, et tamen nullatenus inveniret, ut et merito non careret optati martyrii et insigniendus servaretur in posterum privilegio singulari. Sic utique factum est, ut ignis ille divinus adhuc perfectius ipsius aestuaret in corde, ut post patentius evaporaret in carne. O vere beatum virum, cuius caro, etsi tyrannico ferro non caeditur, occisi tamen Agni similitudine non privatur! O, inquam, vere ac plene beatum, cuius animum, etsi gladius persecutoris non abstulit, palmam tamen martyrii non amisit' (IX 9, 601, 6—11). — Zu den besonderen Tugenden des Heiligen zählt auch sein Eifer im Gebet, da das Gebet sein Trost war und er öfter ganz in Beschauung versunken erschien, was Gott dadurch nach außen sichtbar machte, daß er seinem Gebet außergewöhnliche Kraft verlieh (X 1—7, 602—605): Hanc quidem devoti militis visionem non solum videntis sanctitas credibilem facit, sed et designata veritas comprobatur, et miracula subsequuta confirmant. Nam exemplum Francisci consideratum a mundo, excitativum est cordium in fide Christi torpentium, et foenum praesepti reservatum a populo mirabiliter sanativum brutorum languentium et aliarum repulsivum pestium diversarum, glorificante Deo per omnia servum suum sanctaeque orationis efficaciam evidentibus miraculorum prodigiis demonstrante (X 7, 605, 15—21). — Obschon Franziskus keine wissenschaftliche Bildung besaß, kann man bei ihm ein erstaunliches Verständnis der Heiligen Schrift (XI 1 f, 605 f) bewundern, die er der Erleuchtung durch das ewige Licht verdankte: Nec absonum, si vir sanctus Scripturarum a Deo intellectum acceperat, cum per imitationem Christi perfectam veritatem ipsarum descriptam gestaret in opere et per sancti Spiritus unctionem plenariam, Doctorem earum apud se haberet in corde (XI 2, 606, 7—10). Ferner ward an ihm auch der Geist der Propheten sichtbar,

daß er Zukünftiges vorhersagte, Geheimnisse der Herzen durchschaute, ferne Ereignisse sah, als sei er zugegen, und sich ein Wunder Abwesenden gegenwärtig zeigte (XI 3—14, 606—610; IV 4, 572 f; 10, 575 f, 10—19). Wenn aber Franziskus in dieser Weise „wie ein zweiter Elisäus den zweifachen Geist des Elias empfangen hatte“ (XI 6, 608, 15), so hat Gott offenbar auf diese Weise die Einfalt und Demut des Heiligen bestätigt: Quod factum esse divina dispositione credendum est, ut ex praesentiae corporalis apparitione mirabili patenter claresceret, quam praesens et pervius spiritus eius luci sapientiae foret aeternae, quae omnibus mobilibus mobilior est et ubique attingens propter sui munditiam, per nationes in animas sanctas se transfert et Dei amicos et prophetas constituit. Simplicibus enim et parvulis sua pandere solet mysteria Doctor excelsus, sicut prius apparuit in David, prophetarum eximio, et post in Apostolorum principe Petro et tandem in pauperculo Christi Francisco. Hi enim, cum essent litterarum imperitia simplices, facti sunt sancti Spiritus eruditione illustres: is quidem pastor, ut gregem pasceret Synagogae de Aegypto eductum; iste piscator, ut sagenam repletet Ecclesiae multiformitate credentium; hic autem negotiator, ut margaritam emeret evangelicae vitae, venditis et dispersis omnibus propter Christum (XI 14, 610, 4—15).

Wenn Bonaventura aber diese Tugendvorzüge des Heiligen im Anschluß an den Bericht behandelt, wie Papst Honorius III. die endgültige Regel des Franziskus bestätigte, so sieht er in diesen vom Himmel beglaubigten Zeichen der Heiligkeit im weiteren Sinne ein Zeugnis dafür, daß Franziskus nur das in seine Regel aufgenommen, was er als Willen Gottes erkannt hat, näherhin aber dafür, daß Gott selbst ihn zum Künder seiner Frohbotschaft bestellt hat: Excellens namque in ipso praerogativa virtutum, prophetiae spiritus, efficacia miraculorum, oraculum de praedicando caelitus datum, obedientia creaturarum ratione carentium, vehemens immutatio cordium ad verborum ipsius auditum, eruditio eius a Spiritu sancto praeter humanam doctrinam, praedicandi auctoritas a Summo Pontifice non sine revelatione concessa, insuper et Regula, in qua forma praedicandi exprimitur, ab eodem Christi Vicario confirmata, summi quoque Regis signaculis per modum sigilli corpori eius impressa tamquam testimonia decem toti saeculo indubitanter affirmant, *Christi praeconem et venerandum officio et doctrina authenticum et admirabilem sanctitate, ac per hoc tamquam vere Dei nuntium Christi evangelium praedicasse* (XII 12, 6153—12). Zu diesem Zeugnis aus der Lebenszeit des Heiligen kommen noch jene Zeichen und Wunder, durch die Gott nach dem Tode des Franziskus dessen göttliche Sendung und heiliges

Leben bezeugt hat, die Bonaventura in einer Ergänzung zu seiner Franziskuslegende „zur Ehre des allmächtigen Gottes und zum Ruhme des seligen Vaters Franziskus“ festhält (Mir I, 1—X 6, 627—651).

Mit Recht konnte daher der Seraphische Lehrer von seinem Ordensvater sagen: *Dei nuntium amabilem Christo, imitabilem nobis et admirabilem mundo servum Dei fuisse Franciscum indubitabili fide collegimus, si culmen in eo eximiae sanctitatis advertimus, qua, inter homines vivens, imitator fuit angelicae potestatis, qua et positus est perfectis Christi sectatoribus in exemplum* (Prol. 2, 558, 1—4).

c. *Seine Sendung im Heilsplan Gottes*

Die besondere Sendung, die Gott in seiner Sorge für das Heil der Menschen seinem Diener Franziskus in seinem Heilsplane zugewiesen, behandelt Bonaventura dort, wo er von der Gedächtnisfeier der Geburt unseres Herrn Jesus Christus zu Greccio berichtet; dort sah in dieser Weihnacht der fromme Ritter Johannes in einem Gesicht „in der Krippe ein überaus schönes Kind liegen, das schlief; der selige Vater Franziskus habe es in seine Arme geschlossen und aus dem Schlafe geweckt“. Im Anschluß daran umreißt er dann die Heilssendung des Heiligen mit folgenden Worten: *Hanc quidem devoti militis visionem non solum videntis sanctitas credibilem facit, sed et designata veritas comprobant, et miracula subsequuta confirmant. Nam exemplum Francisci consideratum a mundo, excitativum est cordium in fide Christi torpentium* (X 7, 605, 15—18).

Um dieser besonderen Sendung willen „kam Gott in seiner Güte ihm mit reichstem Segen zuvor, entriß ihn gnädig den Gefahren des gegenwärtigen Lebens und bedachte ihn reichlich mit Gnadengaben“ (I 1, 560, 5—7), obschon er sich noch nicht durch Kleidung und Lebenswandel von der Welt getrennt hatte (I 6, 563, 20 f) und damals Gottes Absichten noch nicht kannte“ (I 2, 561). Schritt für Schritt erkannte er diese Absichten besser, seit Gott „seinen Leib mit langwährender Krankheit schlug, um seinen Geist für die Salbung des Heiligen Geistes zu bereiten“ (I 2, 561, 4—6). Als er dann „eines Tages so ganz einsam betete und sich dank seiner übergroßen Glut ganz in Gott verloren hatte, erschien ihm Jesus Christus wie ans Kreuz geheftet. Bei seinem Anblick stockte ihm der Atem, und das Andenken an Christi Leiden prägte sich so tief in das Innerste seines Herzens, daß er sich von da an nur mit Mühe äußerlich der Tränen und Seufzer erwehren konnte, wenn er der Kreuzigung Christi gedachte . . . Daraus ersah der Mann Gottes, daß jenes Wort des Evangeliums (Mt 16, 24) an ihn selbst gerichtet war: „Wenn du mir

nachfolgen willst, so verleugne dich selbst und nimm dein Kreuz auf dich und folge mir nach!“ (I 5, 652, 11—18). Weil er aber „keinen andern Lehrmeister als Christus hatte“ (II 1, 563, 3 f), „hörte er mit seinen leiblichen Ohren, wie vom Kreuze her dreimal eine Stimme also zu ihm sprach: ‚Franziskus, geh hin und stelle mein Haus wieder her, das ganz zerfällt, wie du siehst!‘“ (II 1, 563, 9 f); doch verstand er diese Worte zuerst von dem aus Stein gebauten Kirchlein, „wenngleich sich der vornehmliche Sinn des Wortes auf jene Kirche bezog, die sich Christus mit seinem Blute erworben, wie ihn der Heilige Geist lehrte“ (II 1, 563, 13—15): *providentiae nutu, qua Christi servus dirigebatur in omnibus, tres materiales erexit ecclesias, antequam, Ordinem inchoans, Evangelium praedicaret, ut non solum a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia, a minoribus ad maiora ordinato progressu conscenderet, verum etiam, ut quid esset facturum in posterum, sensibili foris opere mysterialiter praesignaret. Nam instar reparatae triplicis fabricae ipsius sancti viri ducatu, secundum datam ab eo formam, regulam et doctrinam Christi triformiter renovanda erat Ecclesia trinaque triumphatura militia salvandorum* (II 8, 566, 17—23). Bald danach „empfang er selbst . . . den Geist des wahren Evangeliums und schenkte ihn der Welt“ (III 1, 567, 5 f), als er am Matthiasfest jenes Evangelium (Lk 10, 9 f) hörte, „in dem Christus seine Jünger zur Predigt aussandte und ihnen die Lebensform des Evangeliums gab, daß sie nämlich weder Gold noch Silber, noch Geld in ihren Gürteln, auch keine Tasche auf dem Weg und keine zwei Röcke haben und keine Schuhe und keinen Stab tragen sollten“ (III 1, 567, 7—10). Wie er aber selbst, vom Himmel belehrt, seine Sendung erkannte und „das vorbildliche Leben der Apostel zur Richtschnur seines eignen Lebens“ machte (III 1, 567, 15 f), so hat er auch, als sich ihm Bernhard von Quintavalle anschloß, wiederum den Willen Gottes erkundet, schlug „dreimal das Evangelienbuch auf und bat Gott dabei, er möge durch ein dreifaches Zeugnis den heiligen Entschluß Bernhards gutheißen“ (III 3, 568, 10 f); dann „schrieb er mit einfachen Worten für sich und seine Brüder eine Form des Lebens, bei der er die Befolgung des heiligen Evangeliums zur unumstößlichen Grundlage machte und nur wenig hinzufügte, was für eine einheitliche Lebensweise unerläßlich schien“ (III 8, 569, 1—4). Nachdem dann Papst Innozenz III. diese Lebensregel approbiert hatte, „machte sich Franziskus auf den Weg zum Spoleto, um Christi Evangelium zu leben und zu lehren“ (IV 1, 571, 3 f).

Worin besteht nun auch nach Bonaventura die besondere Sendung des Franziskus im Heilsplan Gottes, die er auf diese Weise immer klarer erkannt und verwirklicht hat? Bevor im Jahre 1262 der Seraphische

Lehrer sein Franziskusleben schrieb, veröffentlichte bekanntlich Gerhard von Borgo San Donnino im Jahre 1254 sein Werk, in dem er die Lehre des Abtes Joachim von Fiore verfälschte. Sein Buch *Introductorius in aevangelium aeternum* lehrte, das Evangelium Christi werde bald dem geistigen und ewigen Evangelium weichen, dieses neue Evangelium bestehe aus den Schriften dieses Abtes Joachim und der von ihm vorher-verkündete neue Orden der armen, kleinen und geistlichen Männer seien Franziskus und sein Orden, die dieses neue Evangelium verkündigen³⁰. Mochte auch der Minderbrüderorden das von der Kirche verurteilte Buch verwerfen und seinen Verfasser mit lebenslänglichem Klosterkerker bestrafen,³¹ so haben dennoch Wilhelm von St.-Amour und seine Freunde an der Pariser Universität unter Berufung auf dieses Buch die Mendikantenorden der Dominikaner und Franziskaner als Irrlehrer und Diener des Antichristen bekämpft; die ließen auch von solchen Verdächtigungen nicht ab, obschon der Generalminister Johannes von Parma und die übrigen Joachiten in Minderbrüderorden Gerhard in diesen ausgefallenen Ideen nicht folgten.³² Daher mußte Johannes von Parma im Jahre 1257 die Ordensleitung niederlegen und sich wegen Häresieverdacht rechtfertigen, erlangte aber durch Vermittlung des Kardinals Ottoboni den Freispruch³³. Als dann Bonaventura wenige Jahre später sein Franziskusleben schrieb, legt er mit großem Nachdruck die besondere heilsgeschichtliche Sendung des Franziskus dar und grenzte sie eindeutig gegen Mißdeutungen ab: „Christus Jesus, der Gekreuzigte“, ist „der wahre Führer und Retter des Volkes“ (Mir X 9, 652, 7 f), Franziskus aber „Kreuzträger Christi“ (Mir X 9, 652, 1), „der gute Führer der Heerschar Christi“ (V 1, 577, 4 f) und „Träger und Diener des Kreuzes Christi“ (IV 10, 576, 22 f). Wenn die Gefährten „als wahre Israeliten ihm folgen“ (IV 4, 573, 14 f), den „Gott als zweiten Elias den geistlichen Männern zum Wagen und Lenker gegeben“ hat (IV 4, 573, 15 f), „auf dem der Geist des Herrn in solcher Fülle ruhte, daß ihnen das Leben nach seiner Lehre und seinem Leben als der sicherste Weg erschien“ (IV 4, 573, 22 f), und wenn er „dem Moses ähnlich wurde, als er Wasser aus dem Gestein hervorquellen ließ, und ebenso dem Elisäus, als er die Nahrungsmittel vermehrte“ (VII 13, 591, 5 f), so trägt doch Franziskus als tapferer Ritter Christi nur die Waffen seines unbesiegten Herzogs Christus. Unter ihrem Schutz wird er alle Gegner niederringen. Er trägt das Banner des allerhöchsten Königs, dessen Anblick allen Streitern im Heere Gottes

³⁰ A.a.O. 3.

³¹ *Ders.*, Franziskus, Engel des sechsten Siegels, 60.

³² *Ders.*, Mendikantentum, 3 f; 6; 8—11.

³³ A.a.O., 2; 43 f; vgl. L. Oliger, in: ArchFrancHist 3 (1910) 346 f.

Mut verleiht. Er ist bezeichnet mit dem Siegel des Hohenpriesters Christus, um dessentwillen seine Worte und Taten als wahr und beglaubigt anerkannt werden, wie es billig ist (XIII 9, 619, 1—5). Wenn „man auch auf seine Worte achtete, als redete ein Engel des Herrn (XII 12, 615, 2 f), so war doch Franziskus für Bonaventura nur „Herold Christi“ und hat „als echter Sendbote Gottes das Evangelium Christi gepredigt“ (XII 12, 615, 10—12).

Daher hat Bonaventura diese heilsgeschichtliche Sendung des Franziskus in unvergleichlich schönen, aber auch eindeutig klaren Worten dargetan, indem er ihn Johannes dem Täufer vergleicht und ihn dem wiederkommenden Herrn die Wege bereiten läßt, wie es dieser vor der ersten Ankunft Christi getan hat: *Apparuit gratia Dei Salvatoris nostri diebus istis in servo suo Francisco omnibus vere humilibus et sanctae paupertatis amicis, qui superaffluentem in eo Dei misericordiam venerantes, ipsius erudiuntur exemplis, impietatem et saecularia desideria funditus abnegare, Christo conformiter vivere et ad beatam spem desiderio indefesso sitire . . . Hic etenim quasi stella matutina in medio nebulae, claris vitae micans et doctrinae fulgoribus, sedentes in tenebris et umbra mortis irradiatione praefulgida direxit in lucem, et tamquam arcus refulgens inter nebulas gloriae, signum in se dominici foederis repraesentans, pacem et salutem evangelizavit, exsistens et ipse Angelus verae pacis, secundum imitatoriam quoque similitudinem Praecursoris destinatus a Deo, ut viam parans in deserto altissimae paupertatis, tam exemplo quam verbo poenitentiam praedicaret. Primum supernae gratiae praeventus donis, dehinc virtutis invictae adauctus meritis, propheta quoque repletus spiritu nec non et angelico deputatus officio incendioque seraphico totus ignitus et ut vir hierarchicus curru igneo sursum vectus, sicut ex ipsius vitae decursu luculenter apparet, rationabiliter comprobatur venisse in spiritu et virtute Eliae (Prol. 1, 557f, 3—7; 11—22).*

d. *Sein Beitrag zur Kirchenreform*

Während die heilsgeschichtliche Sendung des Franziskus durch Bonaventura stark auf dem ideengeschichtlichen Hintergrund der Auseinandersetzungen mit den Mendikantengegnern eher negativ umschrieben wurde, besteht sie nach ihrer positiven Bedeutung in der Erneuerung des altchristlichen Ideals oder in der Reform der Kirche.

Franziskus ist daher für Bonaventura nicht allein als „Herold Christi wegen seiner Sendung verehrungswürdig, wegen seiner Lehre glaubwürdig, wegen seiner Heiligkeit bewunderungswürdig“ und hat darum „als echter Sendbote Gottes das Evangelium Christi gepredigt“ (XII 12,

615, 10—22), sondern er begann als „Arzt gemäß dem Evangelium“ (II 6, 565, 7) „unter dem Antrieb von oben ein Eiferer für die Vollkommenheit des Evangeliums zu sein und auch andere zur Buße einzuladen“ (III 2, 567, 1 f), indem er „das Heil der Seelen predigte und durch heilsame Ermahnungen viele zum wahren Frieden führte, die vorher von Christus getrennt und darum dem Heil fern waren“ (III 2, 567, 8 f). Kein Wunder also, daß sich viele „durch sein Beispiel zu einem Leben der Buße angeregt“ fühlten (III 3, 567, 2). Diese seine Tätigkeit für die Erneuerung der Kirche sah der Priester Silvester vor seiner Bekehrung in einem Gesicht dargestellt, nachdem aus dem Munde des Franziskus ein goldenes Kreuz hervorging und den schrecklichen Drachen verscheuchte, der die Stadt Assisi bedrohte (III 5, 568); denn Franziskus „wollte alle Gläubigen für Christus den Herrn gebären, indem er sie zur Bußtrauer aufrief“ (III 7, 569, 6 f). Ein anderes Mal offenbarte Gott die besondere Sendung seines Heiligen einem Meister höfischen Gesanges in einer Vision, nach der dieser „Prediger des Kreuzes Christi von zwei funkelnden Schwertern bezeichnet war, die in Kreuzesform übereinander lagen“ (IV 9, 575, 7 f). Schließlich offenbarte Gott dasselbe dem Papste Innozenz III., als dieser Bedenken hatte, die Lebensweise des Franziskus und seiner Gefährten gutzuheißen: „Er sah nämlich im Traume . . ., wie die Laterankirche dem Einsturz nahe war; doch ein armer Mann, bescheiden und verachtet, stützte sie mit seiner Schulter, damit sie nicht zusammenfalle, und hielt sie. ‚Wahrlich‘, sagte er, ‚das ist jener Mann, der durch sein Werk und seine Lehre die Kirche Christi erhalten wird‘“ (III 10, 571, 12—17);³⁴ daher gab er „ihm den Auftrag, Buße zu predigen, und ließ allen Laien, die den Gottesknecht begleitet hatten, kleine Tonsuren schneiden, damit sie das Wort Gottes ungehindert verkündigen könnten“ (III 10, 571, 19—21). Ebenso erschien er eines Tages, als er zur Predigt in Assisi weilte, den entfernten Brüdern „in dem leuchtenden und glühenden Wagen von himmlischen Licht umstrahlt und von himmlischer Glut entflammt, damit sie ihm als wahre Israeliten folgen sollten; hat doch Gott ihn als zweiten Elias den geistlichen Männern zum Wagen und Lenker gegeben“ (IV 4, 573, 13—16).

Weil er stets bestrebt war, „Christi Evangelium zu leben und zu lehren“ (IV 1, 571, 4), darum erschien er auf seinen Predigtwanderungen den Zuhörern „als Mensch aus der anderen Welt, wie einer, der alle Menschen nach oben zu führen trachtet, indem er selbst Herz und Ant-

³⁴ Derselbe Traum wird auch auf den hl. Dominikus angewandt, vgl. *L. Lemmens*, *Testimonia minora saeculi XIII de S. Francisco Assisiensi*, *Ad Claras Aquas* 1926, 67—70.

litz gen Himmel gerichtet hat“ (IV 5, 573, 6 f). Die Frucht eines solchen Einsatzes für die Reform der Kirche war die Gründung seiner drei Orden, da „von Andacht ergriffen und vom Verlangen nach der Vollkommenheit Christi erfüllt, viele alle Eitelkeit der Welt verachteten und den Spuren des Franziskus folgten“ (IV 7, 574, 1—3). Wegen dieser Erneuerung der Kirche sagt Bonaventura vom Leben des Franziskus, daß er „das vorbildliche Leben der Apostel zur Richtschnur seines eigenen Lebens“ machte (III 1, 567, 15 f). Hierin sieht Bonaventura auch die eigentliche Wurzel seines Seeleneifers, daß er sich „vor allem zu den durch Jesu Christi kostbares Blut erlösten Seelen“ hingezogen fühlte (VIII 1, 592, 8 f), und die Wurzel seiner Ehrfurcht vor dem Priestertum der Kirche: „Sooft er darum sah, daß sie (die Menschen) sich durch Sündenschuld befleckt hatten, weinte er in Liebe und Mitleid so über sie, daß er wie eine Mutter täglich um sie Geburtswehen erlitt, und dies war der Grund, warum er besonders die Verwalter des Gotteswortes verehrte, daß ihr Beispiel und ihre liebevolle Besorgnis dem verstorbenen Bruder, nämlich Christus, der für die Sünder sein Leben hingegeben hat, Nachkommen-schaft erwecke“ (VIII 1, 592, 9—13). Darum bejahte er auch das apostolische Leben: „Durch eine Offenbarung erleuchtet, erkannte er, der Herr habe ihn dazu gesandt, für Christus Seelen zu gewinnen, die ihm der Teufel zu entreißen suchte. Darum wollte er lieber für alle als für sich allein leben, angeleitet durch das Beispiel dessen, der allein zu sterben sich gewürdigt hat“ (IV 2, 572, 5—8). Als er später im Zweifel war, ob das beschauliche Leben oder die apostolische Tätigkeit mehr dem göttlichen Willen entspreche und er die Gründe für das eine und das andere Leben gegeneinander abwog, gab für ihn das Beispiel des Sohnes Gottes den Anschlag, „der auf die Erde herabstieg, um durch sein Beispiel die Welt zu unterweisen und das Wort des Heils zu den Menschen zu sprechen“ (XII 1, 611, 18—20); wenn in der Weihnacht zu Greccio der Ritter Johannes in einem Gesicht schaute, wie Franziskus das wunderschöne Kind in der Krippe in seine Arme schloß und es aus dem Schläfe erweckte, und wenn Bonaventura dies in dem Einsatz des Heiligen für die Reform der Kirche erfüllt sah, da er „die Herzen der Menschen erweckte, die im Glauben an Christus erkaltet waren“ (X 7, 615, 11—19), so sehen wir dies in der Predigt-tätigkeit des Heiligen erfüllt: „Er verstand sich nicht darauf, die Fehler gewisser Menschen zu beschönigen, wohl aber zu geißeln, nicht das Leben der Sünder zu entschuldigen, sondern durch heftigen Tadel zu erschüttern. Mit gleichem Freimut redete er zu groß und klein und mit gleich freudiger Bereitschaft zu wenigen wie zu vielen“ (XII 8, 613, 2—5). Aus diesem Grunde „wußte

er die Zeit, die ihm zu verdienstlichen Werken geschenkt war, so klug einzuteilen, daß er einen Teil zur Mühe der Seelsorge an dem Nächsten, den andern aber auf die Ruhe gottergebener Beschauung verwandte“ (XIII 1, 615, 5—7). Je mehr er aber sein Ende nahe fühlte, desto mehr „dürstete er mit Christus dem Gekreuzigten danach, daß eine große Schar gerettet werde. Er ließ seinen halbtoten Körper durch die Städte und Dörfer herumführen, um die Menschen zu ermahnen, Christi Kreuz zu tragen“ (XIV 1, 620, 3—7). Zu den zehn Zeichen aber, in denen Gott sein Wohlgefallen an diesem seinem Werk ausgedrückt hat, gehört auch „die plötzliche Umkehr der Menschen beim Anhören seiner Worte“ (XII 12, 615, 5 f); denn „er hielt sich nur dann für einen Freund Christi, wenn er die Seelen liebhaber, die jener erlöst hat . . . Deshalb sein Ringen im Gebet, seine Unermüdlichkeit bei der Predigt, sein überschwänglicher Eifer, ein gutes Beispiel zu geben“ (IX 4, 599, 4—8).

Wenn Bonaventura mit sovielen Einzelzügen — und diese ließen sich unschwer noch um manche vermehren — den Einsatz des Franziskus für die Erneuerung der Kirche aus dem Geist des Evangeliums schildert, dann will er damit seinen Lesern zeigen, wie Franziskus das erfüllt hat, was einst der große Reformpapst Innozenz III. erstrebte. Unter Anspielung auf die Anfangsworte des Buches Job (1, 1) hatte schon Thomas von Celano im Jahre 1228 sein Franziskusleben begonnen: „Ein Mann lebte in der Stadt Assisi, die im Spoletotal liegt, namens Franziskus“ (I 1, in: *AnalFranc* X, 5), so beginnt auch Bonaventura seine *Vita* mit fast den gleichen Worten: „Ein Mann lebte in der Stadt Assisi, namens Franziskus“ (I 1, 560, 4). Doch im Gegensatz zu Celano will er damit jenen Rufer zur Buße kennzeichnen, dem Gott das Amt aufgetragen hat, „zum Weinen und Wehklagen, zum Scheren des Hauptes und zum Bußgewand aufzurufen und den Wehklagenden und trauernden Männern das Tau-Zeichen auf die Stirn zu prägen“ (Prol. 2, 558, 5—7): denn in seiner Predigt zur Eröffnung des Vierten Laterankonzils von 1215 hatte Innozenz III. dieses Ezechielwort (9, 2) auf die Kirchenreform bezogen³⁵ und von diesem Kirchenreformer ausgesagt, er müsse an Tugenden reich sein, „wie jener, von dem die Schrift berichtet: ‚Ein Mann lebte im Lande Hus, namens Job, und dieser Mann war einfältig und gerade, fürchtete Gott und hielt sich vom Bösen fern‘.“³⁶ Wenn ferner nach

³⁵ Sermo VI in concilio generali Lateranensi habitus, *Migne* PL 217, 676: „De spiritali vero transitu Dominus ad virum vestitum lineis, habentem attramentarium scriptoris ad renes: Transi per mediam civitatem, et signa Thau super frontes virorum gementium atque dolentium super cunctis abominationibus quae sunt in medio eius (Ezech 9, 3 f).“

³⁶ A.a.O.: „Vir vestitus lineis, habens attramentarium scriptoris ad renes eius, is debet esse qui loquatur, vir virtutibus virens, qualis erat ille

den Worten dieses Papstes „das Tau der letzte Buchstabe des hebräischen Alphabets ist, der die Form des Kreuzes, wie es bei der Kreuzigung des Herrn war, bevor Pilatus die Aufschrift anbringen ließ“, ³⁷ so hat auch Bonaventura diese Verbindung zwischen Tau-Zeichen und Kreuz Christi herausgestellt; Pazifikus, ehemals Meister des höfischen Gesanges, sah ein großes Tauzeichen auf der Stirn des Franziskus (IV 9, 575, 16 f), als er diesen „Prediger des Kreuzes Christi“ (IV 9, 575, 7) bei dem Dorf San Severino traf. Außerdem betont Bonaventura noch die Vorliebe des Heiligen für dieses Zeichen, „als ob sein ganzes Streben darauf gerichtet sei, das Tau-Zeichen auf die Stirn der Männer zu zeichnen, die seufzen und trauern, wie der Prophet sagt, d. h. der Menschen, die sich in Wahrheit zu Jesus Christus bekehrt haben“ (IV 9, 575, 20—22).

Wiederum folgt Bonaventura Worten Innozenz' III., der trage jenes Zeichen an seiner Stirn, der die Kraft des Kreuzes Christi in seinen Werken dadurch zeige, daß er nach des Apostels Wort (Gal 5, 24) sein Fleisch samt seinen Leidenschaften und Gelüsten kreuzigt“; ³⁸ denn anschließend berichtet Bonaventura von Franziskus: „Darum beherzigte er jenes Apostelwort: ‚Die aber Christus angehören, haben ihr Fleisch samt den Leidenschaften und Gelüsten ans Kreuz geschlagen‘. Um in seinem Leben die Rüstung des Kreuzes zu tragen, nahm er die sinnlichen Gelüste in so strenge Zucht, daß er sich kaum gestattete, was zur Erhaltung seines Lebens erforderlich war“ (V 1, 577, 4—9).

Ebenso hat Bonaventura noch einen letzten Gedanken des Papstes Innozenz auf Franziskus übertragen. Dieser hatte nämlich von dem Kirchenreformer gesagt, er könne ferner mit dem Apostel (Gal 6, 14) von sich bekennen: ‚Mir aber sei es fern mich zu rühmen — außer im Kreuze unseres Herrn Jesus Christus, durch den mir die Welt gekreuzigt ist und ich der Welt‘. ³⁹ Hatte Bonaventura nämlich schon im Prolog seines Franziskuslebens, wie wir sahen, die Sendung des Franziskus für die Kirche in den Worten Ezech 9, 2 gefunden und später noch dessen Vorliebe für das Tau-Zeichen betont, so greift er am Schlusse seines Wunderberichtes (X 6, 651, 10—14) dasselbe noch einmal auf und fährt dann

de quo dicit Scriptura (Job 1, 1): Vir erat in terra Hus nomine Job. et erat vir iste simplex et rectus, ac timens Deum, et recedens a malo.”

³⁷ A.a.O. 677: “T est ultima littera Hebraici alphabeti, exprimens formam crucis, qualis erat antequam Domino crucifixo Pilatus titulum superponeret.”

³⁸ A.a.O.: “Hoc signum gerit in fronte, qui virtutem crucis ostendit in opere, ut iuxta quod dicit Apostolus (Gal 5, 24) crucifigat carnem suam cum vitiis et concupiscentiis.”

³⁹ A.a.O.: “idemque cum Apostolo (Gal 6, 14) dicat: Mihi absit gloriari nisi in cruce Domini nostri Iesu Christi, per quem mihi mundus crucifixus est, et ego mundo.”

in offenkundiger Anlehnung an die Worte des Papstes, deren Gedanken er noch weiterführt, fort: „Der glorreiche Bannerträger des Kreuzes Christi hat uns durch seine Verdienste und durch Gottes Fügung zum Tau, dem Zeichen des Kreuzes, gelangen lassen . . . Sein ganzes Leben hindurch folgte er den Spuren des Kreuzes, kostete er des Kreuzes Wonnen und predigte er des Kreuzes Herrlichkeit. Denn schon zu Beginn seines Bekehrung konnte er in Wahrheit mit dem Apostel (Gal 6, 14 ff) sprechen: ‚Mir aber sei fern mich zu rühmen — außer im Kreuze unseres Herrn Jesus Christus‘. Mit nicht geringerem Recht konnte er dann im Verlauf seines Lebens fortfahren: ‚Wer immer diese Richtschnur befolgt: Friede über ihn und Erbarmen!‘ Doch konnte er mit größtem Recht bei der Vollendung seines Lebens auf sich das Wort anwenden: ‚Ich trage die Wundmale des Herrn Jesus an meinem Leibe‘. Wir aber möchten von ihm täglich das andere Schriftwort hören: ‚Die Gnade unseres Herrn Jesus Christus, Brüder, sei mit euch allen Amen‘“ (Mir X 7 f, 651).

Zwar ließen sich auch die Worte Bonaventuras, Franziskus habe begonnen, „Christi Evangelium zu leben und zu lehren“ (IV 1, 571, 4), mit der Schilderung des Kirchenreformers bei Innozenz III. in Verbindung bringen, nach denen dieser „dank der ihm vom Heiligen Geist verliehenen Gnade die Gelüste des Fleisches in Zucht hält und bezwingt, damit sein Leben nicht von seiner Lehre abweiche“⁴⁰, und noch eher mit jenen andern Worten: „Zwei Dinge haben wir zu einem verdienstvollen Leben notwendig, Leben und Lehre; das erste unserer- und das zweite des Nächsten wegen; denn Jesus begann zu lehren und zu tun (Apg 1, 1) und hat uns ein Beispiel hinterlassen, damit wir seinen Fußspuren nachfolgen (1 Petr 2, 21)“⁴¹. Doch ist die Parallelität zwischen beiden Texten weder zwingend noch ist diese Berufung auf Apg 1, 1 oder ähnliche Schriftworte beiden Autoren ausschließlich eigen⁴². Ebensowenig läßt sich auf eine direkte Abhängigkeit Bonaventuras von Innozenz III. schließen, wenn er von den Wundmalen sagt: „Sie nehmen den Ungläubigen jeden Schein von Entschuldigung, bestärken die Gläubigen in ihrem Glauben, weisen sie in Vertrauen und Hoffnung

⁴⁰ A.a.O. 676 f: „Ille igitur habet attramentum scriptoris, qui per donum scientiae sibi a Spiritu sancto datum desideria carnis cohibet et restringit, ut in vita non discrepet a doctrina.“

⁴¹ Sermo VII in concilio generali Lateranensi habitus, *Migne* PL 217, 679: „Duo sunt nobis ad meritum necessaria, vita scilicet et doctrina; alterum propter nos, alterum propter proximos. Coepit enim Jesus docere et facere (Act 1, 1), nobis relinquens exemplum, ut sequamur vestigia eius (1 Petr 2, 21).“

⁴² Walafridi Strab. Glossa ord. in Act 1, 1, *Migne* PL 114, 420; Augustini Sermo 251, c. 5, n. 4, *Migne* PL 38, 1169; Gregorii M. Regulae pastoralis l. 1, c. 2, *Migne* PL 77, 15 u. öfter.

nach oben und entflammen sie durch das Feuer der Liebe“ (XIII 9, 620, 10 f); mag sich bei diesem Reformpapst auch eine ähnlich lautende Formulierung finden, wo er die Übelstände der Kirche schildert: „Der Glaube wird zugrunde gerichtet, die Frömmigkeit verfälscht, die Freiheit unterdrückt, die Gerechtigkeit in den Staub gezerzt, der Irrglaube verbreitet, das Schisma übermütig, die Wortbrüchigkeit übermächtig und die Söhne Hagens werden überlegen“,⁴³ so handelt es sich in beiden Fällen um stereotype Zustandsschilderungen, denen man im Mittelalter auch anderswo begegnet.⁴⁴ Schließlich läßt sich auch aus der Spekulation mit der Sechs-Zahl bei Innozenz III.⁴⁵ und der Bezeichnung des Franziskus bei Bonaventura als „Engel des sechsten Siegels“ (Prol. I, 558, 22—26)⁴⁶ nichts weiter folgern; denn die Quelle all dieser Spekulationen um die Sechs-Zahl als vollkommenste Zahl dürfte für beide Augustinus sein.⁴⁷ Gerade diese scheinbaren Fälle von Abhängigkeit machen aber den tatsächlichen Einfluß jener Vorstellungen, die Innozenz III. in seiner Konzilspredigt dargelegt hat, auf die bonaventurianische Sicht des Franziskuslebens klar sichtbar, so daß sich beide wie Vorhersage und Erfüllung verhalten. Jedenfalls sind bei Bonaventura Worte über Franziskus als „Bannerträger des Kreuzes“ (Mir I 2, 627, 6), „der die Kraft des Kreuzes Jesu zeigt und seinen Ruhm erneut bekräftigt“ (Mir I 1, 627, 4 f), vom Reformprogramm dieses Papstes erst in ihrer Tragweite zu verstehen. Dabei entbehrt eine doppelte Feststellung nicht des Interesses, daß sich nämlich zunächst auch der Orden der Kreuzherren, die sich auf eine Bestätigung ihrer Lebensweise durch Innozenz III. berufen⁴⁸, von dem Programm der Kirchnerneuerung dieses Papstes her als solche versteht, „die den trauernden und wehklagenden Männern

⁴³ Sermo VI, 678: „Hinc etiam mala proveniunt in populo christiano. Perit fides, religio deformatur, libertas confunditur, iustitia conculcatur, haeretici pullulant, insolescunt schismatici, perfidi saeviunt, praevalent Agareni.“

⁴⁴ Z. B. Nikolaus von Clairvaux († um 1170) in: Ps-Petri Damiani Sermo 69, *Migne* PL 144, 900; vgl. J. J. Ryan, S. Peter Damian and the Sermons of Nicholas of Clairvaux, in: *Medieval Studies* 11 (1947) 151—161.

⁴⁵ Sermo VI, 677 f: „Sex viri habentes vasa interitus unusquisque in manu sua, vos esse debetis viri virtutum: sex siquidem propter numeri sacramentum, ut perfecti sitis in opere et sermone: senarius enim numerus est perfectus eo quod redditur ex suis partibus aggregatis. Unde sexta die perfecit caelum et terram, et omnem ornatum eorum (Gen 2, 1). Et cum in plenitudine temporis sexta veniret aetate, sexta die sub hora sexta (Joan 19, 14), genus redemit humanum. Ideoque sex ultima verba dixit in cruce.“

⁴⁶ Eher möchte man als Parallele zu den Worten Innozenz' III. sehen in: *Breviloquium*, prol. § 2, S. Bonaventurae Opera omnia V, 203b—204b; *Hexaëm.* coll. 3, n. 30, a.a.O. 347b—348a; coll. 8, n. 12, 371ab; coll. 16, n. 16—29, 405b—408b; coll. 20, n. 29 f, 430b.

⁴⁷ De Genesi ad lit. I, 4, c. 7, n. 14, *Migne* PL 34, 301; c. 2, n. 20, 296 f.

⁴⁸ H. Russelius, *Chronicon Cruciferorum*, in: *Bibl. Antiqua Crucigeriana* I, Diest 1964, 31; 43.

das Tau-Zeichen auf die Stirn prägen“ und für die „das Tau-Zeichen nach dem Zeugnis des Hieronymus das Kreuz darstellt“, ⁴⁹ und ferner daß schon 1237 Papst Gregor IX. die Bedeutung des Franziskanerordens in dessen Eintreten für die Erneuerung der Kirche sieht. ⁵⁰

Man mißverstünde freilich Innozenz III., nähme man an, er habe Franziskus und seine kleine Bruderschar bereits als Träger seiner Kirchenreform angesehen oder sich sogar in dieser Weise bei einer Konzilspredigt geäußert. Vielmehr betrachtet sich Innozenz in seiner Eigenschaft als Papst als den Mann, dem Gott diese Aufgabe zugewiesen hat, und, bereits zu Konzilsbeginn von Todesahnungen erfüllt, möchte er „noch gern solange im Fleische weilen, bis das begonnene Werk (Befreiung des Heiligen Landes und Kirchenreform) abgeschlossen ist“ ⁵¹. Der Träger der Kirchenreform ist also für ihn der Papst; „denn der höchste Bischof, als Wächter über das Haus Israel bestellt, soll durch die gesamte Kirche, die Stadt des großen Königs und die Stadt auf dem Berge, gehen, um zu erforschen und zu prüfen, was die einzelnen verdienen . . . Darum soll er, um zwischen diesen und jenen zu unterscheiden, das Tau-Zeichen auf die Stirn der Männer und der Wehklagenden prägen und dadurch zeigen, daß jene, welche über die in der Kirche begangenen Greuel trauern und wehklagen, mit dem Tau-Zeichen gekennzeichnet sind“. ⁵²

Nachdem jedoch Gregor IX. die Gründung des Franziskus und ihr Wirken als Träger der Kirchenreform anerkannt hatte, verstehen wir gut, daß Bonaventura, der gerade damals das Wirken seines Ordens gegen dessen Gegner zu verteidigen hatte, besonderen Nachdruck auf die päpstliche Guttheißung und die kirchliche Sendung legt; dadurch wird nicht allein der grundlegende Unterschied zu den als häretisch verurteilten Wanderpredigern seiner Zeit hervorgehoben, sondern vor allem die Erfüllung des päpstlichen Reformanliegens durch Franziskus und seinen Orden.

*

Die besonderen Umstände der damaligen Zeit, nämlich der Pariser Mendikantenstreit, der Joachimismus im Franziskanerorden und das große Reformanliegen Papst Innozenz' III. und seiner Nachfolger, haben sicher Bonaventuras Franziskusleben weitgehend beeinflusst. Dennoch

⁴⁹ A.a.O., 2; vgl. Hieronymus in Ezech. 1. 3, c. 9, v. 4, *Migne* PL 25, 88: antiquis Hebraeorum litteris, quibus usque nunc utuntur Samaritani, littera crucis habet similitudinem, quae in Christianorum frontibus pinguitur."

⁵⁰ *Quoniam superabundavit*, in: BullFranc I, n. 224, 214 f. Zur Stellung Gregors IX zum Franziskanerorden, in dem er eine Antwort auf die Seelsorgsnot seiner Zeit sah, vgl. die Dissertation von L. Landini über die Ursachen der Klerikalisierung des Franziskanerordens in den Jahren 1209 bis 1260, die fast abgeschlossen ist.

⁵¹ Sermo VI, 673.

⁵² A.a.O. 677.

wäre es irrig, wollte man dieses Werk unter die apologetischen Schriften des Seraphischen Lehrers einreihen, als habe er damit versucht, zu den Kontroversfragen der Zeit Stellung zu nehmen und sich mit seinen Gegnern darüber auseinanderzusetzen. Dagegen spricht schon seine Beteuerung im Prolog (3, 558, 2—9), das brennende Verlangen der Brüder nach einem neuen Franziskusleben, der einmütige Wunsch des Generalkapitels von 1260 zu Narbonne und seine dem Heiligen geschuldete Verehrung hätten ihn zu diesem Werk veranlaßt. Bonaventura hat also sein Franziskusleben für seine Mitbrüder verfaßt und wendet sich darum an sie. Ihnen will er zeigen, wie herrlich und verdienstvoll ein Leben nach der Regel und nach dem Beispiel des Seraphischen Vaters sein kann, mögen auch die Gegner des Ordens es bekämpfen und Fanatiker in den eignen Reihen das Bild des Heiligen verdunkeln. Die Guttheißung dieser Lebensweise durch Gott, der durch das einzigartige und bisher unbekannte Wunder der Wundmale die Regel des Franziskus besiegelte, das vorbildliche Leben des Franziskus, das der Himmel selbst durch zahlreiche Wunder beglaubigte, die segensreiche Sendung, die der Herr seinem Heiligen in seinem Heilsplan zuwies, und sein fruchtbares Wirken an dem großen Reformwerk der Päpste sind Bonaventuras ebenso überzeugende wie ansprechende Argumente, mit denen er aufs neue die Begeisterung und die Hingabe der Mitbrüder für diese Lebensweise wirksam machen will. Daß er, der selbst der zweiten franziskanischen Generation angehört und der als Ordensgeneral sehr unter mancherlei Mißständen in den eignen Reihen litt,⁵³ bei seinen Schilderungen auch auf jene Fragen und Einwände, die von draußen in die Konvente hineingetragen wurden, einging und im Leben des Heiligen nach einer überzeugenden Antwort suchte, ist durchaus verständlich. Sein Anliegen war also weder die Widerlegung der Mendikantengegner noch die Abfassung eines im modernen Sinn biographischen oder hagiographischen Werkes, sondern er wollte ein erbauliches und den Ordensvater verherrlichendes Werk schreiben, zu dem er sich allerdings geschichtlicher Begebenheiten und echter Franziskusworte bediente, und er wollte durch dieses Werk seine Mitbrüder begeistern und zur treuen Nachfolge ihres Vaters aufrufen. Diese Feststellung gilt sowohl für Bonaventuras *Legenda maior* wie *Legenda minor*.

„Tu vero, lector, utaris fruarisque his opusculis eximiis ac suavissimis Doctoris Seraphici!“⁵⁴

Mönchengladbach

SOPHRONIUS CLASEN, O. F. M.

⁵³ *Epistolae officiales* I f, VIII, 468a—471b.

⁵⁴ *Bonaventurae Legenda maior S. Francisci Assisiensis (Editio Minor)*, Ad Claras Aquas 1941, XXVII.

ST. BONAVENTURE AND THE AUGUSTINIAN CONCEPT OF *MENS*

St. Bonaventure was the greatest augustinian of the medieval period. His theology carried forward, with a high degree of integrity, the devotional approach to truth which characterized the thought of St. Augustine. Nevertheless, because of the age in which he lived, St. Bonaventure has been interpreted frequently as representative of the aristotelian rather than the augustinian tradition. It would be more correct to say that St. Bonaventure is an augustinian who makes significant use of the thought of Aristotle.¹ It is the purpose of this paper to show the predominance of the augustinian tradition in the work of St. Bonaventure by examining the concept of *mens*, which is basic to the work of both men. In order to show the relationship, the paper will examine the concept as it is found in the *Itinerarium Mentis ad Deum*² of St. Bonaventure, and in three works of St. Augustine: *De Libero Arbitrio*,³ *De Vera Religione*,⁴ and *De Trinitate*.⁵

¹ Fernand Van Steenberghen has explored this question in depth in his work, *Aristotle in the West: The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism*. Translated by Leonard Johnston. Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1955. On pages 161—162, Van Steenberghen states, "It is as a *theologian*, and only as such, by the spirit of his theology and by its principal doctrines, that St. Bonaventure belongs to the Augustinian school, or to *Augustinian trend in theology*. In philosophy, St. Augustine is one of the sources of his thought, but is secondary with respect to Aristotelianism. In short, St. Bonaventure's philosophy is an eclectic Aristotelianism with neo-Platonic tendencies, put at the service of an Augustinian theology."

² Translated with an Introduction by George Boas and published with the English title, *The Mind's Road to God*, New York, 1953. Hereafter referred to as *Itinerarium*. Quotations are from the English translation, but each has been compared with the Latin text as published in S. Bonaventure, *Opera Omnia*, volume xii, Ludovicus Vivès, Bibliopola Editor, Parisiis, 1868.

³ *Augustine: Earlier Writings*, Selected and translated with Introductions by John H. S. Burleigh. *The Library of Christian Classics*, volume vi. Philadelphia, 1953. Hereafter referred to as *DLA*. Quotations are from the English translation, but each has been compared with the Latin texts as published in *Opera Omnia Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Latina Prior*, Tomus xxxii. Accurante J.-P. Migne, Parisiis, 1877.

⁴ *Ibid.*, hereafter referred to as *DVR*. Quotations are from the English translation, but each has been compared with the Latin text as published in *Opera Omnia Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Latina Prior*, Tomus xxxiv. Accurante J.-P. Migne, Parisiis, 1877.

⁵ Marcus Dods, Editor, *The Works of Aurelius Augustine, Bishop of Hippo*, volume vii, translated by Arthur West Haddan, Edinburgh, 1873.

One of the factors responsible in part for the improper interpretation of St. Bonaventure's work is his failure to define his terms. He assumes an understanding of his terminology on the part of his readers, but it is precisely the failure to understand that has led to modern difficulties. The foundations of his terminology must be derived clearly, therefore, and the examination must begin with the work of St. Augustine in order to lay the proper foundation.

I

Basic to the thought of St. Augustine, and fundamental to his concept of knowledge, is the conviction that without faith there can be no understanding.⁶ Faith is the cornerstone for knowledge. The will is primary in all knowledge, for what is known cannot be divorced from what is loved. The will of man apart from Christ is directed to goods which are, for the man involved, ultimate goods but which are not *the* Ultimate Good. When a man is in Christ, the Word made flesh so moves the will that the individual is enabled to love The Good of which he has been aware without personal acknowledgement.

For St. Augustine, all knowledge is possible because of Divine Illumination. Through the eternal Logos, all things are made conformable to God and to the human mind. Because of this conformity, the human mind is capable of knowledge of the things of the external world. It is only by faith that full understanding comes; then the external things become exemplars through which and in which the individual can be led to know God. It is with knowledge of the redeemed man that this paper is concerned.

As man views the world around him, he is brought to an awareness of that which is above the corporeal world. "Whatever comes into contact with a bodily sense is proved to be not one but many, for it is corporeal and therefore has innumerable parts . . . And yet all these parts could not be counted unless we had some notion of unity . . .

Hereafter referred to as *De Trin.* Quotations are from the English translation, but each has been compared with the Latin text as published in *Opera Omnia Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Latina Prior*, Tomus xlii. Accurante J.-P. Migne, Parisiis, 1877.

⁶ *DLA*, II. ii. 6: "Nisi enim aliud esset credere, et aliud intelligere, et primo credendum esset, quod magnum et divinum intelligere cuperemus, frustra propheta dixisset, *nisi credideritis, non intelligetis* (Isai. vii. 9, Sec. LXX)." Compare *In Joannis Evangelium tractatus* XXIX, 6; XXVII, 9; XI, 9; *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. CXVIII, Sermon. xviii, 3; *Epistolae* CXX, i, 3, 4.

however I have to know unity, I have not learned it from the bodily senses . . ."⁷ This unity is known by the "inner light."⁸

Truth, Wisdom, Unity, all are known by the man who has the persevering will, who is fixed on the eternal realm, and who is possessed of the Divine Illumination. "Hence it is evident beyond a doubt that wisdom is better than our minds, for by it alone they are made individually wise, and are made judges, not of it, but by it of all other things whatever."⁹ In *De vera Religione*, St. Augustine says much the same thing of truth. "Clearly, then, the standard which is called truth is higher than our minds."¹⁰

It is important to realize that, for St. Augustine, not ontology but axiology is the primary concern. Man does not strive for and desire "being" primarily; he strives for and desires "good." St. Augustine states the relation of "being" and "good" very clearly when he says, "Existence as such is good, and supreme existence is the chief good . . . whatever is must have some form, and though it be but a minimal good it will be good and will be of God. . . . Every good thing is either God or derived from God. Therefore even the lowest form is of God. And the same may be said of species."¹¹

⁷ *DLA*, II. viii. 22: "Unum vero quisquis verissime cogitat, profecto invenit corporis sensibus non posse sentiri. Quidquid enim tali sensu attingitur, jam non unum, sed multa esse convincitur: corpus est enim, et ideo habet innumerabiles partes. . . . Cum enim quaero unum in corpore, et me non invenire non dubito, novi utique quid ibi quaeram, et quid ibi non inveniam, et non posse inveniri, vel potius omnino ibi non esse. . . . Ubicumque autem unum noverim, non utique per corporis sensum novi; quia per corporis sensum non novi nisi corpus, quod vere pureque unum non esse convincimus."

⁸ *DLA*, II. viii. 23: "Hoc ergo quod per omnes numeros esse immobile, firmum incorruptumque conspiciamus, unde conspiciamus? Non enim ullus ullo sensu corporis omnes numeros attingit; innumerabiles enim sunt: unde ergo novimus per omnes hoc esse, aut qua phantasia vel phantasmate tam certa veritas numeri per innumerabilia tam fidenter, nisi in luce interiore conspiciatur, quam corporalis sensus ignorat?"

⁹ *DLA*, II. xiv. 38: "Ac per hoc eam manifestum est mentibus nostris, quae ab ipsa una fiunt singulae sapientes, et non de ipsa, sed per ipsam de caeteris iudices, sine dubitatione esse potiores."

¹⁰ *DVR*, I. xxx. 56: "Haec autem lex omnium artium cum sit omnino incommutabilis, mens vero humana cui talem legem videre concessum est, mutabilitatem pati possit erroris, satis apparet supra mentem nostram esse legem, quae veritas dicitur."

¹¹ *DVR*, I. xviii. 35: "Deus incommutabilis Trinitas, quoniam et per summam Sapientiam ea fecit, et summa benignitate conservat. . . . Ipsum enim quantumcumque esse, bonum est: quia summum bonum est summe esse. . . . Quoniam quidquid est, quantulumcumque specie sit necesse est; ita etsi minimum bonum, tamen bonum erit, et ex Deo erit. . . . Omne autem bonum, aut Deus, aut ex Deo est. Ergo ex Deo est etiam minima species. Sane quod de specie, hoc etiam de forma dici potest."

This indicates quite clearly why St. Augustine can turn to the outer world to find God. Whatever in that realm is good is of God and is thus an exemplar of God. Through and in that external object, God may be seen. When the supreme Good, or God, is the object of the will, that object is loved supremely. In that love, *sapientia* is possible. "... we with all possible keenness give our whole soul, so to speak, to what is mentally discerned . . .",¹² and man can rise above mere *scientia* to a knowledge of God and of all things in and through God. St. Augustine is so certain of this that he can say, "if fleshly pleasure is loved, let it be carefully considered and vestigial traces of number will be recognized in it. We must, then, seek the realm where number exists in complete tranquillity, for there existence is, above all, unity."¹³ He sees the same type of pattern unfolding in the order of nature. "The whole rhythmic succession and gradation in space and time is judged to be beautiful not by its size or length but by its ordered fitness."¹⁴ This same orderedness holds true for man; thus it is that in man also can be found the image of God. "Some things are made conformable to that first form such as rational and intellectual creatures, among whom man is rightly said to be made in the image and likeness of God. Not otherwise could he behold unchangeable truth with his mind."¹⁵

The wisdom for which man strives is nothing "but the truth in which the chief good is beheld and possessed."¹⁶ Here is happiness to be found: "everyone is happy who attains the chief good, which indisputably is the end which we all desire. . . . No one is happy without wisdom. For no one is happy except by the possession of the chief good which is

¹² *DLA*, II, xvi. 41: "Quid igitur aliud agimus cum studemus esse sapientes, nisi ut quanta possumus alacritate, ad id quod mente contingimus, totam animam nostram quodammodo colligamus, et ponamus ibi, atque stabilius infigamus; ut non jam privato suo gaudeat quod implicavit rebus transeuntibus, sed exuta omnibus temporum et locorum affectionibus apprehendat id quod unum atque idem semper est? Sicut enim tota vita corporis est anima, sic beata vita animae Deus est."

¹³ *DVR*, I, xlii. 79: "Si ergo voluptas carnis diligitur, ea ipsa diligentius consideretur; et cum ibi recognita fuerint quorundam vestigia numerorum, quaerendum est ubi sine tumore sint. Ibi enim magis unum est quod est."

¹⁴ *DVR*, I, xliii. 80: "Sic mora unius horae ad diem, et diei ad mensem, et mensis ad annum, et anni ad lustrum, et lustrum ad majores circuitus, et ipsi ad universum tempus relati breves sunt: cum illa ipsa numerosa successio, et quaedam gradatio, sive localium, sive temporalium spatiorum, non tumore vel mora, sed ordinata convenientia pulchra judicetur."

¹⁵ *DVR*, I, xliv. 82: "Horum alia sic sunt per ipsam, ut ad ipsam etiam sint, ut omnis rationalis et intellectualis creatura, in qua homo rectissime dicitur factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei: non enim aliter incommutabilem veritatem posset mente conspiceri."

¹⁶ *DLA*, II, ix. 26: "Num aliam putas esse sapientiam nisi veritatem, in qua cernitur et tenetur summum bonum?"

beheld and possessed in the truth which we call wisdom."¹⁷ And how is the knowledge of this wisdom and happiness obtained? "Before we are happy the notion of happiness is stamped in our minds. . . . even before we are wise we have the notion of wisdom stamped in our minds."¹⁸

The significance of such wisdom and happiness becomes more clear when attention is directed to *De Trinitate*. In this work, St. Augustine deals at great length with the doctrine of knowledge, not as an academic study, but as a devotional writing. We find in this intent a parallel with the *Itinerarium* of St. Bonaventura. Both men are interested in leading the believer beyond the knowledge of this world to a knowledge of God himself insofar as that knowledge is available to men. If one keeps this in mind, it will aid in attaining an understanding of what both men mean by *mens*.

In the wise man, the soul participates in the immutable and eternal truth of God, and St. Augustine emphasizes that the mind of man must rise above the sensory images of corporeal things in order to think truly about God.¹⁹ St. Augustine distinguishes between knowledge of a matter of fact and knowledge of the truth which is in his mind which can be known directly.²⁰

In dealing with *mens*, St. Augustine notes that in loving itself, the mind must know itself. Here he finds a new trinity: mind, love, and

¹⁷ *Ibid.*: "Summo autem bono assecuto et adepto, beatus quisque fit; quod omnes sine controversia volumus. Ut ergo constat nos beatos esse velle, ita nos constat velle esse sapientes; quia nemo sine sapientia beatus est. Nemo enim beatus est, nisi summo bono, quod in ea veritate, quam sapientiam vocamus, cernitur et tenetur."

¹⁸ *Ibid.*: "Sicut ergo antequam beati simus, mentibus tamen nostris impressa est notio beatitatis; per hanc enim scimus, fidenterque, et sine ulla dubitatione dicimus beatos nos esse velle; ita etiam priusquam sapientes simus, sapientiae notionem in mente habemus impressam, per quam unusquisque nostrum si interrogatur velitne esse sapiens, sine ulla caligine dubitationis se velle respondet." The translator, Burleigh, read this passage as saying that the notions of happiness and wisdom are stamped "upon our minds," but this is inaccurate. I have corrected the English in the translation in the body of this paper so that the English reads "in our minds," which is more precise and conveys the intent of St. Augustine. The mind is not something *upon* which knowledge of God is composed; rather, the mind is that in Which God is known.

¹⁹ See *De Trin.*, III. ii. 7, 8; compare also *De Trin.*, VIII. i. 2.

²⁰ See *De Trin.*, IX. vi. 9. This is concerned with the distinction between synthetic and analytic knowledge. In a footnote on page 211 of his book, *Augustine's Quest of Wisdom*, Milwaukee (c 1945), Vernon J. Bourke says, "in other words, there is no question of the abstracting of the second form of knowledge (that of the eternal) from the first. Any interpreter who tries to make this theory into one resembling the Thomistic abstraction theory is guilty of a misreading of these pages of St. Augustine." The present writer agrees with Bourke completely; there is a vital distinction between synthetic and analytic knowledge, and St. Augustine is insisting that the knowledge of God is analytic. This will be seen again in St. Bonaventura.

knowledge.²¹ St. Augustine rules out the possibility that knowledge and love are accidents of which the substance, mind, is the subject. Love and knowledge are not contained in the mind as in a subject but exist substantially, as the mind itself does.²² At the same time, mind, love, and knowledge are co-essential. "... the mind itself loves itself, and itself knows itself; and these three so exist, as that the mind is neither loved nor known by any other thing at all. These three, therefore, must needs be of one and the same essence."²³ St. Augustine says that mind knows itself in the light of eternal truth.²⁴ By this he means to indicate that the mind is not sufficient unto itself; it requires the assistance of God. Mind is given to man in the creative act in which all created things are made under the Divine Illumination. Mind is not self-sufficient. The eternal Logos is the very principle of all knowledge and is the key, in His Incarnate Form, to true and complete knowledge. Mind is therefore never sufficient unto itself; it always operates within the "light of eternal truth."

Mens, it seems clear, is not rationality. To speak of "man's mind" for St. Augustine does not refer to a man's powers to reason discursively. Mind includes the noetic activity of man and not just the discursive powers. St. Augustine finds a great deal that is known by man apart from images. It is by images that man knows bodies of the external world;²⁵ but there is knowledge that is not of the external world. It is in the memory that St. Augustine finds knowledge of the principles of intellectual judgment.²⁶ In cogitation, the mind groups together

²¹ *De Trin.*, IX. iv. 4.

²² *De Trin.*, IX. iv. 5.

²³ *De Trin.*, IX. iv. 7: "... cum mens ipsa se amet, atque ipsa se noverit; atque ita sunt haec tria, ut non alteri alicui rerum mens vel amata vel nota sit. Unius ergo ejusdemque essentiae necesse est haec tria sint: ..."

²⁴ *De Trin.*, X. iii. 5: "... An in ratione veritatis aeternae videt quam speciosum sit nosse semetipsam, et hoc amat quod videt, studetque in se fieri? quia quamvis sibi nota non sit, notum tamen ei est quam bonum sit, ut sibi nota sit."

²⁵ *De Trin.*, X. vii. 10: "In his omnibus sententiis quisquis videt mentis naturam et esse substantiam, et non esse corpoream, id est, non minore sui parte minus occupare loci spatium, majusque majore; simul oportet videat eos qui opinantur esse corpoream, non ob hoc errare, quod mens desit eorum notitiae, sed quod adjungunt ea sine quibus nullam possunt cogitare naturam. Sine phantasiis enim corporum quidquid jussi fuerint cogitare nihil omnino esse arbitrantur. Ideoque non se, tanquam sibi desit, mens requirat." Compare also *De Trin.*, X. ix. 12⁹

²⁶ *De Trin.*, X. x. 13: "... Meminisse etiam se sciunt; simulque sciunt quod nemo meminisset, nisi esset ac viveret: sed et ipsam memoriam ad aliquid referimus, quod ea meminimus. Duobus igitur horum trium, memoria et intelligentia, multarum rerum notitia atque scientia continentur: voluntas autem adest, per quam fruamur eis vel utamur. Fruimur enim cognitis, in quibus voluntas ipsis propter se ipsa delectata conquiescit: utimur vero eis quae ad aliud referimus quo fruendum est."

diverse elements of its experience as a preliminary to understanding.²⁷ The universal is obtained from the higher vision of the eternal truth and is applied by an intellectual judgment to the "mind groups."²⁸ This is not abstractionism in the thought of St. Augustine; the last species is not an intelligible form but merely the principle of that grouping of memory contents.

To avoid any possible confusion at this point, one must make clear the distinction between *mens* and *ratio*. *Ratio* refers to the ability of mind with regard to discursive activity.²⁹ In Book XII of *De Trinitate*, St. Augustine deals at some length with the distinction between two functions of *ratio*; *ratio inferior* considers bodily things known through images and this is *scientia*; *ratio superior* considers reasonably the immutable truth and this is *sapientia*. It is in this distinction that St. Augustine goes back to the Platonic doctrine of *anamnesis* or recollection. He does not accept the doctrine as it stands, but he revises it, eliminating the 'transmigration of souls' concept and reinterprets *anamnesis* in his own terms as "Divine Illumination." All knowledge, both science and wisdom, requires the spiritual light with which God illumines the intellect of all men.³⁰ Thus it is that, under the Divine

²⁷ *De Trin.*, XI. vii. 12: "... Atque illud primum videndum est, non esse posse voluntatem reminiscendi, nisi vel totum, vel aliquid rei ejus quam reminisci volumus, in penetralibus memoriae teneamus. Quod enim omni modo et omni ex parte obliti fuerimus, nec reminiscendi voluntas exoritur: quoniam quidquid recordari volumus, recordati jam sumus in memoria nostra esse vel fuisse. ... Unde intelligi potest, voluntatem reminiscendi ab iis quidem rebus quae memoria continentur procedere, adjunctis simul eis quae inde per recordationem cernendo exprimuntur, id est, ex copulatione rei cujusdam quam recordati sumus, et visionis quae inde facta est in acie cogitantis cum recordati sumus. Sed ipsa quae utrumque copulat voluntas, requirit et aliud quod quasi vicinum est atque contiguum recordanti. Tot igitur hujus generis trinitates, quot recordationes, quia nulla est earum ubi non haec tria sint; illud quo in memoria reconditum est etiam antequam cogitetur, et illud quod fit in cogitatione cum cernitur, et voluntas utrumque conjungens, et ex utroque ac tertia se ipsa unum aliquid complens."

²⁸ *De Trin.*, XI. ix. 16: "In hac igitur distributione cum incipimus a specie corporis, et pervenimus usque ad speciem quae fit in intuitu cogitantis, quatuor species reperiuntur quasi gradatim natae altera ex altera: secunda, de prima; tertia, de secunda; quarta, de tertia. A specie quippe corporis quod cernitur, exoritur ea quae fit in sensu cernentis; et ab hac, ea quae fit in memoria et ab hac, ea qua fit in acie cogitantis." See Bourke, *op. cit.*, page 214.

²⁹ Cf. James Morgan, *The Psychological Teaching of St. Augustine*, London, [n. d.], page 221.

³⁰ *De Trin.*, XII. xv. 25: "Si ergo haec est sapientiae et scientiae recta distinctio, ut ad sapientiam pertineat aeternarum rerum cognitio intellectualis; ad scientiam vero, temporalium rerum cognitio rationalis: quid cui praeponendum sive postponendum sit, non est difficile judicare. Si autem alia est adhibenda discretio, qua dignoscantur haec duo, quae procul dubio distare Apostolus docet, dicens, *Alii datur quidem per Spiritum sermo*

Illumination, and the revelation of Jesus Christ, a man can consider the *vestigia* of God in the world around him, can find the evidences of God in his own mind, and move through his own mind to a contemplation of God Himself in the Holy Trinity.

It becomes evident at this point that St. Augustine's epistemology does not involve the concept of *mens*; rather, his epistemology *is* his concept of *mens*. Mind is never simply rationality; it is basically axiological in nature and within that axiological orientation rationality takes its proper place. Mind culminates in intellectual contemplation which finds its climax in a vision of the incorporeal, eternal and immutable things of God.

II

It is this mystical culmination in St. Augustine's epistemology which becomes characteristic of all medieval mysticism. The man who seeks to understand more fully the reality of God must rise above *scientia* and make the intellectual journey to the knowledge of God.

St. Bonaventure takes up the quest which St. Augustine had begun. He follows St. Augustine clearly in holding the primacy of the good above the true, and in maintaining the primacy of willing over knowing. In the *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, St. Bonaventure is concerned to outline the steps in the progress of the mind toward God, and his approach is typically augustinian in that it is not philosophical but devotional in orientation.

There are three very clear stages in this progression, each of which is sub-divided once.³¹ At the apex of the journey is the seventh step where peace with God is found. Our question is: when St. Bonaventure speaks of mind, does he mean the same thing that St. Augustine meant?

He indicates at the very beginning of the Prologue of the *Itinerarium* what he means by mind; he says that God "may enlighten the eyes of our mind to guide our feet into the way of that peace which surpasses all

sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem Spiritum; tamen etiam istorum duorum quae nos posuimus evidentissima differentia est, quod alia sit intellectualis cognitio aeternarum rerum, alia rationalis temporalium, et huic illam praeponendam esse ambigit nemo."

³¹ This is not a new concept with St. Bonaventure. P. Irenaeus Squadrani, "S. Bonaventura christianus philosophus (continuatio et finis)" *Antonianum*, XVI (1941), page 260, says: "Gradus porro quibus ascendit Bonaventura idem ac tot sunt fundamentaliter quot eam percurrerant Plato ad bonum, Plotinus ad unum et Augustinus ad Veritatem attingendam, nempe tres: a rebus externis ad animam, ab anima ad ideas et ab ideis ad Deum."

understanding."³² In this, mind is clearly not to be identified with all rationality. If this reference to "peace" is related to the peace of the final step of the journey to God, then he is clearly speaking of that which is above rationality. On the same page, St. Bonaventure says "I meditated on the ascent of the mind to God . . ."³³ This should aid in understanding his meaning. If mind is related to meditation, as the root of the word seems to indicate, then mind is clearly not discursive reasoning. On the following page, he speaks of "contemplation which leads to mental elevation"³⁴ and this supports the understanding that mind does not refer to discursive or synthetic reasoning. We must understand that the entire presentation of the *Itinerarium* is based on the assumption that the person reading it is a Christian who is disposed already, by the re-direction of his will, to seek to apprehend God. There is no knowledge without love and no understanding without humility.³⁵ Here one can see the combination of the augustinian axiological emphasis and the franciscan poverty-of-spirit maxim.³⁶ Unless there is poverty of spirit, the "mirror of the mind"³⁷ is be-fogged; the mirror can only be cleared

³² *Itinerarium*, Prologue: "... det illuminatos oculos mentis nostrae, ad dirigendos pedes nostros in viam pacis illius, quae exuperat omnem sensum: . . ."

³³ *Ibid.*, Prologue: "... ibique existens dum mente tractarem aliquas mentales ascensiones in Deum . . ."

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Prologue: "Non enim dispositus est aliquo modo ad contemplationes divinas, quae ad mentales ducunt excessus . . ."

³⁵ *Ibid.*, Prologue: "Igitur ad gemitum orationis per Christum crucifixum, per cuius sanguinem purgamur a sordibus vitiorum, primum quidem lectorem invito, ne forte credat, quod sibi sufficiat lectio sine unctione, speculatio sine devotione, investigatio sine admiratione, circumspectio sine exultatione, industria sine pietate, scientia sine charitate, intelligentia sine humilitate, studium absque divina gratia, speculum absque sapientia divinitus inspirata." P.-L. Landsberg, "La philosophie d'une expérience mystique: L'*Itinerarium*," *La Vie Spirituelle* LI (1937), page [81], says: "... c'est précisément que Dieu n'est pas essentiellement object, mais acte, qu'il n'est pas intelligence, mais amour. S'il est l'être, il l'est seulement dans ce sens que l'être dans sa vérité s'identifie à l'amour . . . c'est la connaissance de l'amour par l'amour, la connaissance par identification, la connaissance proprement mystique. . . . L'intellect y est en quiétude, et l'amour en acte donne la béatitude."

³⁶ While it may seem unnecessary to recall that St. Bonaventure saw in St. Francis the ideal figure of Christian man, it should be remembered as one considers the augustinianism of St. Bonaventure. Seeing St. Francis as the ideal, St. Bonaventure tends to read St. Augustine in the light of St. Francis and individualizes concepts which were for St. Augustine universal. Landsberg, *op. cit.*, page [82], says: "Cette interprétation spirituelle de l'histoire qu'Augustin voulait donner de l'humanité, Bonaventure la donne de l'individu. . . . Découvrir dans la vie individuelle de saint François l'expression de la vie universelle de tous les vrais spirituels est pour saint Bonaventure la tâche centrale de sa philosophie chrétienne."

³⁷ *Itinerarium*, Prologue: "... insinuans quod parum aut nihil est speculum exterius propositum, nisi speculum mentis nostrae tersum fuerit et politum."

as man in humility turns toward God in love. Then mind is activated to seek the knowledge of God.³⁸

There is a possibility of confusion in reading St. Bonaventure when one comes across a statement such as the following: "our mind has three principal aspects. One refers to the external body, wherefore it is called animality or sensuality; the second looks inward and into itself wherefore it is called spirit; the third looks above itself, wherefore it is called mind."³⁹ How can the mind include three aspects, one of which is mind? There is no answer given to this problem by St. Bonaventure himself, but against the background of St. Augustine the answer is apparent.⁴⁰ The mind is that which is oriented to the Divine Illumination which is God Himself.⁴¹ Within it are three aspects to deal with the three aspects of life—external, internal and eternal—but all of which, under the Divine Illumination revealed to the individual in Christ, are pointed toward the highest goal of mind—the knowledge of God Himself.⁴²

In the first chapter of the *Itinerarium*, St. Bonaventure helps to clarify any difficulties about the meaning of mind in the narrow sense. "... there are six stages of the soul's powers by which we mount from the depths to the heights, from the external to the internal, from the temporal to the eternal — to wit, sense, imagination, reason, intellect,

³⁸ Squadrani, *op. cit.*, page 304, points to this combination of augustinianism and franciscanism: "Hac ratione duobus viris praesertim contradicere nequit eosque proximius sequitur: Augustinum et Franciscum. Augustinum nempe, quia illum recognoscit inter expositores sacrae Scripturae uti maxime authenticum; Franciscum vero, quia illum admiratur et imitari studet ut exemplum perfectae contemplationis Iesu Christi Crucifixi."

³⁹ *Itinerarium*, Caput Primum: "Secundum hunc triplicem progressum, mens nostra tres habet aspectus principales: unus est ad corporalia exteriora, secundum quem vocatur animalitas seu sensualitas; alius intra se et in se, secundum quem dicitur spiritus; tertius est supra se, secundum quem dicitur mens."

⁴⁰ Landsberg, *op. cit.*, page [77]: "La notion de *mens* dans ce sens et l'identification permanente du *mens* avec une vue de l'esprit (*oculi mentis*, *acies mentis*, etc.) est d'origine augustinienne. ... Ici, chez Bonaventure, le *mens* est compris encore plus clairement comme la tendance de l'âme vers l'au-delà, vers le spirituel, les idées, la vérité pure, c'est-à-dire vers Dieu, Le Logos, Le Christ, qui est le centre de la doctrine bonaventurienne. Dans sa triple distinction, il ne s'agit pas de facultés différentes, inhérentes à une substance stable de l'âme, il s'agit de possibilités dynamiques de l'existence impliquant autant de directions cognitives."

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, page [79]: "Il a plus: sans la vérité de Dieu, pas d'intelligence pour Bonaventure, sans l'éternité, pas de mémoire, sans le *summum bonum*, pas d'amour: La présence motrice de Dieu conditionne l'homme dans toutes ses activités. Le texte est décisif pour la théorie strictement augustinienne de la connaissance humaine chez Bonaventure."

⁴² Cf. George H. Tavard, *Transiency and Permanence: The Nature of Theology According to St. Bonaventure*, St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1954, page 58.

intelligence, and the apex of the mind, the illumination of conscience.”⁴³ While this division does not correspond exactly with any given by St. Augustine, still there is the basic distinction into *ratio inferior* and *ratio superior* which is found in St. Augustine. Sense, imagination, and reason would come within the category of *ratio inferior*, because these are the elements of mind which are concerned with the external existence. Intellect, intelligence, and the apex of the mind would correspond to the *ratio superior*, because these are concerned with the internal and eternal. The apex of the mind or illumination of the conscience is exactly that for which St. Augustine was striving in *De Trinitate* — the lifting of the mind of man to a contemplation of the Divine. The perfection of this process of mind is to come by “wisdom” and this corresponds clearly to the augustinian teaching that the ultimate for which man desires and strives is wisdom itself — that is, God.

St. Bonaventure says that “he who wishes to ascend to God must . . . strive toward purifying justice, and this in intercourse; toward illuminating knowledge, and this in meditation; toward perfecting wisdom, and this in contemplation.”⁴⁴ Here St. Bonaventure points us clearly to the total concern of mind: the practical, the meditative and the contemplative aspects of life. Man is to see God in the creatures of the world and then move through the creatures to a contemplation of Him Who is behind them. Here, again, the augustinian concept of the formal structure of the universe emerges. Everything that is, participates in God as He is reflected in their being, their value, and their knowability. Then man is to turn inward to consider God in himself and finally, through self-examination, man is to consider God through himself. Ultimately, man is to consider God in the Holy Trinity, and through the Holy Trinity man is to pass to contemplative union, the *apex mentis*, the *mentis excessus*, with God. Here will be found the illuminating knowledge and the perfecting wisdom for which man seeks.

The ultimate end of mind is clearly set forth in chapter seven of the *Itinerarium*. At the level of union with God, man attains to peace of

⁴³ *Itinerarium*, Caput Primum: “Juxta igitur sex gradus ascensionis in Deum, sex sunt gradus potentiarum animae, per quos ascendimus ab imis ad summa, ab exterioribus ad intima, a temporalibus ad aeterna, scilicet sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, intelligentia, apex mentis, seu synderesis scintilla.”

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Caput Primum: “Quicumque ergo vult in Deum ascendere, necesse est, ut vitata culpa deformante naturam, naturales potentias supradictas exerceat ad gratiam reformantem, et hoc per orationem; ad justitiam purificantem, et hoc in conversatione; ad scientiam illuminantem, et hoc in meditatione; ad sapientiam perficientem, et hoc in contemplatione.”

mind,⁴⁵ which is clearly to be identified with the *apex mentis* and *mentis excessus*. This is the goal for which St. Augustine was seeking in *De Trinitate*; it is the goal which St. Bonaventure sought for himself and toward which he seeks to point others in the *Itinerarium*. This is the "transport of contemplation" which St. Francis experienced on Mount Alverna. It is this to which "all truly spiritual men have been invited by God."⁴⁶ Notice that here man is above *intellectus* and even above *intelligentia*; the external and the internal have been surpassed and only the eternal remains to be of any importance. The ultimate key to the augustinian basis of this concept is set forth in this same chapter: "This, however, is mystical and most secret, which no man knoweth but he that received it, nor does he receive it unless he desire it; nor does he desire it unless the fire of the Holy Spirit, Whom Christ sent to earth, has inflamed his marrow."⁴⁷ This is pure augustinianism; here the will is made central to knowledge. It is the desire or love within man that is turned from inferior goods to the ultimate good as the goal of its love which is the key to *mentis excessus*. Unless a man begins with this, he cannot attain to the *mens pacifica*.

III

The concept of *mens* as the totality of mind, yet in a more narrow sense that which apprehends and acknowledges the Eternal, is fundamental to the theology of both St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure. St. Augustine is the author most quoted and most utilized throughout the period, and his foundational concept is basic to the theological viewpoint of the High Middle Ages. The rising influence of Aristotle's writings, rather than being foundational, is most apparent when theologians such as St. Bonaventure utilized aristotelian philosophy as an instrument for speculative method. St. Bonaventure's apparent aris-

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Caput VII: "His igitur sex considerationibus excursis, tanquam sex gradibus throni veri Salomonis, quibus pervenitur ad pacem, ubi verus Pacificus in mente pacifica, tanquam in interiori Hierosolyma, requiescit..."

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Caput VII: "Quod etiam ostensum est beato Francisco, cum in excessu contemplationis in monte excelso (ubi haec, quae scripta sunt, mente tractavi) apparuit Seraph sex alarum in cruce confixus, . . . ut omnes viros vere spirituales Deus per eum invitaret ad huiusmodi transitum et mentis excessum, magis exemplo, quam verbo."

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Caput VII: "In hoc autem transitu, si sit perfectus, oportet quod relinquantur omnes intellectuales operationes, et apex affectus totus transferatur et transformetur in Deum. Hoc autem est mysticum et secretissimum, quod nemo novit, nisi qui accipit; nec accipit, nisi qui desiderat; nec desiderat, nisi quem ignis Spiritus sancti medullitus inflamat, quem Christus misit in terram."

totalitarianism is nothing more than his use of the philosophical methodology of his day in the service of the interpretation of revealed truth.⁴⁸

The augustinian concept of *mens* as the path to the beatific vision is deeply imbedded in the thought of St. Bonaventura. Only through the union of mind in man and in the Divine — a union made possible through Christ — can the *mens pacifica* be experienced. All reality in man and nature, if viewed under the Divine Illumination, serves as a means to that visionary experience. It is his concept of *mens* that creates St. Bonaventura's concern to chart the mind's road to God in the *Itinerarium*.

The mind of man may journey from concern for the world around him to the moment of apprehension of the Divine, the ecstatic moment which is also the end of the road, the moment of peace with and true knowledge of God. As for St. Augustine, so also for St. Bonaventura: their epistemology does not involve the concept of *mens*; rather, epistemology is the concept of *mens*.

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⁴⁸ Cf. Van Steenberghen, *op. cit.*, page 151 ff. The relationship between aristotelian thought and St. Bonaventura's theology is expounded in lucid detail in these pages.

MAX SCHELER: ON THE GROUND OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

I

Max Scheler, one of the major contemporary European philosophers, was born in Munich in 1874 of a Protestant father and a Jewish mother. Early in life he became a convert to Catholicism. In the writings of the first two periods of his scholarly life, from 1900—1922, Scheler was influenced by Catholicism. *On the Eternal in Man*, the fifth volume of the collected works, is a representative production of these first two periods. However, Scheler found himself in growing disagreement with the Church and its doctrine during the third period of his scholarly life, which dates approximately from 1922—1928. It is not surprising, therefore, that many Catholic writers have emphasized Scheler's "Catholic period", and have tended to ignore his last period of philosophical inquiry. Yet Scheler's writings from all periods of his life have had great impact on contemporary thought. Indeed because of this influence, we wish to examine in this paper some of the basic ideas which have contributed to his understanding of Christianity and the nature of Christian thought.

Initially we should note that Scheler agrees with nearly every representative of the phenomenological and existential movement in Europe, that a Christian philosophy as such does not exist and never has existed. Like his close friend, Martin Heidegger, who compares the notion of Christian philosophy to a square circle because reason (philosophy) and genuine faith (religion) are different in essence¹, Scheler argues similarly, namely, that an act of thinking and an act of faith are phenomenologically (i. e. in consciousness-of) different. For whereas an act of philosophical reasoning does not imply divine response, acts of faith (e. g. praying, living, petitioning, worshiping, thanking) must always imply the experience of a divine response. A religious act is, therefore, a receiving act, awaiting the response of the divine. This is true not only in the Christian religion, but also in any religion. Indeed if divine response as a correlate of the religious act is not experienced, Scheler argues, there is not a religious act present.

¹ Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, II, p. 132.

In contrast to this, Aristotle's notion of an *ens a se* is clearly metaphysical, since it excludes any possible religious experience of faith and response of a *personal* God. Hence the *ens a se* is defined in Greek thought as an object of reasoning, as νόησις νοήσεως, or pure thought. There is no indication in Aristotle's philosophy, for example, that there is a response on the part of the Self-Thinking Thought. Consequently, the *ens a se* pertains only to metaphysics. According to Scheler, a strict phenomenological distinction must be made between acts of rational insight into the *ens a se* and religious acts of consciousness directed to a *personal* God. Scheler developed his phenomenological presentation of religious acts as distinct from acts of thinking in his work, *On the Eternal in Man*.

His analysis of the concept of Christian philosophy in its modern controversial form is both historical and philosophical. Indeed it is the historical facts of its development which underlie the modern conception of Christian philosophy. Supposedly Christian philosophy originated in the Middle Ages; yet Medieval philosophy is anything but a unified whole. Not only were there several influential schools of thought which developed somewhat independently of each other, but these schools also frequently contradicted each other, e. g. the Augustinian, the Thomistic, and the Scotistic schools. In each of these schools the primacy of love or intellect or will received very different explanations, and this led to different philosophical results. But it is the philosophy of St. Thomas and its Aristotelian implications particularly, which Scheler opposed.

For Scheler, the Aristotelianization of the new Christian event (i. e. love) is a totally inadequate undertaking for Christian philosophy. Because a reputed Christian philosophy, such as that of St. Thomas, has retained the conceptualization of man as *animal rationale*, its understanding of Christian man is inadequate. Thus, Scheler recognizes only the rudimentary beginnings of a genuine Christian philosophy in the works and exemplary lives of St. Augustine, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, St. Francis, Pascal, and Malebranche. Their works and their lives center around the original Christian experience of love. Scheler regrets especially that Christian thought failed hitherto to recognize St. Francis' return towards selfless love and to incorporate it within philosophical discussion.² Clearly as a Christian, Scheler stands well within the Augustinian tradition. He has never given up this attachment despite the metaphysical ideas of his last years. But what precisely was Scheler's conception of Christian love?

² *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, Bern 1963, p. 93.

The notion of Christian love as the *act* of love towards God and towards all of one's neighbors, is what Scheler calls the new Christian event in man's history. Christian love is fundamentally different from a "concept" of love as it is found in pre-Christian epochs. In Greek philosophy, for example, love was neither an ultimate principle, nor was it considered to be all-embracing and unconditional. Love was believed to be only one-directional, namely, it had only one upward direction from the lower to the higher, from the unformed to the formed. It was conceived to be a tendency between lower and higher knowledge and lower and higher values. No matter how differently individual Greek thinkers described love, in one point, so Scheler argues, they agreed, namely, that love is always directed towards a higher end.

This conception of love as a tendency between the $\mu\lambda\ \delta\upsilon$ to the $\delta\upsilon\tau\omega\varsigma\ \delta\upsilon$ is reflected in Greek social life. The more noble or the representative of higher values and higher social levels is always worthy of love. Hence, throughout the ancient era there was absent any concern of love with regard to the slave. Slavery, therefore, was considered to be a natural institution of ancient life, and did not invite commiseration, sympathy, or love. Because of the strong ties which medieval philosophy has had with Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle, the original Christian event of love, as acted out by Christ, was deemphasized. Love and all feelings became modifications of the *vis appetitiva*, and every activity of the appetitive power became secondary to the activity of intellect: the *species sensibilis* precedes all conation, and acts of intentional cognition precede willing. In short, according to Scheler, the assertion of the priority of the intellect over love and will is in fact the reason why there is no genuine Christian philosophy.

Furthermore, the philosophical ties of historical Christianity with Greek philosophy have had two consequences. First, these ties have affected the presentation of Christian dogma, for example, the christological dogma in which the Greek idea of $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ is merged with the person of Christ.³ Other instances of this influence are the traditional doctrine on the soul as defined by the Council of Vienne, as well as the doctrine of Transsubstantiation which retains the Greek notions of matter, form, and substantial change. Even the traditional proofs for the existence of God are Aristotelianizations.⁴ Secondly, the ties of historical Christianity with Greek philosophy are reflected in the very structure of the Church which has dependencies in only one upward

³ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁴ *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*, Bern 1960, p. 80.

direction. The episcopate resembles "Roman rulers", in whom the Church culminates, and the proper function of bishops, priests etc. as humble servants has been disappearing. The Church is directed from offices derived from legal tradition, rather than from genuine acts of love. Even charity and love, Scheler says, have become a part of law prescribed by divine will. In all the hierarchical structure of the Church there is evident the teleological world-view of Aristotle and the entelechy of forms, culminating in a νοῦς.

This, however, is in marked contrast to the act of *love* which is the true ground of Christianity. This act is not only directed upwards towards God, but also at the same time downwards towards the sinner, the slave, the sick, and the innocent. The twofold direction of Christian love Scheler calls the "turn of love" (*Bewegungsumkehr der Liebe*), and it is in disagreement with everything that has been said about love in pre-Christian ages: "Wonderful Christian mystery of the coming-down of God into the dark, silent prison of the womb of the wife of a carpenter. Wonderful birth of God in a stable."⁵

II

The dominant influence of Greek thought has led to the subordination of love to knowledge in the history of Christian philosophy. It has also led to the acceptance of the Aristotelian definition of man as *animal rationale*. But Scheler says, neither the subordination of love to knowledge nor the Aristotelian definition of man is acceptable from either a religious or a phenomenological point of view. Our question is, therefore: how does Scheler show this?

Phenomenology, as a rigorous science, deals with intentionality. The term intentionality is synonymous with "consciousness-of" (*Das Bewußtsein-von*). Investigations into the nature of human consciousness are by no means new. They have been made in both philosophy and psychology for many centuries. However, phenomenological investigations in consciousness since Husserl are fundamentally different. Consciousness is not an object of thought; rather that which is given in consciousness-of in terms of immanent, immediate experience is intuited to the degree of self-givenness. The method for doing this developed by Husserl was in part accepted by Scheler, though with his own orientation.

⁵ *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, Bern 1954, p. 335.

Now that which remains in consciousness-of, after all factors and data of reality have been bracketed, is a stream of immanent experience of reality. This stream manifests itself in terms of acts of consciousness, such as acts of thinking, willing, remembering, expecting, loving, or perceiving. These acts can never be objectified, since objectification is itself an act of consciousness. The nature of consciousness' act-being remains hidden in all attempts to objectify it. It is possible, however, to determine, for instance, the proper correlates of the various classes of acts. Acts of thinking correlate to concepts, acts of willing to projects (whatever they may be), acts of love correlate to values, and acts of perception correlate to pictures or representations. Note, however, that it does not matter if such correlations are exemplified by direct physical appearances. Indeed one can perceive "red" in the absence of the presence of a red thing. It is impossible on the other hand to correlate "red" to an act of hearing, for colors cannot be heard just as sounds cannot be seen. There exists, therefore, an order of all possible acts and their correlates.

But not all phenomenologists agree as to the foundation of the acts of consciousness and as to the order of such a foundation. Indeed the philosophical message of Husserl, of Heidegger, and of Scheler differ precisely because they differ in their respective understanding both of the foundations of the acts of consciousness and of the order of such a foundation. Husserl argues that it is the doxic-theoretic acts which underlie all other acts, while Heidegger sees practical "*Umgehen*" (*Alltäglichkeit*) as the ultimate experience. Scheler, however, maintains that it is the acts of feeling (love), and therefore, the value experience which underlies all acts of consciousness.

For Scheler, every act of consciousness is anteceded by an experience of value. In every experience of our daily lives there is present a "value-ception" which guides all perception, cognition, and willing. Such a "value-ception," for example, is present in the experience of "love at first sight." In this experience the beloved person is by no means "known" or "willed", rather an emotional "value-ception" is immediately present. Similarly, but with lesser degrees of intensity, such value or disvalue experiences occur in our daily affairs. Indeed over every one of our actions an experience of values or disvalues silently hovers, which either attracts or repels us from any object imaginable. Hence, man is a being who is always in the process of being attracted or repelled, no matter how slight this "push" or "pull" may be. Granted this premise, Scheler still had to answer the question whether there are

any fundamental value experiences which reveal an order within the emotional correlations in terms of higher and lower values. This question is the cornerstone of his *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik*.

According to Scheler, the emotional order of value experiences which is *a priori* to any factual experience representing itself in this order, is the following: 1) There are sensible values. These values range from the value "agreeable" to the disvalue "disagreeable." 2) There are vital values. These values encompass all values ranging from the "noble" to the "base." 3) There are spiritual values; these are of three kinds. First, aesthetic values; second, the values of right and wrong; and third, all values of the cognition of truth. 4) The highest value experience is that of "holiness."

As was pointed out above, there exists a plurality of acts of consciousness. These acts are not, however, comparable to a mosaic of acts of consciousness and identical in their sum total to consciousness as a whole. For Scheler, the unity of all acts of consciousness is more than their sum total. This unity is the "sphere of the person." While the types of all acts of consciousness are the same in every single consciousness, the way such acts are acted out is unique for each particular person, for every social group, for every age, as well as for every cultural unit. The "sphere of the person," then, is a dynamic act-being, translucent in every single act in a unique way, i. e. any act undergoes variations characteristic of the individual person. Person-being is the "unity of acts of different natures." This unity permeates every act. Every person has, therefore, a "qualitative direction" of his acts.

Two points of significance emerge from Scheler's description of "person." First, since the person cannot be an object as such an act-center, it cannot be the substrate (ὑποκείμενον) behind all acts. Hence, a person cannot be "known." Secondly, since the being of the person cannot be objectified, knowledge of other persons is possible only in terms of co-execution and co-operation with other persons. We shall return to this point later.

Since Scheler is convinced that the act of love, i. e. the act of being purely attracted (or repelled) is the fundamental act in consciousness-of, it is not surprising that throughout his philosophy he conceives man, not as rational animal, but as an *ens amans*. Our entire personal existence is one in which we are continuously drawn towards or pushed away from objects, ideas, states of affairs etc. This, of course, must hold true also in any collective personality or any group of persons. It is indeed the

social aspect of the being of the person which Scheler considers important for Christian thought. Persons experience togetherness with one another. Furthermore, it is the "thou" which Scheler conceives as the most fundamental category of human existence.⁶ There is no "I" without a "thou," nor is there an "ego" without the "we-experience." But the "thou-experience" takes place in different fashions, depending upon which kind of collective togetherness the person experiences. Scheler believed that there were four essential kinds of personal relations and together-experiences which were the basis of all historical development⁷. However, it must be emphasized that such personal together-experiences have not the sense of personal relations in the ordinary sense of the term, but rather the thou-experience is a specific way to exist, independently from the existence of things (*existentia*). This communal experience, therefore, has an ontological meaning. This meaning is very similar to that later developed by Heidegger in the ontology of *Dasein*.⁸

The first or lowest form of togetherness Scheler identifies with mass-experiences, such as revolts, revolutions, or mob movements. In these experiences people herd together and are bound in a common psychic mass-passion in which the sphere of the person is almost extinct. Acts of thinking and willing on the part of the individual are dissolved by a psychic mass-infection which drives a mob forward like the leaves are blown by the wind. Of course, the movement of a mass has its own order, similar to that found in animal herds.

The second on the scale is the experience of *Lebensgemeinschaft*, a type of togetherness found in "life-communities," such as clans, tribes, nomads, primitive and rural life. In this experience the "other" is present only on natural terms. The member-persons are held together by feelings of natural blood relations and kinship. A common trust in each other prevails throughout a life-community, because solidarity is based on mutual need. Thus, a life-community forms an organic whole of togetherness of which each member-person is an organ so to speak. The relations such persons have with one another are determined by what Scheler calls "organic causality."

The third stage of togetherness is society. Society is substantially different from the first two lower stages because it involves planning and will-directed activity. Yet society also implies a certain mutual

⁶ *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*, p. 57.

⁷ *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik*, pp. 528 ss.

⁸ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* 26.

distrust on the part of its members. Accordingly, the whole of society resembles a mechanical whole which finds its expression in constitutions, laws, and organizations. However, only from this level upwards do certain values pertaining to the sphere of the person come into play. Indeed society is the ground for the highest form of togetherness wherein the sphere of the person achieves its fullness.

The fourth, and highest form of personal, communal experience is the "totality-person" (*Gesamtperson*), such as a nation, a Church, or a cultural unity (e. g. western culture). A totality-person is a collective personality held together by faith or fundamental world views as these are expressed in theologies, philosophies, or laws. Common ideals unite the member-persons of such collective personalities throughout time and societal changes.

Clearly these four communal experiences, the mass, the lifecommunity, the society, and the collective personality experiences, are inter-related with the emotional *a priori*, namely, values. The mass, at least in extreme mass experiences, is almost blind to a genuine experience of values. But a life community is strongly gauged to vital values, for example, the purity of blood, physical strength, pride, courage, and the preservation of the race. Meanwhile, a society possesses a complex emotional feeling towards all value ranks because of its complex structure. And finally, the value experience of a totality-person is ultimately one of an absolute ideal, whether religious or metaphysical. Hence it may be expressed in religious beliefs or metaphysical principles.

III

The unity of the act-being of consciousness is the sphere of the person. Interpersonal experience takes place in four fundamental forms and their possible multiple combinations. We must now turn our attention to what Scheler calls the "sphere of the absolute," in order to understand what constitutes the ground of Christian thought. We will follow his application of the phenomenological method of elucidating this sphere. Only if the sphere of the absolute in intentionality can be exhibited, is there a phenomenological possibility of saying something about our theme.

Human history and human experience point up the fact that men have always believed in transcendent absolutes. This is true not only of highly developed religious experience, but also of even the very primitive. This historical record of factual beliefs we shall bracket out, that is, we shall no longer concern ourselves with it. Moreover, we shall

also bracket out the factor of the possible existence (or non-existence) of any absolute being, thereby avoiding the question of the "provability" of the existence of an absolute. Note, however, that despite the bracketing of the historical and existential aspects of the absolute, the "sphere" of the absolute in consciousness is not affected. Indeed it remains throughout this reduction as an empty, given sphere, as it were, which may be "filled" with any supernatural idol, god, or even any finite good, such as a political theory, enjoyment of life, money, and even with "nothingness."⁹ In addition, by retaining, and thereby gaining, the sphere of the absolute in consciousness-of, we have to bracket also the type of our present experience of this sphere as it pertains to our cultural unit or religion. In fact this sphere may be experienced in many different fashions of emotional givenness (e. g. in Buddhism or Christianity). Should one succeed in bracketing even the scope of one's own experience, this sphere will even more clearly exhibit itself, so that it will come to the fore by itself in pure intuition. It is impossible, however, to bracket this sphere as such. Scheler argues, therefore, that every consciousness, whether individual or group, is essentially related to the sphere of the absolute. As Scheler puts it: "Every finite spirit (*Geist*) believes either in God or in an idol."¹⁰ Phenomenologically, then, it is beyond question that to every consciousness there belong religious acts to which the sphere of the absolute is given as a correlate. But how can we decide which supernatural or divine content is adequate to this sphere in intentionality?

It is in the answer to this question that the being of the person shows itself as the locus of genuine religious experience. In Scheler's phenomenological investigations of religious acts, there can be distinguished three characteristics, which make the religious act essentially different from any other act of consciousness:

1) A religious act, (e. g. an act of praying, worshipping, of contrition, adoration etc.) transcends all contingent being in that this act leaves the world as a whole behind. Scheler calls this the "world-transcendence" of a religious act.

2) A religious act implies that its fulfillment is only experienced as coming from a divine being alone. A religious act has, therefore, always a negative aspect, namely, that anything belonging to this contingent world fails to give it fulfillment.

⁹ *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, p. 263 ff.; *Schriften aus dem Nachlaß*, pp. 204 ff.

¹⁰ *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, p. 261.

3) Any fulfillment of a religious act (e. g. the fulfillment of an act of contrition by experienced forgiveness) is possible only if the divine bends down to the person performing the religious act. This response of the divine is unique, and it is essential to a genuine religious act. A religious act is a receiving act insofar as the person is directed upwards towards the divine and is at the same time the recipient of a divine response.

Thus, Scheler argues, only if these aspects are present and given, can we speak of a religious act. Certainly the religious act is always one of communion and co-operation with a divine being, for the "response-experience" can only come from a *personal* divine being, never from a metaphysical *ens a se*. After all, an act of metaphysics is only one-directional, culminating in a notion of pure act-being, pure form, or *ens a se*. However, the phenomenological correlate of a religious act is not a notion, but solely a *personal* being. Hence, to apply metaphysical acts of reasoning to the divine is a false application of rational acts to an improper correlate. All the phenomenologist says about the divine is, that intentionality reveals a sphere of the absolute, and that it is a matter of phenomenological investigation to determine the adequate content (e. g. idols, deities, or a personal God). The question of the existence of God is not one for phenomenology. The only locus of divine experience is intentionality.¹¹ The title of Scheler's major work on the phenomenology of religion indicates this point quite clearly: *On the Eternal in* (spaced by the author) *Man*, because "the object of religious acts is at the same time the source of their existence."¹²

It was pointed out above that the fundamental act of consciousness is the act of love in the sense of a purely being-attracted-towards any possible object. Correspondingly it is values which are the proper correlates of acts of love. Thus the experience of a positive or negative value precedes all cognition, willing, and perception. Since the sphere of the person is not object-being, other persons can only be co-experienced in their act-being. Indeed every person experiences himself as a member-person within a community of persons. The act-being of the person is, therefore, both individual and social act-being. It is individual insofar as every person acts out his own personal being by way of the qualitative direction of his acts. Personal act-being is social insofar as every person experiences togetherness with other persons in the forms of communal

¹¹ Cf. M. Frings, *Max Scheler, A Concise Introduction into the World of a Great Thinker*, Pittsburgh 1965, pp. 149 ff.

¹² *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, p. 255.

experience (e. g. a nation, a Church). These forms, however, have their own consciousness. This collective consciousness is not something transcendent, hovering as it were over the individual members, rather every person experiences this collective consciousness in his own consciousness to some degree. A collective consciousness is both dependent on and independent of the individual consciousness of member-persons. It is dependent on them insofar as there must be member-persons for its occurrence. It is independent insofar as it survives the lifetime of the individuals (e. g. in the "history" of a nation).

On the basis of this analysis Scheler arrives at a hierarchy of personal forms of togetherness, beginning with the individual as a member of a group or society, and culminating in the community of a collective personality, the Church. The Church as a religious form of togetherness has a privileged position among the other collective personalities (nation, cultural unit), because the experience within this form is gauged to the highest value, holiness. Moreover, since various types of religious communities and churches exist, each one has to be considered as one individual person within an ultimate community in God, which is based on the most fundamental act, love. A genuine religious community is, therefore, one in which the act of love is not overshadowed by other acts, e. g. acts of metaphysical reasoning. The exemplary person of the religious community is the saint in the widest sense of that term. He is the person who binds the member-persons, not by intellectual acts such as works on theology or philosophy, but by his personal *being*.

Scheler's ontology of the sphere of the person reveals five fundamental exemplary types of persons, each related to a specific value. The highest type is the saint.¹³ In contrast to other personal models (e. g. the "artist of enjoyment," the "hero," the "genius"), the saint is that person whose being and life is co-operated in and shared (*nach- und miterlebt*) by his followers. It is this act of co-operation and free emotional identification with the person as saint which constitutes his presence amongst his followers.

The religious act is the most personal act in that it takes place in the ontological level of the person alone. This cannot be said with regard to other acts. Even at the level of spiritual acts (*geistige Akte*) pertinent to spiritual values, Scheler argues, there is a non-personal element involved concerning the community of persons united by spiritual values. Their personal model, the genius, lives in and through his work

¹³ *Schriften aus dem Nachlass*, pp. 274 ff.

(e. g. a masterpiece, written philosophy). The saint, however, lives among his followers through the radiance and splendor (halo) of his *person*. Every religion has saints in the wide sense, such as Buddha, Mohammed, Christ. Thus each religion exists in terms of the ontic draw which their personal model (the saint) exercises throughout history among his followers because of a specific experience of personal values. From this viewpoint it would appear that all religions are only different perspectives of a universal personal religion. However, Scheler never accepted this. Instead, he retained throughout his writings the position that Christ and Christianity have a privileged position among all religions, and that it is the person of Christ who is in the true sense the personal saint.¹⁴

The phenomenologist Scheler retained his position on Christianity despite the various personal difficulties he had with the Church. Indeed since the act of love and the experience of values is prior in order among all acts there can only be one religion which conforms to this phenomenological datum, namely, the religion of a love-directed God and Son. Scheler's own words illustrate clearly Christ's central role as the true ground of Christian life and Christian thought:

"I ask what it is, then, that the saints, strictly speaking, wanted, lived, and did, when they, for instance, *followed* Christ?"

Certainly, they did not want to be psychically infected by Him in a manner similar to individuals being psychically infected by mass movements, where they raise their arms in protest and rage, setting things afire and murder; after having been psychically infected by a leader. Nor did they want to imitate Him, as the misleading expression "*imitatio Christi*" suggests. Nor did they just want to copy Him, that is, just live in Galilee, or agonize in Gethsemane, and die on the cross. Nor did they mean to commiserate with Him and share joy with Him in his glorification. They wanted, did, and lived something different: they wanted in an act *co-experience* and *re-live* (*mit- und nacherleben*) the life of the spirit of His historically fortuitous brief life of simplicity. This they did, of course, but in very different life situations, with very different results, deeds, actions, and works. They wanted to permeate and leaven their accidental abilities, talents, environments, historical situations, occupations and obligations with the individual nature of His Person and His mysterious life. This is like a unique jump into the core of a person, an

¹⁴ M. Frings, "Der Ordo Amoris bei Max Scheler. Seine Beziehungen zur Materialen Wertethik und zum Ressentimentbegriff," *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung*, XX, 1966, p. 72.

intuitive taking over of its source in order to live from it, each of them living his always random historic life. That is truly the great act of following. It is not an approach from without as the historian would have it. This knowledge of Christ in the above sense is something essentially different from historic knowledge of traditional theology. But it is the very foundation and ground."¹⁵

MANFRED FRINGS

De Paul University

¹⁵ *Schriften aus dem Nachlaß I*, p. 285.

GUALTERI DE CHATTON ET GUILLELMI DE OCKHAM CONTROVERSIA DE NATURA CONCEPTUS UNIVERSALIS

I

Conceptus, utpote elementum primum iudiciorum et syllogismorum, fundamentum universae philosophiae constituit. Proinde opinio quam quivis de eius natura tenet totum systema philosophicum eiusdem auctoris non modicum afficit immo quandoque velut in nucleo includit. Hoc imprimis verum est de auctoribus qui prima medietate saeculi decimi quarti floruerunt, ut de Guillelmo de Ockham et de eius sequacibus.

Nostra in hoc articulo intentio est eam controversiam breviter illustrare quae de natura conceptus universalis exorta est inter Venerabilem Inceptorem et Gualterum de Chatton¹: ambo franciscani, ambo anglici, ambo Universitatis Oxoniensis alumni primo, deinde lectores, qui aliquo saltem tempore in eodem conventu Oxoniensi simul commorabantur. Ipsi quidem Duns Scotum in scholis non audierunt, magistros tamen tales habuerunt qui discipuli fuerant Doctoris Subtilis, cuius auctoritas in scholis Fratrum Minorum cum in Anglia tum in Gallia eo tempore iam praevalere coepit. Gualterus huic auctoritati, ut plurimum, libenter se submittit, Guillelmus econtra eidem, ut plurimum, recalcitrat; et quoties Guillelmus opiniones Scoti impugnat fere toties Gualterus easdem defendit.

Problema quod nostra hic interest, quodque inter hos duos auctores in controversia versatur, non est utrum universale quocunque modo extra animam exsistat vel in rerum natura fundamentum habeat, sed

¹ Circa hunc auctorem videsis A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A. D. 1500*, I, Oxford 1957, 395s.; J. O'Callaghan, "The Second Question of the Prologue to Walter Catton's Commentary on the Sentences. On Intuitive and Abstractive Knowledge," *Nine Medieval Thinkers*, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts, I, Toronto 1955, 233—269; C. K. Brampton, "Gauthier de Chatton et la provenance des Mss. Lat. Paris Bibl. Nat. 15886 et 15887," *Etudes Franciscaines*, XIV (1964), 200—205; J. Murdoch and E. Synan, "Two Questions on the Continuum: Walter Chatton(?) O.F.M. and Adam Wodeham, O.F.M.," *Franciscan Studies*, XXVI (1966), 212—288; Guillelmi de Ockham, *Opera Theologica*, I (continens Prologum et dist. 1 *Ordinationis*, ed. G. Gál et. S. Brown, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 1967), 26*—31*.

agitur potius de natura seu realitate conceptus universalis in ipsa anima: quid scilicet sit conceptus communis seu universalis et quaenam realitas vel modus essendi ei conveniat.

Quantum ad primum aspectum universalium spectat, Venerabilis Inceptor constanter firmiterque unam propugnat opinionem: nihil nisi singularia in rerum natura existunt. De natura tamen conceptus communis seu universalis ut est in ipsa anima non semper eandem tenet opinionem: initio quidem uni favet, deinde duas ut aequae probabiles proponit, et tandem alteri ex his adhaeret.

I. *Opinio cui Venerabilis Inceptor initio favet*

Opinio Guillelmi de hac re iam semel atque iterum illustrata et discussa est a bonae memoriae Philotheo Boehner,² qua de causa non intendimus eam iterum exponere, iuvat nihilominus paucis delineare eam quaestionem contra quam Gualterus de Chatton in textu infra edendo arguit.

Ockham in sua *Ordinatione*, I, d. 2, q. 8 A—P³ de natura seu quidditate conceptus universalis in anima primo quatuor opiniones recenset. Iuxta primam universale est conceptus mentis qui in rei veritate nihil aliud est nisi ipsa intellectio, et iuxta hoc universale est 'intellectio confusa' rei. Dicitur autem 'confusa' eo quod confuse seu indeterminate supponit pro suis singularibus. Secunda tenet universale esse speciem aliquam, quae licet in essendo singularis sit, dicitur tamen universale quia universaliter omnia singularia respicit. Tertia asserit universale esse aliquam veram rem quae actum intelligendi sequitur et est similitudo rei, aequaliter seu universaliter omnia singularia respiciens. Secundum quartam 'nihil est universale ex natura rei sed tantum ex institutione, eo modo quo vox est universalis'.

Nulla ex his quatuor opinionibus — eo saltem tempore — favorem ante Guillelmum invenit, etiamsi tres priores non consideret omnino improbables nec evidenter falsas. Itaque quintam, ut magis probabilem proponit. Iuxta hanc opinionem universale "non est aliquid reale

² Ph. Boehner, "Text Tradition of Ockham's *Ordinatio*," *The New Scholasticism*, XVI (1942), 203—241; "The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham," *Traditio*, IV (1946), 307—335; eadem, textibus editis omissis, in *Collected Articles on Ockham* (ed. E. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 1958, 110—127, 156—174); *History of Franciscan Philosophy* (arte mimeographica), III, 24—29.

³ Editio critica *Ordinationis*, I, dd. 2—3 paratur, curantibus S. Brown et G. Gál; quaestio ista edita est iam a Ph. Boehner, "Text Tradition" cit., 222—241; ceterum *Ordinatio* Guillelmi de Ockham citabitur iuxta editionem quae facta est Argentinae 1495.

habens esse subiectivum, nec in anima nec extra animam, sed tantum habet esse obiectivum in anima, et est quoddam fictum, habens esse tale in esse obiectivo quale habet res extra in esse subiectivo". Iste conceptus universalis, ab intellectu ad similitudinem rerum extra animam fictus seu productus cuiusque esse est obici seu intelligi, est obiectum ab intellectu immediate cognitum; est similiter terminus propositionis, supponens pro omnibus illis singularibus quorum est imago seu similitudo. Hanc opinionem Noster pluribus S. Augustini auctoritatibus fulcit simul ac illustrat, deinde quaedam contra eam dubia movet eaque solvit. Et sic terminatur textus redactionis incompletae, in solo codice Florentino, Bibl. Nat. conv. A. 3. 8or asservatae.⁴

Ista positio non solum quoad sensum sed quoad terminos quibus exprimitur proxime accedit ei opinioni quam Henricus de Harkeley, paucis ante Guillelmum annis, in tertia quaestione suarum *Quaestionum ordinariarum* proposuit,⁵ quaerens utrum universale significet aliquam rem extra animam aliam a singulari vel supposito.

Notamus imprimis tam Henricum quam Guillelmum aequae firmiter tenere omnem rem extra animam esse eo ipso singularem, unde et problema utrique commune de formatione conceptus universalis exsurgit.

Problema Henrici est hoc: quidditas, seu id quod definitur, est extra animam; sed si nihil est extra animam nisi res singularis, tunc definitio erit rei singularis, quod est contra Aristotelem et contra totam philosophiam. Ad hanc difficultatem evadendam introducit theoriam suam de 'ficto': res quidem ut sunt extra animam sunt singulares, sed intellectus consideratione sua 'fingit' ex eis unum quoddam 'quasi exsistens' quod differt a quolibet singulari, et tale fictum non est in re sed in intellectus consideratione tantum, et hoc est quod definitur. Itaque definitio quidem erit rei, non tamen absolute, sed ut concipitur.

Huiusmodi tamen 'fictum' non est figmentum poeticum sed potius philosophicum, necessitate doctrinae factum, eo modo quo geometer fingit lineam sine latitudine. Ista autem ficta non sunt in mente subiective, ut ex. gr. species, habitus et actus, sed obiective tantum.

Expositiones Henrici et Guillelmi se invicem quasi complent ac illustrent; differentia in eo est quod Henricus auctoritatibus Aristotelis

⁴ Plura de hoc codice invenies apud Guillelmi de Ockham, *Opera Theologica* cit., I, 11*, 19*—31*.

⁵ Cod. Vat. Borghes. 171, ff. 7vb—12rb; cf. J. Kraus, "Die Universalienlehre des Oxforder Kanzlers Heinrich von Harclay in ihrer Mittelstellung zwischen skotistischem Realismus und ockhamistischem Nominalismus," *Divus Thomas* (Friburgiae), X (1932), 36—58, 475—508; XI (1933), 76—96, 288—314; cetera videsis apud A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register* cit., II, 874s.

et Boethii innititur, Guillelmus econtra positionem suam, seu opinionem quam aliis praeferat, auctoritatibus Augustini fulcit. Dubium non est quin Venerabilis Inceptor expositionem Henrici legerit. In praecedenti enim quaestione refellit conclusionem eiusdem expositionis, reprehendens Henricum in eo quod minus proprie dixerit eandem rem distincte conceptam esse quidem singularem, sed confuse conceptam esse universalem. Positio, iuxta Guillelmum, 'falsa et non intelligibilis', nam res nullo sub aspectu, nulla consideratione, nec distincte nec confuse concepta potest esse universalis⁶.

2. Gualterus de Chatton impugnatur opinionem de ficto

Chatton omnem arripit occasionem ut opinionem a confratre suo propositam de conceptu universali ut ficto reprehendat et ridiculam reddat. Ex professo vero impugnatur eam in *Reportatione* (cod. Paris., Nat. lat. 15887), I, d. 3, q. 2, infra edenda. Ista *Reportatio* est fructus lectionum super *Sententias* Petri Lombardi, quas Gualterus maxima cum probabilitate Oxonii circa 1322—1323 habuit.⁷ Titulus quidem istius quaestionis est "utrum sit aliquis conceptus communis et universalis Deo et creaturae", nihilominus maxima pars quaestionis versatur circa naturam conceptus universalis et dirigitur contra opinionem iuxta quam "conceptus universalis non est aliqua intentio, sed aliquid fictum, non habens aliquod esse subiectivum in mente, sed tantum esse obiectivum et cognitum". Hanc opinionem credit esse opinionem propriam Venerabilis Inceptoris, et si — ut alibi ostensum est⁸ — eo tempore nonnisi incompletam redactionem *Ordinationis* Guillelmi noverit, vix potuit aliter credidisse.⁹

Discussionem circa naturam conceptus Gualterus in duos articulos dividit. In primo, opinione Guillelmi breviter sed satis fideliter recitata,

⁶ Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, d. 2, q. 7 M—R.

⁷ De hac re videsis L. Baudry, "Gauthier de Chatton et son Commentaire des Sentences," *Arch. d'Hist. Doctr. et Litt. du moyen âge*, XIV (1943—45), 337—369.

⁸ Guillelmi de Ockham, *Opera Theologica* cit., I, 26*—31*.

⁹ Notandum tamen est Guillelmum iam in redactione incompleta *Ordinationis*, I, d. 28, q. un. J (cod. Florentiae, Bibl. Nat. conv. A. 3. 801, f. 95rb) mentionem facere de opinione quae tenet conceptum esse veram qualitatem mentis ("Si teneatur opinio..."). Hoc, ut videtur, Gualterum non latuit, nam in *Reportatione*, I, d. 3, q. 1 (f. 17ra) dicit: "Item, accipio articulum fidei istum in mente 'Deus est trinus et unus'. Subiectum huius aut significat immediate rem extra animam, et hoc est propositum, quia nulla alia res est trina et una nisi Deus; aut significat fictum, quale frequenter ponis, saltem sub disiunctione, et aliquando tenuisti absolute, et tunc illud fictum esset trinum et unum, et alia multa absurda sequerentur." Simile argumentum occurrit etiam in textu infra edendo, sed ibi nulla fit mentio de positione 'sub disiunctione'.

propriam opinionem proponit, deinde vero ostendit quanta inconvenientia et absurda sequantur si admittatur conceptum universalem non esse nisi quoddam fictum, et tandem solvit argumenta quae id suadere videntur. Gualterus in evertendo argumenta adversarii quatuor praesertim praemit: frustra ponitur fictum, cum actus intelligendi sufficiat ad explicandum ea propter quae salvanda fictum introducebatur; eadem argumenta quae in favorem ficti adducuntur aequè probarent cognitionem singularium habere pro obiecto tale fictum, quod ipse Guillelmus (refellens opinionem Petri Aureoli) negat; cum cognitum in universali possit diligi, etiam obiectum dilectionis fictum esset; talibus fictis positis, processus in infinitum vitari nequit.

In secundo articulo Chatton solvit septem dubia: quid intelligitur conceptu universali; quomodo idem conceptus universalis subicitur pluribus et quomodo supponit in propositione; conceptus superior estne de intellectu inferioris; quid est de conceptibus syncategorematicis tenendum; quomodo definitio convenit naturae specificae; quomodo se habent ad invicem conceptus specificus et individualis. — Problemata, sane, maximi momenti, cum sub aspectu epistemologico tum sub aspectu logico.

Quod ad naturam seu quidditatem conceptus universalis spectat — quae nostra hoc loco interest — mens Gualteri sic paucis colligi potest: Conceptus universalis (similiter ac particularis) nihil aliud est quam intellectio seu ipse actus cognoscendi. Hoc sufficit ad habendum aliquid unum quod subiciatur et praedicetur in propositione universali. Intellectio seu actus cognoscendi non requirit terminum concomitantem, nam est vera qualitas absoluta, existens subiective in anima. Est etiam signum naturale obiecti quod per eam immediate intelligitur seu significatur.

Crux utique problematis est, utrum per conceptum, intensionem seu intellectionem communem res universalis an singularis intelligatur. Responsio Gualteri ad hanc quaestionem in solutione primi dubii expressa est: per conceptum communem *de facto* res singularis intelligitur, quia *de facto* Sortes, homo, animal non distinguuntur; sed *per se* non res singularis intelligitur, quia si Sortes et eius humanitas distinguerentur, conceptus seu intentio humanitatis non Sorteitatem sed humanitatem haberet pro obiecto. Et haec est — iuxta Gualterum — mens genuina etiam Doctoris Subtilis de natura communi et de distinctione formali.¹⁰

¹⁰ Vide infra, notam 29.

3. *Ockham ad opinionem Gualteri inclinatur*

Inspicienti completam *Ordinationis* redactionem aliaque Venerabilis Inceptoris scripta, res satis miranda occurrit: ipse correctiones confratris sui non solum non contempsit, immo ad hoc adductus est ut opinionem quam prius aliis praetulerat, velut minus probabilem proponeret et finaliter relinqueret, ut opinionem adversarii sui amplecteretur, — quod spectatae integritatis atque humilitatis signum est.

Primum mentis mutatae indicium apparet in *Expositione in Perihermenias Aristotelis*,¹¹ et quidem in ea parte quae iudicio Philothei Boehner — qui illud capitulum edidit¹² — additio quidem posterior est, sed absque dubio ipsius Guillelmi. Ibi legimus¹³: “Alia posset esse opinio quod passio animae est ipse actus intelligendi. Et quia ista opinio videtur mihi probabilior omnibus opinionibus quae ponunt istas passiones animae esse subiective et realiter in anima tamquam veras qualitates ipsius . . .”. Deinde hac opinione explanata, dubia quaedam movet, quae tamen omnia satis diffuse solvit. Licet opinionem de ficto nondum relinquat nec minus probabilem declaret, opinio tamen de conceptu ut intellectione tam ample et cum tanto favore exponitur, ut hic locus iure meritoque indicium mentis mutatae vel saltem mentis mutantis considerari possit.

Ista *Expositio* praecessit redactionem completam *Ordinationis*, I, d. 2, q. 8 Q. In hac quaestione, ut supra diximus, Guillelmus exposuit defenditque opinionem de ficto, sed aliquanto post addidit novum paragraphum, in quo legimus: “Cui non placet ista opinio de talibus fictis in esse obiectivo, potest tenere quod conceptus, et quodlibet universale, est aliqua qualitas existens subiective in mente”, quae qualitas vel est ipsamet intellectio vel aliquid aliud ab intellectione, et posterius ipsa. Et hic remittit lectorem ad ea quae alibi declaravit. ‘Alibi’ absque dubio est *Expositio in Perihermenias*, et quidem ea pars *Expositionis* quae additio esse videtur, sicut iam memoravimus. Revera in codice Merton Coll. 100, loco verbi ‘alibi’ amanuensis substituit: “in principio I *Perihermenias*”.¹⁴

¹¹ Guillelmi de Ockham, *Expositio aurea super totam artem veterem* (Bononiae 1496, f. 16ra).

¹² Ph. Boehner, “The Realistic Conceptualism” cit., 320—335.

¹³ Ibidem, 322.

¹⁴ Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, d. 27, q. 3 J: “Potest etiam dici probabiliter quod nihil est tale medium, sed quod tunc universale est ipsamet cognitio confusa terminata immediate ad omnes res singulares quibus est communis et universalis, secundum modum quem alibi recitative declaravi. Sed quidquid dico de tali esse ficto ponendo vel non ponendo, recitative dico, quamvis hoc non explicite semper.” Ista quaestio, paucis lineis exceptis, additio est, sed probabiliter praecessit additionem “Cui non placet . . .”.

Paragraphus iste quem Venerabilis Inceptor *Ordinationi* suae addidit, Gualtero tempore *Reportationis*¹⁵, seu cum prima vice *Sententias* legeret, nondum innotuit, sed tempore *Lecturae*¹⁶ eum detexit, satis mirans et quasi vexatus, cum sibi videretur in priori suo opere se contra umbram dimicasse.

In *Lectura*, I, d. 3, a. 2 (quae respondet quaestioni *Reportationis* infra edendae) Chatton ex professo quaerit utrum conceptus differat ab ipsa cognitione. Pars quaestionis contra Petrum Aureoli pars vero contra Ockham directa est. Opinione de ficto eiusque argumentis diffuse recitatis, Gualterus sic prosequitur: "In fine autem quaestionis addunt quod cui non placet haec opinio, potest dicere quod conceptus universalis sit quaedam qualitas subiective existens in ipsa anima, scilicet ipsa intellectio . . . Tamen sive sit opinio sive non, probo quod tale fictum non est ponendum".¹⁷ — Ac si diceret: tela parata sunt, ergo iactanda sunt.

In *Summa Logicae*,¹⁸ p. I, c. 12 Ockham opinionem de ficto vix commemorat, sed cum favore proponit eam quae tenet universale esse qualitatem in anima subiective existentem, ab ipso actu intelligendi minime differentem. Pro hac enim opinione militat principium quod Venerabilis Inceptor frequenter libenterque allegare solet: 'frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora'. *Summa Logicae* in *Reportatione* Gualteri nondum citatur, ast in *Lectura* expressis verbis allegatur; unde eam inter haec duo opera Gualteri compositam fuisse satis apparet.

4. Venerabilis Inceptor opinionem Gualteri amplectitur

Ockham itaque, ut hucusque vidimus, opinione de ficto magis magisque neglecta ad positionem Gualteri de Chatton appropinquat. In *Quodlibet* IV, q. 19¹⁹ eam finaliter suam facit defenditque, non amplius ut opinionem aliorum et probabilem, sed ut suam et certam, doctrinam vero de ficto reicit atque impugnat: "Circa secundum dicunt aliqui quod intentiones primae et secundae sunt quaedam entia ficta, quae tantum sunt obiective in mente et nullibi subiective . . . Ideo dico quod

¹⁵ In codice Paris. Nat. lat. 15887, ff. 1ra—37rb habetur Prologus, qui tamen, ut nobis videtur, non est Prologus *Reportationis* sed potius *Lecturae*. Hoc eo quippe suadetur quod numeratio foliorum huius codicis inde a distinctione prima iterum ab uno incipit.

¹⁶ *Lectura* Gualteri (certe posterior *Reportatione*) incompleta est in utroque codice nobis noto. Cod. Paris. Nat. lat. 15886 deficit mutila (f. 191vb) in distinctione septima libri I. Cod. Florentiae, Bibl. Nat. Conv. C. 5. 357 est *Lectura* usque ad dist. 14—16, q. 7, inde vero (f. 153) prosequitur ut *Reportatio*. Prologus, ut iam diximus, idem est in omnibus tribus codicibus.

¹⁷ Cf. Guillelmi de Ockham, *Opera Theologica* cit., I, 26*—31*.

¹⁸ Ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 1957, 39.

¹⁹ Citamus editionem quae prodiit Argentinae 1491.

tam intentio prima quam secunda est vere actus intelligendi, quia per actum potest salvari quidquid salvatur per fictum". En, iterum principium oeconomiae, quod etiam in *Summa Logicae* paulo supra citata adduxit. Sed idem principium, velut cantilena, redit in argumentis quae Gualterus de Chatton contra 'fictum' protulit. Unde apparet Guillelmum positionem adversarii sui non solum acceptasse sed eam eisdem ac ille argumentis fulsisse, argumentis scilicet quae primo contra se prolata fuerant. En unum exemplum:

Chatton, *Report.*, I, d. 3, q. 2

Primo sic: opinio de fictis ponitur ut habeatur aliquid unum quod subiciatur vel praedicetur in propositione universali. Quod non oportet. Probatio: illud quod est in se aequae indivisum et ab omni alio divisum sicut actus, non est magis [*pro*: minus] unum quam actus, nec magis propter hoc universale. Sed fictum, si ponatur, est huiusmodi. Quod per hoc patet, sive loquaris de universali in essendo vel repraesentando: actus enim ita sufficit ad repraesentandum quaecumque sicut tale fictum.

Et quod in essendo etiam, probatio: quia unde concludimus quod actus intelligendi aliquis est unus actus singularis? Certe, quia potest destrui alio manente et circumscripto... Assumptum patet, quia quaero de isto ficto: aut essentialiter dependet ab isto actu in essendo, et tunc cessat intellectione ista cessante, et tamen remanet alia intellectio et per consequens huiusmodi fictum sibi correspondens... Igitur duo sunt ficta sicut duae intellectiones.

Si non dependet essentialiter ab ista intellectione, eadem ratione nec ab aliqua alia eiusdem rationis. Igitur potest exsistere sine hoc quod aliqua talis intellectio sit, et remanebit esse obiectivum et esse intellectum sine omni intellectione, quod est plana contradictio...

Ockham, *Quodl.* IV, q. 19

Praeterea, tale fictum non est ponendum ut habeatur subiectum et praedicatum in propositione universali, quia actus intelligendi sufficit ad hoc, quia ita tam singulare in essendo quam in repraesentando est illud esse fictum sicut actus.

Quod patet ex hoc quod unum fictum potest destrui alio manente sicut actus. Quia aut illud fictum dependet essentialiter ab actu aut non. Si sic, tunc cessante uno actu destruitur illud fictum, et tamen manet fictum in alio actu, et per consequens sunt duo ficta singularia sicut duo actus.

Si non dependet ab actu isto singulari, nec per consequens dependet essentialiter ab aliquo actu eiusdem rationis; et ita remanebit illud fictum in esse obiectivo sine omni alio actu, quod est impossibile.

Vel sic: nihil negandum est a potentia Dei quod non includit contradictionem evidentem. Sed nulla apparet contradictio quod remaneat intellectio sine tali ficto sicut et sine rebus subiective existentibus extra. Et tamen contradictio est quod ponatur intellectio quin aliquid intelligatur, puta terminus ipse. Igitur etc.

Item, accipiamus articulum fidei, scilicet quod Deus est trinus et unus, et resolvamus subiectum eius in mente in suam descriptionem sic: ens infinitum est trinum et unum. Aut subiectum istius significat immediate rem extra, et [habetur] propositum, quia componitur ex intellectionibus communibus; si fictum, igitur propositio ista denotat unum fictum esse trinum et unum.

Praeterea, non est contradictio quod Deus faciat cognitionem talem sine tali ficto essentialiter. Sed contradictio est quod ponatur intentio in intellectu quin aliquid intelligatur. Ergo non est ponendum propter intentionem communem.

Praeterea, tale fictum impedit cognitionem rei, ergo non est ponendum propter cognitionem. Assumptum probatur, quia illud nec est cognitio nec albedo extra cognita nec ambo simul, sed quoddam tertium, medium inter cognitionem et rem. Ergo si illud fictum intelligitur, tunc res extra non intelligitur. Et tunc quando formo hanc propositionem mentalem 'Deus est trinus et unus', non intelligo Deum in se, sed illud fictum; quod videtur absurdum.²⁰

II

Quaestio Gualteri hic evulganda habetur, ut diximus, in *Reportatione*, I, d. 3, q. 2 (cod. Paris., Nat. lat. 15887, ff. 18rb—19vb). Folia huius codicis inde a distinctione prima iterum ab uno numerari incipiunt. Eadem quaestio paulo fusius habetur etiam in *Lectura*, I, d. 3, a. 2 (cod. Paris., Nat. lat. 15886, ff. 134ra—137va), sed ibi simul cum Ockham etiam Petrus Aureoli impugnatur. Ex hoc opere locos quosdam notabiliores, qui apti nobis videntur ad textum *Reportationis* explanandum sive complendum, in imis paginis referemus.

Utrum sit aliquis conceptus communis et universalis Deo et creaturae

Quod non, videtur, quia minus conveniunt Deus et creatura quam duo conceptus entis, id est quam conceptus entis bis replicatus, et tamen illi ita parum conveniunt quod non potest esse aliquis universalis conceptus communis eis, igitur etc. Minor patet, quia si illa duo habeant tertium commune, eadem ratione ille tertius cum duobus praecedenti-

²⁰ Venerabilis Inceptor hanc eandem propugnat opinionem, et quidem fere eisdem argumentis, etiam in suis *Quaestionibus in libros Physicorum Aristotelis*, qq. 1—6, ubi remittit lectorem ad suum *Quodlibet*, q. 19, Cf. F. Corvino, "Sette questioni inedite di Ockham sul concetto," *Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia*, X (1955), 265—288.

bus habebit quartum, et illi quatuor quintum, et sic in infinitum; quod falsum videtur, quia tunc iretur in infinitum in conclusionibus scientificis.

Item, si sic, igitur possent convenire et differre. Sed nihil per idem quo convenit cum aliquo differt ab eodem, aliter non esset via investigandi differentiam inter esse genus et differentiam, et tunc Deus sine compositione posset esse in genere.

Contra: in primis principaliter 'de quolibet esse vel non esse'. Omne ens est creatum vel increatum. Aequae fit distributio pro Deo sicut pro aliis. Igitur subiectum istarum propositionum in mente aequae est commune Deo et creaturae; igitur etc.

Hic primo investigandum est de natura conceptus; secundo ponam dubia contra me.

De natura conceptus est una opinio²¹ quod conceptus universalis non est aliqua intentio, sed aliquid fictum, non habens aliquod esse subiectivum in mente nec extra, sed tantum esse obiectivum et cognitum.

Istud probatur: quia accipimus intensionem confusam et generalem: quid intelligitur ea? Aut res extra, — quod non, quia aliquod commune intelligitur, et nulla res extra est commune multis; nec res singularis intelligitur, quia est intentio communis; nec ipsamet, certum est; ergo aliquid aliud, et illud voco conceptum. Sed illud non est nisi ens fictum, igitur etc.

Confirmatur, quia, secundum omnes communiter, illud quod terminat actum vocatur conceptus. Sed quod terminat actum confusum non est res alicubi habens esse subiectivum sed obiectivum tantum. Probatur ut prius. Igitur etc.

Et ideo finaliter ponunt tale fictum, et illud est conceptus universalis, praedicabilis de pluribus.

Probatur hoc primo, quia ens primaria divisione dividitur in ens in anima et ens extra animam. Et ibi non sumitur 'ens in anima' pro eo quod habet esse subiectivum in anima, quia illud cadit sub altero membro, nam [ens] extra animam dividitur in decem praedicamenta, et entia subiective in anima sunt de praedicamento qualitatis. Igitur accipitur pro ente naturae pure obiectivo, quod est propositum.

Secundo, quia chimera et huiusmodi impossibilia²² sunt in anima tantum obiective, igitur isti conceptus ficti.

Item, propositiones syllogismi sunt entia et in anima, et non subiective, igitur obiective tantum.

²¹ Opinio hic recitata, cum suis argumentis, est Guillelmi de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, d. 2, q. 8 E -F; quoad 'confirmationem' infra, cf. argumenta contra primam opinionem, ibidem, sub B.

Item, artificialia sunt in mente artificis, et non subiective, igitur obiective tantum.

Quinto, quia, secundum communiter opinantes, respectus rationis sunt in anima, et certum est quod non subiective.

Item, aliter nullus conceptus universalis.

Item, aliter non esset distinctio inter intentiones primas et secundas.

Item, aliter nihil idem praedicaretur de pluribus in propositione universali nisi detur fictum.

Item, aliter genus non differret a specie, quia singularia eadem correspondent eis nisi ponantur duo ficta distincta.

Ultimo probatur hoc per auctoritates.²² — Non solum hic, sed multi alii²³ ponunt unum esse obiectivum huiusmodi, medium inter cognitionem et res extra, diminutum quoddam. Etiam quidam²⁴ hoc ponunt in cognitione intuitiva, ut tactum fuit in Prologo.²⁵

Alia est opinio: quia non intelligo quod conceptus universalis vel particularis sit aliud quam ipse actus cognoscendi. Et ideo pro hac opinione et contra illud fictum adhuc arguo.

Primo sic: opinio de fictis ponitur ut habeatur aliquid unum quod subiciatur vel praedicetur in propositione universali. Quod non oportet. Probatio: illud quod est in se aeque [in]divisum et ab omni alio divisum sicut actus, non est magis [*pro*: minus] unum quam actus nec magis propter hoc universale. Sed fictum, si ponatur, est huiusmodi. Quod per

²² *In Lectura*, I, d. 3, a. 2 (cod. cit., f. 134rb) Chatton sic prosequitur: "In fine autem quaestionis addunt quod cui non placet haec opinio, potest dicere quod conceptus universalis sit quaedam qualitas subiective existens in ipsa anima, scilicet ipsa intellectio vel quaedam qualitas producta per intellectionem, ita quod sicut voces significant ex institutione, et quaedam per se, sicut categorematica, et quaedam solum significant ut syncategorematica (f. 134va), ita de istis signis naturaliter significantibus. Et secundum istam opinionem possent solvi argumenta in oppositum. Quae tamen opinio praedicta sit verior, dicunt se relinquere iudicio aliorum."

Contra istam secundam opinionem arguo primo. Licet enim isti de secunda opinione in fine aliquorum dictorum suorum de ente ficto addunt ultimam particulam, tamen processus quaestionum suarum de conceptu totaliter est exaratus in Primo suo super *Sententias* ad declarandum quod conceptus communis sit tale ens fictum obiectivum, nec penes aliam est aliqua quaestio de conceptu communi discussa vel pertractata. Hoc etiam patet videnti Prologum Primi sui, et distinctionem primam et distinctionem secundam et tertiam, et videnti modum quo ponit productionem Verbi et Spiritus Sancti, et ubicumque pertractat de cognitione Dei vel creaturarum in conceptibus communibus. Tamen sive sit opinia sive non, proba quod tale ens fictum non sit ponendum."

²³ Ex. gr. Henricus de Harkeley, *Qq. Ordinariae*, q. 3 (cod. Vat. Borghes. 171, ff. 7vb—12rb); Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum*, I, d. 2, sect. 10, a. 4; d. 3, sect. 14, a. 1 (ed. E. Buytaert, II, 544—550, 694—701).

²⁴ Ut Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum*, I, Proem., sect. 2, a. 3 (ed. cit. 196—207).

²⁵ Quaestio 2, a. 2 (ed. a. J. O'Callaghan, "The Second Question of the Prologue" cit. 241—246).

hoc patet, sive loquaris de universali in essendo vel repraesentando: actus enim ita sufficit ad repraesentandum quaecumque sicut tale fictum. Et quod in essendo etiam probo: quia unde concludimus quod actus intelligendi aliquis est unus actus singularis? Certe, quia potest destrui alio manente et circumscripto. Ita est de fictis, si ponantur, quod unum potest cessare alio remanente, igitur ita distinguuntur inter se sicut actus. Assumptum patet, quia quaero de isto ficto: aut essentialiter dependet ab isto actu in essendo, et tunc cessat intellectione ista cessante, et tamen remanet alia intellectio et per consequens huiusmodi fictum sibi correspondens. Probo per argumentum: quid intelligitur illa intellectione remanente, priori cessata, etc. Igitur duo sunt ficta sicut duae intellectiones. — Si non dependet essentialiter ab ista intellectione, eadem ratione nec ab aliqua alia eiusdem rationis. Igitur potest exsistere sine hoc quod aliqua talis intellectio sit, et remanebit esse obiectivum et esse intellectum sine omni intellectione, quod est plana contradictio.

Item, e converso, non plus dependet actus intelligendi ab esse ficto vel ab ente ficto et obiectivo quam [a] rebus realiter et subiective existentibus. Sed per potentiam Dei sine rebus subiective extra existentibus potest fieri actus intelligendi, igitur sine ficto. — Vel sic: nihil negandum est a potentia Dei quod non includit contradictionem evidentem. Sed nulla apparet contradictio quod remaneat intellectio sine tali ficto sicut et sine rebus subiective existentibus extra. Et tamen contradictio est quod ponatur intellectio quin aliquid intelligatur, puta terminus ipse. Igitur etc.

Item, accipiamus articulum fidei, scilicet quod Deus est trinus et unus, et resolvamus subiectum eius in mente in suam descriptionem sic: ens infinitum est trinum et unum. Aut subiectum istius significat immediate rem extra, et [habetur] propositum, quia componitur ex intellectionibus communibus; si fictum, igitur propositio ista denotat unum fictum esse trinum et unum.

Dices quod non sequitur, quia illud fictum non supponit pro se sed pro Deo et re extra, contra: accipio propositionem in mente includentem intellectiones causatas eodem ordine quo profero voces correspondentes, et quaero de complexione intellectuum: quid significat immediate? Si fictum, igitur immediate significat fictum esse trinum et unum, licet Deum mediate, et tunc non significaret verum nisi per hoc quod immediatius significat falsum et impossibile; si rem extra, habeo propositum, quia tunc frustra ponitur fictum.

Item, in proposito 'intelligi' est 'significari', quia intellectio est signum naturale obiecti sui. Igitur si immediate ens fictum intelligitur

esse trinum et unum per istam propositionem, igitur hoc immediate per eam significatur.

Item, actus credendi causatus mediante articulo fidei aut habet complexum pro immediato obiecto, — et oppositum probavi in prima quaestione Prologi —; aut rem extra, et [habetur] propositum; aut fictum, et certe in illud ego non credo.

Item, nihil adoramus nisi cognitum, fictum autem non adoramus; habito isto articulo igitur aliud cognoscimus quam fictum, quod est propositum.

Item, immediatum obiectum visionis aut est fictum huiusmodi, et tunc beatitudo nostra haberet pro obiecto immediato huiusmodi et non Deum ipsum, — quod falsum est, quia sicut Deus immediate diligitur actu fruitionis ita immediate videtur actu visionis; si ens reale, hoc est propositum, quia illud idem quod est obiectum immediate cognitum per visionem est immediatum obiectum fidei cui succedit visio.

Confirmatur, quia illud idem quod videtur ad sensum intellectus definit et illud idem etiam est immediate significatum per definitionem.

Item, aliter in propositione universali prius fieret distributio pro infinitis fictis quam pro rebus.

Rationes eorum non concludunt, quia, sicut patebit in solvendo eas, aequae sunt contra omnes homines et etiam contra se ipsos, quia aequae probant cognitionem singularem habere pro obiecto ens fictum; et dilectionem, quia cognitum in universali possumus diligere. Probant etiam processum in infinitum in fictis.

Teneo igitur oppositum²⁶: quod nec actus intelligendi terminans alium actum nec species aliqua nec actus imaginandi — quod magis concederem, quod phantasmata se habent ad intellectum sicut sensibilia ad sensum — nec aliquid productum per intellectionem, sive fictum sive reale, est conceptus ipse, quia sine contradictione absque omnibus istis posset actus fieri a Deo, et tamen tunc necessario aequae intelligeretur cognitione universali sicut modo. Igitur etc.

Ad primam igitur rationem, quando quaeris quid intelligitur per intentionem sive generalem sive specialem: aut aliquid aut nihil; si nihil, igitur simul intelligis et nihil intelligis, etc. Istud aequae probat

²⁶ In *Lectura* I, d. 3, a. 2 (cod. cit., f. 135vb) opinio propria Gualteri sic exprimitur: "Ideo dicendum est aliter ad istum articulum quod praeter intellectionem et praeter ipsam rem extra cognitam per illam intellectionem nec est ibi ens fictum medium quod immediate terminat actum pro re extra, nec est aliquod esse rei distinctum ab existentia cognitionis et ab existentia reali rei extra, sed tantum est ipsa intellectio vel species vel habitus. Hoc enim sufficit a parte intellectus quod verum sit dicere intellectum cognoscere hominem."

quod praeter tuum fictum oportet ponere aliud fictum, et praeter illud aliud tertium, et sic in infinitum. Probatio: illud fictum aut aliquid repraesentat vel significat aut nihil. Si nihil, igitur simul repraesentat et nihil repraesentat. Si aliquid, aut universale, et nullum tale extra; igitur aliquid intra, habens tantum esse obiectivum, et de illo arguam sicut de primo: si singulare, hoc est propositum, quia ita dicam de intellectione. — Item, aequè probat quod volitione generali aut diligis aliquid aut nihil per illam etc. Per omnia tu arguis.

Item, sicut ipsi²⁷ concedunt, et bene, cognitio singularis potest haberi ipso non existente. Quid intelligitur illa intellectione? Aut aliquid aut nihil etc., sicut tu dicis. Certum est enim quod tunc [non] cognoscitur per eam singulare exsistens. — De voce etiam, cuiusmodi est 'homo' vel 'animal' est idem argumentum, quia quaero: quid significat? Aut aliquid aut nihil etc., ut prius. De rugitu etiam boum eodem modo: quid significat? Aut nihil aut aliquid, etc. sicut prius.

Quidquid sit de argumento tuo, quid intelligis per 'rem intelligi'? Si nihil aliud nisi intellectionem esse in mente a qua res extrinsece denominatur et dicitur intelligi, ita quod nihil plus ibi requiritur, concedo tecum. Sed tunc non oportet ponere aliquod fictum, planum est. Si intelligas quod aliquid sit ibi quod terminet actum, puta fictum vel ens reale sine quo terminante non potest haberi intellectio, falsa imaginatio est, quia intellectio [est] absoluta qualitas et termino non indiget aliter quam in primo intellectu acceptum est.

Confirmatur hoc per te, quia fictum illud quod ponis non minus dependet a rebus quam intellectio ipsa, igitur si intellectio non possit esse sine re terminante, nec fictum illud. Vel sic: igitur si intellectio necessario requirit terminum, igitur et fictum illud, et processum in infinitum; vel rem, et tunc intellectio aequè poterit significare immediate et repraesentare rem.

Dices: rosa intelligitur. Ponamus quod nulla sit in rerum natura: quomodo supponit ibi subiectum vel pro quo? Et non inveniri poterit quid dare nisi fictum, igitur etc. Dico quod non oportet ubique uniformiter referre ad proprietatem logicalem sermonis. Concordemus in 'quid nominis' terminorum et propositionis, et statim apparebit evacuatio difficultatis. Dico quod per istam 'rosa intelligitur' nihil significat[ur] nisi quod haec intellectio, vel talis, informat mentem. Et quomodo supponit rosa in ista 'intellectio est in mente'? Certum est quod nullo modo. Et eodem modo nec in prima, sed est metaphorica et impropria

²⁷ Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, Prol., q. 1 (*Opera Theologica* I, ed. G. Gál et S. Brown, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 1967), 38s.

locutio per denominationem extrinsecam qua rosa denominatur ab intellectione. Exemplum: qualem suppositionem habet lapis in ista 'lapis est in potentia'? Dico quod talem qualem in ista 'materia est' vel 'efficiens talem est', quia prima non significat nisi quod causa materialis vel effectiva est, et ideo non aliam suppositionem habet lapis in unaquam in alia. Nolo tamen negare quin haec sit vera 'lapis non habet repugnantiam essendi'.

Item, secundum communem Scholam, hic est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter 'Homerus est in opinione, igitur Homerus est', quia praemissa nihil significat nisi quod opinio sit a qua extrinsece denominatur Homerus, sive sit sive non sit, et ideo non sequitur consequens. Eodem modo in proposito de intellectione et re quae intelligitur.

Ad aliud,²⁸ cum dicis 'conceptus est id quod terminat actum': sed actum reflexum terminare non est nisi voce cognosci; et sic dico quod res terminat et non fictum. Res terminat intellectionem, id est denominatur extrinsece ab intellectione in mente, sic dicendo 'res intelligitur'.

Ad primum supra enumeratorum de divisione entis in ens in anima et extra animam dico quod illa est consimilis divisio qualis est entis in actum et potentiam, ut cum dico 'lapis quidam est in potentia et quidam in actu'; et illa distinctio valet istam 'lapis vel exsistit existentia propria vel extrinsece denominatur ab existentia causae materialis vel effectivae ex qua potest lapis produci vel quae potest lapidem producere'. Similiter hic 'lapis quidam in anima et quidam extra animam', id est 'vel lapis denominatur extrinsece ab existentia intellectionis in anima vel exsistit extra animam existentia propria'.

Item, habent aequae respondere quod praeter istud fictum oportet ponere aliud et aliud in infinitum. Nam lapis non tantum est in anima per hoc quod intellectio est in anima secundum hoc, sed etiam ex hoc quod fictum illud est in anima. Et quaero: quomodo lapis est in anima per illud fictum? Aut quia illud significat immediate et repraesentat

²⁸ Fusius respondet in *Lectura*, loco cit. (f. 136rb): "Ad secundum argumentum ibi positum, cum dicitur quod conceptus terminat intellectionem, dicendum quod argumentum aequae probat quod illud ens fictum terminetur ad aliud, et illud ad aliud, et sic in infinitum, quia representat rem extra. — Similiter eadem ratione tam vox quam imago quam etiam visio. si causaretur sine praesentia repraesentante [*pro*: rei repraesentatae] terminaretur ad talia entia ficta, scilicet nunc eo modo terminantur sicut tunc; igitur modo terminantur ad talia. Quod non concedunt.

Dicendum est igitur quod intellectio est quaedam qualitas absoluta, quae non requirit talem terminum concomitantem in essendo, differens a quocumque ente reali. Ideo dicendum quod ipsamet intellectio est conceptus, quia per eam concipitur res quae concipitur, nec est ibi aliquod tale ens fictum concomitans."

lapides singulares, et aequae dicam hoc de intellectione; aut aliquid aliud, et nonnisi fictum, sicut tu arguis etc.

Item, aequae concludit de dilectione, quia esse amatum ita est esse in anima sicut esse cognitum, ut prius.

Item, idem argumentum de cognitione singularium, quia aequae sicut ens dividitur in ens extra animam et in anima, Sors eodem modo dividitur. Er similiter lapis eodem modo dividitur in ens in potentia et in actu, et certum est quod causa sua a qua denominatur esse in potentia non est in potentia sed in actu, igitur in causa oportet ponere unum esse fictum lapidis.

Ad secundum de chimera dico quod intelligere chimeram et huiusmodi impossibilia non est aliud nisi intellectionem esse in mente virtute cuius ipsa potest iudicare quod talis esset natura chimerae si esset in rerum natura. Item, argumentum aequae procedit de voluntate, quia aequae possum velle habere chimeram sicut intelligere. Item, aequae procedit de singulari ficto et de singulari chimera sicut de universali.

Ad aliud: dictum est frequenter quod actus sciendi non habet complexum pro obiecto, nec syllogismus vel propositio componitur ex fictis sed ex ipsis intellectionibus. Et argumentum aequae procederet de cognitionibus singularium sicut universalium. Et propositiones et syllogismi et etiam huiusmodi sunt subiective in mente et non obiective, nisi quando intelliguntur per actus reflexos. Sunt enim syllogismi compositi ex veris intellectionibus subiective menti inhaerentibus.

Ad aliud de artificialibus: aequae procedit de voluntate sicut de intellectu, quia possum velle producere domum sicut et intelligere domum, igitur aequae deberes ponere fictum volitum sicut cognitum. Dico igitur quod non est aliud artificialia esse in mente nisi quod cognitio fiendorum informet mentem.

Ad quintum de respectu rationis dicetur in materia de intentionibus vel intellectionibus. Et istud etiam ita procedit de volitione, quia ita possum velle aliquid in ordine ad aliud sicut et intelligere. Quid igitur intelligis per respectum rationis? Si intellectionem quandam relativam unius ad se vel ad aliud, tunc bene; et tunc dico quod respectus rationis est subiective in anima. Si intelligas unum respectum existere extra animam quae tamen non existit extra animam, dico quod eo ipso quod hoc est falsum fingere, tale nec est subiective in anima nec extra animam, sed bene intellectio qua hoc fingis, sive significat negative sive affirmative, est in anima subiective.

Ad aliud: 'tunc nullus conceptus est universalis et univocus', dico quod aequae probat de conceptu ficto illud sicut de aliis, quia duo ficta

conveniunt, igitur est aliquis conceptus communis eis, et illud non est nisi fictum, et illa tria adhuc conveniunt, et sic in infinitum.

Ad aliud de differentia inter primam intentionem et secundam alias. Sed sive prima intentio vocetur res extra sive intellectio rei extra vocetur intentio prima, hic dico quod conceptus est vera intellectio.

Ad octavum: illud est aequae contra te, quia fictum illud non est plus aliquid unum quam ipsa intellectio, quia si fictum essentialiter dependet ab intellectione, sicut intellectiones distinguuntur numero ita quod est alia et alia, ita et ficta proportionaliter distinguuntur, et ita aequae habes idem quod possit esse praedicatum vel subiectum in propositione universali ponendo solum actum sicut ponendo fictum praeter actum. Dico igitur quod in una propositione idem penitus praedicatur de subiecto aliquo distributo pro omnibus singularibus extra, et stare universaliter est stare pro singularibus. In diversis tamen propositionibus non praedicatur idem numero sed simile, quia successive succedunt et praecedunt propositiones se invicem in mente vel succedere possunt correspondenter sicut et in voce, et una potest cessare antequam alia incipiat, ita quod in syllogismo aliud secundum numerum est subiectum maioris et praedicatum minoris secundum numerum, sed tamen conceptus consimilis est medius terminus, et hoc sufficit. A pari igitur currit de unitate actus sicut de unitate ficti [*cod.*: puncti], et propter hoc non debet poni.

Ad aliud: 'tunc genus et species non differrent nec praedicarentur de diversis'; non sequitur, quia unum illorum praedicatur de differentibus specie, aliud non.

Ad auctoritates concedo quia anima potest fingere multa, sicut montem aureum et chimeram et huiusmodi, sed hoc non est aliud quam habere intellectionem montis aurei vel chimerae, id est intellectionem virtute cuius possem iudicare quod talis esset natura eius si esset, ut supra dictum est. Et tu salvas hoc per complexa, ego melius possum, quia pono conceptum simplicem aequivalentem semper complexo. Complexum enim significaret alia ratione partium, nec sic conceptus simplex; nec est ibi aliud 'terminare' nisi intellectionem esse in anima. Quod si species vel habitus vel aliquid aliud concurrat ibi, hoc non est in ratione termini, sed tantum ad causandum actum quo immediate res ipsa extra intelligatur.

Dices: intellectio ipsa est res extra animam, quia in praedicamento reali etc. Si omnino velis vocare omnem veram qualitatem rem extra, non possum impedire.

Sed hic restant dubia: primum de qualitate conceptus, et quid intelligitur eo. Et de hoc tactum est supra in materia de fruitione. Et

dico quod duplex est modus quo hic potest exprimi. Unus est iste: dicere quod aliqua res intelligitur et alia non, eo quod intellectio sit in mente, virtute cuius iudicas talem esse rem vel debere esse si res esset et talem esse eius naturam. Quando igitur quaeritur, quid intelligitur per intentionem communem, aut vis loqui ad talem intellectum, videlicet cognitionem esse in mente virtute cuius tu poteris iudicare rem esse talem vel talem et cuiusmodi naturae sit. Aut ad alium intellectum: quae scilicet est illa res quae denominatur esse cognita per cognitionem in mente, quae, inquam, est illa res si existeret. — Si quaeras ad secundum intellectum, tunc dico quod res singulares; ita quod tantum res singularis est illud quod intelligitur per cognitionem universalem, et iste conceptus specificus hominis tantum est intellectio Sortis et Platonis et aliorum singularium. — Si ad primum intellectum, tunc conceptus specificus hominis est intellectio hominis et non intellectio Sortis, quia ille est cognitio et intellectio in mente virtute cuius potes iudicare de Sorte ipsum esse hominem et non ipsum esse Sortem. Et illa est, isto modo, intellectio animalis, non Sortis nec hominis, virtute cuius potes iudicare de Sorte ipsum esse animal, non ipsum esse hominem nec ipsum esse Sortem, et ita de aliis conceptibus comunibus. — Sed si quaereres in secundo intellectu an Sortes sit illa res quae intelligitur, dico quod sic, ex quo de facto non distinguuntur in re Sortes et homo et animal in isto cognito [*ita cod. pro: concreto?*], nec etiam res correspondentes abstractis istorum concretorum.

Modus secundus exprimendi qualitatem istius conceptus et naturam eius et quid intelligitur eo est iste: quando quaeritur quid intelligitur per intellectionem hominis, vel sub aliis verbis, utrum iste conceptus specificus sit intellectio hominis vel Sortis, iuxta modum frequenter tactum, si quaeras an de facto sit intellectio Sortis, dico quod sic. Si quaeras an per se sit intellectio Sortis, dico quod non, quia si humanitas distingueretur a Sorteitate in re, intellectio humanitatis non haberet pro obiecto Sorteitatem sed humanitatem, quae foret pars Sorteitatis; de facto tamen habet Sorteitatem pro obiecto. Et qui ad aliam mentem exponunt Doctorem,²⁹ quin de facto sint omnino idem, et idem sit cognoscere unum et aliud, non vadunt ad mentem eius.

²⁹ Quod Chatton per 'Doctorem' intelligat Doctorem Subtilem et velit explicare rectum intellectum distinctionis formalis, planum est ex quodam loco parallelo qui occurrit distinctione 25, q. 1 (cod. cit., ff. 57vb—58ra), ubi haec, notatu plane digna, leguntur: "Ad tertium: quis ponit communitatem in re? Nescio quis. Verumtamen aliter doctores intelligunt et aliter exprimunt. Bene enim aliquando exprimunt quia 'humanitas est in re', vel quia 'natura communis est in re', quae verba possent trahi ad hunc sensum

Contra: quae est illa res quae per se et primo intelligitur conceptu specifico hominis? Si Sortes, oppositum dicit; si alia, igitur vel res extra animam, et tunc aliquid commune extra animam; vel in anima, et tunc fictum, quod improbasti. Vel sic: si Sortes, propositum; si non Sortes, tunc tertius homo.

Respondeo: quid intelligis per 'habere Sortem pro per se obiecto'? Ego dico quod habere Sortem vel aliud pro primo et per se obiecto est quod ipso posito, quacumque positione facta possibili vel impossibili, puta posito quod humanitas removeatur a Sorteitate sicut pars a toto, adhuc haberet illud pro obiecto. Et isto modo loquendo conceptus iste specificus habet humanitatem pro obiecto primo et non Sorteitatem; conceptus autem Sortis haberet totam essentiam Sortis pro obiecto primo, et ideo illa intentio quae est conceptus specificus non aequaliter est humanitatis et Sorteitatis. Sed unde tunc est unus conceptus universalis et specificus et alius non? Dico quod unus significat quodlibet individuum de facto, non sic alius. — Sed quare videtur universalis? Dico quod non ideo quia conceptus specificus humanitatis per se requirat quod humanitas sit Sorteitas et Platonitas, quia conceptus iste non requirit quod humanitas sit humanitates, ideo non solum non exigit hoc, sed oppositum, scilicet quod non sit plures humanitates.

Contra: definitio humanitatis indifferens est ad unum et ad plura, igitur non requiritur quod humanitas non sit plures. Dico quod conceptus specificus per se requirit quod nullum eius individuum sit plures humanitates, quia tunc non esset humanitas sed humanitates; et ideo non sic abstrahit ab uno et pluri, sed sic quod non per se exigit conceptus specificus quod sit unum tantum in re vel plura de quibus dicatur, sed ex opposito est de conceptu deitatis.

Secundum dubium est: quomodo potest subici pluribus et supponere in propositione? Et hic negant aliqui³⁰ distinctionem inter suppositionem simplicem et materialem in propositione ex conceptibus

quod eadem natura in re esset [communis] omnibus individuis. Sed hoc est trahere talia ad peius... Nullus enim sic intellexit...

Aliqui videntur dicere quod paternitas non sit persona... Sed tenendum est oppositum, quod nulla distinctio in persona eadem; unde est distinctio conceptuum eiusdem rei. Unde nec Doctor Sollemnis audebat [*cod.*: pudebat?] ibi ponere distinctionem intentionalem nec Subtilis distinctionem formalem. Cum aliqui enim concepissent ex verbis eius aliquibus talem distinctionem formalem, ipse Parisius ordinavit quasdam quaestiones logicales, in quibus docuit oppositum. Sed tantum posuit quod hoc non est per se illud. Et ideo dico cum eo quod sine omni pluralitate divinitas non est per se paternitas, nec e converso. Et quid est hoc dictum? Quod si per impossibile in eadem persona esset distinctio qualis est conceptum, tunc divinitas non esset paternitas nec e converso."

³⁰ Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, d. 2, q. 4 M.

in mente quamvis non in propositione in voce, quia subiectum in propositione concepta, secundum eos, vel supponit pro re extra, et tunc personaliter, vel pro conceptu ipso, et tunc simpliciter. Sed ego [dico] quod est adhuc tertia, ita quod conceptus in mente potest supponere materialiter, sicut cum dico 'iste conceptus est qualitas'. Et dico etiam quod pro re extra potest habere suppositionem tam simplicem quam personalem, nam quando conceptus specificus hominis sic supponit pro individuis extra sicut supponeret si humanitas distingueretur a quolibet individuo, tunc supponit simpliciter quodcumque signum eius, sive in conceptu sive in voce. Et quod ita sit, videtur, quia hoc posito possum salvare communes locutiones quas ipsi salvare non possunt negando suppositionem simplicem pro rebus extra. Haec enim conceditur tamquam vera 'humanitas in Sorte est natura realis specifica', et certe non pro conceptu, igitur pro re extra; et tamen hic non supponit subiectum huius propositionis in mente personaliter, quia non pro aliquo individuo, igitur simpliciter.

Confirmo: isti concedunt istam 'homo est per se et primo risibilis', et non istam 'Sortes est per se et primo risibilis'. Ly 'homo' hic non stat pro conceptu nec pro individuis, quia negas hoc de quolibet individuo, igitur pro natura reali specifica. Dico igitur quod pro rebus potest habere aliam suppositionem quam personalem, ut in ista 'humanitas est natura realis specifica', et pro conceptu aliam quam simplicem, scilicet materialem, ut in ista 'conceptus hominis est qualitas'. Utrum autem in ista 'homo est species', non curo.

Tertium dubium est quomodo praedicatur conceptus universalis de pluribus. Ipsi³¹ ponunt fictum ad salvandum hoc quod ponunt quod praedicari [*cod.*: probari] est intelligi et obici. Sed ego dico quod praedicari est habere esse subiectivum. Nec causa eorum valet, quia fictum illud aut dependet essentialiter ab intellectione, et tunc variatur ad variationem intellectionis, quae [*cod.*: quia], ut certum est, variatur et plurificatur; aut non dependet ab ea, et tunc esset aliquid — vel esse posset — cognitum si non cognoscitur, quod est contradictio. Dico igitur quod praedicari universaliter est esse praedicatum in propositione universali, et subici universaliter est subici cum distributione. Et praedicare et subicere non est aliud quam causare intellectiones ordinate in mente uniformiter quomodo ordinantur in propositione in voce, sicut et praedicare in voce est sic ordinare et disponere voces in propositione vocali. Et haec est causa quare [angelus] non componit nec dividit nec

³¹ Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, d. 2, q. 8 E—F.

discurrit, quia sic non ordinantur conceptus sui, et similiter quare potest non discurrere; nec doctores intenderunt docere quin angelus posset discurrere, sed quod non necessario.

Quantum dubium: an conceptus superior sit de intellectu inferioris. Et hic laborant³² in alio significato vocabuli dicentes quod non. Si enim velint habere quod una intellectio non est alia, nec quod res extra sit intellectio, certum est, nec aliqua est in hoc difficultas. Sed tamen triplex alius potest esse intellectus bonus: primus, quod superius est de intellectu inferioris, id est, est pars definitionis eius. Secundus, id est impossibile est habere conceptum inferiorem quin virtute eiusdem quo habes illum possis habere superiorem. Generaliter enim omnis intellectio virtute cuius potes scire Sortem esse hominem et etiam virtute cuius potes scire ipsum esse animal et corpus et substantiam, et sic de aliis. Tertius intellectus est quod res significata per conceptum superiorem vel est res significata per inferiorem vel pars eius. Sic vocamus et dicimus conceptum superiorem esse de intellectu inferioris. Et si istos intellectus negaveris, verum negas.

Quintum dubium est de conceptibus syncategorematicis. Et hic dicunt³³ quod sunt ad placitum multi eorum et praesupponunt institutionem voluntariam vocum, sicut et conceptus grammaticales, et non proveniunt ex re. Sed mihi apparet oppositum: quod non plus conceptus perseitatis est ex institutione voluntaria quam conceptus hominis. Et arguo hoc sic: omni institutione voluntaria circumscripta aequae verificatur haec propositio in mente 'homo per se est homo' sicut haec 'homo est homo'. Igitur cum veritas secundae provenit ex hoc quod conceptus isti significant rem extra tantum, igitur et primae. Nec est simile de conceptibus grammaticalibus, quia esse genitivi casus et huiusmodi sunt condiciones vocum, sed condiciones conceptus non plus dependent a voluntate quam rugitus boum. Ideo enim praecise est haec per se 'homo est homo' quia talis est natura rei extra et talis est natura conceptuum qui sunt signa naturalia rerum. Licet enim voluntarium [sit] quod definitio sit in mente, quod tamen per se significet rem si ponatur in mente non est voluntarium.

Sextum dubium est: quomodo definitio, et similiter passio, communis est et primo convenit naturae specificae. Ipsi³⁴ exponunt: id est convertibiliter praedicantur de se invicem. Sed certe, adhuc remanet tota dubitatio: quare convertibiliter? Sed ego dico, ideo convertibiliter

³² Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, d. 2, q. 7 X.

³³ Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, d. 2, q. 8 K.

³⁴ Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, I, d. 2, q. 4 D—L.

quia talis est natura rerum extra et istorum conceptuum quod de quocumque verificatur unum et reliquum. Quia igitur humanitas est talis natura quod non per se determinat sibi quod sit Sortes nec quod sit Plato ideo primo convenit homini definitio et passio specifica et non primo Sorti vel Platoni.

Septimum dubium est: quomodo se habent ad invicem conceptus specificus et individualis. Dico quod sunt alterius rationis, et unus est communis et alter proprius. Conceptus enim ultimus proprius Sortis est alterius rationis et a conceptu specifico et a conceptu ultimo et proprio Platonis, quia plus conveniunt conceptus Sortis bis replicatus quam conceptus Sortis et Platonis.

Ad quaestionem dico quod sic, quia ens, bonum et huiusmodi transcendentia distribuuntur in propositione universali pro utrisque.

Ad primum argumentum principale concedo processum in infinitum in talibus actibus reflexis.

Ad secundum dico quod eodem in re convenit Deus et differt a creatura, et ita de duobus aliis quibuscumque; sed non eodem conceptu, quia impossibile est quod idem conceptus sit communis sibi et alteri et tamen sibi proprius.

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AQUINAS AND THE SUBSISTENCE OF THE SOUL: NOTES ON A DIFFICULTY

After St. Thomas argues in his *Summa Theologiae* that any soul, because it is the act and form of body, is opposed to matter and not a body,¹ he attempts to prove that the human soul, unlike the forms of all other bodies,² does not depend upon body for its being.³ His argument that the soul exists independently of the body does not successfully overcome the methodological difficulty posed for it by his acceptance of the Aristotelian position that the soul is a substantial form and by his admission, which functions as a premise in his argument, that man performs intellectual activities. In this paper we intend to clarify the nature of this difficulty.

In the *Summa Theologiae*, St. Thomas' argument for the subsistence of the soul has two parts. In the first he argues that the soul is the source of an operation in which the body does not share:

Dicendum quod necesse est dicere id quod est principium intellectualis operationis, quod dicimus animam hominis, esse quoddam principium incorporeum et subsistens. Manifestum est enim quod homo per intellectum cognoscere potest naturas omnium corporum. Quod autem potest cognoscere aliqua, oportet ut nihil eorum habeat in sua natura; quia illud quod inesset ei naturaliter, impediret cognitionem aliorum; sicut videmus quod lingua infirmi quae infecta est cholerico et amaro humore, non potest percipere aliquid dulce, sed omnia videntur ei amara. Si igitur principium intellectuale haberet in se naturam alicuius corporis, non posset omnia corpora cognoscere. Omne autem corpus habet aliquam naturam determinatam. Impossibile est igitur quod principium intellectuale sit corpus. Et similiter impossibile est quod intelligat per organum corporeum, quia etiam natura determinata illius organi corporei prohiberet cognitionem omnium corporum; sicut si aliquis determinatus color sit non solum in pupilla sed etiam in vase vitreo, liquor infusus eiusdem coloris videtur. Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium, quod dicitur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, cui non communicat corpus.⁴

In the second part of his argument, St. Thomas concludes that the human soul subsists:

Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod per se subsistit. Non enim est operari nisi entis in actu; unde eo modo aliquid operatur, quo est. Propter

¹ I, 75, 1.

² I, 75, 3.

³ I, 75, 2.

⁴ *Idem*.

quod non dicimus quod calor calefacit, sed calidum. Relinquitur igitur animam humanam, quae dicitur intellectus vel mens, esse aliquid incorporeum et subsistens.⁵

Clearly, if St. Thomas is to prove that the soul of man subsists, he must first establish that it has an operation in which the body does not share. In his proof of the latter, "homo per intellectum cognoscere potest naturas omnium corporum" and "Quod autem potest cognoscere aliqua, oportet ut nihil eorum habeat in sua natura" function as premises. "Man" is the subject of the first statement quoted, and some man, say Socrates, is its referent. But if man in fact knows all corporeal things, either Socrates is not a body or the second statement quoted, "What knows some things can have nothing of these in its own nature," is not true. For, at this stage in St. Thomas' argument, it is not possible to assume that the subject of the second statement refers to the soul *alone*, as though it were the only source of intellectual activity. This would be to assume what the statement is used to prove, namely, that the soul, because it is the only source of the operation of knowing all bodies, is what knows all bodies.⁶ If we accept for the moment the context of St. Thomas' argument, the soul of man, as are the souls of plants and animals, is the formal source by which there is an agent that moves itself, senses, and understands. But until proof is presented that the human soul, because it is the *only* source of intellectual activity, is an agent source in addition to being a formal source, there is no reason to identify the form by which Socrates is a living thing which understands all bodies with the agent which understands all bodies. In the absence of proof of such identification the only *known* referent for the subject of St. Thomas' second premise is the referent of the subject of St. Thomas' first premise, namely, some man.

It appears that St. Thomas uses "What knows some things can have nothing of these in its own nature" to prove that the soul is the source of an operation in which the body does not share. Indeed, if that premise be true, what knows all bodies could not by nature be a body. Yet how establish that "What knows some things can have nothing of these in its own nature" is true in the face of the admitted fact that Socrates, who is naturally a body, knows all bodies? As we have seen, the difficulty cannot be avoided by claiming at this point that it is the soul alone that knows all bodies, for this is the very claim in dispute which "What

⁵ *Idem.*

⁶ In the context of the hylomorphic theory, proof that the soul is the source of an operation in which the body does not share is proof that it is the only source of the operation in question.

knows some things can have nothing of these in its own nature" is used to establish. Neither is it possible to avoid the difficulty by claiming that it is the mind, instead of the soul, that knows all bodies. For there is no reason to think, at this point in St. Thomas' argument, that mind is independent of body. But if we do not as yet know whether or not mind depends upon body for its being, why accept "What knows some things can have nothing of these in its own nature"?

To restate the same issue in slightly different fashion, is the knowledge that it is the soul *alone* that knows all bodies a condition for knowing "What knows some things can have nothing of these in its own nature" or is the knowledge that "What knows some things can have nothing of these in its own nature" a condition for knowing that it is the soul *alone* that knows all bodies? The first alternative is a begging of the question, at least in St. Thomas' eyes, for in his text, "What knows some things can have nothing of these in its own nature" functions as a premise for proving that the soul has an operation in which the body does not share.

In the face of the example of Socrates and to avoid begging the question, St. Thomas offers the following reason to support the premise we have called into question:

What knows some things can have nothing of these in its own nature *because what would be in it naturally would impede knowledge of the others*, as we see that a sick man's tongue, being infected by a feverish and bitter fluid, is unable to perceive anything sweet, but everything seems bitter to it.⁷

The italicized part of this quotation leaves us with the same problem. Instead of asking the question we framed above about "What knows some things can have nothing of these in its own nature," we now have to ask it of the italicized part of the above quote. It is difficult to see how, without assuming that it is the soul *alone* that knows all bodies, the italicized statement can be judged true, for we are still faced with the example of Socrates. If the body he is does not prevent him from knowing all bodies, why accept the italicized statement as true of anything other than the senses?⁸

St. Thomas' argument seems to presuppose some determination of what body can or cannot do. He appears to be arguing, if I can simplify

⁷ I, 75, 2. Emphasis mine.

⁸ While it may be the case that the presence of a sensible in the sense precludes the presence of other sensibles, this itself does not establish that the presence of a body in a knower would prevent him from knowing all bodies. Such an argument would be by way of a supposed similarity and could not be probative but only suggestive.

his procedure without distorting it, that, because man knows all bodies and body cannot be involved in what knows all bodies, the soul has an operation in which the body does not share.

But, if St. Thomas' argument requires some statement about what body can or cannot do prior to proof that the soul is the source of an operation in which the body does not share, can he, in the face of his admission that Socrates knows all bodies and without begging the question, justify the knowledge that is required of body? After all, if St. Thomas is right in thinking that the human soul functions in man as a form, why should man not be used, along with such things as trees, cats, and inanimate objects, to establish the criterion for what he bodily can or cannot do? While it may be the case that what is *just* a body cannot know all bodies, it does not follow from this that knowing all bodies is an operation in which the body does not share. On this basis, self-motion or sensation would be activities in which the body does not share, for what is *just* a body cannot perform these operations either. For St. Thomas' argument to be successful, he must show that what is a body, not merely what is just a body, cannot know all bodies. He can do this only if he can show that to body as such some characteristic belongs which would prevent anything that is a body from knowing all bodies. However, if Socrates be included among those things which have to be taken into account in determining what belongs to body as such, since what belongs to body as such is found wherever there is a body,⁹ it does not seem possible to find some characteristic which would belong to body as such that would prevent what is a body from knowing all bodies. One cannot, for example, when Socrates is taken into account and before proof that the soul is the only source of intellectual activity, argue that it belongs to body as such to restrict whatever form it receives to the here and now,¹⁰ for Socrates, who is a body, receives in

⁹ Cf. I, 75, 1: "Manifestum est enim quod esse principium vitae, vel vivens, non convenit corpori ex hoc quod est corpus: alioquin omne corpus esse vivens, aut principium vitae." As this remark indicates, St. Thomas uses what is or is not the case with every body as a sign of what belongs to body as such. Similarly, can we not argue that if it belonged to body as such to limit the forms it receives to the here and now Socrates could not receive a form without limiting it to the here and now. Socrates, in other words, could not know all bodies. Moreover, does not the fact that Socrates, who is a body, knows all bodies argue that it does not belong to body as such to limit a received form to the here and now? Surely the fact that Socrates, who is a body, knows all bodies calls into question the notion that what is naturally present in a thing prevents knowledge of other things of the same genus.

¹⁰ That a reason of this kind may be operative in St. Thomas' mind is indicated by I, 50, 1: "Intelligere autem non potest esse actus corporis nec

knowing all bodies the form of body itself without restricting it to the here and now.¹¹

When we turn to other texts of St. Thomas which treat of the soul and subsistence, we are often referred to the third book of Aristotle's *De Anima* for proof that knowing cannot be an act in which the body participates.¹² The reference seems to be the chapter four of book three where Aristotle says:

Therefore, since everything is a possible object of thought, mind in order, as Anaxagoras says, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all admixture; for the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance and a block: it follows that it too, like the sensitive part, can have no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity. Thus that in the soul which is called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing.¹³

In his explication of this passage, St. Thomas notes that Anaxagoras had said that mind was without matter in it because it moves all things. St. Thomas, however, since he intends to talk about mind as what understands all things and not about it as what moves all things, claims that it is unmixed with matter because it knows all things. He puts it this way:

As Anaxagoras has posited that the mind is unmixed in order that it might dominate, it is necessary for us to posit it is unmixed in order that it might know.¹⁴

In a text which continues the one just quoted, St. Thomas gives us, in support of Aristotle, his reason for thinking that what knows must be unmixed. He writes,

Which indeed by this reason becomes clear. For everything which is in potency to something and receptive of it lacks that to which it is in potency and of which it is receptive; as the pupil, which is in potency to colors and

alicuius virtutis corporeae, quia omne corpus determinatur ad hic et nunc." But Socrates, who is a body, in knowing all bodies has within him body not determined to the here and now. The knower of all bodies, Socrates, is an instance which, it seems, renders doubtful, if not false, the statement, "Omne corpus determinatur ad hic et nunc."

¹¹ Cf. above notes 9 and 10. If, in knowing, the form of body were received and restricted to the here and now, knowledge of body would, in the view of St. Thomas, be at best knowledge of *this* body. Knowledge of body that is good for all times and places is possible, as St. Thomas sees it, only if the form of body is received in knowing without limiting it to the here and now.

¹² See *De spiritualibus creaturis.*, art. 1 and *Quaestiones disputatae de anima.*, I, 1 and 14.

¹³ 429a 18—429a 24, trans. by J. A. Smith, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, edited by Richard McKeon (New York, 1941).

¹⁴ *In III De anima.*, vii, 679.

receptive of them, lacks all color: *but our intellect understands intelligible things because it is in potency to them and receptive of them as the sense is of sensibles: it lacks, therefore, all those things which of its nature it understands.* Since, therefore, our intellect naturally understands all sensible and corporeal things, it is necessary that it lack every corporeal nature, as the sense of sight lacks every color because it is cognitive of color. For if there should be some color in it, this color would prevent it from seeing other colors; as the tongue of one in fever, when it is bathed in a bitter fluid, is not able to perceive a sweet flavor. If the intellect were restricted, then, in the same way [in the way, that is, that the tongue sometimes can be] to any particular nature, this nature connatural to it would prevent it from knowing other natures.¹⁵

In order to prove that the soul has an operation in which the body does not share, St. Thomas appeals, in the above quotation to the principle, "Everything which is in potency to something and receptive of it lacks that to which it is in potency and of which it is receptive." This principle, according to St. Thomas, is applicable in the case of the senses. The senses, as he understands them, are passive powers.¹⁶ In his view, sensation is a passing from potency to act in which the sense power receives a sensible which it has lacked. The senses, which move from potency to act and receive a wide range of sense qualities, must lack in their own being, if they are to function properly, the sensibles they are capable of sensing. The senses, in other words, exemplify, but do not prove, the principle just quoted. Clearly, if St. Thomas can bring what knows all bodies under this general principle, he will have established that what knows all bodies cannot depend upon body for its being.

Here again, however, St. Thomas faces the same kind of difficulty as before. The soul can be taken as referent for "what knows all bodies" only if proof of its subsistence is successful, for, although it is not a body,¹⁷ it is only known to be a form and not yet known to be a doer. If Socrates be kept as referent for "what knows all bodies," what knows all bodies cannot be brought under this principle, for Socrates is by nature a body.¹⁸ It is equally clear, moreover, that if mind be taken as

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 680. Emphasis and brackets mine.

¹⁶ I, 78, 3.

¹⁷ I, 75, 1.

¹⁸ Since Socrates is a body, knowing all bodies cannot be an activity which is the result of a passage from potency to act. Socrates, i. e. what knows all bodies, does not, in knowing all bodies, pass from potency to act and receive what he lacks, for he is by nature a body. Since he is by nature a body, either St. Thomas' general principle is not true, or Socrates, the knower of all bodies, cannot be brought under it. In either case it is impossible to use St. Thomas' general principle to prove that what knows all bodies cannot be a body. Cf. the objections raised in the sentence which follow to the subsuming of mind, if it be taken as referent for "what knows all bodies," under St. Thomas' general principle.

referent for "what knows all bodies" what knows all bodies cannot in this case either be brought under St. Thomas' principle. If the mind were in potency to and receptive of what it knows as the senses are vis-à-vis what they sense (see the italicized part of the quotation referred to above by note 15), the mind, because it can know all beings, could not itself be a being. This difficulty cannot be avoided by claiming that St. Thomas means "Every bodily power which is in potency to something and receptive of it lacks that to which it is in potency and of which it is receptive" when he says, "Everything which is in potency to something and receptive of it lacks that to which it is in potency and of which it is receptive." The former is in doubt until it is known whether mind or what knows all bodies depends upon body for its being, while the latter faces the objection just raised about the mind not being a being. Moreover, if the mind is bodily, then it cannot be brought under St. Thomas' general principle for the same reason Socrates cannot, and if it is not known whether or not the mind is bodily, one can hardly prove that it is not bodily by a principle the use of which would also prove that the mind is not a being.

What knows all bodies, i. e. Socrates, in knowing receives a form without limiting and determining it to the here and now. Man can do, in other words, what trees and cats cannot do. The fact that man can do this, however, does not prove that what knows all bodies cannot be a body. If anything, St. Thomas' ready acceptance of this fact helps create the difficulty which, if our evaluation of it is correct, prevents him from showing that what knows all bodies cannot be a body. But if he cannot establish that what knows all bodies cannot be a body, he cannot prove that the soul has an operation in which the body does not share, both of which are required if his argument that the soul subsists is to be successful.

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THE NATURE AND EFFICACY OF PREACHING ACCORDING TO ST. BERNARDINE OF SIENA*

The understanding which Bernardine of Siena (1380—1444) had of the important role of preaching in the life of the Church depended in large measure on a late medieval view of history. It is not easy for our minds, stamped with the thought-patterns of the modern era and dominated by the ideal of uninterrupted progress, to sympathize with and understand the late medieval mentality, saturated with and even haunted by the sentiment of the imminent end of the world.¹ This feeling was focussed on the imminent advent of the Antichrist nearly everywhere in western Europe by the end of the fourteenth century.² The all-pervasive anxiety about the Antichrist, so strange to our modern way of thinking, became especially acute during the Great Schism with its continual strife and political turmoil, with famine and pestilence following on the devastation of whole countrysides. Following a line of apocalyptic expectation influenced in large measure by the theories of Joachim of Flora (1202), the late medieval tendency was to identify the Antichrist with a particular historical personage.³ This led to wild speculations regarding his birth and possible whereabouts.

* This article, based on the first part of doctoral dissertation "A Theology of Preaching according to St. Bernardine of Siena", is published as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Theology at the Alphonsian Institute Of Moral Theology, Lateran University, Rome. Abbreviations used are as follows: *Opera* for *S. Bernardini Senensis Opera Omnia*, 9 vols., Quaracchi-Florence, 1950—1965; *Seraphim* for *S. Bernardini Senensis Quadragesimale Seraphin nuncupatum*, *Opera Omnia*, Venice, 1591, vol. IV, parts 1—2; *Sabatelli* for *La Fonte della Vita. Prediche scelte*, ed. by G. Sabatelli, Florence, 1964; *Banchi* for *Le Prediche volgari di S. Bernardino da Siena, dette della Piazza del Campo di Siena, l'anno 1427*, 3 vols., Siena, 1880—1888.

¹ Cf. M.-D. Chenu, "La fin du monde dans la spiritualité médiévale" in *Lumière et Vie* 11 (1953), 101—116.

² E. Delaruelle, "L'Antéchrist chez S. Vincent Ferrer, S. Bernardin de Sienne et autour de Jeanne d'Arc" in *L'Attesa dell'età nuova nella spiritualità alla fine del Medioevo* (Todi, 1962), 37.

³ Joachim had identified six Antichrists during the history of Christianity: Herod, Nero, Constantius, Mahommed, Masmudi and Saladin, thus giving rise to the expectation of the seventh "qui proprie dicitur Antichristus." The eight would come at the conclusion of the seventh age. Cf. H. de Lubac, *Exégèse Médiévale*, II, t. 2, (Paris, 1962), 546.

The preachers of the period were not above using this popular anxiety and agitation to further their missionary aims. This is evident in the case of St. Vincent Ferrer († 1419)⁴ and more particularly in the crusade of his Italian confrère and follower, Manfred of Vercelli, who drew the fire of Bernardine during the latter's missionary tour of Lombardy around 1420.⁵ What Bernardine objected to most of all was the gross presumption which pretended to know more than God had revealed in Jesus Christ and which could only disillusion those who believed in these predictions.⁶

Although Bernardine's own ideas on the history of the Church do not figure prominently in either of his two great Lenten courses, *De Christiana Religione* and *De Evangelio Aeterno*, they are very much in evidence in the earlier *Itinerarium Anni* and in certain unfinished sermons which probably date from the same early period of his preaching viz., 1418—1425.⁷ Following the traditional division of history into seven periods, Bernardine believed that his own era was placed towards the end of the sixth, and therefore penultimate, period of Church history. He did not profess to know, however, how long this sixth period would last and rejected all speculations about times or dates.⁸ On the contrary, it was his firm conviction that "grace or the presence of the Holy Spirit was more important for the disciples of Christ than any knowledge of future events."⁹ The beginning of the last age might be fast approaching but, in the eyes of Bernardine, it was more important to emphasise the present gift of grace and the preaching activity which disposed for it.

Preaching was of supreme importance for another reason. The contemporary era, preceding, as was believed, the era of Antichrist, already gave clear evidence of those immoral conditions which would eventually introduce that fateful era when Lucifer, with the help of Antichrist, would eradicate from the hearts of men the faith, hope and charity of

⁴ E. Delaruelle, *art. cit.*, 46—50.

⁵ J. Hofer, *Giovanni da Capestrano*, (It. trans., L'Aquila, 1955), 139—141.

⁶ E. Longpré, "S. Bernardini dicta selecta contra Manfredum de Vercellis, OP (Florentiae, 1425)" in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 30 (1937), 461—465. Cf. also *Opera* VI 267, 274.

⁷ These texts are fundamental in understanding Bernardine's doctrine and outlook; they are found in *Opera* VIII. Cf. the remarks of the editors in *Opera* VIII, *Introductio*, 21.

⁸ *Opera* VIII 107: "... qui [status sextus] adhuc sit duraturus ignoro." At Siena in 1427, he said (*Sabatelli* 56): "che pazzia è questo di coloro che vogliono sapere più che Iddio non vuole che si sappia? Chi è colui che lo sa? Non è creatura al mondo che el possa sapere, imperò che Iddio Cristo Gesù nol volse dire alli discepoli, nè Cristo, in quanto uomo, no' lo seppe mai."

⁹ *Opera* VII 99.

Christ.¹⁰ Before the advent of Antichrist, however, there would be a "great silence in heaven" (cf. Apoc. 8, 1). Following the interpretation of Mathias of Sweden,¹¹ Bernardine understood this to mean that "the word of God would not be preached or would be adulterated to such an extent that preachers would preach themselves and not Jesus Christ."¹² This silence would bring in its wake the silence of true devotion and of the fear of God: "haec tria silentia Antichristum introducent."¹³ Just as faith in Christ was communicated to the world through preaching, so also the lack of preaching would be the cause of its demise and the harbinger of Antichrist. On the other hand, as long as the faith was truly preached Antichrist could not come.¹⁴

Therefore, the remedy for the ills of the age was the Gospel of Christ, the "Eternal Gospel" as Bernardine called it.¹⁵ Since the Gospel was the good news of salvation, it was summed up in the Holy Name of Jesus, the Saviour.¹⁶ Faith in the Name of Jesus should be at the heart of the preacher's message and not any too-worldly fear and anxiety about the

¹⁰ *Opera* VIII 227. Cf. also *Opera* VI 154; IV 151; VII 306. In *Opera* I 123, Bernardine refers to the proximity of the end of the world and *Seraphim* IV² 57a, 59a, 62a to the imminent advent of Antichrist. In a recently discovered autographed codex, he has a text called "De 12 abusionibus saeculi" which enumerates 12 specific types or areas of immorality which prepare for the coming of Antichrist; cf. C. Cenci, "Un manoscritto autografo di S. Bernardino a Budapest" in *Studi Francescani* 61 (1964), 343 n. 71. It was against these sins, signs of the Antichrist, that Bernardine preached mostly.

¹¹ For the influence of this little-known preacher and scriptural commentator on Bernardine cf. D. Pacetti, "L'Expositio super Apocalypsim di Mattia di Svezia (c. 1281—1350) praecipua fonte dottrinale di S. Bernardino da Siena" in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 54 (1961), 273—302; id., "Le postille autografe sopra l'Apocalisse di S. Bernardino da Siena recentemente scoperte nella Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli" in *Arch. Fran. Hist.* 56 (1963), 40—70; review of B. Strömberg, *Magister Mathias ach fransk mendikantpredikan*, (Stockholm, 1944) in *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* 41 (1946), 663—664.

¹² *Opera* III 149.

¹³ *Opera* VIII 227—228, 300.

¹⁴ *Sabatelli* 53, 55. It is interesting that O. Cullmann, *Christ and Time*, (Eng. trans., London, 1962), 164—166, interprets the text of 2 Thess. 2, 6—7 in similar vein. Cf. also D. Grasso, *op. cit.*, 97, who concludes: "bisogna concludere che la predicazione missionaria è l'impedimento (κατέχον) che trattiene la fine, mentre colui che trattiene (κατέχων) è l'apostolo stesso cui la predicazione è affidata."

¹⁵ *Opera* III 3—19, where Bernardine gives to the Joachimistic terms, "Evangelium Aeternum" and its "triplex littera" a thoroughly orthodox meaning; cf. also *Opera* I 34—35; VII 509; *Seraphim* 7b. For this very important aspect of Bernardine's thought, cf. E. Delaruelle, E.-R. Labande, P. Ourliac, *L'Eglise au temps du Grand Schisme et de la crise conciliaire (1378—1449)*, t. 2, (Paris, 1964), 647—649.

¹⁶ This point is central to the missionary preaching of Bernardine and merits special treatment on a future occasion.

coming of Antichrist. Bernardine followed the basic intuition of St. Francis when he envisaged renewal in the Church of his time coming not from some novel outpouring of the Spirit during a Joachimistic "new era" but rather from sincere conversion of heart to the Gospel message of salvation in the Name of Jesus. We would like to examine in this article how the act of preaching operates this change of heart.

1. *The Place of Preaching in God's plan*

The conversion of sinners is part of the mystery of God's love for the world.¹⁷ God has the initiative at all stages. The Father sent Christ, his only Son, into the world because he loved the world; Christ was the supreme gift of his love for men. This Christ who went back to the Father and who will return in judgment at the end of the world ceaselessly makes intercession before his Father for those who believe in him, his Church. His role on this earth, his mission, was to cast the fire of divine love among men. This fire is kindled by Christ by sending the Holy Spirit into the Church, to the whole body of the faithful, preachers and people, in the form of interior inspiration and public preaching.¹⁸

The mystery of God's relation with man is fundamentally a mystery of love.¹⁹ Christ was sent by the Father's love in order to cast the fire of divine love on the earth (cf. *Lk.* 12, 19), and his greatest desire is that all men might be enflamed by it. Christ's self-offering, realising the Father's gift of his only Son (*Jn.* 3, 16), gives him an eminent place before the throne of God's mercy in order to make intercession for those whom he has redeemed. It is the same Christ who will come again in majesty (cf. *Mt.* 25, 31), that is, as a most just judge of all our works. The same Christ came in his Incarnation, filling human nature thereby with virtues and graces, voiding it of all vice and yet he continues to come each day by means of internal inspirations and the public preaching of the Church. Christ "stands" before the golden altar in the sanctuary of

¹⁷ It is in this context that Bernardine considers the role of the preacher in the divine plan of salvation. This has not been brought out in the only systematic treatment of Bernardine's theology of preaching which has so far appeared: F. Simoncioli, "La teologia della predicazione in S. Bernardino da Siena" in *Studi Francescani* 61 (1964), 275—299.

¹⁸ The part played by the preacher in communicating to men God's love through Christ in the Spirit is outlined in *Opera* III 20—29. It is inspired by the commentary of Matthias of Sweden on *Apoc.* 8, 3—5. The angel before the altar in heaven is identified as the risen and ascended Christ, the fire from the altar to be cast on the earth is the Spirit and the thunders and voices are the preachers of the word of God. For an earlier rendering of the same material cf. *Seraphim* IV¹ 3a—6b.

¹⁹ *Opera* III 20—23.

heaven in the sense that having undergone a cruel death for us, he confirms this self-offering in an outpouring of grace.²⁰

The gift of the Father's love for us is summed up for us in the Heart of Christ; and our response must be to embrace in a return of love God's own self-offering in Christ. God gives all in Christ and asks for our all in return: our spirit by love, our body by mortification and our possessions by detachment from the world. For it was in order to win the heart of man that Christ experienced all his mysteries: incarnation, birth, crucifixion, descent into hell, resurrection and ascent to the right hand of the Father.²¹

However, the gift of this divine love offered in Christ is obtained only by those who desire and pray for it (*Lk.* 11, 9). Such prayer must come from the whole body of the faithful, must be presented by Christ, the Mediator, to his Father in order to be acceptable to him.²² Prayers of ours are useless and without effect unless they are quickened by the fire of Christ's intercession. That is the reason why all the prayers of the Church are offered to God through Jesus Christ and why they are acceptable to the Father (cf. *Jn.* 16, 23). Before the altar in heaven, Christ presents the prayers of the "saints", and the prayers of sinners, such as they are, are not excluded from these;²³ included also in this concerted petition are the prayers of the just, of the blessed in heaven and, above all, the most efficacious prayers of the Mother of God.²⁴ These prayers, through the merits of Christ's Passion "which he bore in his own body upon the tree" (cf. 1 *Pet.* 2, 24), are acceptable to the heavenly Father; without Christ's intercession they avail nothing (cf. *Jn.* 15, 5) but only through his advocacy do they deserve to be heard. In himself, as he stands in the heavenly places, he is the propitiation for all sins, not only for ours but also for the sins of the whole world (1 *Jn.* 2, 1—2).

Christ's redemptive Passion was for the sake of the Church that he might sanctify her (*Eph.* 5, 25—26),²⁵ and therefore the propitiation which he offers to the Father is realised effectively in the Church by means of the mission of the Holy Spirit to the Church at Pentecost (*Acts* 2, 2). This historical mission is continued and confirmed each day

²⁰ *Ibid.* 22: "Venit namque iam per incarnationem, sed quotidie venit per internam inspirationem vel praedicationem; stetitque per acerbissimae mortis supportationem, necnon quotidie stat per gratiae confirmationem."

²¹ *Ibid.* 23.

²² *Ibid.* 24—26.

²³ *Ibid.* 24.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 25: applying 3 *Kgs.* 2, 20 to Mary, Bernardine says: "Propterea merito ei imputare possemus, si nollet eum placare nobis."

²⁵ *Opera* II 265.

as Christ renews the Church with Spiritual gifts enabling her to cope with every fresh onslaught of the demon. These gifts are that fire which Christ continues to cast on the earth, principally by enflaming the people and preachers with the fervour of ardent devotion and the ardour of zealous love. Despite our vices and corruption, Christ visits the Church unceasingly with his love and gives us to share in it according to his promise (cf. *Mt.* 28, 20).²⁶

What must be prayed for above all, by preacher and people together, on the occasion of the preaching of the word of God, is this living visitation of Christ by means of the Spirit who pours out into the hearts of the faithful the overflowing love of God (cf. *Rom.* 5, 5).²⁷

Such love as God pours out in the Spirit reaches into the hearts of sinners in three complementary ways. This complementarity follows from the various mutual relationships between the individual and God, between the members of the Christian community, and between the accredited preacher and the people.²⁸ God's approach to the sinner in these various ways underlines the fact that it is he who has the initiative in seeking to create in man a heart responsive to God's love.

Firstly, God speaks to the heart of the sinner by means of interior inspirations. As indicated by the words of the prophet (*Os.* 2, 14), he allures the heart of the sinner, leading him into the wilderness, into the solitude of the inner conscience, speaking in accents of reproof, promise, allurements, persuasion, chastisement. By means of this interior thrust of the spirit ("instinctu interiori spiritus") God seeks to humiliate the miserable self-sufficiency of the sinner. It is the Spirit of God who works in this way on man's spirit (cf. *Jn.* 16, 8, 13), convincing the world of sin, of justice and of judgment, i. e., causing shame for sins committed, inducing sorrow for the desertion of God's justice and inflicting fear of the future judgment.²⁹

Secondly, the same Spirit of God works in the heart of those Christians who live a life of justness and who, out of love for God and their brethren

²⁶ *Opera* III 26: Commenting on the same text of *Apoc.*, he says in *Opera* V 140: "Ex hoc altari crucis, et meritis eius, accepit angelus ignem, et in die Pentecostes implevit thuribulum, id est apostolorum coetum, atque misit in terram, quando in omnem terram exivit sonus eorum . . . scilicet praedicantium mysterium crucis Christi."

²⁷ Bernardine insisted constantly on this union of preacher and people in prayer so that preaching might be fruitful for salvation. Cf. *Opera* III 24.

²⁸ *Opera* VII 338. These "tria indicia divini amoris" are the various ways that God "chastises those whom he loves" (cf. *Apoc.* 3, 19), according to Bernardine.

²⁹ *Ibid.* 339.

in the Lord, seek to chastise and correct those who live in sin.³⁰ All Christians are brethren, with God as a Father who created them, Adam who generated them and Christ who redeemed them. Therefore the correction of which Christ spoke (cf. *Mt.* 18, 15) must be born of fraternal love. It is in such manner that God chastises in the Spirit those whom he loves.³¹

Thirdly, as a sign of his great mercy towards sinners, God sends preachers to his people. Such preachers, in the design of God, can be compared to the clouds spoken of in *Job* (37, 11—13) which “spread their light; which go about, whithersoever the will of him that governeth them shall lead them, to whatsoever he shall command them . . . in whatsoever place of his mercy he shall command them to be found.” Such preachers, publicly announcing the word of God, are in fact his messengers and must be listened to: it is not they who speak but the Spirit of the Father who speaks in them (*Mt.* 10, 20).³²

The love of God, therefore, seeking a response of love in the heart of man, is active in the word spoken in the inner heart; it disposes the sinner to fraternal correction and especially to the word of God spoken by the Spirit by means of accredited preachers. The interplay of the spoken word of the preacher and God’s inspiration in the heart is explained a little differently in another sermon.³³ When the word of God is fervently preached, the Uncreated Word assists or is with the preacher and, through his Spirit, effects in the heart all that the word of God is said to do. In other words, he guarantees the efficacy of the word by means of the Spirit who speaks in the preacher and who also can penetrate to the heart’s interior: “et ipse (sc. Spiritus) est qui incendit auditorum corda et urit.” The power of the word which is preached is hidden unless the Word enlightens from within, as Bernardine says in another sermon.³⁴

Preaching, therefore, shares in the loving mission of the Spirit whom Christ sent at Pentecost and continues to send daily into his body on earth, the Church. This gift of the Spirit, however, is effectively received

³⁰ *Opera* VI 326. Cf. also *Opera* IV 35 where he quotes the definition of Astesanus, *Summa* II tit. 67 par. 2: “correctio est admonitio fratris de emendatione peccatorum, ex fraterna caritate procedens.”

³¹ *Opera* VII 339.

³² *Ibid.* 339—340.

³³ *Opera* III 155.

³⁴ Referring to the illumination effected in the heart of man by the preaching of the Name of Jesus, he says (*Opera* II 116): “Dictionum connexio mihi ministratur exterius per sermonem: sed nisi Iesum docentem interius habeam, vocis occultam ignoro virtutem. Nam sicut scribitur Ioan. 1, 9, ipse est qui illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.”

by those only who desire and pray for it.³⁵ The role of the Spirit is the same whether he is considered as acting on man's heart or speaking through the preacher viz., the Spirit convinces sinners of their sins, of the loving and holy God whom they have deserted and of the fearful judgment to come. The preacher, in his turn, must show sinners "the ways of the Lord"; these are mercy and truth. Christ came on earth — and continues through the Spirit to do so — on a mission of mercy, to save that which was lost (cf. *Lk.* 19, 10). His return, however, at the judgment will be in truth (or justice). Both ways of the Lord must be preached harmoniously so that the thought of mercy might not lead to presumption nor the emphasis on justice lead to despair.³⁶

Contrition for sin, Bernardine states in another sermon,³⁷ is stimulated by the interplay of two spiritual forces; the hope of forgiveness because of God's mercy and the fear of God's justice which inevitably punishes the hard-hearted. Both are necessary for salvation: "*nec sperandum sine Dei timore nec timendum sine Domini spe.*" Experience, however, teaches that a false hope in God's mercy predominates in many people who are not willing to change their ways; in this way, they do not reckon with God's justice. They should recall the words of the angel in the *Apocalypse* (14, 7): "Fear God" and those other salutary words (*Hebr.* 10, 31): "It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God."

A preacher, therefore, will not convert sinners unless he gives the correct emphasis to each of three aspects of God's relation to the sinner: God's mercy as manifested principally in Christ, the miserable state of the sinner and the dire judgment awaiting those who refuse to accept God's word of love.³⁸ The Lord stands at the door and knocks (*Apoc.* 3, 20). If he is received with humility there follows a feast of grace and glory, while if he is obstinately resisted — even in the person of his preachers — the sinner will reap the eternal consequences of his own self-sufficiency.³⁹

In the person of the preacher the Lord comes and knocks. The holy Spirit, sent by Christ, is God's gift to all in the Church, to inspire the people with an interior longing for conversion and the preachers, duly accredited,⁴⁰ with the true and efficacious word of salvation. If the word of the preacher is accepted and obeyed, the Lord will liberate his people from their enemies — demons, sins and evil men — according to

³⁵ *Opera* III 26.

³⁷ *Opera* I 134.

³⁹ *Opera* I 167.

³⁸ *Opera* VII 456.

³⁸ *Opera* III 27—29.

⁴⁰ *Sabatelli* 42.

his promise of old (Ps. 80, 14—15): "If my people had heard me: if Israel had walked in my ways, I should have humbled their enemies."⁴¹ The reason for this is that the word of God, spoken by duly appointed preachers who are consequently sent by God, is truly an efficacious word which effects what it announces — if received with an open heart.

2. The Efficacious Word of God

The eternal Gospel, which was the burden of Bernardine's message, was the "word of God" i. e., God was the principal subject or source of this word when the preacher was faithful to his calling. He arrived at this affirmation from a realistic interpretation of several Scriptural texts, as has been the case with Christian preachers in other ages.⁴² Bernardine did not hesitate to say that the word of God was efficacious for salvation simply because God spoke through the mouth of the accredited preacher.

Explaining the words of the Gospel (Mt. 4, 4): "Not on bread alone . . .", Bernardine says that a man lives on the word of God as he hears it from the preacher. It is God himself who utters his word by means of the preacher; therefore, if a man wishes to live, let him frequently hear the word preached.⁴³ The words of the preacher are not merely human words for he speaks "in persona di Dio" i. e., the Holy Spirit speaks through him. The promise of Christ to those who will bear witness to him (Mt. 10, 20) is fulfilled also in preachers: "It is not you who speak but the Holy Spirit speaks in you."⁴⁴ Just like the Apostles at Pentecost (cf. Acts 2, 4) and in line with them, preachers proclaim the message "as the Holy Spirit gives them to speak." In fact, the Spirit himself speaks through them "velut in organis." Just as the musical instrument gives a melody only at the musician's touch, even so the good word spoken by the preacher has its source in the will of the Father whose Spirit inspires him. The sweetness which is experienced in the

⁴¹ *Opera* VII 340.

⁴² On this point, cf. D. Grasso, *L'Annuncio della Salvezza* (Naples, 1965), 68, 77, 80.

⁴³ *Sabatelli* 68: "non vive l'uomo pure solo di pane, ma vive della parola di Dio, la quale è detta da chi dice [= predica]. Ogni volta che si dice la parola di Dio, è detta per bocca di Dio." Cf. *Seraphim* IV¹ 25a: "... praedicator non ex ore proprio, sed ex ore Dei loquitur." In *Opera* VII 458 he says: "... si devote et humiliter auditur, numquam sine fructu verbi Dei veritas ad Deum humiliter auditur, numquam sine fructu verbi Dei veritas ad Deum redit. Proinde Is. 55 cap., 11, Dominus ait: "Verbum meum quod egredietur de ore meo, id est de ore praedicatoris qui est os Patris, per quem annuntiat populis veritatem Filii sui . . ."

⁴⁴ *Banchi* I 107.

coming of the Spirit is communicated to the people by the preacher just as it was by the Apostles. Not only does the Spirit move the heart, he also enlightens the preacher so that he understands what should be preached and how it should be properly transmitted.⁴⁵

God says to preachers as he said to Moses (*Exod.* 4, 12): "I will be in your mouth and will teach you what you should say,"⁴⁶ just as Christ extends to preachers what he said to his disciples as he sent them out to preach: "he who hears you hears me and he who despises you despises me."⁴⁷

As the word of Christ raised the son of the widow and Lazarus also to life (cf. *Lk.* 7, 14; *Jn.* 11, 43—44) so does the word of the preacher raise to life sinners who are dead in sin. This is because the "vox Filii Dei" of the Gospel has become the "verbum Dei" of the preacher. When the soul, dead in sin, is raised to life by the divine word there is evidence of truth, charity and power in action. One could attribute this three-fold concerted influence to the action of the Holy Trinity who act as one on the faculties of the soul in order to raise it to life.⁴⁸

Precisely because of the dynamic presence of God in it, the word which is preached is a vehicle of life and salvation (cf. *Rom.* 1, 16).⁴⁹ Christ is the light of the world, the light which gives life to the world. As Christ, the "sol iustitiae," gives light, warmth and vigour and thus life, so does the word of the preacher;⁵⁰ but the life given by the word is the divine life of charity. We are born of an incorruptible seed by the word of God (cf. 1 *Pet.* 1, 23); we live by this same word which is spirit and life (cf. *Jn.* 6, 64); as the dew and soft showers fructify the fruits of the earth (cf. *Is.* 55, 11), so also does the word of God invigorate and fructify our growth in charity.⁵¹ In short, without the word of God, there is no sharing in the divine life of charity. As Rabanus Maurus said: "the man who does not feed on the word of God does not live; as the body cannot live without earthly food, so neither can the soul without the divine word."⁵²

This light which is the life of the soul and which is given by the preacher's word is faith that lives by charity. There is no faith if the word is not preached; St. Paul's words to the Romans (10, 9—17) are proof

⁴⁵ *Opera* VI 221.

⁴⁶ *Opera* VII 339.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 341.

⁴⁸ *Opera* III 152.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 15.

⁵⁰ *Opera* VIII 217; *Sabatelli* 48.

⁵¹ *Opera* III 147.

⁵² *Sabatelli* 68; *Opera* III 147 citing Rabanus Maurus, *Comm. in Matth.* I c. 4 (*PL* 107, 782). *Seraphim* IV¹ 22b: "Ita si verbum Dei deficeret, quod est sol animae . . . omnes spiritualiter morerentur . . ."

enough for us of that.⁵³ The principal and primary task given by Christ to the Apostles when he sent them on their world-wide mission was to preach the Gospel; based on this and secondary to it is the celebration of the sacraments. It is only the man who has heard and responded to the living word who comes into contact with the reality of the Mass and the sacraments.⁵⁴ By means of faith which accepts and welcomes the external word ("nell'orecchia"), the word of God passes to the interior of the heart and there Jesus resides within.⁵⁵

Such a life-giving contact with Christ in the interior beings depends on how the hearer responds to the call of God which is transmitted by the preacher. God's presence and power in the word are addressed to the free will of the hearer by means of his intelligence. If truly accepted, the response must be: "Lord what will you have me do?" (*Acts* 9, 6). In this instant, born of God's gracious call and the hearer's free response, he who was dead comes to life in the grace of God.⁵⁶ This commerce between the gracious and loving God and the sinful hearer is the kernel of that contact which takes place through the word which is preached.⁵⁷ What is offered to the hearer, at the heart of the message, is new life — that life to which God raised Jesus in his resurrection.⁵⁸ If one firmly believes this message of life in and through the risen Jesus and confesses it in word, resolving to renounce in act all that is incompatible with it, such a person already lives with this new life. It is this faith which is the root and beginning of salvation.⁵⁹

By means of such faith, the hearer is instantly purified of his sins. There is no better way to become contrite for one's sins than to hear the word of God with devotion, says Bernardine. The word purifies and changes the sinful heart and because of its immediate contact with mind and will, is more efficacious than the Body of Christ received at Mass, which of itself purifies only from venial sins. Preaching may be lower

⁵³ *Opera* III 189; *Sabatelli* 50—51.

⁵⁴ *Sabatelli* 53: "che credaresti tu del santo Sacramento dello altare, se non fosse la predicazione che tu hai udita? Tu avaresti la fede solo de la predicazione."

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 50.

⁵⁶ *Opera* III 152—153.

⁵⁷ This commerce between God's all-embracing love and the nothingness of the sinner (for his only "possessions" are his sins) is portrayed with an imagery suitable to the commercial mentality of the times in *Opera* III 87—99: "De mercantia divini amoris."

⁵⁸ *Sabatelli* 50.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 67: "E in questo modo, stando a udire, tu ti mondi de' peccati tuoi, e così amendandoti, tu vieni a riscaldare nel calore di Dio; è così facendo non fai vana la parola di Dio, la quale parola è vita dello spirito nostro; che talvolta una parola che tu oda, ti puo dare precipio alla tua salute."

in dignity than the sacrament of the Lord's Body but for those who heed the word, its efficacy is grater because it chastises them and causes the remission of their sins.⁶⁰ From the point of view of conversion of heart, preaching is more necessary than the celebration of Mass. This was all the more true in Bernardine's day when the Mass had largely become a clerical preserve,⁶¹ and an unknown language made no mental impact on a people immersed in and preoccupied with worldly affairs. A break-through to their inner selves was more effectifely accomplished by the good preacher who "intimidates with words about God's punishments, enlightens with explanations of the Scriptures and softens the heart with encouragements."⁶²

The word of God, then, which speaks of Christ, is like a flame of fire which penetrates the mind and heart; it burns and consumes all sins and leaves in the heart a fiery love for God and for one's neighbour.⁶³ The same word communicates faith and love because it is centred on the tremendous reality of God's love for men in Christ. When the heart responds in love, faith comes to its fullness of expression.

The word of God is addressed not only to man's intelligence. At one and the same time, the saving presence of God in the word of the good preacher is light for the mind, warmth for the heart and strength for decisive action — if only the heart of man is properly disposed.⁶⁴

It is light for the mind in so far as it points out to him the ways of truth which lead to salvation. It speaks of truth incarnate enlightening the mind as to the radical difference between good and evil, virtue and vice. The word of God is compared to a sword of the Spirit (cf. *Eph.* 6, 17) because it is made by the Spirit of God.⁶⁵ It is so penetrating that it can divide a man from his sins⁶⁶ because, sharper than any two-edged sword (cf. *Hebr.* 4, 12—13), it distinguishes what is of the spirit and what of the flesh in man, penetrating to the marrow of his being and provoking

⁶⁰ *Opera* III 188—189. Bernardine quotes here a commentary by Archidiaconus (Guido de Baisio), *Rosarium Decreti* (Venice, 1601) on a text attributed to St. Augustine in the *Decretum* but which in fact was written by Caesarius of Arles (*PL* 39, 2319). Cf. D. Grasso, *op. cit.*, 136, n. 7.

⁶¹ For the relation between liturgy and personal piety at this period cf. F. Vandenbroucke, "Liturgie et piété personnelle: les prodromes de leur tension à la fin du Moyen âge" in *La Maison Dieu* 69 (1962), 56—66.

⁶² *Opera* III 190.

⁶³ *Sabatelli* 74.

⁶⁴ Cf. *Opera* III 148—155, 186—188; VII 457—461; *Seraphim* IV¹ 22a—24b; *Sabatelli* 49—81.

⁶⁵ *Opera* VII 459.

⁶⁶ *Sabatelli* 63: "più divide la parola di Dio il peccato dell' uomo, che non fa il coltello ne le battaglie l'uno membro dell'altro."

him to a decision.⁶⁷ It is like a "mirror of the soul" as it reveals a man to himself in his innermost thoughts and intentions. Because it is the "sermo Dei, vivus et efficax" in which God reveals himself, man can see himself and his sinful life standing out against it in so far as he yields to all that is not of God in the three "mundana vitia" which characterise the world as it sets itself up against God: pride, lust and avarice.⁶⁸

Such light from the word of God comes from persevering study and attention or it can be infused by God through the grace of Christ into a humble heart which perseveres in the search for the message of salvation. For this superior illumination, one must be convinced of one's inability to know anything so that God can come with his daylight brightness to enlighten the evening half-light provided by study of God's word.⁶⁹

Not only is the word light for the mind, it is also warmth for the heart.⁷⁰ As fire penetrates metal, assimilating it and transforming it, so does the word of God when it penetrates and possesses ("invadens") the open heart; it expels the coldness of malice with a certain God-given violence and transforms the heart into a furnace of charity.⁷¹ The deathly coldness of a sinner's heart is warmed to life at the word of Christ, as happened with those who were raised to life at his word (cf. *Lk.* 7, 14; *Jn.* 11, 43—44).⁷² By raising his voice, Christ wished to point out the necessity of hearing his word in order to come to life from the death of sin. The word of Christ heard in preaching is not comparable to mere natural rhetoric or eloquence but it is a contagious divine warmth which is vivifying of itself. It can make both the body and the soul come to life⁷³ and for that reason the prophet Isaias says to preachers (cf. *Is.* 58, 1): "Cry, cease not, lift up thy voice like a trumpet and shew my people their wicked doings." The hearer can thus be cleansed of his sins in the instant of hearing as he purposes to change his ways; he thus allows the word to fulfill its God-given mission, that is, to be the life of our spirit.⁷⁴

Accepted as the life of the spirit, the word nourishes as food, it delights and consoles (cf. *Ps.* 118, 103; *Cant.* 5, 6) as it did for Mary when she sat at the feet of Jesus (*Lk.* 10, 39), and it enflames the heart with divine love as the disciples' experience on the road to Emmaus clearly shows (cf. *Lk.* 24, 13—35).

⁶⁷ *Opera* VII 459.

⁶⁸ *Opera* III 149; *Seraphim* IV¹ 23a.

⁶⁹ *Opera* III 151—152.

⁷⁰ Cf. *Opera* III 152—155, 187; VII 459—460; *Sabatelli* 64—69.

⁷¹ *Opera* III 155, 187; *Sabatelli* 74.

⁷² *Opera* III 152.

⁷³ *Sabatelli* 66.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* 67.

Finally, the power and vigour of the word project the hearer towards a new type of existence which is the fruit of that seed implanted in the heart.⁷⁵ This power is first of all a force which is instrumental in effecting a radical change of heart for there is no heart so hard that it cannot be softened by the word of God unlesse it be one that resists with stubborn perversity.⁷⁶ The word is then a defence against all the dangers of this world; against the multiple attacks of the devil (cf. *Ps.* 90, 5—7) who uses strife, tribulations and the manifold and insidious involvements in the opposing factions; against the evil forces of the world with its wars and calamities, because God protects a people who turn to him and crushes their enemies (cf. *Ps.* 80, 14—15);⁷⁷ against the infirmities of the flesh with its pestilences and misery because, as the word causes repentance, it removes the reason for these sufferings (cf. *Wisd.* 16, 12).

There is further evidence of the vigour of the word in its manifold fruitfulness; being a divine seed it confers the grace of salvation which leads gradually to the glory of heaven (cf. *James* 1, 21). This elevation of man's existence to a new level is due to the „ingrafted“ word in his heart which yields fruit commensurate with its divine origin, unlike any fruit that man's own corrupted nature could produce without it.⁷⁸ Such abundant fruit will be either a hundredfold, sixty or thirty according to the degree of its acceptance; virgins, therefore should produce a hundredfold, widows sixty and married people thirty.⁷⁹ This „semen spirituale“ is implanted and must be nurtured in the heart so as to lead to eternal life, gradually bearing fruits of ever greater perfection; in such manner does one „keep the words“ of the Lord (cf. *Jn.* 8, 51).

The announcement of the word is already a judgment on the hearers. If it is accepted and adhered to, one already shares in eternal life while if it is rejected, the hearer places himself already in the state of eternal damnation.⁸⁰ The hearer shows whether he is of God or of the devil in his attitude to the word of God (cf. *Jn.* 8, 44. 47) for he is provoked by the word to decide for God or against him. Thus it is always a „verbum efficax“ (*Hebr.* 4, 12) for one cannot remain indifferent to the word

⁷⁵ Cf. *Opera* III 155—158; VII 460; *Sabatelli* 74—81.

⁷⁶ *Opera* III 156. Here Bernardine cites the *Vita Patrum* (PL 73, 983): „Quid durius lapide? quid mollius aqua? Et tamen gutta saepe cadendo lapidem cavat. Sic verbum Dei cor durum aperit ad timorem et amorem Dei.”

⁷⁷ *Opera* III 156; VII 460: „Experientia namque certa didici populos tantum a Domino flagellari quantum rebelles inveniuntur in verbo Dei” (III 156).

⁷⁸ *Opera* VI 318.

⁷⁹ *Opera* III 157. Cf. also *Opera* II 434 ff.

⁸⁰ Cf. *Sabatelli* 80—81.

which is heard. To neglect hearing the word when that is possible is thought by Bernardine to be seriously sinful.⁸¹

When Bernardine considers the power of salvation contained in the announcement of the word, he asserts, "salvo iudicio meliori," that the Christian people are as obliged to hear the word on Sundays and feast-days as they are to attend Mass. There is no better way to fulfill that innate desire for eternal life implanted in every man, nor is there a more suitable way to repent of one's sins than by hearing the word. The obligation to hear Mass in any event includes the obligation to hear the word of preaching, for those with the care of souls should also see to it that the people have the word explained to them. If there is no sermon during Mass, the people are still obliged, according to their possibilities, to hear the word elsewhere.⁸² Such is the nature and the value of the word of God when it is preached in the Church.

3. *The Preacher of the Word*

The efficacy of preaching depends on the nature of the word of God as it is transmitted by the preacher. The preacher does not engage in some natural activity with certain supernatural effects but rather shares in the mission of the Holy Spirit who is sent by Christ and the Father into the Church to kindle in it the fire of divine love. The Spirit is that fire sent down by Christ, the fire he willed to cast on the earth. The preacher of the word is inspired by that same Spirit who is also the principal author of the Scriptures, so that the preacher's words, when accepted in faith, are like divine fire which consumes sins and kindles in the heart a glowing charity for God and neighbour.

The preacher, however, can fulfill this dynamic rôle only if he has himself listened to and lives by the word of God. His tongue must be at one with his heart. The word of God in his mouth will be a life-giving force only if his heart is warmed by the same word so that the tongue, "rooted in the heart" as Bernardine says, speaks from the fullness of the

⁸¹ *Opera* III 188. This Bernardine proves from an assertion in the sermon of Caesarius of Arles to which we have referred. "Quia non minus reus erit qui verbum Dei negligenter audierit, quam ille qui Corpus Christi sua negligentia in terram cadere permisserit." In *Sabatelli* 68 he adds: "... e questo si è peccato mortale, potendo udire e non volendo udire." In *Seraphim* IV¹ 26ab he says: "Unde corpus Christi est verbum Dei, et praedicatio est verbum Dei vestitum voce."

⁸² *Ibid.* 188—189. That there was little preaching during Mass is pointed out by Bernardine's phrase: "infra Missam curati antiquitus praedicabant." He also adds that if a sinner does not try to express sorrow for his mortal sins on a Sunday or holy day he violates the holiness of the day and adds to his mortal guilt.

heart.⁸³ Although he recognises that a preacher must have authority to preach,⁸⁴ what he needs most of all, according to Bernardine, is a personal assimilation of and even identification with that word of God which he intends to preach.⁸⁵

Such profound contact with the word can only be effected by and in the Holy Spirit. Since he it was who inspired the Scriptures (2 *Pet.* 1, 21) only he can inspire a true understanding of them. Anyone who seeks to understand them without the help of the Spirit is working in vain and his teaching will be neither good nor solid: the same Spirit who inspired the writer must inspire the reader.⁸⁶

The true understanding of the Scriptures is based first of all on a deep distrust of self and of one's own talents. The more humble a man is and empty of selfishness, the more enlightenment and grace he receives from God. His confidence must not be in himself but uniquely in Christ, for he is the Angel who gives the book to the prophet "to devour" (cf. *Apoc.* 10, 10). Only in this dialectic of distrust in self and complete trust in Christ is the preacher capable of receiving all that God wishes to give him in Christ. To receive this gift of illumination his confidence must be expressed by means of fervent prayer. Then the assimilation of the Scriptures — "swallowing the book" — is God's unfailing answer to the asking and the knocking of humble prayer (cf. *Lk.* 11, 9). It must be remembered that the presence of God in the Scriptures is hidden to a certain extent. The letter of the word contains him like a prison-house and if one is to visit him within, it can be done only through fervent prayer.⁸⁷

This hidden presence of God in the Scriptures is further developed by Bernardine in one of his two autographed letters.⁸⁸ God is secretly

⁸³ *Ibid.* 154.

⁸⁴ *Sabatelli* 42: "dico che colui che dice, si conviene che abbi l'offizio del potere o dovere dire."

⁸⁵ Cf. *Opera* VIII 11—14. Bernardine's portrait of the preacher is derived from Mathias of Sweden's commentary on *Apoc.* 10, 8—10. It is worth emphasising that the angel who gives the open book to the prophet to eat appears after the sounding of the sixth trumpet. The message of the prophet — or the preacher — has, therefore, peculiar relevance to the sixth age in the history of the Church.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* 12.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* 13. "Hic nota quomodo verbum Dei, cum oratione ordinatum, est quasi Deus incarceratus, ad quem, orando et dicendo, debemus pro visitando accedere. Ideo incarceratum dicitur quia *non omnes capiunt illud*" (cf. *Mt.* 10, 11).

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* 321—323. The letter is addressed to Suor Nicolina, Augustinian Abbess of St. Martha's convent at Siena. Bernardine protests that the profound and reverent attitude he counsels the nuns — only at their request — is not practised to the full by the writer. However, what his charity advises them is desired fervently for himself: "mentre che consiglarò voi, predicarò ad me."

present in the words of Scripture and of the Divine Office: they are like a prison-house in which he encloses himself in his goodness and for our benefit so that we might have him close by in order to converse with him. His presence there is somewhat like the presence of the soul in the human body.⁸⁹ This divine presence is explained by the Holy Spirit's inspiration and the Gospel words spoken by the Word in person who is "sommo sapore et sapienza." Consequently, such words, holding the divine presence, should be read in a spirit of devout, attentive and humble prayer so that God, by opening the understanding to their true meaning, might place them in the heart and thus give the supernatural taste of himself.

Such an experience of God given in prayerful consideration of God's word in the Scriptures is a free gift from "the Father of lights" (*James* 1, 17) and should be shared with others with the same spirit of largesse so that others might come to love the things of God.⁹⁰ For this reason, the preacher must prostrate himself in adoration at the feet of Christ out of a profound sense of gratitude.⁹¹

This divinely and freely given enlightenment is destined for "many nations and peoples" (cf. *Apoc.* 10, 11) but it can be truly communicated only after the preacher has assimilated the message by eager and continuous reflexion. The book must be swallowed but, like food, it must be retained and digested before it nourishes the spirit. This calls for lengthy rumination on the word of God. To be an efficient dispenser of the spiritually nourishing word, a preacher must be already caught up with and held by the delights of its promises and likewise deeply moved by the bitterness of the punishments, temporal and eternal, threatened on those who reject it.

Such a balanced experience and appreciation of God's revelation guarantees the efficacy of the preacher's message, for the pleasant and unpleasant truths are integral parts or the one truth. A preacher's denunciation of vice is not arbitrary or pharisaical but springs from the bitterness he experiences personally when he reflects on the eternal misery to which rejection of the word condemns the sinner. The integral message of salvation with its promises of fulfillment or damnation must be communicated by the preacher to his hearers and suitably

⁸⁹ In *Seraphim* IV¹ 26ab he says: "Unde corpus Christi est verbum Dei. Et praedicatio est verbum Dei vestitum voce."

⁹⁰ *Opera* VI 337: "Et quae gratis acceperunt, gratis refundant; tradant hominibus quae illis tradidit Deus, eoque fine quo acceperunt diffundant . . ."

⁹¹ *Opera* VIII 13.

adapted to their capacity.⁹² Neither fear nor false humility should deter him from confronting his hearers with their sins.⁹³ He should be encouraged by Paul's words to Timothy (2 *Tim.* 4, 2) and remember the words of God to the prophet for the sinful people of God (*Is.* 58, 1—2): "Cry, cease not, lift up thy voice like a trumpet, and show my people their wicked doings . . . For they seek me . . . as a nation that hath done justice and hath not forsaken the judgment of their God . . ." ⁹⁴

The task of the preacher is "to prophesy to many nations" in order to renew the life of the Gospel among the Christian people. The only way to achieve this is to follow Christ's words to Peter (*Lk.* 5, 4): "Launch out into the deep and let down your nets for a draught." For the preacher, this primarily means that he must embark on the depths of a life of holiness so as to be a competent fisher of men. His life, therefore, must be, like that of the Apostles, a following of Jesus because only he can make out of poor human material true fishers of men (cf. *Mt.* 4, 19—20).⁹⁵ Secondly, the preacher "must let down his nets" by way of a clear presentation of the doctrine of the Church explained by the living tradition of the holy doctors and teachers.⁹⁶ The message must be thoroughly prepared and suitably adapted to his hearers⁹⁷ because unless they can grasp what is preached they are not caught themselves by the word.⁹⁸ Thirdly, because the preacher is performing a God-given task his intention must always be to do the will of God; his only intention in letting out the nets of the divine Fisherman must be the honour of God and the salvation of men and never for applause or earthly gain.⁹⁹

The preacher, then, is a man who speaks the word of God from a heart full of this same word. He is enlightened by the Holy Spirit because of his humility and prayer. He preaches the word with clarity and precision according to the tradition of the Church and with her authorisation,

⁹² *Ibid.* 14.

⁹³ Cf. *Opera* VII 455—456; VIII 20.

⁹⁴ *Opera* VIII 16.

⁹⁵ *Sabatelli* 46: "Fa' che tu vada dietro a Cristo, tu che vuoi essere predicatore." Cf. also *Opera* IV 335; VIII 195.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* 47.

⁹⁷ *Opera* IV 118. Quoting from the *Decretum* c. 12, he says: "Oportet eum qui docet et instruit animas rudes esse talem, ut pro ingenio discentium semetipsum possit aptare et verbi ordinem pro audientium capacitate dirigere." This explains to some extent the difference between the sober Latin sermons of Bernardine and the more adventurous and imaginative renderings of the *reportata*.

⁹⁸ *Opera* VI 318: "Verbum quippe Dei hamo simillimum est, qui tantum dum capitur, capit." Cf. also his emphasis on clarity, "chiarozzo, chiarozzo," in *Sabatelli* 43—45.

⁹⁹ *Sabatelli* 47.

trying all the while to live this word himself by following closely after Christ. His only intention in preaching to others is to further the glory of God and the salvation of men. Such is the heart and the goal of every renewal of the Gospel-life.

What if the preacher himself is not a living witness to that faith, hope and love which are the life of the Church? Is God's word robbed of its efficacy by the unworthy life of its herald? Bernardine answers this practical difficulty by saying that the preaching of such a man is not as effective for his hearers as it might be. The Holy Spirit, however, is not denied some effect on the hearers. Such an unworthy preacher could be compared to the Church bell that summons the people to hear the sermon; they benefit by it but the bell does not. The good done to his hearers by such a preacher is not due to him but to the power of the Holy Spirit who is, as it were, the bell-ringer. If the preacher does not live in charity, his own words condemn him (cf. *Lk.* 19, 22).¹⁰⁰ The Spirit, in this case, works for the good of the hearers depending on their dispositions towards what is said, overlooking the scandal of him who says it. Even one word, Bernardine insists, can be the beginning of salvation when it is received into the well-disposed heart, no matter how sinful. These dispositions which constitute the fertile soil for the seed of the word will be the subject of our next paragraph.

4. *The Hearer of the Word*

The efficacious and salvation-bearing word of God as preached in the Church cannot achieve its purpose unless the sinner shows himself disposed to hear it. The initiative of God in sending preachers to bring the word of salvation to cities and peoples must encounter a certain good-will and desire for conversion on the part of sinners. It is true that God does not depend on preaching alone in order to touch the heart of the sinner. However, the interior urgings of God's spirit in the heart — chastising, reproving, attracting, encouraging the sinful heart — are, as it were, a preparation of the soil before the preacher sows there the seed of God's public word of salvation. It is the voice of Christ, re-echoed in the words of the preacher, which raises the dead to life and in order to hear this voice, the sinner must place himself in the ambience of its utterance. Faith, which is generated and comes to life most frequently by means of

¹⁰⁰ *Opera* III 31. In *Opera* IV 54—55, following an anonymous commentary *Super Lucam* (which he erroneously attributed to Alexander of Hales), Bernardine says that the man who preaches in mortal sin and does not seek compunction and sorrow from what he preaches, sins again out of contempt, whether his former sin was hidden or notorious.

preaching,¹⁰¹ depends on the hearer's freedom which responds to the gift of God. God is lavish in his gifts but faith requires a heart which is rightly disposed in humble prayer (cf. *Mt.* 7, 7; *Lk.* 11, 9; *Mk.* 9, 23; *Eph.* 2, 8; 1 *In.* 5, 20) and simple trust (*Wisd.* 5, 1).¹⁰² Because the Lord wishes the salvation of the sinner, he can say (*Jer.* 5, 1): "seek . . . if you can find a man that executeth judgment and seeketh faith; and I will be near to him."¹⁰³

Whoever seeks this living faith will, therefore, hear the word of God with care, devotion, vigilance and perseverance.¹⁰⁴ This means that he must open the windows of the soul to the light from above as evidence that he is disposed, at least in desire, to do what God's word demands of him.¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, a strong attachment to an immoral life is an obstacle to the infiltration of this light: the body of sin comes between the sinner and the sun of divine life.¹⁰⁶ The heart is thus left unchanged in its indisposition towards the word and its minister. Strong attachment to the "three vices of this world," lust, avarice and pride, constitutes the unsuitable ground spoken of in the parable of the sower.¹⁰⁷ That the efficacious word of God does not bear fruit in some people is due to the fact that the dispositions of their hearts are ill-suited to the reception and growth of the spiritual seed. Freedom of choice in these people is intent only on that selfishness which surrounds itself with the passing goods of pleasures, riches and honours and turned away from the lasting and immutable good which is God himself in whom only they should believe, hope and love.¹⁰⁸ These people, basically, have the wrong attitude towards God's word of conversion and salvation. They do not listen to it so that they might be converted because they cannot bear such a radical change in their lives. To them one could apply the words of the Psalmist (35, 4): "he would not understand that he might do well." Since they are self-centred, these people seek in the word of God only what suits themselves.

¹⁰¹ *Opera* I 338: "Infunditur autem [sc. fides] saepius mediante auditu divini verbi, sicut ad Rom. 10, 17. Apostolus ait: *Fides* . . ."

¹⁰² *Ibid.* 337. Much of Bernardine's treatment of faith comes from William of Auvergne, *De fide* (*Opera* I, Venice, 1591).

¹⁰³ Bernardine's scriptural reference has: "propinquus ero ei."

¹⁰⁴ *Opera* I 338: "Sollicite ergo ac devote ac vigilanter ac perseveranter audiendum est verbum Dei quia facile per illud anima radiosam consequitur fidem." Cf. also *Opera* III 157.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* 337.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* 339.

¹⁰⁷ *Opera* VIII 14—22, 196: "Haec tamen diversitas non est ex defectu seminis, sed ex varia auditorum dispositione . . ."

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.* 14.

Those whose hearts are set on the pleasures of this life, particularly on the pleasures "of the flesh," render themselves inept for the full message of the word of God.¹⁰⁹ The word is not uttered in order to satisfy a worldly curiosity interested in poetry or philosophy or idle subtleties impervious to clear statement. Nor should it deal only with the pleasant aspects of revealed truth, with contemplation, the virtues and heavenly things. It should also include the uncovering of sins and God's punishments because its purpose is the welfare of the many, namely, in order to save them (cf. *1 Cor.* 10, 33). Those who are soft and pleasure-seeking cannot bear the word of the preacher who rebukes them for their sins, for example in the use of marriage. There is no clearer indication of the hearer's dispositions than in his reaction to the preacher's condemnation of sins of the flesh. The pleasure-loving hearer seeks the ornate and the grandiloquent in the preacher and when he does not find it he rejects the word of salvation. He is not truly hungry for the bread of God's word.

The proud heart which is intent only on honours and self-aggrandisement is hard like the stony ground of the parable.¹¹⁰ This is the hardening of selfishness and obstinacy which proves impenetrable to the reproofs and blandishments of the preacher. The proud are puffed up and have little respect for the message of the Scriptures and less for the preacher should he show any defects in his utterance. They forget that the preacher of the Gospel represents Christ who sent him (cf. *Lk.* 10, 6). If he is despised, Christ is despised. Whatever his defects, the power of God can work through him for the good of the hearer.¹¹¹ When the inner face of the proud man is so puffed up with self-sufficiency, he cannot see the truth any more¹¹² nor can he admit that the preacher is sent to help him. On the contrary, he is like the madman who attacks the doctor in the very act of curing him. Being full of himself and satisfied with his sinful life, he seeks only to magnify the sins of others in order to protect himself against the recriminations of the preacher.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* 14—18.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* 18—20.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* 19. Here Bernardine quotes from the *Decretum* c. 6 in *Glossa Gratiani* (ed. Friedberg) I 294: "Sicut enim lixivina per cinerem humidum fluens lavat et non lavatur, ita bona doctrina per malum doctorem lavat a sorde peccatorum."

¹¹² *Ibid.* 19. In *Opera* I 340 he says: "Haec superbia interioris faciei quidam tumor et inflatio est. Unde Augustinus, VII *Confessionum* [c. 7, n. 11 *PL* 32, 740] de seipso ait: Tumore meo separabar a te, et nimis inflata facies claudebat oculos meos."

¹¹³ Thus many avoid the demands of conversion by pointing out the sins of the clergy. In *Opera* I 252—255 Bernardine shows why the clergy should not be reprimanded publicly for their sins.

The heart of the man who desires only riches is like the thorny ground of the parable.¹¹⁴ He is so preoccupied with money-making that he neglects the word of God, either by not coming to hear it or not listening attentively to it or by not persevering in attendance. He is more concerned about the outer crust of the message and not intent enough on the inner moral meaning in which salvation lies. Being caught up in his dishonestly-acquired riches he is afraid to allow the word to come between him and them. In contrast to the man who is detached from the goods of this world and who finds great satisfaction in the word of God, the rich man finds it intolerably insipid and bitter. The purse-proud are only too inclined to condone their own selfishness by referring the vices they hear denounced to some other person or class. The laity among them will think only of the vices of the clergy and remember nothing else from the sermon than the condemnation of the latter — if the preacher is imprudent enough to condemn them. The clergy on the other hand never think that the general denunciation of the sins of the rich has anything to do with themselves. The avaricious are full of solicitude for the passing riches of this world and thus, like soil full of briars and thorns, suffocate the seed of a proper understanding of God's word.

On the other hand, the seed of the word falls on good ground and yields its fruits when the hearer comes to listen to it with the honest purpose of fulfilling in deed what the word demands of him. This is to hear truly the word of God.¹¹⁵ Whereas the hearers who are not disposed to hear the word allow their sinful lives to stand between them and its luminous rays, the true hearer of the word, though a sinner, comes to hear it with the desire to amend and live according to its demands. He listens with humility and attention, retains the word in his heart and seeks to put it into effect. Such a conversion may be achieved by means of one word from the preacher or may be the gradual and cumulative effect of persevering attendance at a whole course of sermons.¹¹⁶

The sinner who willingly hears the word of God gives one of the clearest indications that he is of God and that he wishes to be saved from his sins. "He who is of God, hears the word of God" (*Jn.* 8, 47). This demands in practice that he come in time for the sermon and remain

¹¹⁴ *Opera* VIII 20—22.

¹¹⁵ *Banchi* I 98: "l'uno è udire coll'orechia, l'altro è coll'effetto di volere operare . . ." As the third sermon of the Sienese course of 1427 deals with the nature of the word of God, the fourth deals with the correct attitude of the hearer which guarantees its efficacy. Bernardine treats of the same topic in similar terms in *Seraphim* IV¹ 26a—28a.

¹¹⁶ *Banchi* I 109, III.

until it is finished.¹¹⁷ Neither does he come with a vacant mind but rather with a consciousness of his own sinful condition. He knows his sinful ways and prays for the light and grace to amend. God will thus enlighten the preacher to speak even one word which would bring the sinner to repentance.¹¹⁸

Because such a sinner comes to the sermon with the purpose of seeking salvation, when he is in the presence of the preacher he listens attentively and with humility. Like the widow spoken of in 4 Kgs. 4, he offers the empty vessel of a humble mind and it is filled by the preacher with the abundant oil of God's grace. Such humble attention on the part of the hearer ensures that he remain completely absorbed in the word even though he should have heard such a sermon before. A new and fuller understanding will not be denied to the humble man. As well as being humble, he must also show forth that meekness spoken of by the Apostle (*James* I, 17) to ensure that the ingrafted word may inhere in his heart.¹¹⁹ If his heart is not softened by the goodwill and meekness which gladly accepts the charitable admonitions of the preacher, he is not prepared for that good seed which yields the fruits of repentance. The preacher, if he is true to his calling, has often to chastise his hearers for their sins — admonishing them "to live as persons and not as beasts"¹²⁰ — but when this is accepted with gladness, because it is motivated by concern for the salvation of the sinner, then such acceptance is a clear sign that the love of God has already entered the heart of the sinner. This contact with God's redeeming love is founded on and realised in the hearer's respect for the preacher who is thought to be speaking "in persona di Dio" in so far as the Holy Spirit speaks through him (cf. *Mt.* 10, 20). He is listened to, therefore, with faith and trust and this attitude is extended even to the preacher who does not practise what he preaches. The good he utters is willingly accepted; whatever is not good is left with him.¹²¹

Having accepted the word of salvation, the hearer of meek and humble heart seeks to retain it so that it will yield its fruits in due season. Such "keeping of the word" is expressed by continuous reflexion on what was preached and by turning over or ruminating on ("con cor-

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.* 99. As regards willingness to hear the word being a sign of predestination cf. also *Opera* III 153; VI 327.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* 102.

¹¹⁹ *Opera* VI 318; *Banchi* I 106.

¹²⁰ *Banchi* I 106: "non odi che nelle prediche t'ho detto che tu viva come debbono vivere le persone, e non come le bestie . . . ?"

¹²¹ *Ibid.* 108.

rugumazione”) what the preacher said regarding sins and how one should avoid them. This Bernardine calls “uno ripetere spirituale.” Due to this personal reflexion, appreciation for the word increases and deepens.¹²² Deepening this appreciation of the word by means of taking notes on the content of the sermon or discussing it with others should be encouraged so as to imprint the message on the heart. The women should discuss the sermon among themselves, the mother with her daughter, the wife with her husband, the countryman with his fellow in the fields who may not have been present to hear it. There is no better way to grasp personally and deepen the awareness of the message of salvation.¹²³ Such constant contact with the word of God in the heart and in conversation with others has a purifying effect on the inner man and gradually cleanses him of his sins. This is particularly the case when the sinner nourishes his mind and heart by returning frequently to hear the preacher.¹²⁴

The sinner who hears the word of God in this manner retains it in his heart, adheres to it with a living faith and gradually finds the strength to translate it into good deeds. He is not like those who receive the word, believe in it for a time but then reject it because of temptations and trials.

It is clear from the above discussion that Bernardine linked very closely the justification of the sinner with the proper reception of the words of the preacher. He could say that the power and presence of the Word of God were in the word that was preached. Preaching was the “verbum Dei vestitum voce.”¹²⁵ That the reconciliation of the sinner with God before the reception of sacramental absolution was possible and very likely, did not appear strange to Bernardine — nor indeed to the great scholastics before him.¹²⁶

To come willingly to hear the word of God, desiring to learn from it and willing to accede to the demands of God, is to give evidence of the beginnings of that living faith which justifies the sinner as he humbly accepts the will of God in his regard. This acceptance would obviously include the will to confess his sins to a minister of the Church when available. Such justification of the sinner through contact with God's

¹²² *Ibid.* 108: “così fa' tu della parola di Dio, quando tu l'odi; e rugumalo molto bene, ch'ella ti parrà migliore a rugumarla, che quando tu l'odi.”

¹²³ *Ibid.* 109: “. . . in questo modo si rafferma nelle menti vostre la vostra salute.” In the previous sermon, Bernardine had told the women that he would make them all preachers who would carry his message into their homes. Cf. *Sabatelli* 43.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* 111.

¹²⁵ Cf. *Seraphim* IV¹ 26b.

¹²⁶ Cf. ex. gr., S. Thomas, *Summa contra gentes* (Turin 1914) l. 4, c. 72; Scotus, *Oxon.*, 4, d. 49, q. 5, n. 2 (*Opera*, ed. Vivès, XXI 172).

word can take place in an instant as one word from the preacher pierces a vulnerable heart; or it can progressively take shape as the word penetrates the heart over a period of time so that the sinner is, as it were, eased out of the grip of his selfishness into the embrace of the good God who has made his love known to men in Christ. When the sinner is confronted in the sermon with all that God has done for him in Christ, he is led through the grace and power of the word to a deep desire for renewal in him; this "suspirium cordis," as Bernardine calls it, can draw the Holy Spirit into the heart to dwell there with his gifts and graces.¹²⁷ Such a moment of illumination becomes a movement of sorrow as the Spirit inspires the sinner to ask for mercy; in this sense, the Spirit "prays" within his heart (cf. *Rom.* 8, 26). Both the revelation of God's mercy in Christ and the abyss of a sinful life, held up to the sinner's view in the mirror of God's word,¹²⁸ are "unspeakable realities" ("inenarrabilia") as they are contrasted by the Spirit in the heart of the sinner.¹²⁹ In such manner does the Spirit of the Father burn the heart of the sinner when the word is fervently preached.

The only obstacle to that sorrow which reconciles man with God is attachment to sin.¹³⁰ Contrition, with the never-failing help of God's grace who wills the salvation of the sinner, is always within the power of man's free will and, therefore, easy of accomplishment. However, where the flesh dominates the reason, as in carnal and worldly men, there is no true contrition because there is no living faith in God. Practically speaking, the difference between the sorrow which reconciles with God and the sorrow which does not, comes from the fact that the former is God-centred while the latter is self-centred. The one is grieved because the good God has been offended while the other is merely afraid of being punished for sins.¹³¹ The sinner who does not strive to overcome his self-centredness retains an affection for some of his sinful ways while the

¹²⁷ *Opera* VI 322: "Dum homo recolit . . . beneficia Dei . . . atque recogitat . . . ingratitude suam, iam cupiens reformari in Christo et praecepta Dei servare; tunc, quodammodo attrahens Spiritum, per desiderium bonum erumpere cogitur in suspirium sanctum."

¹²⁸ *Opera* IV 576: "Specula quidem verba divina sunt; unde Iacobus, I cap., 23—24, ait: "Si quis auditor est verbi et non factor . . . Et iterum Gregorius, II libro *Moralium* [PL 75, 553] ait: "Scriptura Sacra mentis oculis quasi quoddam speculum opponitur, ut interna nostra facies videatur; ibi enim foeda, ibi pulchra nostra cognoscimus."

¹²⁹ *Opera* VI 322.

¹³⁰ *Opera* II 113.

¹³¹ *Opera* I 137: "Ex his aperte elici potest quod qui conteritur principaliter propter timorem inferni et non propter amorem Dei non est in statu salutis, quia non dolet amore Dei, sed amore sui; ut et si cessaret damnatio ex perpetrata culpa, cessaret etiam contritio illa."

sinner who is truly contrite turns generously towards God and retains no attachment to any sin however small. In this, he gives himself over fully to the will of God and "reserves nothing of himself as for himself."¹³² The sinner's conversion is, therefore, found in his willingness to love God more than himself and his selfishness.¹³³

However, the sinner can gradually progress from an attitude of fear of punishment to one of fear of God which in itself is an element of true contrition. This will be the task of the preacher who brings home to him the revelation of the mystery of God's love. In the light of this overwhelming love, the sinner gradually comprehends the nature of his own selfishness which excludes him from the lifegiving force of this love. Bernardine encourages the sinner to express whatever sorrow he can, for grace will not be wanting in order to make him fully acceptable to God. Such is the nature of God's immutable and gracious will to save those who do what they can to open their hearts to his generosity.¹³⁴

The saving power of God is present in the words of the preacher but just as the preacher shares in this power only through humble prayer and assiduous reflexion, so too does the hearer: the only obstacle to the new life transmitted by the word of God is the hard heart. The heart "whose windows are closed" through selfish attachment to sins is impenetrable to the rays of the divine sun which confers divine life. The sinful hearer who, notwithstanding his past sins, desires to come back to God and who shows this by humble attention to and patience with the preacher is already in the way of salvation and the Spirit has already taken up his abode within him.

Conclusion

Because Bernardine of Siena was more of a preacher than a theologian, his contribution to the history of the Church belongs more to the history of the Church's pastoral activity than to that of doctrine. His ideas on the nature of preaching and its efficacy are closely bound up with his convictions regarding the progress and gradual fulfillment of God's plan in time. He understood clearly that the word of God must be contemporaneous with every age, revealing the nature of, and giving answer to,

¹³² *Ibid.* 135.

¹³³ *Ibid.* 137.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* 136: "Advertandum est tamen quod, si homo disponit se per attritionem et facit quod in se est, Deus infundit gratiam gratum facientem de necessitate per veram contritionem . . . ex praesumptione immutabilitatis suae et ordinationis suae, quae . . . ordinavit se daturum gratiam omni petenti et quod in se est facienti."

man's deepest anxieties and aspirations. Bernardine's sense of balance allied with a basic though moderate optimism gave to the over-anxious apocalyptic mentality of his time a more sane, because more Christian, perspective by focussing attention on the vital importance of the grace of God's love, offered in the present through the medium of the accredited preacher.

However, what we might call his theology of preaching does not depend on a certain interpretation of the historical process but has an internal coherence and validity that are still of interest in a later age when there is much discussion regarding the nature and efficacy of preaching. In his own way, Bernardine is a witness to the realism of the patristic theology of the word of God. His theology is based on the clear assertions of Scripture regarding God's "*verbum efficax*" which always achieves its mission. As we have seen in the course of the article, Bernardine goes on to develop this basic insight using extensively the ideas of Mathias of Sweden and, to a lesser extent, those of St. Augustine and St. Gregory, great preachers all three in their different situations and eras. It is thus that he works out in some detail the rôle of the preacher in the history of salvation.

LOMAN MCAODHA, O. F. M.

THE STARTING POINT OF THE *PRIMA VIA*

I

In an article published some fifteen years ago,¹ I undertook to show that in the *Summa Theologiae* of St Thomas the *prima via* for reaching God has as its immediate conclusion existential actuality. Notwithstanding the resemblance in external structure to its Aristotelian model, the Thomistic *via* does not arrive at a plurality of finite forms. Rather, it culminates in a unique actuality that all are supposed to recognize at once as the God of Scriptural revelation, the God just described solely in terms of being.² The argument, accordingly, seems to conclude directly to an actuality whose very nature is to be. In "a first movent that is not being moved by anything"³ the Thomistic reasoning does, like that

¹ "The Conclusion of the *Prima via*," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXX (1952—53), 33—53; 109—121; 203—215.

² "Sed contra est quod dicitur *Exodi* III, ex persona Dei: *Ego sum qui sum*." St Thomas, *ST*, I, 2, 3. On the solidarity of this interpretation of the Scriptural text with Christian philosophical tradition, see C. J. De Vogel, "'Ego sum qui sum' et sa signification pour une philosophie chrétienne," *Revue des Sciences Religieuses*, XXXV (1961), 346—354. It is St Thomas' own understanding of the text, rather than its meaning in the original Hebrew, that is pertinent here. This way of viewing the conclusion of the *prima via* gives the answer to the question of Walter Kaufmann, *Critique of Religion and Philosophy* (New York, 1958), p. 108, who, after noting that in Aristotle the argument infers the existence of over forty unmoved movents, asks: "Is not Thomas arbitrary in supposing that there is but one?" It is hardly a case in which "logical argument has been forsaken" (*ibid.*) and the threat imposed that one must either understand this to be God or be burnt. One should follow out rather the implications of Kaufmann's correct observations that we become involved in St Thomas' own metaphysics in this adaption of Aristotle's argument (*ibid.*), that "the premises must be interpreted as containing a great deal of Aquinas' metaphysics in a nutshell" (p. 111), and that the *prima via* "is in fact a world view in miniature" (p. 109), not able to be assessed independently of St Thomas' metaphysics as a whole. The understanding of the *Summa* form as a summary of reasoning developed elsewhere is familiar enough; e. g. "Ea enim quae in *Summa Theologica* summam Angelicus exponit multa praesupponunt quae alibi fusius tradit," A. Bogliolo, "De Numero Viarum S. Thomae ad Probandum Existentiam Dei," *Doctor Communis*, III (1950), 192.

³ "... aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo movetur: et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum." *ST*, I, 2, 3c. In book *lambda* (6, 1071b 18—20) of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle, while not using the expression "pure actuality," concludes to a nature that is actuality alone: "... even if it acts, this will not be enough, if its essence is potency; for there will not be *eternal* movement, since that which is potentially may possibly not be. There must, then,

of Aristotle, conclude to actuality that is entirely devoid of passive potentiality. But can it, like the argument of Aristotle, see pure actuality in any finite form or plurality of finite forms? On account of St Thomas conception of the way anything is actual, namely through existence, is not his argument bound to regard everything quidditative as potential in respect of both being and operation? By "a first movent that is not being moved by anything," then, can the argument be envisaging any nature other than existence? By pure actuality must it not mean only existence, the sole actuality that is not in potency to anything further, the sole movent that in imparting motion is not being brought to actuality by anything at all?⁴

Nor may one say that the existential character of the primary movent's nature is a corollary drawn by further reasoning from an already established conclusion.⁵ If the actuality immediately reached by the argument is not existence, how can further reasoning conclude to a nature that is existence itself? Would not the process be open to the basic objection against the ontological argument? From quidditative perfection, no matter how well established, would not an existential conclusion be illegitimately drawn? The primary movent would indeed be established as an existent, but its nature would not be immediately recognized as existence itself. From the nature so known, without existence appearing as essential constituent, the conclusion that it is existence would be reached. No. In the framework in which St Thomas has already rejected the Anselmian argument, this way of reasoning

be such a principle, whose very essence is actuality" (Oxford tr.). Having established this kind of substance on the basis of the *eternity* of cosmic motion, Aristotle can go on to the question (*ibid.*, 8, 1073a 14—15) whether it is one or more than one, and, if more than one how many.

⁴ Against the Platonic background, the possibility of a self-movent as primary movent had to be excluded. The wording of the conclusion in the *Summa Theologiae* does exclude it. The *Contra Gentiles* (I, 13, Sed quia Deus) expresses the Aristotelian conclusion as follows: "Oportet igitur esse *primum motorem separatim omnino immobilem*, qui Deus est."

To regard creatures as potential in respect of existence and operation is not to presuppose a real distinction between the creature's essence and existence, but merely to take account of the fact that sensible things begin to exist and cease to exist, start activities and end them.

⁵ Cajetan, *In ST*, I, 2, 3, comm. III (ed. Leonine, IV, 32b), and F. Van Steenberghen, *Dieu Caché* (Louvain & Paris, 1961), pp. 187; 216—220, require a further reasoning process to show that the primary movent is God. Duns Scotus (*Ord.*, I, 2, 1—2, no. 58; ed. Vaticana, II, 164. 5—165. 3) has to make use of a "coloring" (*ibid.*, nos. 137—139; II, 208. 16—211. 1) of the Anselmian argument to establish the existence of the primary efficient cause. For Kaufmann, on the other hand, a critical examination shows that the primary movent is not the God of the Bible: "What Thomas describes is clearly not the God of Job, nor the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob." *Op. cit.*, p. 135; cf. pp. 115—116.

does not offer any entrance into the existential domain.⁶ Rather, the alternatives are clear. On the one hand, the argument may be regarded as based upon the motion's existence that is grasped through judgment. It would then proceed directly in the line of existence to a movent identical with existence itself. On the other hand, it may be conceived as based upon a quidditative actuality in things. It would then conclude to an existent movent from whose nature neither subsistent existence nor any other existence can be deduced. Does not the case have to be either the one or the other? Pure actuality, as St Thomas understood it, has either to be reached by a demonstration in which existence is the operative factor from the start, or else it cannot be reached at all. Therefore pure actuality cannot take on the meaning of subsistent existence by way of a corollary from the nature of a primary movent that has not already been established as existence itself.

This is what the study of the conclusion of the *prima via* showed.⁷ Two objections are easily raised against so operative a role for existential actuality in the argument's procedure. They concern the starting point of the reasoning. The one is that existence is not mentioned at all in the starting point. No cognizance whatsoever is taken of it. If it has in fact so operative a role, why is it not explicitly mentioned? Why the complete silence in its respect? More generally, and more pointedly, in regard to all the *quinque viae* the claim has been made that "this explanation of the starting points of the ways is at variance with the very text it purports to interpret."⁸ In its extreme form, then, this first

⁶ See *ST*, I, 2, 1, ad 2m. Fundamental in this respect is the radical distinction between the sources of knowledge of quiddity and knowledge of existence for St Thomas: "Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio intellectus. Una . . . qua apprehendit quidditates rerum . . . Alia autem comprehendit esse rei, . . ." *In I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 903. Cf.: "Sed intellectus noster . . . non apprehendit illud esse nisi componendo et dividendo" (*ibid.*, ad 2m; I, 904). Likewise: "Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei . . . Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei, . . ." *In Boeth. de Trin.*, V, 3c; ed. Decker, p. 182. 6—10. The twofold origin of intellectual knowledge prevents quidditative cognition, even when represented in expansion to the infinite, from passing over to the existential realm on the strength of its own content.

⁷ Art. cit., *The Modern Schoolman*, XXX (1953), 212—214. Cf. ". . . les cinq voies sont probantes. Lorsqu'elles enchaînent: 'Il y a du fini, du contingent; celui-ci dépend dans son être d'une cause qui le transcende; donc cette cause existe et elle est l'être même, c'est-à-dire Dieu,' elles ont valablement prouvé l'existence de Dieu." J. Defever, *La Preuve Réelle de Dieu* (Paris, 1953), p. 8.

⁸ T. C. O'Brien, in *The New Scholasticism*, XXXVIII (1964), 271. Cf. ". . . la notion clef d'*esse*, ou acte d'être, n'est invoqué dans aucune d'entre elles." E. Gilson, "La preuve du 'De ente et essentia,'" *Doctor Communis*, III (1950), 258. Gilson contrasts the respective starting points: "Au lieu de

objection maintains not only that the existential understanding of the starting point is not explicit in the text, but that it is at variance with the text itself.

A second objection is that the existential interpretation of the starting point presupposes in some way that a real distinction between the thing's essence and its existence has already been accepted. But no real distinction between a thing and its being can precede a demonstration of God's existence. Only after having proved God's existence can one know that there is a real distinction between essence and existence in all other beings. The distinction cannot be read into the starting point of any demonstration of God's existence. There can be no question, therefore, of existence as an operative factor in the starting point of the *prima via*, according to this way of setting up existence in the argument.

These objections are serious. The first admits no ready answer. Rather, it involves many questions regarding the procedure of St Thomas in a theological work such as the *Summa*. More deeply still, it focuses attention upon the nature of metaphysical reasoning in the theology of St Thomas, with the problem whether this metaphysical reasoning is formally philosophy or formally theology. It is the question about the way a philosophical proof should be organized in a theological work. The second objection concerns the basic problem of man's original grasp of existence as he first knows things. Has he an immediate intuition of existence upon which he can base a reasoning process? Does he have to distinguish the existence from the thing itself if he is to give existence an operative role in an argument? If so, to what extent does he have to distinguish the existence from the thing, and what means has he for making that initial distinction?

Certainly, these objections call for another and closer look at the starting point of the *prima via*, with the express purpose of seeing whether or not the operative feature in the starting point itself is motion's existential actuality. In the event of an affirmative answer, there will remain the questions, why within the text of the argument St Thomas does not explicitly mention existence when analyzing the starting point, and to what extent, if any, existence has to be distinguished from thing in the starting point in order to play an operative role in the argument.

la contingence métaphysique de l'existence par rapport à l'essence finie, saint Thomas part d'une évidence physique et sensible" (ibid.). On the other side: "Uno è infatti in tutte le Vie il punto di partenza, cioè la creatura considerata metafisicamente, . . . Insomma le cinque Vie ci appaiono come altrettanti aspetti o forme di un unico argomento." I. Bonetti, "Indole metafisica delle prove dell'esistenza di Dio," *Doctor Communis*, III (1950), 115.

II

Clearly, the starting point of the *prima via* is that some things are being moved in this world. The term "moved," as the examples⁹ in the argument show, is not restricted to the sense of local motion, though local motion is of course included in its scope. One example is a cane that has been moved by the hand and is itself pushing something else. This is local motion. The other example is a piece of wood being heated by a fire. From the viewpoint of change in temperature the wood is regarded as being "moved" by the fire and altered by it. In the *prima via*, accordingly, "being moved" includes alteration as well as local motion. The term quite apparently has here the wide technical sense given it in the tradition of Aristotelian natural philosophy.

In this wide sense of accidental change, then, the starting point of the *prima via* is that some things are actually being moved in the sensible world. The starting point is not restrictively the nature of motion, or the concept of motion, or the mobility of things, or anything else that can be expressed in merely quidditative terms. It is rather the fact that motion is taking place. From this point of view its contrast with the starting point of Duns Scotus' demonstration is striking, and is well enough known. For Scotus,¹⁰ the starting point is expressly quidditative. For St Thomas, on the contrary, the starting point is the actual motion that some things are here and now undergoing. The process of concretely observed motion is then explained in terms of actuality and potentiality.

What does this indicate? It certainly suggests that St Thomas was accepting without qualms the Aristotelian description of motion, in the passive sense of the term, as "the fulfilment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially."¹¹ Against this background, motion appeared as an actuality that is there in the sensible thing, though it is

⁹ "... sicut calidum in actu, ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum ... sicut baculus non movet nisi per hoc quod est motus a manu." *ST*, I, 2, 3c. The example of the cane is taken from Aristotle, *Ph.*, VIII 5, 256a 6—32. That of fire and heating is used at *Ph.*, VIII 1, 251a 29—32. "Wood," however, fits in rather as an example of something being burnt; cf. *Mete.*, IV 9, 387a 18, and *Ph.*, VIII 1, 251a 15—16 and 251b 32—33.

¹⁰ *Ord.*, I, 2, 1—2, nos. 56—58; II, 161. 10—164. 14. The preoccupation of Scotus is to have premises that are necessary, not contingent — "sic procedendo ex necessariis" (no. 56, p. 162. 5), "et sunt ex necessariis" (no. 58, p. 164. 15).

¹¹ *Ph.*, III 1, 201a 10—11. Cf. VIII 1, 251a 9—10. The Aristotelian definition is explicitly mentioned by St Thomas in his earliest use of the argument from motion in proving the unchangeableness of God, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 3, a. 1, *Contra & Solut.*; I, 211. It is included in the argument as presented in *CG*, I, 13, *Tertio*. See also texts *infra*, n. 16.

functioning as actuality only insofar as the thing is potential to something further. Motion, accordingly, was something to be explained in these terms of actuality and potentiality. Into these terms, in fact, the *prima via* analyzes its starting point to show that whatever is being moved is being moved by something else: "For nothing is being moved except insofar as it is in potentiality to that towards which it is being moved; while something imparts motion insofar as it is in actuality. Indeed, to impart motion is nothing else than to bring something from potentiality into actuality."¹² Different from any conception of motion in modern physics or modern logic, the understanding of it in the *prima via* is offered in the obviously Aristotelian terms of actuality and potentiality.

What does this understanding of motion imply? It means that for St Thomas motion is an actuality really present in sensible things, but actual only in rendering a thing potential to something further. On both these points, the presence of motion in the observed world and the analysis of its nature into actuality and potentiality, St Thomas and Aristotle are in accord. However, in his Commentary on the *Physics* St Thomas is careful to note that in the Aristotelian procedure the description of motion is antecedent to the question of its existence in things,¹³ even though the existence of motion in general is a presupposition of natural philosophy.¹⁴ This observation has an important bearing on the crucial difference between the two thinkers in regard to the eternity of motion.¹⁵ It underscores the significance of the existential consideration

¹² "Nihil enim movetur, nisi secundum quod est in potentia ad illud ad quod movetur; movet autem aliquid secundum quod est actu. Movere enim nihil aliud est quam educere aliquid de potentia in actum." *ST*, I, 2, 3c. The notion that a thing "imparts motion insofar as it is in actuality" is stated as though it could be taken for granted in the Aristotelian setting of the argument, in which any nature exercises its activity as long as nothing is hindering. See *Ph.*, VIII 4, 255b 3—256a 3. So, in *De Pot.*, II, 1c, St Thomas regards the notion as a consequence of the communicative nature of actuality: "Dicendum, quod natura cuiuslibet actus est, quod seipsum communicet quantum possibile est. Unde unumquodque agens agit secundum quod in actu est." On the explanation through "virtual act," see R. Effler, *John Duns Scotus and the Principle "Omne quod Movetur ab Alio Movetur"* (St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1962), pp. 81—89.

¹³ "In praecedentibus enim libris Aristoteles locutus fuerat de motu in communi, non applicando ad res; nunc autem inquirens an motus semper fuerit, applicat communem considerationem motus ad esse quod habet in rebus." *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 1, Angeli-Pirotta no. 1975.

¹⁴ "Est igitur communis suppositio in Scientia Naturali, quod motus habeat esse in rebus." *Ibid.*, no. 1976.

¹⁵ "Sed sicut dictum est, ipsum esse non acquisiverunt per mutationem vel motum . . . et sic non sequitur quod ante primam mutationem sit aliqua mutatio." *Ibid.*, lect. 2, no. 2046. Because motion can begin to exist ("incipiat de novo esse motus," *ibid.*) in a way other than through a preceding

in St Thomas' treatment of Aristotle. But it does not at all infringe upon the general way in which the Aristotelian analysis of motion functions as the background in the starting point of the *prima via*. The description is clearly Aristotelian. For both thinkers, accordingly, motion is an "imperfect actuality,"¹⁶ in the sense that it is tending towards further actuality that is terminal.

This conception of motion, then, involves a twofold actuality. It involves the imperfect actuality in which the motion itself consists, and the further terminal actuality that the very nature of motion implies. The two kinds of actuality have to be carefully distinguished, yet the one cannot be considered in separation from the other during an explanation of motion. If the actuality in which motion consists were regarded as an actuality already *accomplished*, as an actuality there for itself, it would no longer exhibit the nature of motion. Motion is the process of *accomplishing* a further actuality. It cannot be understood except in reference to that actuality. The twofold actuality, therefore, has to be kept present in one's understanding of motion.

Perhaps this point is significant enough to merit a glance at an instance in which it is exemplified in Aristotle,¹⁷ and at the illustration with which it is introduced in the *prima via*. The completed structure of a house, in Aristotle's example, functions as a terminal actuality in an artifact. It is an actuality that remains, that has status in itself. But the process of being built, though an actuality, is present in the materials only in the role of potency to the completed structure. The process of being built has no abiding status of its own. It is actual only insofar as it is passing into something further. It does not remain even for the smallest *part* of time in the actuality it has attained at any given instant. It is always in process to further actuality, as long as it is motion. Before

motion, it need not be eternal for St Thomas. The existential viewpoint in the approach to the consideration of motion enables St Thomas to reason about the eternity of the world in a way so different from that of the Aristotelian *Physics*.

¹⁶ Aristotle, *Ph.*, III 2, 201b 31—32; VIII 5, 257b 8—9; *De An.*, II 5, 417a 16. Cf.: "Sed hic loquitur de motu *secundum quod est actus imperfecti* id est existentis *in potentia*." St Thomas, *In VII Phys.*, lect. 1, no. 1779. "... est actus imperfectus, quia est actus ejus in quantum adhuc est in potentia." Ibid., lect. 10, no. 2218. See also references infra, n. 17.

¹⁷ *Ph.*, III 1, 20a 16—18; 7b—13. Cf.: "Ipse igitur actus imperfectus caloris in calefactibili existens *est motus*; non quidem secundum id quod iam actu tantum est, sed secundum quod iam in actu existens habet ordinem in ulteriorem actum: quia si tolleretur ordo ad ulteriorem actum, ipse actus quantumcumque imperfectus, esset terminus motus et non motus, sicut accidit cum aliquid semiplene calefit." St Thomas, *In III Phys.*, lect. 2, no. 560. See also nos. 559 and 561.

the building process commences, the potentiality in regard to the completed structure is in the materials, but just as potentiality. In the finished edifice, the actuality is there functioning in its role of actuality. It is present *qua* actuality. But the actuality in which the process of being built consists is there in the role of potentiality, of potentiality to the finished structure. Similarly, in the first example of the *prima via*, being heated is an actuality in the wood, and not solely a potentiality, in regard to heat. Yet it is an actuality not in its own right, but only insofar as the wood is potential to a higher degree of heat. It cannot be or be understood except in reference to the further actuality. Both actualities are involved. If the actuality of the changing process itself were not present in the wood, how could there be any question of the wood being heated? It is the only pertinent actuality present, since the terminal actuality has not as yet been acquired. Yet the motion is but an imperfect actuality through which the further and terminal actuality is being acquired by the things in motion. It is a process through which actuality yet to come is being given by means of an imperfect actuality now present in the sensible thing.

For St Thomas, however, nothing can be actual except through being.¹⁸ This is the way actuality is explained in the immediately following *quaestiones* of the *Summa*.¹⁹ It is accordingly the understanding of actuality that is evoked by the use of the term in the *prima via*. The actuality signified in the description of motion can be had for St Thomas only through existence. Moreover, the actuality towards which motion is directed and in which it terminates is being.²⁰ Motion consists in a process towards the being of its term. The existence of its term is the actuality that it finally brings about. Accordingly, to be brought into

¹⁸ "Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur." *De Pot.*, VII, 2, ad 9m. "Quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc verbum EST, est communiter actualitas omnis formae, vel actus substantialis vel accidentalis, . . ." *In I Periherm.*, lect. 5, Leonine no. 22.

¹⁹ "... esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae: non enim bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus eam esse." *ST*, I, 3, 4c. "Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi in quantum est. Unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum et etiam ipsarum formarum." *ST*, I, 4, 1, ad 3m.

²⁰ "Hoc autem est esse, ad quod generatio et omnis motus terminatur: omnis enim forma et actus est in potentia antequam esse acquirat." *CG*, II, 52. Item cum omne. Cf.: "Generatio per se loquendo est via in esse, et corruptio via in non esse: non enim generationis terminus est forma, et corruptionis privatio, nisi quia forma facit esse et privatio non esse; dato enim quod aliqua forma non faceret esse, non diceretur generari quod talem formam acciperet." *CG*, I, 26, Item generatio. See also *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, no. 551.

actuality is to be brought into being, and a process towards actuality is a process towards being. To prescind from the existential actuality would mean doing away with the actuality of the motion and of its terminus. It would, in the context of St Thomas, be equivalent to saying that things are not being moved in the sensible world.

In the setting of the *prima via*, then, the fact that some things are being moved in the sensible world means that they have the existential actuality of motion and by its means are in process towards the further existential actuality of its terminus. How else could the notion of actuality into which motion is analyzed be understood, against the metaphysical background of St Thomas? How could any actuality be meant, unless actual through existing? Of course, the statement "some things are being moved in this world" may be taken out of its own context and read against a narrowly Aristotelian background. The sensible thing's form would then be understood as actual in virtue of itself and as imparting actuality to the matter and the composite.²¹ Understood strictly in this Aristotelian setting, no existential actuality would be operative in the starting point of the argument from motion. But would the argument any longer be the *prima via* of St Thomas?

Likewise in the other backgrounds outside that of St Thomas the existential feature lacks any operative role, for instance in Plato, Duns Scotus, Cajetan, Suarez, Kant.²² If the argument is taken out of the immediate setting it has in St Thomas, it does not honor the claim that the actuality of motion has to be understood existentially. But in St Thomas, by the same token, in what other way can motion be actual than by existing? In what other way can a thing be moved than by having the motion existing in it? And, conversely, what else does the existing of motion in a thing mean than that the thing actually is being moved? Further, that the motion exists in the thing means that the terminus of the motion is being brought into existence. Existence is universally the terminus of all the types of motion, even though these types are specifically different. In the examples already considered, the fire

²¹ See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Z 17, 1041b 7—28; H 3, 1043b 13—14; 6, 1045a 29—33.

²² The Platonic source material is collected in René Arnou, *De Quinque Viis Sancti Thomae* (Rome, 1932), pp. 11—20. On Scotus, see *supra*, n. 10, and on Cajetan and Suarez my discussion in *art. cit.*, *The Modern Schoolman*, XXX (1953), 203—211. Kant's (*KRV*, B 632—640) reduction of the argument, under the title of "the cosmological proof," to the ontological argument, is well-known. The same process may be seen in C. D. Broad, *Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research* (London, 1953), pp. 176—189, with the express reduction of the cosmological argument "historically, to a physical argument of Aristotle's about motion" (p. 183).

causes heat, and the builder constructs a house, but both are in accord in causing the being of these effects; for without the primary effect of being there cannot be any effect at all.²³

Far from being at variance with the text, then, is not the existential explanation of the starting point the only explanation possible in the setting of St Thomas himself? How else, with him, can you have actuality except through being? Only by existing is motion actual for him, and only by bringing about the existence of its terminus does it reach the actuality for which it is meant. The whole process in which an imperfect actuality is tending towards a terminal actuality is existential in character. How else, then, can a de-existentialized understanding of the actuality be obtained than by detaching the starting point of the *prima via* from its setting in St Thomas himself? Against the metaphysical background of St Thomas, the very wording of the text "some things are being moved in this world," requires that the actuality of the motion be understood as actual through existing. The wording, emphatically enough, is not confined to the nature of motion, or the concept of motion. It expresses the existence of motion in the visible world.

Has this existential understanding of the *prima via's* starting point presupposed in any way the real distinction between a thing's essence and existence? Certainly the initial judgment that motion exists in the sensible world is made antecedently to one's knowledge of that distinction. Whether it is expressed in the wording "some things are being moved in this world," or "motion is going on in this world," or any such equivalent phrasing, the judgment that motion exists is made.²⁴ Existential judgments of this type are being made continually in everyone's daily experience. They do not require or presuppose any acquaintance with the philosophic tenet of a real distinction between essence and existence. The one judgment required is that the motion is really there, that it is actually taking place. In that way the motion is understood to have its own actuality and to be bringing about thereby the actuality of the terminus towards which it is tending. So understood it is analyzed in terms of actuality and potentiality, and is regarded as bringing about new actuality to the extent it brings about new existence. It results in

²³ "Calor enim facit calidum esse, et aedificator facit domum esse. Conveniunt ergo in hoc quod causant esse, sed differunt in hoc quod ignis causat ignem, et aedificator causat domum. . . . Et propter hoc dicitur . . . quod primus effectus est esse, et non est ante ipsum creatum aliquid." *De Pot.*, VII, 2, c. Cf. texts on primacy of being, *infra*, n. 49.

²⁴ Cf. ". . . cum volumus significare quancumque formam vel actum actualiter inesse alicui subiecto, significamus illud per hoc verbum EST." *In I Periherm.*, lect. 5, no. 22.

the existence of its terminus. Existence, accordingly, is the ultimate actuality involved,²⁵ whether really distinct from the essence or not. Having understood actuality in this way, from the start, the argument in arriving at pure actuality arrives at existence alone.²⁶

Surely no real distinction is presupposed or assumed in this reasoning. No attention, in fact, is paid to any distinction between motion and its being, even though some kind of a distinction is implicit in the judgment that motion exists. The motion itself is expressed by a simple concept, its existence by the complexity of a judgment. That distinction is implicit in every judgment, no matter how primitive. Further distinction is not required for the argument. Enough is already present to understand the motion as actual through its existence.

²⁵ "... ultimus autem actus est ipsum esse. Cum enim omnis motus sit exitus de potentia in actum, oportet illud esse ultimum actum, in quod tendit omnis motus." *Comp. Theol.*, I, 11.

²⁶ T. C. O'Brien, *Metaphysics and the Existence of God* (Washington, D. C., 1960), p. 253, claims "St. Thomas himself states that that God is subsistent *esse* is proved (*probatur*) by reason of His being the unmoved mover," in the sense that "the formalities involved must be distinct in order that there be a proof." The text referred to is: "Unde si esset unus calor per se existens, oporteret ipsum esse causam omnium calidorum, quae per modum participationis calorem habent. Est autem ponere aliquod ens quod est ipsum suum esse; quod ex hoc probatur, quia oportet esse aliquod primum ens quod sit actus purus, in quo nulla sit compositio" (*De Pot.*, III, 5). There is no mention of the unmoved mover, the reason is given as that of Avicenna, and the example of the "calor per se existens" would model it on the *quarta via* rather than on the *prima via*. The reasoning seems to proceed directly to a pure actuality that is subsistent existence, without any composition. Fr O'Brien likewise claims that "the same thing is said" in *Comp. Theol.*, cc. 3, 6, and 11. Yet there is no mention of subsistent being in cc. 3 and 6; and in c. 6 the reasoning seems modeled rather on the *tertia via*. In c. 11, the reasoning is from being as the ultimate actuality to which motion tends (text supra, n. 25) and from being as ultimate actuality the conclusion is "oportet igitur, quod essentia divina, quae est actus purus et ultimus, sit ipsum esse." There is no reasoning in these texts from a primary movent to subsistent being.

The claim (O'Brien, p. 252) that the text of St Thomas "Et propter hoc moveri non attribuitur non existentibus... Quia, cum moveri significet esse actu, sequeretur quod non entia actu essent actu" (*In IX Metaph.*, lect. 3, Cathala no. 1806) is "simply irrelevant" to the existential interpretation of the starting point of the *prima via*, would mean that St Thomas is remaining strictly within Aristotle's understanding of the expressions used. What the text states is that "being moved" is not attributed to non-existents, since it means to be in actuality. The text from the *Contra Gentiles*, apparently brought under the same charge of irrelevance (O'Brien, p. 252, n. 122), occurs in a setting that requires "*esse in actu*" to be interpreted according to St Thomas' own doctrine of being: "In omni autem actione esse in actu est principaliter intentum, et ultimum in generatione: nam, eo habito, quiescit agentis actio et motus patientis" (*CG*, III, 66, *Adhuc*). The motion ceases when what is *initially* intended, namely the being of the effect, has been attained.

One may with Aristotle, Scotus (see Effler, *op. cit.*, pp. 90—91), or Suarez unhesitatingly acknowledge the existence of things and still proceed unaware of the distinctive problems to which existence, when taken as

But if this is all that is meant by the existential feature in the starting point of the argument, one may be tempted to ask, does not the whole question become trivial? In requiring existence in the starting point, are you saying anything more than that an actuality has to be something? Unless an actuality has being of some kind, it is nothing. In dealing with an actuality, however, one is dealing with something. An article published a few years ago observed: "Before we can attach any predicate to anything . . . , we must presuppose that it exists. If we were not making that assumption, we could not even raise the question whether a given predicate attaches to it."²⁷ Accordingly, "we will always be too late either to apply or to withhold a predicate of existence" (*ibid.*). If nothing more than this is meant by existence, then, it can hardly be considered to offer a factor that would be operative in a demonstrative process. To stress the existential feature understood in this way, in the starting point of the *prima via*, seems merely to labor the obvious in calling attention to a universal presupposition that can have no meaning whatsoever for the argument.

Here, perhaps, one has exposed the most sensitive nerve in the whole metaphysical functioning of St Thomas' thought. It is a nerve so thickly protected that it has not often been touched by commentators. That the argument from motion can allow the real existence of the motion in sensible things and yet proceed without giving the existence any operative role, is a commonplace, and can be seen clearly in Aristotle and in Duns Scotus and in so many others. That quiddities can be regarded as having an actuality of their own in express contrast to real existence, may be seen from the doctrine of "essential being" (*esse essentiae*) that sprang up among the scholastics in the wake of Avicenna's notion of essence.²⁸ But the conclusion that existence has to be regarded as merely presupposed or assumed, instead of being directly known, does not at all follow from the fact that men have been able to reason

originally grasped through judgment, gives rise. Scotus (*Ord.*, I, 2, 1—2, no. 56; ed. Vaticana, II, 161. 9—162. 5) can note the contingency of produced existence, and yet deliberately set aside the actual existence as operative in his proof that God exists.

²⁷ William P. Alston, "The Ontological Argument Revisited," *The Philosophical Review*, LXIX (1960), 454.

²⁸ "... est sicut esse proprium rei." Avicenna, *Metaph.*, I, 6c; fol. 72v1 (Venice, 1508). So, in Giles of Rome, *Quodl.*, V, 3 (Louvain, 1646), p. 273a, a created nature has actuality of its own, sufficient to make it intelligible, but to which further actuality is added to make it exist: "Dicimus enim quod natura creata, licet sit tantae actualitatis quod possit per se intelligi: non sit tamen tantae actualitatis, quod possit existere in rerum natura, nisi superaddatur ei actualitas aliqua, quae communi nomine vocatur esse."

in these ways. To maintain that all one knows is expressed by the non-existential predicates, and that existence is not directly known but just presupposed through the knowledge of these predicates, can hardly be accepted in approaching St Thomas' tenets on actuality. Mentioned but rarely, yet asserted too plainly to leave any doubt about its meaning and its importance, is his teaching that a thing's being is known through a different operation of the mind from the one through which the thing's nature is conceived.²⁹ Instead of being presupposed or assumed, the sensible thing's being is known, is apprehended, is understood, directly, through the activity of judgment.³⁰ The thing's being is grasped not in the manner of a simple still-life picture, but in a dynamic complexity worked out in the one-directional continuum of time.³¹ This way of knowing the sensible thing's existence is a tenet peculiar to the thought of St Thomas. It is very easily missed under all the items of the superstructure raised upon it, as the history of the commentators shows. But if it claims to give direct knowledge of sensible existence, in an operation different from yet always accompanying the knowledge of the thing's nature, is it not indicating something far from trivial for a doctrine in which nothing is actual except through existence?

Regardless, then, of any real distinction or lack of real distinction between sensible motion and its existence, the fact that they are the objects of two different though concomitant activities of the intellect is highly significant for the starting point of the *prima via*. Grasped not in the manner of a finite nature, as is everything known through the first operation of the intellect, the existence is known in a way not

²⁹ See texts *supra*, n. 6, and *ST*, II—II, 83, 1, arg. 3 (*infra*, n. 30). For convenience today the distinction between the two acts of cognition may be expressed as the distinction between conceptualization and judgment. In St Thomas' own terminology, however, the word "concept," as a general term for the *verbum* expressed in any act of human intellection, is applied likewise to what is expressed in a judgment. For a discussion of this question, see E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, Appendix, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1952), pp. 217—223.

³⁰ "Sed intellectus noster, cujus cognitio a rebus oritur, quae esse compositum habent, non apprehendit illud esse nisi componendo et dividendo." *In I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2m; ed. Mandonnet, I, 904. "Secunda vero est compositio et divisio, per quam scilicet apprehenditur aliquid esse vel non esse." *ST*, II—II, 83, 1, arg. 3. "Intellectus enim habet judicare, et hoc dicitur sapere et apprehendere, et dicitur intelligere." *In III De An.*, lect. 4, Pirota no. 629. "... secundum hanc operationem intellectus aliquid intelligere." *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 6, Cathala no. 605.

³¹ "Esse autem nostrum habet aliquid sui extra se; deest enim aliquid quod jam de ipso praeteriit, et quod futurum est." *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 195. On this topic, see my discussion in "Diversity and Community of Being in St Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies*, XXII (1960), 289—297.

necessarily subject to the limitation that arises from the nature of every finite object. Accordingly it is able to remain open to a progress of demonstration that will establish its nature and primary instance in the unlimited actuality of subsistent being.

The significance of this Thomistic view about the way existence is apprehended would be hard to exaggerate. It is basic for the understanding of St Thomas' metaphysical procedure. It is what enables him to reason so differently from his predecessors and from other metaphysicians. It is what requires his notion of actuality in the starting point of the *prima via* to be interpreted in so radically different a fashion from Aristotle and from others who begin their proof with motion. It means that every sensible thing and every sensible occurrence is known in a twofold way. From the standpoint of its nature, it is known through the first operation of the mind, called in scholastic terminology simple apprehension. From the standpoint of its being, it is known through the second operation of the mind, called in scholastic terminology judgment. One and the same thing is known in both ways, simultaneously. For convenience of expression, however, St Thomas' own manner of saying that the first operation regards or grasps the thing's nature, and the second its being, may be followed.³² In this twofold grasp of the sensible thing, St Thomas is able to respect both aspects of the perceptible world, the manifestly permanent features and the basic, thoroughgoing flux. Unlike Bergson he is not obliged to honor only the ever flowing duration as the sole reality in the universe, relegating the abiding features to a cinematographical activity of the intellect. Unlike Alston³³ and so many others, he is not obliged to reduce existence to the universal presupposition required by any nature expressed in a quidditative predicate. Rather, he sees both stable nature and flowing existence in the sensible thing itself. He grasps them in the thing through two different intellectual activities. His way of understanding how existence is known in the thing by a specific operation of the intellect enables him to develop an authentically existential metaphysics, different from any other. It is this metaphysics that sees nothing actual except through being.

This means, then, that the existential interpretation of the starting point in the *prima via* depends ultimately on the way existence is grasped through judgment for St Thomas. Because the motion actually taking place in the sensible world is seen as actual through its real existence, the actuality towards which it is ultimately tending has to be existence. Regardless of the kind of distinction understood between

³² See texts *supra*, nn. 6 and 30.

³³ *Supra*, n. 27.

motion and its existence, and without any attention being paid to the distinction, the different way in which the existence is directly grasped and known *allows* it to function as an intelligible factor in the ensuing demonstration. It allows existence to play an operative role in the reasoning. The function of existence as the actuality through which anything else is actual then *requires* that existence play the operative role. The starting point of the *prima via*, accordingly, is that things are being moved in the sensible world, with the motion known as actual through what is grasped by judgment.

But again, the former objection persists in this new context. If the authentic interpretation of the *prima via* in its starting point depends upon the way the fact of motion is known through judgment, why did not St Thomas himself emphasize and clarify this tenet? Why is there no mention of it in the *prima via* or in any other version of his argument from motion? If the special grasp of the sensible world through judgment is basic in his metaphysical procedure, why is it not presented cogently in that role, instead of just being mentioned disjointedly, and only on incidental occasions? Why is the whole of the *De Ente et Essentia* developed without any explicit reference to the function of judgment? Surely the work of an historian is not to invent new metaphysical doctrine, but rather to report what is already there.

There is little need to stress the fault committed by an historian who presents his own inventions as the doctrine of the author with whom he is dealing. The fault is not justified by the fact that it has so often been committed. But in all the foregoing interpretation, has any tenet been attributed to St Thomas that is not found explicitly stated in his writings? That a thing's existence is grasped through the second operation of the intellect, is expressly even though infrequently noted. That nothing can be actual except through existence is just as pointedly though likewise infrequently stated.³⁴ Those are the two Thomistic tenets that are pertinent here. They are not invented by any modern historian. They are explicit in the text of St Thomas. They are, however,

³⁴ Texts *supra*, nn. 18, 19, 24—26. In the sixth edition of *Le Thomisme* (Paris, 1965), p. 97, n. 85, Gilson writes: "Je n'admets plus ce que j'écrivais alors (p. 119): 'les preuves thomistes de l'existence de Dieu se développent immédiatement sur le plan existentiel'; ce n'est pas exact si l'on entend par là, comme je l'entendais alors, que ces preuves supposent admis *l'esse* thomiste." The scope of this revision, as the words themselves testify, is limited to an existential level that would start the demonstration with the real distinction between a thing and its being. Gilson's footnote goes on to explain clearly that only after the proof for the existence of God is one able to acquire knowledge of the real distinction between essence and being in creatures. In the fifth edition of *Le Thomisme* (Paris, 1944), p. 119, after the

brought now into different focus. They are viewed in the role they play in St Thomas' metaphysical thinking when that thinking is analyzed on a purely philosophical plane. The question concerns the organization of the metaphysical thinking from a viewpoint other than that of the author himself. Is not this a legitimate task for an historian? Is he not obliged to explain the past in a way required by the exigencies of the times in which he himself lives? Does he not have to present his material in a manner organized to meet the needs of contemporary thinking? If his reading public is accustomed to having metaphysics organized from a philosophical and not a theological viewpoint, can the historian exempt himself from the labor of making his author's metaphysics intelligible to a public that will assess it in a philosophical framework? He is not permitted to add any tenets of his own. But he is both permitted and required to bring the materials before him into the focus made obligatory by the new mentality of his readers.

By the same token, however, the historian is called upon to explain why St Thomas himself did not organize his own metaphysical teachings from the philosophical viewpoint that is mandatory today. What, then, is the character of the organization they have in St Thomas? Why is it so different from a strictly philosophical order?

III

The bearing of the question should by this time be clear enough. If the existential feature is so unavoidable in the starting point of the *prima via*, if actuality cannot be understood in any other sense against the background of St Thomas' metaphysical thinking, why is there no mention of existence in the argument itself? Why is the argument not presented in a way that brings out its existential import, and organizes its procedure in accord with the requirements of an existential metaphysics? Why, in a word, is the organization of the argument so different

completion of the proof, Gilson mentioned that "les preuves thomistes de l'existence de Dieu rejoignent un autre ordre de considérations," in which the distinction between essence and existence in caused beings is shown. It was quite possible, and was in fact the experience of more than one reader, to go through Gilson's treatment of the *quinque viae* in the fifth edition without finding anything to imply that an understanding of the "plan existentiel" (p. 119) or "ordre existentiel" (p. 60) commenced with a real distinction between essence and existence. Rather, the statements there seemed based clearly on existence as immediately known through judgment (cf. pp. 61—62), without any attempt to show that existence was really distinct from essence. On the distinctions made in St Thomas' procedure in this question, see my article "Quiddity and Real Distinction in St Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies*, XXVII (1965), 1—22.

from the philosophical organization that St Thomas' tenets on existence would seem to demand?

The *prima via*, as is obvious enough, is located in a theological context. Accordingly, as found in the *Summa Theologiae*, the argument from sensible motion is developed as a formally theological item. That is sufficient to make it formally theological in character.³⁵ It does not call for formal organization from a philosophical viewpoint. It need not be presented as part of a philosophical synthesis, nor be developed in a way meant to satisfy the interests of philosophic inquiry. On grounds of its position in its own context, therefore, the argument requires only the development and way of presentation that meet the needs of the theological situation in the *Summa*.

Does the theological character of the *prima via*, then, account for the complete silence on the existential character that, from a philosophical viewpoint, has to be operative in the starting point and procedure of the argument? To answer this question, a confrontation with the way St Thomas proves the existence of God in a formally philosophical context would be of great help. Do his writings offer any instance of the proof's development in a formally philosophical setting?

The *De Ente et Essentia* at once comes to mind. True, this short work was written while St Thomas was engaged with his *Commentary* on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. It was the work of a theologian, of a man actually immersed in the teaching of theology at the period in which the treatise was written. It contains nothing of note that may not also be found in the *Commentary* on the *Sentences* in formally theological guise. There is no reason to claim that its philosophical tenets were thought out in any other setting than that of the theological commentary. There is no reason, therefore, to think that they were originally developed in any other matrix than the theological. They first saw the light of day, one need not doubt, as theology. Historically there is no indication that they were first thought out as philosophy, and then used as philosophically complete materials in an ancillary role in theology. Yet with all this recognized, the *De Ente et Essentia* is admittedly³⁶

³⁵ "Whatever else is true, in the two *summae* St Thomas wrote theology, and the philosophy that is in these works is *formally* theology and *only materially* philosophy." A. C. Pegis, "Sub Ratione Dei: A Reply to Professor Anderson," *The New Scholasticism*, XXXIX (1965), 153. The whole article (pp. 141—157) is a cogent demonstration of this tenet and a discussion of its crucial bearing upon the modern interpretations of St Thomas.

³⁶ "In an early work, the little treatise *On Being and Essence*, St Thomas asked the meaning of essence and existence as metaphysical notions." A. C. Pegis, *St Thomas and Philosophy* (Milwaukee, 1964), p. 3.

a philosophical work. Its statements and conclusions do not go beyond the philosophical pale. They are developed without explicit help or management on the part of theology. They are organized from a patently philosophical viewpoint, they rest on bases that are philosophical through and through, they are presented within the range of a genuinely metaphysical problem. Their express purpose is to explain what is meant by "essence and being (*ens*)," and how these are found in various types of things, and how they are related to the logical notions of genus, species, and differentia.³⁷ Whatever may have been the personal intention of St Thomas in explaining these topics to Dominican confreres, and no matter whether they were originally developed on the level of theological thinking, they are here given separate organization by St Thomas himself and synthesized in a framework that does not go beyond the philosophical. They are dealt with in this work as "metaphysical notions."³⁸ There seems accordingly no reason for declining to recognize the *De Ente et Essentia* as one of the "many purely philosophical discussions"³⁹ produced during the middle ages.

A second difficulty is whether the *De Ente et Essentia* does in fact contain a proof that God exists. The work has been regarded as a dialectical treatment of the notions mentioned in its introduction. Accordingly it should not be engaged in proving the existence of anything. Does this view of its procedure square with the text? It may be maintained without too much difficulty throughout the opening chapters of the treatise. One of the principal notions is being (*ens*), the other is essence. Being is here taken in the substantive sense of the being that is divided into the ten Aristotelian categories.⁴⁰ Taken in this way, being means that which is or that which exists. It embraces the whole range of finite things. These are known through various processes of abstraction. To that extent the treatise is dealing with concepts. But to constitute a being in this sense, the essence has to exist either in

³⁷ *De Ente et Essentia*, Prooemium; ed. Roland-Gosselin, pp. 1—2.

³⁸ *Supra*, n. 36.

³⁹ "They . . . wrote many purely philosophical discussions." A. C. Pegis, *The Middle Ages and Philosophy* (Chicago, 1963), p. 23. This sentence was meant as part of a summary of Gilson's reflections.

⁴⁰ *De Ente*, c. I; p. 3. 13—14. There seems no other way of translating *ens* conveniently here than by "being." In this sense "being" denotes all that exists, in the way "all existence" would signify all existents. The inconvenience is the use of "being" to translate *esse* later in the work. J. Bobik, *Aquinas on Being and Essence* (Notre Dame, 1965), uses "being" to translate *ens* and "existence" to translate *esse*. This use of two different verbs tends to obscure the common notion that runs through both expressions, for existence is the only kind of being in St Thomas.

reality or in the mind. Existence, however, is not part of the essence, nor is it derivable in the way one notion is derived from another. It has to be caused efficiently.⁴¹

At this point it is any longer possible to view procedure in terms of the derivation of one notion from another, in terms of analysis of notions, in terms of dialectical development? Rather, is not the formal sequence of one notion from another expressly set aside? The existence is not a new notion added to the essence or emerging from the essence. It is what an efficient cause achieves through real activity. It has subsistent existence, that is, something that is existence alone, as its primary cause. In this clearly non-dialectical way the reasoning concludes that there has to be a first cause, and identifies this first cause with God: "It is necessary that there be some thing that is for all things the cause of being, in that it itself is being only; . . . and this is the first cause, which is God."⁴² In the reasoning there is no question of the formal sequence of one notion from another. There is only question of something being by an efficient cause.

The difficulty here seems to lie in the very notion of dialectic when faced with existence. Dialectic, in keeping with its logical nature, deals with notions in abstraction from existence.⁴³ What happens when it

⁴¹ . . . causatum dico sicut a causa efficiente." *De Ente*, c. IV; p. 35.7—8.

⁴² . . . oportet quod sit aliqua res que sit causa essendi omnibus rebus ex eo quod ipsa est esse tantum; . . . et hec est causa prima que Deus est." *De Ente*, c. IV; p. 35. 13—19.

⁴³ "Dialectic," as St Thomas understood the term against the Aristotelian background, meant reasoning from probable premises, and resulted not in scientific knowledge but in belief or opinion. See *In Post. Analyt.*, Proemium, Leonine no. 6. In the present sense, however, "dialectic" studies the formal sequence in which one notion follows upon another, a sequence that is necessary and not just probable. From this viewpoint it may be compared with St Thomas' view of mathematical sequence in regard to abstraction from existence: "Unicuique autem competit habere causam agentem, secundum quod habet esse. Licet igitur ea quae sunt mathematica habeant causam agentem, non tamen secundum habitudinem quam habent ad causam agentem, cadunt sub consideratione mathematici." *ST*, I, 44, 1, ad. 3m.

Though existence lies outside the order dealt with by logic, this does not at all mean that reasoning based on existence can escape the control of logical rules. To reject logical criticism of an argument on the score that the argument itself is not about logical relations would of course be "mere impertinence," as noted by Peter Geach, "Nominalism," *Sophia* (Melbourne), III (1964), 10. Geach refers to an unidentified discussion of the *tertia via* of Aquinas. The issue, however, is the same as in the *prima via*, or in the *De Ente et Essentia*. It is whether aspects dealt with by logic or by mathematics or by a phenomenology or by a dialectic of concepts can lead to a cause external to the thing immediately known. A negative answer does not at all imply that the structure of an argument from the thing's existence can elude the norms of logic. Conversely, correct logical structure of a proof, say for the historical existence of Socrates, does not make it an argument in the realm of logic.

encounters existence itself as an actuality of the things it is analyzing? If it tries to deal with existence as a notion on a par with characterizing predicates, it immediately becomes entangled in baffling problems.⁴⁴ It can conceptualize existence only by subsuming it under some notion taken from the quidditative order, for instance the notion of "perfection" or of "something." But the existential bearing is thereby lost. The concept of existence does not tell one that anything exists. Interpreted as a dialectic, the argument from the existence of things becomes reduced to the ontological argument.⁴⁵ To call the present argument a dialectic, one would have to extend the meaning of "dialectic" to cover all demonstrative reasoning. In denoting the quest of efficient causes, it would have to include the physicist's reasoning to elementary particles, and the detective's reasoning from the clues to the murderer.

However, the question whether the procedure in the *De Ente et Essentia* is a proof for the existence of God is not settled by the non-dialectical nature of the reasoning. In point of fact, the reasoning does not commence with the assertion that something exists.⁴⁶ It is presented rather in conditionalized form—whatever things exist have their existence caused by subsistent existence. True, one's own real existence and the cognitional existence of the objects of one's thought are known in the very act of reasoning. The existential premise is implicitly given. The materials for a proof of God's existence are therefore present, but they are not formally organized into a proof. From that viewpoint one may say that the *De Ente et Essentia* does not contain a proof for the existence of God. The treatise is organized around composite beings and their essences. It needs existence only to explain the composite. It can be satisfied with the conditionalized form of the argument that establishes subsistent existence. That things exist shows that they are being made to exist by subsistent being. Nothing further is brought into the reasoning here. The minor premise "But things do exist," is not

⁴⁴ The extensive controversies in recent years on the ontological argument and existence as a predicate make this situation very noticable. The various positions brought to the fore in the contemporary discussions may be seen in the collection *The Ontological Argument*, ed. A. Plantinga (New York, 1965).

⁴⁵ See reference to the reduction of the "cosmological" argument to the ontological in Kant and C. D. Broad, *supra*, n. 22. The impasse arises from the impossibility of having a further concept determine the general concept of existence to express the fact that something does exist. "There is no concept whose addition to that of existence can make it signify actual existence, because no concept can signify it." E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1952), p. 198.

⁴⁶ See *De Ente*, c. IV; p. 34. 7—14. The starting point is the nature of sensible things, of which existence is not a part.

stated. The reasoning is not found organized as a demonstration of God's existence, but is developed only as needed in the process of showing the entitative composition of things.

Similarly no mention is made of the way existence is grasped through judgment, nor of the dynamic temporal composing in which it consists. This would be expected in a treatise whose set purpose was to deal with existence in its own right. But existence is not one of the announced themes for the *De Ente et Essentia*. If it had been named *De Esse et Essentia*, or *De Ente, Essentia, et Esse*, it could be expected to give a well-rounded discussion of existence. But it does not propose this theme, and it is not organized to deal with the topic for its own sake. Its purpose and its organization, accordingly, do not call for a thoroughgoing and fully developed treatment of existence. From this viewpoint even the materials in *De Ente et Essentia* for a proof of God's existence need not be expected to occur in the completely satisfying status demanded by each step in a fullfledged demonstration.

A final difficulty is whether the proof constructed from these materials in the *De Ente et Essentia* is the same demonstration as the *prima via*. Does St Thomas' statement that "in speculative matters the middle term of a demonstration, that perfectly demonstrates the conclusion, is one only, but there are many middle terms for probable reasoning,"⁴⁷ apply in the present situation? Does it imply that though there may be a number of ways to establish God's existence with probability, there can be only one philosophically demonstrative means? In the materials offered by the *De Ente et Essentia*, this is clearly existence. If the conclusion of the *prima via* requires that existence be its operative factor, and if its starting point allows nothing to be actual except through existence, the presumption is that its reasoning in terms of actuality and potentiality is geared to existential functioning throughout. This should be sufficient to identify it at least *prima facie* with a proof constructed from the materials in *De Ente et Essentia*. In both cases the one means of demonstration is existence.

With these preliminary difficulties met, the *prima via* may be compared with the reasoning in the *De Ente et Essentia*. The latter treatise (c. IV; pp. 34. 7—35. 10) shows that one can know what a man or a phoenix is without knowing whether the man or the phoenix has real

⁴⁷ ST, I, 47, 1, ad 3m. As the distinction here is between demonstration and probable reasoning, it does not bring out any reason why demonstration from effects should be excluded. The common aspect that enables the effects to serve as middle term, in this case being, constitutes them all under the one means of demonstration.

existence. The existence is not part of the essence. Nor can existence follow upon the essence—to cause the existence is to cause the thing itself,⁴⁸ and to exercise the efficient causality that would cause the thing's own existence would be to presuppose that existence. Neither coincident with the essence nor subsequent to it, the existence when had by the essence can appear only as prior to it. This notion of the priority of existence to essence is not stated explicitly here, but it is implicit in the reasoning, and is St Thomas' explicit teaching elsewhere.⁴⁹ Nor is the word "accident" used to express the notion that existence is not part of the essence, though again the term is used elsewhere.⁵⁰ The combined

⁴⁸ "... quia sic aliqua res esset causa sui ipsius." *De Ente*, c. IV; p. 35. 8. To impart existence means to make something exist. So, in regard to the divine causality: "... ipse est principium dans esse, et per consequens creans omnia alia quae ad esse sunt superaddita." *In I Sent.*, d. 37, q. 3, a. 2, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 874. "... Deus simul dans esse producit id quod esse recipit." *De Pot.*, III, 1, ad 17m. "... ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur." *Ibid.*, 5, ad 2m.

⁴⁹ "Primus autem effectus est ipsum esse, quod omnibus aliis effectibus praesupponitur..." *De Pot.*, III, 4c. "Primus autem effectus Dei in rebus est ipsum esse, quod omnes alii effectus praesupponunt, et supra quod fundantur." *Comp. Theol.*, c. LXVIII. "Id autem quod est commune omnibus intelligentiis distinctis est esse creatum primum, de quo quidem prae-mittit talem propositionem: Prima rerum creaturarum est esse et non est ante ipsam creatum aliud." *In Lib. De Causis*, IV; ed. Saffrey, p. 27. 8—11. Cf. "Omnis enim nobilitas cuiuscumque rei est sibi secundum suum esse." *CG*, I, 28, Omnis enim. It is true that the *notio entis* precedes "the two-fold content of the notion of *ens*, essence and *actus essendi*," as Fabro, "The Transcendentality of *Ens-Esse* and the Ground of Metaphysics," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, VI (1966), 426, notes. But this is because the intellect has to conceive each of the components as an already constituted "something."

⁵⁰ "Ad quod dicendum, quod accidens dicitur hic quod non est de intellectu alicujus, sicut rationale dicitur animali accidere; et ita cuilibet quidditati creatae accidit esse, quia non est de intellectu ipsius quidditatis." *In I Sent.*, d. 8, expos. lae partis textus; I, 209. "Et quod Hilarius dicit, dico quod accidens dicitur large omne quod non est pars essentiae; et sic est esse in rebus creatis..." *Quodl.*, XII, 5c. Cf.: "... esse est accidens, non quasi per accidens se habens, sed quasi actualitas cujuslibet substantiae." *Quodl.*, II, 3, ad 2m.

Accidentality and priority, it is important to keep in mind, are here first intention notions. They are notions obtained by precise abstraction (cf. *De Ente*, c. II; pp. 12. 5—23. 4), and are concerned directly with what is found in the real world. They are here not second intention notions, like individual, species, differentia, genus. Accidentality is found in the real world, for instance in quantity or action or relation in respect of substance. Likewise, priority is found in the real world, for instance in substance with regard to predicamental accidents. The accidentality and priority, therefore, characterize existence as found in the real sensible world. They are not just the relations between concepts formed in the human mind. Yet the direct knowledge that the accidentality and priority of existence is real, does not immediately show a real distinction between existence and thing. Sensible things are known to acquire existence and lose existence, and to be definable without inclusion of existence, even though no real distinction between their essence and existence is evident. Likewise their existence, known in this initial

accidentality and priority of the thing's existence in regard to its essence results in the conclusion that the thing "has its being from something else" (p. 35. 11). The reason is not given any development, just as the preceding considerations were not given development into the notions of accidentality and priority. But its cogency emerges from the dependence implied in any accident, a dependence that in this case cannot be primarily upon the thing in which the existence inheres; for unlike predicamental accidents, the existence is not subsequent to the thing itself but prior to it. In this way the reasoning of the *De Ente et Essentia* shows that the thing is dependent upon something else in line of efficient causality for its being, that is, that its being is caused efficiently by something else. The same reasoning holds till you arrive at something whose being is not accidental and prior to its essence but is identical with it.

Even though the reasoning in the *De Ente et Essentia*, then, is not organized as a proof for the existence of God, and accordingly does not make explicit some aspects required for the proof's cogency, it nevertheless reveals clearly enough the general lines of a metaphysical demonstration. The conditionalized form can be done away by perceiving the real existence, in the example given, of at least one man. That existence, actually being had by the man, is being caused by something else, and ultimately by something that is, not has, existence. Subsistent existence can then be identified with the God of Christian worship.

Does the *prima via* coincide, metaphysically, with this reasoning? It certainly starts with an actually existent occurrence — "some things are being moved in this world." "Being moved" means being brought into actuality (*reduci in actum*) by something else, since the same thing cannot simultaneously be potential and actual in the same respect. Ultimately it is being brought into actuality by something that is actual without being brought into actuality by anything, and that is straightway identified with God.

The different stages of the *prima via*, accordingly, correspond in general with those of the reasoning in the *De Ente et Essentia*. There are, however, some notable contrasts. In the *prima via* there is no explicit mention of existence. Though a thing can be brought into actuality

way as really accidental, cannot be regarded as following upon an already posited nature. It is known as prior in reality to the nature even though it is not known as really distinct from it. The situation, accordingly, does not justify the assertion "il n'y a pas de preuve plus directe ni plus profonde de l'existence de Dieu que la distinction réelle entre l'essence des choses et leur existence, . . ." St. -M. Gillet, *Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1949), p. 67.

only by being made to be, this consideration is not expressed in the *prima via*. Further, a thing is made to be in ways other than by motion, for instance by creation or conservation. Motion is only one of the ways by which something new is given being. In commenting on the Aristotelian argument from motion, St Thomas speaks of the case in which things did not acquire being through motion,⁵¹ as though motion were the obvious way, yet only one of the ways, in which things acquire it. The scope of the *prima via*, consequently, is narrower than that in the *De Ente et Essentia*. The reasoning in the latter is concerned universally with all the ways in which being may be had from something else and ultimately from subsistent being. The *prima via* is concerned with only one way by which actuality is achieved, namely through motion.

In detail, the *prima via* makes no attempt to prove that whatever is being moved is being moved by something. It takes that for granted, and concentrates on proving that the movent has to be something other than the thing moved. The Aristotelian argument, however, had been worded to prove that "everything being moved is necessarily being moved by something."⁵² and St Thomas in his commentary regarded the Stagirite's proof as a *propter quid* demonstration. For St Thomas, accordingly, this proposition was not self-evident but was a demonstrated conclusion. Yet nothing to that effect is mentioned in the *prima via*. The very wording in the passive voice "some things are being moved" suggests pointedly enough that they are being moved by something. Metaphysically, however, it cannot be taken for granted. One should not need Hume to make that clear. In understanding that motion and its terminus are made actual through being, one could thereby prove, through the accidentality and priority of being, that the actualizing mentioned in the *prima via* is being done by an efficient cause. But this consideration, though clear enough for anyone reasoning against the background that nothing is actual except through being, is not brought out in the *prima via*.

Further, the notion that an actuality had through something else is coming ultimately from a thing that is the actuality itself,⁵³ is contained

⁵¹ See text *supra*, n. 15.

⁵² Aristotle, *Ph.*, VII 1, 241b 24. See St Thomas, *In VII Phys.*, lect. 1, Angeli-Pirotta nos. 1776—1778.

⁵³ Cf.: "Et quia omne quod est per aliud reducitur ad illud quod est per se sicut ad causam primam, . . ." *De Ente*, c. IV; p. 35. 11—13. The model is the standard Aristotelian example of fire as the primary instance of heat, and accordingly the cause of heat for all other things; see Aristotle, *Metaph.*, α 1, 993b 24—26. So St Thomas: "... omnia ignita per participationem reducuntur ad ignem, qui est per essentiam talis." *In Joan.*, Prol.; ed. Vivès, XIX, 670b.

in a negative and, even at that, hardly more than implicit way in the *prima via*. According to its phrasing, secondary movents, understood in the sense of all movents other than the primary movent, impart motion in virtue of having been moved by the primary movent: "... sic non esset aliquod primum movens; et per consequens nec aliquod aliud movens, quia moventia secunda non movent nisi per hoc quod sunt mota a primo movente" (ST, I, 2, 3 c). The distinction between first and second movents here is evidently not one of mathematical succession. Every moved movent, whether first or second or third in mathematical order, or whether without serial number in a temporally infinite succession, is a secondary movent in the sense of *moventia secunda* in the *prima via*. Against the Aristotelian background, the primary instance of any kind of things is the cause of the secondary instances. But this principle is not expressly invoked in the present text. Instead of asserting that the primary movent is actuality itself, or pure actuality, the argument describes it negatively as a movent that is not being moved by anything — "primum movens, quod a nullo movetur" (ibid.).

These differences of the *prima via* from the reasoning in the *De Ente et Essentia* are indeed notable. But are they any more than differences of expression? Do they continue to present the same argument in different guises? Does the same demonstration underlie the different formulae?

The answers to these questions can emerge only from a detailed comparison of the successive steps in the *prima via* with those of the demonstration indicated by the materials in the *De Ente et Essentia*. The first step indicated would be a study of existence as immediately known by men, as a dynamic composing apprehended through a specific operation of the mind called judgment, as an object of cognition radically different in character from the quidditative characteristics of things. This initially required study is not made in the *De Ente et Essentia*, a treatise not organized around an investigation of existence or around a proof for the existence of God. The reasoning in the *De Ente et Essentia* starts rather with an admittedly evident distinction between what a thing like a man or phoenix is, and the existence of the man or phoenix in reality or in the mind. One glance at the history of the controversies on essence and existence, or the modern discussions of existence as a predicate, is enough to show that the meaning of existence has to be solidly established before it can serve as the basis for a demonstrative procedure. The initial study and isolation of existence is emphatically indicated, therefore, by the materials in the *De Ente et Essentia*. The

organization of the materials in this treatise, however, did not require it to be undertaken. But the *prima via* is explicitly organized as a proof for the existence of God. If existence is the operative factor in that proof, how is the *prima via* justified in leaving out the initial and thoroughgoing study of existence as an immediate object of human cognition? Here the question obviously requires a different answer from the one in the case of the *De Ente et Essentia*. But the two correspond in the fact that the initial and so necessary discussion of existence is omitted.

Secondly, can "be brought into actuality" (*reduci in actum*) really mean in the *prima via* "be brought to existence," just on the grounds that for St Thomas nothing can be actual except through existence and that the terminus towards which motion tends is existence? There seems no other way of understanding a process towards actuality in his own context. But may this existential interpretation be used when it is not even alluded to in the text itself? Could the argument not be meant by St Thomas himself to remain in a strictly Aristotelian setting, and not to be functioning in his own existential metaphysics? Read against the background of a metaphysics in which nothing is actual except through existence, the argument would mean that new actuality is being made to exist through motion, and that the actuality ultimately acquired is existence. This step of the argument would be thereby coinciding with the step in the *De Ente et Essentia* (c. IV; p. 35. 3—11) in which existence is had through efficient causality. It would differ only in the wider scope of the *De Ente et Essentia*, which extends to other ways of getting existence than through motion. It would give the starting point of the argument the operative existential bearing that would make it lead directly to subsistent existence as its conclusion. But if the existential bearing was really meant by St Thomas, how can mention of it be absent in the wording of the text?

Thirdly, the understanding of motion and its terminus as actual through existence enables one to see why the passing from potentiality to actuality has to be caused⁵⁴ by something, and by something other

⁵⁴ Gilson, *Le Thomisme*, 6th ed., p. 93, n. 80, draws attention to the absence of the word "cause" in the *prima via*. Yet in explaining the force of the original Aristotelian argument, St Thomas makes the notion "cause" carry the burden of the reasoning: "... aliquid movere seipsum nihil aliud est quam esse sibi causa motus. Quod autem est sibi causa alicuius, oportet quod primo ei conveniat; quia quod est primum in quolibet genere est causa eorum quae sunt post. Unde ignis, qui sibi et aliis est causa caloris, est primum calidum." *In VII Phys.*, lect. 1, no. 1777. The *primum movens* is accordingly the primary cause of motion: "Erit ergo aliquid primum movens, quod erit

than the effect. In the wording of the *prima via*, the necessity of having a movent is merely assumed, seemingly on the ground of acquaintance with the Aristotelian *Physics*. All that is proven is that the movent has to be something other than the mobile thing, since the one thing cannot be simultaneously actual and potential in the same respect. Is this at all identical, from a metaphysical viewpoint, with the corresponding step in the *De Ente et Essentia*? Or is there any apparent resemblance whatever? There is in fact no mention, even vaguely, of the accidentality and priority that would show the dependence of the existential actuation upon a movent. Of course, a person reading the argument from the Thomistic existential viewpoint could be aware of those two characteristics. In their light he could understand that the motion is being caused efficiently, and accordingly accept the cogency of the step in the demonstration. But is there any hint in the wording of the argument that this is meant? Rather, does not the situation indicate that the universally admitted authority of the Aristotelian *Physics* allowed the requirement of a movent to be accepted without further question? Although the step corresponds with that of the *De Ente et Essentia* when the argument is read from the existential viewpoint, does not the wording of the *prima via* itself seem to point in quite another direction?

Finally, the *prima via* reaches the negative assertion that the first movent is not being moved by anything. How can this be equated with the positive notion of the *De Ente et Essentia* (c. IV; p. 35. 18) that the first being is existence alone? Would not the corresponding step be that the first movent is actuality alone, in the meaning of actuality itself? But does this even make sense, unless the actuality is thereby understood as subsistent existence? A subsistent form (an angel) is a subsistent actuality. But could it meaningfully be identified with subsistent actuality *tout court*? Does not the experience of Aristotle indicate that any number of subsistent actualities can be reached by his own argument from motion? How can any one of them be equated with actuality itself, as something positive that would include all actuality? Subsistent existence would have to be read into the notion of the first movent, to make it coincide in its final step with the conclusion indicated by the *De Ente et Essentia*.

prima causa motus, . . ." Ibid., lect. 2, no. 1782. In general: "omne quod movetur habet causam sui motus." In *VIII Phys.*, lect. 12, no. 2266. Cf. *causa, causat, causetur* in *CG*, I, 13, *Quod autem necesse*, ff.

The general status of the proposition "whatever is being moved is being moved by something else," in thirteenth century thought, may be found sketched briefly in Effler, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

A confrontation with the *De Ente et Essentia*, then, shows notable lacunae in the *prima via*, when examined from the viewpoint of a complete metaphysical proof. Must one look to its theological context for explanation?

IV

Does the fact that the argument from motion in the *Summa Theologiae* is presented in a theological setting suffice to explain these omissions? Does the theological viewpoint from which the work as a whole is organized allow the suppression of steps that metaphysically are required for the cogency of the *prima via*?

Certainly the method according to which the *Summa Theologiae* is organized excludes a fullfledged metaphysical development of the proof for God's existence. That would extend to the length of a monograph in itself. It could not be crowded into the limits of a brief item in an article. At best only a few highlights of the demonstration can be mentioned. The proof in any case has to be strongly summarized. No other course is possible in the method called for by the *Summa Theologiae*. A development of the argument that would give all the steps required for a satisfactory presentation from the metaphysical viewpoint is decidedly out of the question. All that is permitted by the situation in the *Summa Theologiae* is a very brief summary of the demonstration.⁵⁵

This narrows the problem to the type of summary required. Is it to be a summary that would sketch rapidly the main points expected by a reader trained in an existential metaphysics? Is it to be a telling presentation meant to convince an unbeliever, within a few sentences, that God exists? Is it to be a brief recalling of proofs already familiar to the readers from other sources? Is it to be a merely apologetic reminder to believers that the existence of God is also a subject of philosophical demonstration, a reminder that need not have any interest at the moment in bringing out the cogency of each step of the demonstration? From what viewpoint, in a word, does the summarizing take place?

⁵⁵ If today the term "demonstration" be restricted technically to an argument in which every premise is expressed, it will no longer apply directly to the *prima via*. But in the sense in which "proofs can be regarded as shorthand notations for demonstrations," in the word of Irving M. Copi, *Symbolic Logic* (New York, 1954), p. 215, there seems no reason for refusing to call the *prima via* a true demonstration. In the scholastic terminology of the *Summa Theologiae* (I, 2, 2—3) and of the *Contra Gentiles* (I, 13), the argument for the primary movent is described indifferently as "proving" and as "demonstrating."

One basic norm for interpretation can be laid down without hesitation. In the procedure of the *Summa Theologiae* the arguments for the existence of God are not meant to be the ground on which the existence of God is accepted by the reader. It is too late for that. The theological procedure is based upon the word of God. It accepts the fact that God has spoken, and accordingly that God exists. Its only problems in this regard are to know whether the existence of God is self-evident or demonstrable, and if demonstrable to examine the ways in which the demonstration takes place.⁵⁶ To abstract even for the moment from its certainty about the existence of God would be to undermine its whole method. It would cease to be theology. Even methodically, then, it is not abstracting from its wholehearted and necessarily presupposed accepting of God's existence. True, in accordance with the set formulae of a scholastic discussion, it proposes the question whether God exists and introduces the negative side of the argument in the standard etiquette of "It seems that God does not exist." The arguments presented for the negative are not all straw men. They are the persistent arguments used by atheists through the centuries.⁵⁷ They bring out real problems, and they are faced seriously. Yet for all that, there is no descent to a formally metaphysical procedure in which one's certainty of the existence of God would depend upon the cogency of a philosophical demonstration. The certainty of God's existence is already accepted on supernatural faith, and as long as the procedure remains formally theological his existence is presupposed in the acceptance of divine revelation as the source of theological reasoning.

What, then, is the status of the ways for proving God's existence in the *Summa Theologiae*? They are clearly not meant to convince an otherwise unconvinced reader that God exists. Yet, methodically, they are meant to show how God's existence is proved by reason in abstraction from faith. On the difficulty of this task, St Thomas has no illusions. In the opening article of the *Summa* he had repeated his assertion that through reason truth about God is attained by but few, and over a long period of time, and intermixed with many errors.⁵⁸ One may be pardoned for suspecting an understatement of the difficulty in these

⁵⁶ ST, I, 2, 1—3. Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, aa. 1—3; I, 90—97; CG, I, 9—13.

⁵⁷ ST, I, 2, 3, args. 1—2. In modern language, these two arguments have been summed up as "God is scientifically unnecessary and ethically impossible." E. Borne, *Atheism*, tr. S. J. Tester (New York, 1961), p. 25.

⁵⁸ "Quia veritas de Deo per rationem investigata, a paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum admixtione multorum errorum homini perveniret ..." ST, I, 1, 1c.

words.⁵⁹ St Thomas is well aware that Aristotle's way of demonstrating the existence of immaterial substances depends for its efficacy upon two false premises.⁶⁰ What other thinker outside the light of Biblical revelation could he credit with a metaphysically valid demonstration of God's existence? Yet he can say without the least qualm that the efficacy of the Aristotelian argument from motion becomes clearer if the world has begun in time⁶¹ — an obviously non-Aristotelian premise. He can view the history of philosophy as a gradual progress towards a rational demonstration of the creation of all things by God.⁶² He can realize fully that the immobile movent reached by the Aristotelian *Physics* is a sphere soul, and nevertheless conclude his commentary on the work with the statement that *the Philosopher* ends the study in the first principle of all nature, God.⁶³

What attitude towards human reasoning do these considerations indicate? All men, as Aristotle noted at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, naturally desire knowledge. When men believe things on God's word, the Augustinian tradition insisted, they wish to understand what they can about them. Accordingly the theologian, even though the exigencies of his science do not allow the existence of God to be placed in real doubt, has the task of dealing with human understanding of his topics. One such topic is presupposed by faith and revelation. It is the existence of the God who has made the revelation. The divine revelation itself declares that the invisible things of God are known through the things

⁵⁹ "Mais il est tout aussi avéré que personne, en dehors de la révélation, n'a réussi à se faire une conception pure et ferme de Dieu." J. Defever, *La Preuve Réelle de Dieu* (Paris & Brussels, 1953), p. 7.

⁶⁰ "Et *praeterea*, perpetuitate temporis et motus quasi principio utitur ad probandum primum principium esse . . ." *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 2, no. 2043. Cf. *ibid.*, lect. 1, no. 1990; *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 5, no. 2496; *CG*, I, 13, Praedictos. A comparison of the Aristotelian argument with the formulations of the proof from motion given by St Thomas may be found in my article "Aquinas and the Proof from the 'Physics,'" *Mediaeval Studies*, XXVIII (1966), 119—150.

⁶¹ "Si enim mundo et motu existente sempiterno, necesse est ponere unum primum principium, multo magis sempiternitate eorum sublata." *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 1, no. 1991. "Quia si non fuerit mundus aeternus, necesse est quod fuerit productus in esse ab aliquo praeeistente." *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 5, no. 2499. "... ex suppositione aeternitatis mundi, qua posita, minus videtur manifestum quod Deus sit. Nam si mundus et motus de novo incoepit, planum est quod oportet poni aliquam causam quae de novo producat mundum et motum: . . . cum nihil educat se de potentia in actum, vel de non esse in esse." *CG*, I, 13, Et ad hoc.

⁶² See *De Pot.*, III, 5c.

⁶³ „Et sic terminat Philosophus considerationem communem de rebus naturalibus in Primo Principio totius naturae, qui est super omnia Deus . . ." *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 23, no. 2550.

that have been made.⁶⁴ The inquiring mind wishes to know how. The history of philosophy has shown how men have reasoned to a first cause of all things, in various ways.⁶⁵ This first cause is, in fact, God. True, the few men who have reasoned to it may be expected to have many errors mixed in with their reasoning, according to the first article of the *Summa Theologiae*. Yet their reasoning has shown them that there is a first cause of all things. This is a characteristic that belongs exclusively to God. To that extent, then, and according to their individual capacity, do these philosophers minister to the desire of the human mind to understand how God is known through reasoning from the things in the visible world.

With this attitude established in St Thomas, upon what principle will the selection of ways for proving the existence of God be made? Should a strongly summarized form of the existential demonstration indicated by the materials in the *De Ente et Essentia* be given? But no proof of the existence of God developed along those lines existed in western traditions. There was, among others, a proof from motion. It was readily known from Aristotle. It showed that there is a primary movent for the universe. To the Christian, who believed that in God we live and move and have our being,⁶⁶ the primary movent could be none other than God. In Aristotle's demonstration, as is to be expected, there were errors, namely the eternity of cosmic motion and the requirement of souls for the heavenly bodies. The efficacy of Aristotle's reasoning was grounded on them. These erroneous tenets could be omitted, however, in the resumption of the proof. But at what price? Something had to be read into the argument to substitute for them and even to make the argument clearer. That, as St. Thomas' lengthier treatments of the Aristotelian argument show,⁶⁷ was the viewpoint of existence. But

⁶⁴ *Rom.*, I, 20. Cf. St. Thomas, *In I sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 3, arg. 1; I, 95. *In Boeth. de Trin.*, V, 4c; ed. Decker, p. 194. 17—27. *CG*, I, 12. *ST*, I, 2, 2, Sed contra.

⁶⁵ See *ST*, I, 44, 1c. Cf. *De Pot.*, III, 5c; *De Subst. Sep.*, I—II; *In Joan.*, Prol.; ed. Vivès, XIX, 669b—670b.

⁶⁶ *Acts*, XVII, 28. "Et hoc modo intelligendum est verbum Apostoli dicentis, in ipso vivimus, movemur et sumus: quia etiam nostrum vivere, et nostrum esse, et nostrum moveri causantur a Deo." *ST*, I, 18, 4, ad 1m. "... esse et vivere et moveri, non attribuuntur rebus in Deo existentibus secundum esse quod in ipso habent, sed secundum esse quod in seipsis habent a Deo, ..." *In I sent.*, d. 36, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4m; I, 837.

For a recent discussion of "proof" and "way," see M. Guérard des Lauriers, *La Preuve de Dieu et les Cinq Voies* (Rome, 1966), especially the outline of the proof's stages on p. 37.

⁶⁷ *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 1—2, nos. 1990—2046; *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 5, nos. 2496—2499; *CG*, I, 13. Et ad hoc — cf. "Nam, si motus incoepit, oportet quod ab aliquo movente incoeperit" (*ibid.*, I, 15, Ostendit). Cf. *In I sent.*, d. 8, q. 3, aa. 1—3; I, 210—215.

when motion is understood as a process by which new accidents in a thing are brought into existence, it is concerned with actuality that is coming ultimately from subsistent existence as primary movent.

In this setting the requirements of the theological viewpoint could be best met by a skeleton form of the Aristotelian argument from motion. In that skeleton the bone structure of a metaphysically valid demonstration, against the background of St Thomas's own tenets, remains. The erroneous Aristotelian tenets, upon which it depended for its cogency in its original habitat, are dropped. The skeleton of an argument that St Thomas in his own existential metaphysics reads as valid, is presented. It is a skeleton that recalls unmistakably a long established and universally recognized way in which the western intellect sought to explain observed cosmic motion through a primary movent. The primary movent, in the Christian setting of the theologian, was God and was recognized by all as such. A way to prove the existence of the primary movent was accordingly a way to prove the existence of God. The *Summa Theologiae* (I, 2, 1—2) had already shown that the existence of God was not self-evident, but that it was demonstrable. The next step was to indicate ways in which it was demonstrated. Five ways, all recognized in the tradition of western philosophy and all acceptable in the metaphysical thinking of St Thomas, were listed. Of these, the first and more readily convincing was the way that established a primary movent for the immediately evident cosmic changes. It was valid for St Thomas, it was well-known to his readers. In the skeleton form of the *prima via*, it satisfied both exigencies. What better item could be asked for meeting the requirements of the theological organization of the *Summa* at this particular stage?

How this way of organizing the materials is to be evaluated today from the viewpoint of acceptable theological procedure, is for a professional theologian to judge. From the historical viewpoint, St Thomas is summarizing an Aristotelian argument in a skeleton form that is acceptable for his own demonstration of God's existence, and that could be expected to win immediate assent from contemporary readers for the rational character of the demonstration. In the situation at the particular time was there any other way of satisfying, within the limits of one short item in a *Summa* article, the two very different exigencies? There was the rigor of philosophic exactitude in a subject that few can penetrate and only with admixture of error, on the one hand, and on the other, the legitimate aspirations of the ordinary theological student to see the human mind reaching out on its own powers to the pri-

mary movent of heaven and earth. What better way was there to meet this twofold requirement than the adaptable skeleton structure of the *prima via*?

V

A philosopher's interest in St Thomas today cannot very well consist in looking for an already organized philosophical synthesis in his writings. There is none in them to find.⁶⁸ The philosopher's task, rather, is the understanding and explanation of the philosophical tenets used in the theological reasoning, and their organization and presentation from a strictly philosophical viewpoint. The philosophical organization will not be the work of St Thomas, but of the modern thinker. The *prima via* is far from an exception to this general norm. For philosophical understanding, it has to be given an organization and presentation very different from that of its original setting. It functions in terms of actuality emerging from potentiality. From a philosophical standpoint, as the thinking of St Thomas himself, it has to be read against the metaphysical background of the all-pervading doctrine that whatever is actual is actual through existence. In its very starting point new accidental reality is being brought into existence as things are being moved in the observed world. Upon the existential character of observed motion and its terminus depends the metaphysical cogency of the reasoning to something else that is correspondingly in a state of actuality, and ultimately to actuality that is immediately recognizable as God. But the only actuality metaphysically recognizable as God is subsistent existence. Correctly and pertinently, then, is the starting point of the *prima via* worded "Some things are being moved in this world." Not the quidditative nature of motion that is expressed in a definition, but the fact that motion is here and now taking place, as known through immediate judgment, is the operative factor in the proof's starting point.

The starting point of the *prima via*, accordingly, is the fact of observed motion in its full integrity. It is motion that is actually going

⁶⁸ "The modern student can see the principles that enabled St. Thomas to transform Aristotle, but he cannot find the philosophy that St. Thomas would have built had he chosen to be a philosopher." A. Pegis, *St. Thomas and Philosophy* (Milwaukee, 1964), p. 85. So, in regard to the *quinque viae*: "Les désaccords trop réels sur le sens des preuves tiennent d'abord à ce qu'on les a traitées comme des démonstrations philosophiques. . . il veut simplement mettre à la disposition des théologiens, soit une, soit quatre, soit cinq des manières principales dont les philosophes ont procédé pour démontrer cette vérité." E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme*, 6th ed., p. 90. "... c'est dans les perspectives du théologien qu'il a vu les cinq voies." Louis Charlier, "Les cinq voies de saint Thomas," in *L'Existence de Dieu*, ed. collège dominicain à La Sarte-Huy (Tournai, 1961), 182.

on in the sensible world. The integrity of the fact involves existential actuation. Why, then, should consideration of the existential actuality be bracketed as the demonstration commences? Existence is known immediately through judgment. It is fundamental for knowledge of sensible things. It is obvious to all. Why was it not taken into consideration by Aristotle or by any other thinker before St Thomas? Why was it not adequately noticed in the text of St Thomas for centuries afterwards? Why has it been so completely missed by philosophy in general?

This question brings to the fore the really pertinent problem. If one did not know through revelation that the proper name of God is being, and did not work back from the being of God to the being of creatures, could one have ever realized that the aspect of being is attained through judgment? Gilson seems to suggest a negative answer⁶⁹ — being, as the light in which all the rest is seen, would itself pass unnoticed did not another source of knowledge, divine revelation, call attention to it. Though a necessary cause, acquaintance with divine revelation obviously need not be a sufficient cause. Thinkers like St Augustine meditated on being as the name of God and interpreted it to mean unchangeableness rather than the actuality known through the composition of judgment. But to what extent is divine revelation a necessary cause? The answer, Gilson adds,⁷⁰ is very simple. Just take a verb as a verb. Avoid substituting a noun for it. See this, and no problem arises. — Simple, yes. But no one except St Thomas did see it. Perhaps the difficulties and admixture of errors in human cognition of God⁷¹ do make the revelation in *Exodus* a practically necessary condition for focusing attention on judgment as the cognition by which being is originally grasped. Accordingly, being is immediately known to all through judgment, and at the same time, in the present state of the human intellect, can go philosophically unnoticed without light from revelation.

⁶⁹ "Mais enfin comment faire voir ce principe? Il n'y a peut-être pas de réponse, car la lumière est cela même en quoi l'œil voit le reste." E. Gilson, "La preuve du 'De ente et essentia,'" *Doctor Communis*, III (1950), 260.

⁷⁰ "Saint Thomas a donc accepté de Moïse la vérité sublime que Moïse avait accepté de Dieu, mais il a fallu son génie métaphysique pour la comprendre au sens où lui-même l'a comprise. Et pourtant, comme c'était simple! Il n'y avait qu'à prendre un verbe pour un verbe au lieu de lui substituer un nom. Car le *maxime proprium nomen Dei* est un verbe." Ibid. There is something peculiar, however, about the verb "to be." Its present participle, "being," can be used for both the actuality itself and the subject that has the actuality, just as in Latin (or French or Italian) the infinitive is used for both. This situation does not occur with other verbs.

⁷¹ ST, I, I, 1c. Cf.: "Unde necesse est ad naturalem rationem recurrere, cui omnes assentire coguntur. Quae tamen in rebus divinis deficiens est." CG, I, 2, Contra.

If that is the case, one can understand the bearing of Gilson's exhortation to follow St Thomas in the way from God to creatures.⁷² Concentrate on God as known through Christian faith, meditate on him as creator of heaven and earth, follow being as it proceeds from him to creatures. Look at it in them in its temporal flux, contrast it with its eternity in God, and you may thereby be brought to see how it is attained not statically through conceptualization, but dynamically through judgment. Perhaps, then, the correct method for grasping the existential character of the *prima via's* starting point is to "try the theological way — from God to creatures,"⁷³ to work from "I am who am" to the motion of sensible things.

Perhaps the theological way is indeed necessary, under present habits of human thinking, in order to focus attention upon the existential aspect of observed motion, as immediately known through judgment. In point of fact, there is no record that any man ever attained it through "the philosophical way." But once that focus is attained, one is aware of existential actuality as an aspect immediately known and therefore able to serve as operative factor in the starting point of a genuinely metaphysical demonstration.⁷⁴ The probative force rests entirely upon

⁷² "This impasse is an invitation to us to give up the philosophical way — from creatures to God — and try the theological way — from God to creatures." E. Gilson, *Elements of Christian Philosophy* (New York, 1960), p. 131.

⁷³ Ibid. It should be obvious that this way of concentrating upon being does not at all mean turning philosophy into theology or starting metaphysical demonstration from anything not immediately known to human cognition. No theological premise whatsoever is introduced into the reasoning.

⁷⁴ "C'est qu'en effet une affirmation médiate d'existence ou d'être, comme l'est la preuve de l'existence de Dieu, ne peut être médiatisée que par l'être des choses du monde de notre expérience immédiate, en tant précisément que cet être est exigence de l'affirmation d'un autre être." D. de Petter, "La caractère métaphysique de la preuve de l'existence de Dieu," *L'Existence de Dieu*, ed. collège dominicain (Tournai, 1961), p. 168. This is quite a different approach from that of a philosophical rationalism seeking a sufficient reason for the world, e. g.: "... some real Being of such a kind as to constitute the reason for the existence of the universe," Wallace I. Matson, *The Existence of God* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1965), p. 56. Not so much a reason for its existence, but rather the efficient cause that made it exist, is being sought. Hence arises the requirement of an observed existent as the starting point. Matson, however, suggests that "it is particularly appropriate that God's existence should be demonstrable by the intellect unaided by the senses." Ibid. However, even though the evidence of existence is regarded as sensible, should it be called physical in either the strict Aristotelian sense of "physical," or in the sense associated with modern science? It is certainly beyond the scope of Aristotelian matter and form. It is likewise independent of physical interpretations of the cosmos at any particular period: "Interpreted in this literal way, the first way becomes independent of any scientific hypothesis as to the structure of the universe. The starting point is the existence of change." E. Gilson, *Elements of Christian Philosophy*, p. 67.

what one sees immediately with one's own intellect in things. Under this direct insight into the starting point, the ancient elements of the *prima via*, like the bones in the valley in *Ezekiel* (37, 1—10), come together again in their basic skeleton form. But now they are given new sinews, filled out with new flesh, covered with new skin, and inspired with entirely new life. The different understanding of the starting point in St Thomas makes the demonstration a radically different proof from the original Aristotelian argument.

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NOTES ON SOME ANTIHERETICAL WRITINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

In 1899, Frederic C. Conybeare published from a manuscript of Florence the text of a treatise against medieval heretics¹ who in one passage are called "Manichaeans".² In a brief introduction, he contented himself with noting that the tenets of the heretics seemed to prove their descent from Manichaeans of St. Augustine's day as well as to anticipate doctrines, especially in respect to baptism, later current among Lollards, Quakers, and Anabaptists, but he did no more to identify the author of the text or its provenience than to state that it came from the twelfth century.³ More surprising than Conybeare's failure to pursue his examination of this and similar treatises⁴ is the oblivion into which his article fell, for, as far as I can discover, it is not noticed in the numerous studies

¹ "A Hitherto Unpublished Treatise against the Italian Manichaeans," *American Journal of Theology*, III (1899), 704—28 (hereafter cited as Conybeare). The incipit is missing, due to the loss of fol. 69 ("excised by some bigoted monk," in Conybeare's opinion) and he omitted from the published text certain passages of Catholic reply to heretical arguments. The manuscript is Bibl. Aedilium, Cod. 37, fols. 70r—75v of the Laurentian Library, described in A. M. Bandinius, *Bibliotheca Leopoldina Laurentiana seu Catalogus manuscriptorum qui iussu Petri Leopoldi . . . in Laurentianam translati sunt . . .* I (Florence, 1791), 51—5; see esp. col. 53.

² *Contra manichaeum qui matrimonium detestatur*: Conybeare, p. 712. On that epithet for the Cathars, see Arno Borst, *Die Katharer* (Stuttgart, 1953: "Schriften der Monumenta Germaniae historica," XII), p. 252, nn. 3—4; also Christine Thouzellier, *Une Somme anti-cathare: le Liber contra Manicheos de Durand de Huesca* (Louvain, 1964: "Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense. Etudes et documents," 32), pp. 147, 174, 217, 237.

³ He writes: "The reference to a possible visit of the emperor to Lombardy can only refer to Frederick II (*sic*) and indicates that the document was written about 1180 A.D." The context of the passage, however, shows that no specific emperor or journey to Lombardy was in question.

⁴ He announced his intention to publish a *Summa contra Patarenos* from the same manuscript, but failed to do so, perhaps because he learned that it was not unedited, being, in fact, the *Disputatio inter catholicum et paterinum hereticum*, printed in Martène and Durand, *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum*, V (Lyon, 1717), 1705—54 (on it, see pp. 297—99, below). Conybeare's scholarly work had been largely in Armenian documents and textual criticism of the Bible. Perhaps his interests turned to western heresy as a result of publishing *The Key of Truth: a Manual of the Paulician Church of Armenia* (Oxford, 1898), in which he expressed (pp. LV—LVI) the view that the Paulicians were the direct ancestors of the Cathars, and with which he included (pp. 160—70) a translation of the Catharist ritual in Provençal from the edition by Leon Clédât, *Le Nouveau Testament traduit au XIII^e siècle en langue provençale, suivi d'un rituel cathare* (Paris, 1897), pp. 470—82

of medieval heresy⁵ or of the polemics against heresy published since 1900,⁶ although it does find a line in Kulcsár's bibliography appearing in 1964.⁷ The loss to the learned world, however, was not great, for the tract published by Conybeare has no independent value as a description of Catharist belief, being to a considerable extent the result of pillaging the first two books of the *Summa quadripartita* against heretics, Jews, and infidels written by Alain de Lille.⁸

(French translation of the ritual, pp. vi—xxvi). In later years, Conybeare wrote the article "Cathars" for the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th ed., V (New York, 1910), 515—7; and with F. P. Badham, "Fragments of an Ancient (? Egyptian) Gospel Used by the Cathars of Albi," *The Hibbert Journal*, XI (1913), 805—18. There is a bibliography of his works in *Revue des études Arméniennes*, VI (1926), 200—330.

⁵ Borst, *Die Katharer*, pp. 44—58, canvasses scholarly studies in the twentieth century to 1950. Other recent publications useful for bibliography are: Pierre de Berne-Lagarde, *Bibliographie du catharisme languedocien* (Toulouse, 1957: "Institut d'études cathares. Textes et documents," 1); Fliche and Martin *et al.*, *Histoire de l'église depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours*, Vol. IX (Paris, 1953), Chap. 3; Vol. X (1950), Chap. 3; Ilarino da Milano, O.F.M. Cap., "Le Eresie mediovali (sec. XI—XV)," in *Grande antologia filosofica*, IV (Milan, 1954), 1599—1689; and Herbert Grundmann, *Ketzergeschichte des Mittelalters*, in *Die Kirche in ihrer Geschichte: ein Handbuch*, ed. Kurt D. Schmidt und Ernst Wolf, Vol. II, Lief. G (Part 1), separately published (Göttingen, 1963). See also n. 7.

⁶ Borst, *Die Katharer*, pp. 3—26, and in notes *passim*, mentions most of the polemical literature and studies of it published before 1950. Since that date the following have appeared: Antoine Dondaine, O.P., "Durand de Huesca et la polémique anti-cathare," *Archivum fratrum praedicatorum* (hereafter cited as *AFP*), XXIX (1959), 228—76; *The Summa contra haereticos Ascribed to Praepositinus of Cremona*, ed. Joseph N. Garvin, C.S.C., and James A. Corbett (Notre Dame, 1958: "Publications in Mediaeval Studies," XV); Raoul Manselli, *Studi sulle eresie del secolo XII* (Rome, 1953: "Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo. Studi storici," 5); *idem*, "Il monaco Enrico e la sua eresia," and "Per la storia dell'eresia nel secolo XII: studi minori," in *Bullettino dell'Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo e Archivio muratoriano*, LXV (1953), 1—63, and LXVII (1955), 189—264, respectively; Christine Thouzelier, "Le 'Liber antiheresis' de Durand de Huesca et la 'Contra hereticos' d'Ermengaud de Béziers," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* (here after *RHE*), LV (1960), 130—41; *idem*, "La Profession trinitaire du vaudois Durand de Huesca," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, XXVII (1960), 267—89; *idem*, "Controverses vaudaises-cathares à la fin du XIIe siècle (d'après le livre II du 'Liber antiheresis' Ms Madrid 1114 et les sections correspondants du Ms BN. Lat. 13446)," *Archives d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du moyen âge*, XXXV (1960), 137—227; *idem*, *Une Somme anti-cathare*; *idem*, *Catharisme et valdisme en Languedoc à la fin du XIIe et au début du XIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1966: "Publications de la Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines de Paris. Serie 'Recherches,'" XXVII); Cesare Vasoli, "Il 'Contra haereticos' di Alano di Lilla," *Bull. dell'Ist. stor. ital. per il med. evo e Arch. murat.*, LXXV (1963), 123—72; and Libert Verrees, "Le Traité de l'abbé Bernard de Fontcaude contre les Vaudois et les Ariens," *Analecta Praemonstratensia*, XXXI (1955), 5—35.

⁷ Zsuzsánna Kulcsár, *Eretnekmozgalmak a XI—XIV. században* (Budapest, 1964: "A Budapesti Egyetemi Könyvtár Kiadványai," 22), p. 146.

⁸ The title in the printed edition (Migne, *PL*, CCX, 304—430) is *De fide catholica contra haereticos*, etc. but many of the manuscripts call it *Quadri-*

Alain de Lille's treatise, written toward the end of the twelfth century, is important, not only for its revelation of heretical doctrine, which the author probably knew from personal experience,⁹ but also for its methodical rebuttal, which inaugurated a pattern followed by later controversialist writers.¹⁰ Its wide dissemination is attested by the number of manuscripts which still exist, but the printed text is defective and a critical edition would be most desirable.¹¹ Conybeare's anonymous plagiarizer did not follow Alain's work slavishly; it is possible, of course, that there had been intermediary documents which introduced changes. Those passages of the *Summa quadripartita* which were used were handled rather freely, especially in the more verbose rebuttal of the errors; and in some places there is material not found in the printed text of Alain's treatise. The most serious change, one which distorts for the reader the character of the heresies, is that elements of Alain's first book, against the Cathars, were combined with passages from the second, against the Waldenses, without distinguishing the sects. The extent of dependence and change may be briefly shown by enumerating the sequence of topics

partita magistri Alani contra hereticos, etc. It was written, probably at Montpellier to whose Count William VIII it is dedicated, after 1184/85 and before 1202, most likely between 1190—1195: see Vasoli, *op. cit.*, p. 135; Thouzellier, *Catharisme et valdéisme*, pp. 81—2; and Guy Raynaud de Lage, *Alain de Lille, poète du XIIe siècle* (Montreal, 1951: "Publications de l'Institut d'études médiévales"), p. 29.

⁹ Legend has it that Alain debated with heretics: see M. B. Hauréau, "Mémoire sur la vie et quelques oeuvres d'Alain de Lille," *Mémoires de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres de l'Institut national de France*, XXXII, Pt. 1 (1886), 2—7. He may have taken part in Cistercian preaching missions against heresy: see De Lage, *op. cit.*, p. 29; Vasoli, *op. cit.*, p. 137; Thouzellier, *Catharisme et valdéisme*, p. 81, n. 3.

¹⁰ Cf. Borst, *op. cit.*, pp. 9—10. Vasoli (*op. cit.*, pp. 137 ff.) discusses the theological-philosophical content of the work; Thouzellier (*Catharisme et valdéisme*, pp. 81—106) analyzes the attack on Cathars and Waldenses.

¹¹ For some corrections of the printed text, see Clemens Baeumker, "Handschriftliches zu den Werken des Alanus," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft*, VI (1893), 163—75, 417—29; VII (1894), 169—85. De Lage lists twenty-nine manuscripts. I have seen notices in the catalogues of others: Barcelona, Arch. gen., Ripoll 204, fols. 11—52v; Breslau, Staats- und Univ. Bibl., I F 35, fols. 218v—52v; and Munich, Bay. Stadtbibl. Ms 554, fols. 206v—23. Maria-Thérèse d'Alverny, *Alain de Lille* (Paris, 1965), p. 158 (as cited by Thouzellier, *Catharisme et valdéisme*, p. 82, n. 7) found a Ms. of Book I in London having a preface different from that in Migne. J. J. I. von Döllinger, *Beiträge zur Sektengeschichte des Mittelalters*, 2 vols. (Munich, 1890; reprint New York, 1960), II, 279—86, prints excerpts from the Munich Ms. just referred to. To judge from his transcription, the copyist had handled the treatise roughly, for the passages are from Book I of the *Summa* but in scrambled order. After an incipit, *Dicunt quidam heretici*, there are lines from chapters numbered in Migne as 43, 45, 52, 63, 67, 69, 72, 74; then after the phrase, *Nunc dicendum est de errore Manichei*, are excerpts from chapters 2, 3, 9, 15, 19, 20, 33, 35, 37, 39. I have not seen the Ms. and cannot say whether other parts of the *Summa* are therein.

discussed in the Italian manuscript and indicating comparable passages in the *Summa quadripartita*.

- (1) The heretics assert that there are two gods; an evil one created this world and the bodies of men. The Catholic replies (Conybeare, pp. 705—8). This utilizes passages from Alain's Bk. I, Chaps. 2—4.
- (2) The heretics seek to prove that the devil is the author of mankind and of the Old Testament. The Catholic replies (Conybeare, pp. 708—11). The statements and arguments on each side have no similarity to the treatment of the same subject in the *Summa quadripartita*.
- (3) The heretics (here called "Manichaeans") assert that marriage is not from God. The Catholic replies (Conybeare, pp. 711—2). Alain discusses the Cathars' repudiation of marriage (Bk. I, Chap. 63) in quite different words.
- (4) The heretics, denying that marriage may be interpreted to mean the spiritual union of Word and flesh in Christ, insist that Christ did not assume a true human body, but a *corpus fantasticum*. The Catholic replies at length (Conybeare, pp. 712—5). The statement, without the words *corpus fantasticum*, and the arguments are close to those given by Alain, Bk I, Chaps. 19—22.
- (5) The heretics deny the resurrection of the flesh, asserting that the soul dies with the body. The Catholic replies (Conybeare, pp. 715—7). These passages are close to Alain's treatment of the Catharist doctrine, Bk. I, Chaps. 43—50.
- (6) The heretics deny that meat is a permissible food. The Catholic replies (Conybeare, pp. 718—9). A similar statement and similar arguments are found in Alain's Bk. I, Chaps. 74—77, but there the discussion is somewhat shorter.
- (7) The heretics assert that to take an oath is to commit mortal sin. The Catholic replies and, in addition, discusses whether it is permissible to swear by creatures (Conybeare, pp. 719—21). In similar words Alain discusses the Waldensian opposition to oaths in Bk. II, Chap. 18. He does not give as many arguments on behalf of the heretical position but the development of the orthodox reply is substantially the same. The question of oaths by creatures does not appear.
- (8) The heretics say that remission of sins by bishops and priests, as on the occasion of the consecration of a church, are of no value. The Catholic replies (Conybeare, pp. 721—3). This is attributed to the Waldenses by Alain in Bk. II, Chap. 11, but his discussion is shorter.

(9) The heretics declare that baptism is of no value for infants; some say that it is equally worthless for adults. The Catholic replies (Conybeare, pp. 725—8). These passages are quite close to Alain's discussion of tenets which he attributes to the Cathars in Bk. I, Chaps. 43—50.

In the literary campaign against heresy in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, polemical works were often copied and some textual changes were inevitable. Was the drastic change of Alain's *Summa* unusual? We are told that additions to and emendations of the controversialist tracts are to be expected in view of their practical purpose,¹² yet anyone relying on the treatise published by Conybeare would not have a distinct idea of the opinions of Cathars and Waldenses. Our knowledge of medieval sects, despite recent important discoveries of heretical literature, still rests heavily on the testimony of their Catholic adversaries, which most scholars assume to be essentially reliable.¹³ The arguments for its acceptance include the assertion that there is substantial agreement among polemics written in different times and places.¹⁴ Yet if concordance is to any appreciable extent the result of borrowing, that argument loses weight. Because the Catholic authors wrote for the information of their co-religionists, it is argued that they would not misstate the adversaries'

¹² Ilarino da Milano, O.F.M. Cap., "Fr. Gregorio, O.P., vescovo di Fano, e la 'Disputatio inter catholicum et paterinum hereticum,'" *Aevum*, XIV (1940), 108; *idem*, *Le Eresia di Ugo Speroni nella confutazione del maestro Vacario* (Città del Vaticano, 1945: "Studi e testi," 115), p. 32.

¹³ Contrary views are also expressed. Conybeare, *Key of Truth*, p. CXXII, dismisses the polemics as valueless but his grounds for doing so are untenable. Lucie Varga, "Peire Cardinal, était-il hérétique," *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, CXVII (1938), 212—4, contends that they systematized and oversimplified heretical doctrines, cramming them into a "system" they did not intrinsically have; cf. Zoé Oldenbourg, *Massacre at Montségur: a History of the Albigensian Crusade*, trans. Peter Green (New York, 1961), p. 33, asserting that orthodox writers stressed only the negative (that is, opposed to Catholic) aspect of Catharist thought. Paul Beuzart, *Les Hérésies pendant le moyen âge et la réforme jusqu'à la mort de Philip II, 1598, dans la région de Douai, d'Arras, et au pays d'Alleu* (Paris and Le Puy, 1912), pp. 1—2, accuses the polemicists of distorting their opponents' teaching.

¹⁴ Expressed by, among others, H.C. Vedder, "Origin and Early Teachings of the Waldenses according to Roman Catholic Writers of the Thirteenth Century," *American Journal of Theology*, IV (1900), 465—89; Félix Vernet "Cathares," in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, II, 1987—9; *idem*, "Eucharistie," *ibid.*, V, 1239—40; Edmond Broeckx, *Le Catharisme. Étude sur les doctrines, la vie religieuse et morale, l'activité littéraire et les vicissitudes de la secte cathare avant la Croisade* (Hoogstraten, 1916: "Univ. Cath. Lovaniensis dissertationes," ser. 2, VIII), p. 203; Yves Dossat, "Cathares et vaudois à la veille de la croisade albigeoise," *Revue historique et littéraire de Languedoc*, II (1945), 392—3; most flatly by Jean Guiraud, *Cartulaire du Notre Dame de Prouille, précédé d'une étude sur l'albigéisme languedocien au XIIe et XIIIe siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1907), I, xxi—xxii, xxvi—xxviii; and P. Belperron, *La Croisade contre les Albigeois et l'union du Languedoc à la France, 1209—1249* (Paris, 1942), 65—6.

position. Even assuming that to be true of the original works, can the same be said for alteration or additions in subsequent copies?

In an attempt to contribute in small measure to the critical evaluation of medieval polemical literature,¹⁵ some of the changes in antiheretical treatises and interrelationships of one with another, as discussed by scholars who have studied them, will be passed in review, together with certain other instances of the same sort which have not previously been noticed.

Durand of Huesca and Ermengaud of Béziers

Influence of one author on another and changes in the content of polemical treatises are found in the series of anti-Catharist works which recent studies reveal to have been produced or inspired between 1190 and 1223 by Durand of Huesca. Durand, at one time a disciple of Waldes of Lyon, was reconciled to the Church in 1207—1208 and founded the society of Poor Catholics, dedicated to poverty and preaching.¹⁶ Durand's first treatise against the Cathars was written long before his conversion, probably between 1190 and 1194,¹⁷ and subsequently was re-edited in such a way that its second book of five chapters was shortened and those chapters were inserted at appropriate places among the twenty-six chapters of Book I. Then two additional chapters upholding the licitness of oaths and the permissibility of the death penalty were added to the revision.¹⁸ An *Opusculum contra hereticos*, probably to be dated 1210—1215 and plausibly attributed to Durand, was not entirely original, for it incorpo-

¹⁵ The best discussion of the critical problems presented by the polemical literature is in Antoine Dondaine, O.P., "Nouvelles Sources de l'histoire doctrinale du néo-manichéisme au moyen âge," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, XXVIII (1939), 476—81.

¹⁶ J. B. Pierron, *Die katholischen Armen. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Bettelorden mit Berücksichtigung der Humiliaten und der wiedervereinigten Lombarden* (Freiburg-i-B., 1911); *idem*, „Poor Catholics," *Catholic Encyclopedia*, XII (1911), 249—51; and above all Thouzellier, *Catharisme et valdéisme*, pp. 60—79, 215—32, 255—62, 293—427.

¹⁷ Madrid, BN Ms. 1114, fols. 11—90r. When he first discussed the treatise as found in this Ms. Dondaine attributed it to an unknown follower of Waldes, soon after 1180: "Aux Origines du valdéisme. Une profession de foi de Valdès," *AFP*, XVI (1946), 191—235. When the Paris Ms. (see n. 18) came to his attention, he made the attribution to Durand of Huesca and discussed his other works: "Durand de Huesca," *AFP*, XXIX (1959), 228—76. Mlle Thouzellier contributed an examination of the relationship of the *Liber antiheresis* with the work of Ermengaud of Béziers: "Le 'Liber antiheresis,'" *RHE*, LV (1960), 130—41. She then studied the *Liber antiheresis* itself for her "Controverses vaudoises-cathares," *Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge*, XXXV (1960), 137—227; and "La Profession trinitaire," *Recherches de théol. anc. et méd.*, XXVII (1960), 267—89; and summed up her research in *Catharisme et valdéisme*.

¹⁸ It is found in Paris, BN, Ms. lat. 13446. The revision and addition of two chapters may well have been done by Ermengaud of Béziers.

rated virtually all of the *Contra Henricum*, a tract which had been produced almost half a century earlier against Henry "of Lausanne" or "of Le Mans," the old antagonist of Bernard of Clairvaux in Toulouse in 1145.¹⁹ A third treatise, the *Liber contra manicheos* (1222—1223) which Durand wrote to contradict a heretical work, fortunately for us quoted at length from the latter; the *Liber* also was re-edited from one book to two, but only the first survives and of the second book only a list of chapter titles has been preserved.²⁰ A complement of these three treatises is the *Contra hereticos* of Ermengaud of Béziers, one of Durand's companions in return to the Church. Ermengaud relied somewhat on the *Liber antiheresis* and in its first form the treatise incorporated passages from the *Opusculum contra hereticos*, including parts of the *Contra Henricum*. A re-edition then was made, purged of elements of that early work.²¹ Finally, some other hand added to Ermengaud's revised *Contra hereticos*, which was directed at the Cathars, a further passage under the rubric *De valdensibus*, describing the errors and misconduct of the Waldenses.²² It is quite different in style from the preceding chapters on the Cathars and shows signs of having been derived from an episcopal inquisition after 1225.²³

There is no doubt that Durand of Huesca knew the Cathars well from his reading and his debates with them. His first work, the *Liber antiheresis*, was a storehouse of arguments from which he and Ermengaud of Béziers drew for later polemics. The evidence about Catharism is not appreciably changed in their successive works, although Ermengaud

¹⁹ Dondaine, "Durand de Huesca," *AFP*, XXIX (1959), 254—7.

²⁰ Thouzellier, *Un Traité cathare*, pp. 25—7, 85—6.

²¹ Dondaine, "Durand de Huesca," *AFP*, XXIX (1959), 249—60, *passim*; Thouzellier, "Le 'Liber antiheresis,'" *RHE*, LV (1960), 138; *idem*, *Catharisme et valdéisme*, pp. 272—3.

²² As printed in Migne, *PL*, CCIV, 1235—72, the *Contra hereticos* is cut off after a few words of Chap. 19; another version (*ibid.*, CLXXVIII, 1823—46) ends in Chap. 17. Dondaine ("Nouvelles Sources," *Rev. des sci. phil. et théol.*, XXVIII [1939], 483—4) described a Ms. which had Chaps. 19, 20, and the addition, *De valdensibus*. The latter was published by Giovanni Gonnet, "Waldensia," *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses*, XXXIII (1953), 252—4, and *Enchiridion fontium valdensium* . . . I (Torre Pellice, 1958), 155—7. Manselli called attention to the different style of the comments on the Waldenses and the improbability that they were part of the original treatise: "Per la storia dell'eresia," *Bull. dell'Ist. stor. ital. per il med. evo e Arch. murat.*, LXV (1953), 253—64.

²³ The content comes from confessions by Waldenses. Places mentioned lie along the Rhone River, especially in the diocese of Valence, whose bishop imposed penance on the accused. Among the charges against them was denunciation of the patriarch of Jerusalem as the second beast of the Apocalypse. The fact that Gérold, archbishop of Valence, 1220—1225, in the latter year became patriarch of Jerusalem suggests the provenience and date *post quem*.

did add in his *Contra hereticos* a description of the spiritual baptism or *consolamentum* practiced by the Cathars. But for what is revealed about the Waldenses, if chapters defending oaths and the death penalty were appended to the revised *Liber antiheresis* even before Durand and Ermengaud were reconciled to the Church, the additions reveal divisions of opinion on these subjects among the first followers of Waldes which are not explicitly stated in Catholic sources. The passage *De valdensibus* which someone added to Ermengaud's treatise does not have the warrant of his authority. And one may ask if the fact that the compiler of the *Opusculum contra hereticos* thought it worthwhile to copy the much earlier tract against Henry indicates that the Henrician tradition of heresy continued to exist independently of the Cathars and Waldenses.²⁴

The MANIFESTATIO HERESIS CATHARORUM of Bonacursus and the confession of Mirisona and Jacobus

The well-known disclosure (*manifestatio*) of Catharist doctrine by a convert, Bonacursus of Milan, between 1176 and 1190²⁵ is found also in a manuscript of Paris under the rubric *De confessione hereticorum*. It is there attributed to "Jacobus et Micasmus" and certain errors not found in the printed version are added.²⁶ Raoul Manselli argued that the confession in the Paris manuscript was the original statement by Bonacursus, of which the printed *Manifestatio* represents a revision; the names "Jacobus et Micasmus" would be explained by corruption of the original "Bonacursus de Mediolano" during repeated copyings.²⁷ But in the Paris manuscript another confession follows immediately, said to have been made by "Mirisona et Jacobus" at Florence,²⁸ leading to

²⁴ In one place, discussing infant baptism, the author wrote: "Henry (*aenricus*) taught, and the error still persists . . ." (Dondaine, "Durand de Huesca," *AFP*, XXIX (1959), 260, n. 78). The *Contra Henricum* was probably written in the decade 1130—1140 and is itself an example of change in two copies of a polemic. See Mario Esposito, "Sur Quelques Ecrits concernant les hérésies et les hérétiques au XIIe et au XIIIe siècles," *RHE*, XXXVI (1940), 143—4, describing a Ms. of Nice; Manselli, "Il monaco Enrico," *Bull. dell' Ist. stor. ital. per il med. evo e Arch. murat.*, LXV (1953), 1—63, printing another text from a manuscript of Paris; Dondaine, "Durand de Huesca," *AFP*, XXIX (1959), 257, n. 40, noting still another Ms.

²⁵ Migne, *PL*, CCIV, 775—7. See Ilarino da Milano, O.F.M. Cap., "La 'Manifestatio heresis catarorum quam fecit Bonacursus' secondo il cod. Ottob. lat. 136 della Bibliotheca Vaticana," *Aevum*, XII (1938), 281—333.

²⁶ BN Ms. lat. 14927, fol. 13r—v. On fol. 11v a few lines of the *Manifestatio* also appear: cf. Migne, *PL*, CCIV, col. 775, lines 14—21.

²⁷ "Per la storia dell' eresia," *Bull. dell' Ist. stor. ital. per il med. evo e Arch. murat.*, LXVII (1955), 189—211. The texts of the two versions are printed, pp. 206 ff.

²⁸ *Hec omnia mirisonati (= mirisona et) jacobus iuraverunt . . . ante episcopum et consules florentine civitatis . . .* BN Ms. lat. 14927, fols. 13v—14r.

the suggestion by Dondaine and Thouzellier that both elements, perhaps, should be taken together, the first as a formula in general use for reconciliation of heretics, the second being further revelations by two converts about 1206. Unexploited manuscript sources exist in which the relationship of these confessions and the question of their dates might be further explored.²⁹

Cathar Myths

Early in the thirteenth century appeared an anonymous description of the heresy of the Albigenses which also included comment on the Poor of Lyon.³⁰ Comparison of this with the account of the Albigensian heresy by Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay³¹ suggests that the crusading monk may have known the anonymous work, but Pierre's recital differs enough to raise the question of how much he depended on the anonymous statement. And in connection with these two documents there is still a third to be taken into account.

Among other things, the anonymous author referred to in the preceding paragraph describes certain myths repeated by Cathars in secret assemblies, in which the evil god is portrayed as the first creator, who produced four creatures, two of which were stolen by the good God to use in creating His own good realm.³² In revenge, Lucifer, the son of the evil god, accomplished the fall of angels. The heretics also taught that Christ appeared in this world ("the deepest hell") only spiritually in Paul, but there is a "land of the living" in which Christ was born of Joseph and Mary, who were Adam and Eve, where He actually suffered, died, and rose again, from whence He passed through seven realms to save His people. In that other land, God's people lead lives comparable to

²⁹ Dondaine, "Durand de Huesca," *AFP*, XXIX (1959), 264—5, and n. 85 and Thomas Käppeli, O.P., "Une Somme contre les hérétiques de S. Pierre Martyr(?)," *AFP*, XVII (1947), 295, n. 1 for other Mss. of both confessions. Cf. Thouzellier, *Catharisme et valdéisme*, pp. 33, 44—5 and n. 122, 107, 169, where, in the French translation of the confession of Mirisone and Jacobus (pp. 169—170), one should read "Benedict" instead of "Bernard."

³⁰ *Manifestatio haeresis Albigensium et Lugdunensium*, printed by Dondaine, who supplied that title, in "Durand de Huesca," *AFP*, XXIX (1959), Appendix I, pp. 268—71. He suggested Ermengaud of Béziers as the author and that the date might be as early as the confession of Bonacursus (pp. 261, 262). Thouzellier (*Catharisme et valdéisme*, pp. 284—8) discusses the statement, paraphrasing part of it, suggests a date between 1210 and 1215, and conjectures that the author might have been associated with the hospice of Poor Catholics at Elne (1212).

³¹ *Hystoria albigensis*, ed. Pascal Guébin and Ernest Lyon, 3 vols. (Paris, 1926—39), I, 9—13.

³² This statement that the evil god was the first creator is unique in the sources I have seen.

earthly existence amidst cities, farms, woodlands; there they have wives and mistresses and ample food and drink. Souls who are released from imprisonment in bodies in the hell of this earth go to the land of the living to reclaim their celestial bodies and "the people of God," having despoiled the malign god by force, await the general resurrection. These heretics also said that God the Father has two wives, Collam and Colibam,³³ and children born of them. Mary Magdalene was the wife of Christ. The Waldenses, with whom the anonymous author declares himself to be most familiar (perhaps because he was a Poor Catholic), seemed to him to be much more troublesome to the Church. He mentions their claim to the right to consecrate the Eucharist and to baptize, their opposition to oaths and the death penalty, their scorn for the Roman Church, and their insistence on poverty as a condition for salvation.

In his report of the Catharist myths written about 1213, Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay does not make the statement that the malign creator was the first to act nor does he describe the seduction and fall of angels. The tenet that Christ was in this world only spiritually in Paul is repeated, but the monk adds that the heretics taught that there was an evil Christ, born and crucified in this material world, and it was he who had Mary Magdalene as concubine. Pierre also mentions the wives and children of God and goes on, as the *Manifestatio* did not, to describe the Catharist hierarchy and the rite of *consolamentum*.³⁴ For him, the Waldenses were "much less wicked" than the other heretics. Their chief errors were to wear distinctive sandals in token of their apostolic life, their refusal to swear an oath or take a life, and their claim to consecrate the Eucharist.³⁵

A third version of the myths is found in a manuscript of Prague, inscribed without caption or other identification.³⁶ This statement of "Manichaeism" beliefs agrees in part with Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay, in part with the anonymous document. It speaks of a "pseudo-Christ" who appeared in this world and the real Christ who suffered in a celestial land, "betrayed by his brothers." It mentions the wives and children of

³³ Cf. Ezech. 23 : 4. Steven Runciman, who knew this myth from Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay, suggests that it reached the Cathars by way of a Greek or Slavonic version which in turn derived from the Hebrew. *The Medieval Manichee. A Study of the Christian Dualist Heresy* (Cambridge, 1955), p. 166, n. 4.

³⁴ *Hystoria albigensis*, I, 13—16, 17—18, 19—20.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 18—19.

³⁶ Metropolitan Chapter Ms. M. 1. 527, fol. 110v. It is printed as Appendix B in *The Summa contra haereticos Ascribed to Praepositinus*, p. 292.

God but differs on the fall of angels in that the good God is said to have seduced the wife of the evil one³⁷ and for this reason Lucifer stole from heaven "gold and silver, that is, the souls of men and beasts." As in the *Manifestatio* but not in Pierre's account, Christ passed through seven realms to save His people and thus "suffered seven times." Mary Magdalene was His wife. There is no reference to the Waldenses.

Certain questions present themselves: Do these three documents confirm each other as independent witnesses? Are the variations evidence of imaginative proliferation of myths among the Cathars or might they be produced by lack of full information among the various reporters?

The DE HERESI CATHARORUM in Lombardia and its beneficiaries

A Lombard document dating from about 1200—1214³⁸ consists of three elements which give (a) a description of the origin of Italian Cathars and the schisms into which they fell, (b) statements of the doctrine peculiar to certain major groups among them, and (c) a list of the heretical hierarchy at the time of writing. The first and third parts do not seem to have attracted much contemporary attention, but the second portion was very popular. Portions of it found lodgment in more than half a dozen manuscripts, where they either stood alone or were woven into other writings about heresy and, in the course of these repetitions, details such as names of places or individuals were altered or dropped and the relationships among the heretical factions sometimes confused³⁹. The links among these borrowed excerpts constituted a puzzle for modern scholars until Dondaine's publication in 1949 allowed recourse to the original statement.⁴⁰

Arguments against the Passagians in the treatise ascribed to Praepositinus of Cremona

The *Summa contra haereticos* dating from early in the thirteenth century and ascribed, but not on very solid grounds, to Praepositinus

³⁷ In another Albigensian myth, Lucifer, son of the evil god, is said to have seduced the wife of the good God, promising her that their son, who was Christ, should be worshipped as God in this world: Döllinger, *Beiträge*, II, 612—3; cf. Célestin Douais, *La Somme des autorités à l'usage des prédicateurs méridionaux au XIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1896), p. 125.

³⁸ Published in Dondaine, "La Hiérarchie cathare en Italie. I: Le 'De heresi catharorum in Lombardia,'" *AFP*, XIX (1949), 280—312, the text appearing on pp. 306—12. Dondaine dates it (p. 290) before 1214. Borst (*Die Katharer*, p. 10) would put it about 1200.

³⁹ Dondaine discusses the various fragments: "La Hiérarchie cathare. I," *AFP*, XIX (1949), 282, 294 ff.

⁴⁰ See *ibid.*, p. 303 and n. 41 on how Salvo Burci and his modern editor were misled by a change in a copied passage.

of Cremona describes and refutes the errors of both Cathars and the short-lived sect of Passagians.⁴¹ It gave knotty problems to its editors because of extreme variations of the text in ten manuscripts which survive, in one of which it is severely abridged.⁴² The editors remark that there are no borrowings from contemporary antiheretical writings. There is, however, a probable link between the *Summa* and a work of lesser stature, the *Compilatio auctoritatum de sacramentis ecclesiae*, printed by Célestin Douais,⁴³ which is a compilation of scriptural texts for the use of preachers against heresy. A relationship may be assumed when, in works like these, in discussing a certain subject and citing appropriate biblical texts, the authors present the same or nearly the same verses in the same or nearly the same order.⁴⁴ This occurs in several of the chapters refuting Passagian doctrines in the two works.⁴⁵ Similar concordances cannot be found in their chapters which are devoted to the Cathars and the question of how the existing resemblances occurred is moot at this moment.

The Treatises of Salvo Burci and Peter Martyr

It has already been noted that the *Liber supra Stella*, written by a layman, Salvo Burci of Piacenza in 1235, reproduces inexactly a statement about divisions among Italian Cathars, derived at second or third

⁴¹ George Lacombe, who suggested the name of Praepositinus, admitted that the case for his authorship was not strong: *La Vie et les oeuvres de Prévostin* (Kain, 1927), pp. 43, 131—65; cf. his "Prévostin de Cremona," *Dict. de théol. cath.*, XIII, 165—6. On the sect, see Charles Molinier, "Les Passagiens. Etude sur une secte contemporaine des Cathares et des Vaudois," *Memoires de l'Académie des sciences, inscriptions, et belles-lettres de Toulouse*, 8th ser., X (1888), 448—9; Paul Alphandéry, "Sur les Passagiens," *Revue des études juives*, LXXXII (1926), 353—61; and most recently Raoul Manselli, "I Passagini," *Bull. dell'Ist. stor. ital. per il med. evo e Arch. murat.*, LXXV (1963), 189—210.

⁴² Dondaine ("Nouvelles Sources," *Rev. des sci. phil. et théol.*, XXVIII [1939], 482) suggested the tract may have been used for instruction and the variants might be the results of students' copying it. Marino da Milano (*L'Eresia di Ugo Speroni*, p. 31) dissents. Garvin and Corbett (*The Summa contra haereticos*, p. xv) date the treatise toward the end of the twelfth century. Other dates (1210, 1230) have been suggested: Borst, *Die Katharer*, p. 14, n. 3.

⁴³ *La Somme des autorités*, pp. 56—66, where it is the third of a group of such works. On them see pp. 291—2, below.

⁴⁴ See also n. 71, below.

⁴⁵ The chapters are: Douais III, iii (pp. 56—7) — *Summa*, XI. B (pp. 166—9, New Testament citations only); Douais III, xvii (p. 62) — *Summa*, X. B. 2 (pp. 155—6); Douais III, xviii (pp. 62—3) — *Summa*, X. B. 1 (pp. 150—5); Douais III, xx (pp. 63—4) — *Summa*, VI. B (pp. 104—16); Douais III, xxi (p. 64) — *Summa*, VIII. C (pp. 135—8); Douais III, xxii (p. 65) — *Summa*, VII. B (pp. 125—7).

hand from the *De heresi catharorum*.⁴⁶ Only one copy of Burci's tract is known. A *Summa contra haereticos* written about 1235 and attributed to Peter of Verona, the martyred inquisitor,⁴⁷ is found in two manuscripts and a passage from it was copied into a third. Although it has not been printed in its entirety it seems to be relatively free from connections with other works except for a passage recounting how the devil fabricated human bodies, which is the same as one in the *Disputatio inter catholicum et paterinum hereticum*, which will be referred to in more detail below. The editor of Peter Martyr's *Summa* suggests the dependence of both authors on a third source.⁴⁸ A passage from Book II of the *Summa* on the errors of heretics called "predestinati" was simplified and shortened when it was copied elsewhere.⁴⁹

*The DISPUTATIO INTER CATHOLICUM ET PATERINUM HERETICUM
and Moneta of Cremona's ADVERSUS CATHAROS ET VALDENSES*

The *Disputatio*, referred to in the preceding paragraph, exhibits changes due to addition of new matter and also some relationship with the great treatise of Moneta of Cremona, a work which will be spoken of in more detail in later pages. Georgius, the lay author of the *Disputatio*, probably wrote about 1240 or later in Italy.⁵⁰ Ilarino da Milano has pointed to two traditions of the text in the manuscripts: one he called the original "Italian" tract; another, created when a chapter on the Eucharist was interpolated, he regarded as the work of French scribes. Only the latter has been printed.⁵¹ A shortened version of the *Disputatio* also exists, attributed to "Fratr Torso,"⁵² and some excerpts of the

⁴⁶ Dondaine, "La Hiérarchie cathare. I," *AFP*, XIX (1949), 303, n. 41. Burci's work is printed in part in Döllinger, *Beiträge*, II, 52—84, and in Ilarino da Milano, "Il 'Liber supra Stella' del piacentino Salvo Burci contra i Catari e altre correnti ereticali," *Aevum*, XIX (1945), 307—41. On the author and treatise see *ibid.*, XVI (1942), 272—319; XVII (1943), 90—146.

⁴⁷ Kämpeli, "Un Somme contre les hérétiques," *AFP*, XVII (1947), 295—355.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 325, n. 38.

⁴⁹ Dondaine, "Durand de Huesca," *AFP*, XXIX (1959), 266, n. 92, gives the text of the copied passage. Cf. Kämpeli, *op. cit.*, pp. 331—2.

⁵⁰ Ilarino da Milano, ("Fr. Gregorio, O.P.," *Aevum*, XIV [1940], 85—140, esp. pp. 88—97), attributed the treatise to Gregory, bishop of Fano (1240—44). Dondaine ("Le Manuel de l'inquisiteur [1230—1330], *AFP*, XVII [1947], 85—194, esp. pp. 174—9) overthrew this in favor of Georgius, otherwise unknown.

⁵¹ Martène and Durand, *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum*, V (Paris 1717), 1703—54. Passages from the "Italian" manuscripts are published by Ilarino da Milano in the article cited in the preceding note, pp. 125—40. Dondaine ("Le Manuel," *AFP*, XVII [1947], 176, n. 19) argues against the classification into Italian and French versions.

⁵² On the Mss. see: Ilarino da Milano, "Fr. Gregorio, O.P.," *Aevum*, XIV (1940), 99—111; *idem*, *Le Eresie di Ugo Speroni*, pp. 34—6; Dondaine, "Le

Disputatio were copied into the miscellany collected in Paris, BN Ms. lat. 14927 (on fol. 15v).

It may be pointed out that the chapter on the Eucharist (Chapter VIII of the printed version), which differentiates the two manuscript traditions, appears in slightly different form in the *Adversus Catharos et Valdenses* of Moneta of Cremona.⁵³ Moneta divided his treatment of the Eucharist into three parts, one of which consists of nine heretical statements and the rebuttal of each. These are the arguments which constitute Chapter VIII of the *Disputatio*, although the first two items there are the last to be mentioned by Moneta. One argument and rebuttal in the *Disputatio*, it is true, has the theme but not the exact words of Moneta in that place but those sentences of the *Disputatio* are found verbatim a few pages earlier in Moneta's text.⁵⁴ To illustrate the degree of correspondence the first and last words of only one of the similar passages will be quoted; words omitted are the same in both texts, and resemblances of the same order occur in all the other paragraphs.

Disputatio (col. 1729—30)

MANICHAEUS. Si de pane fit Corpus Christi, quotidie debet augeri ipsum.

CATHOLICUS. Corpus eius non denotat naturam sed conversionem. Et est sensus, Panis convertitur in Corpus Christi, id est simul vertitur . . . Augmentum enim fit ex additione materiae augmentantis ad materiam eius quod augmentum recipit.

Moneta (p. 300, col. 1)

Item adhuc objiciunt (*sic*) haeretici, quod si de pane fit Corpus Christi quotidie debet augeri Corpus eius.

Ad quod dico, quod *de* non notat materiam, sed conversionem, & est sensus: panis convertitur in Corpus Christi, id est simul convertitur . . . augmentum enim fit ex additione materiae augmentantis ad materiam eius, quod augmentum recipit.

Manuel," *AFP*, XVII (1947), Appendix II, pp. 179—80; *idem*, "La Hiérarchie cathare: I," *AFP*, XIX (1949), 283, n. 7; *idem*, "Durand de Huesca," *AFP*, XXIX (1959), 241; Thomas Käppeli, O.P. and A. Zaninović, O.P., "Traité anti-Vaudois dans le manuscrit 30 de la Bibliothèque des Dominicains de Dubrovnik (Raguse)," *AFP*, XXIV (1954), 304. The attribution to Frater Torso occurs in Vienna, Ms. 512, fols. 108—15r: see Hermann Haupt, "Waldensia," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, X (1889), 314—5.

⁵³ Ed. T. A. Ricchini (Rome, 1743). On Moneta, see the introduction thereto, also M. Gorce, "Moneta de Crémone, ou Simoneta," *Dict. de théol. cath.*, X, 2211—5.

⁵⁴ Cf. *Adv. Cath. et Vald.*, p. 300, col. 1, line 6 to p. 302, col. 2, with Martène and Durand, *Thes. nov. anec.*, V, 1729, line 18 to col. 1732. Also cf. *Adv. Cath. et Vald.*, p. 296, col. 2, lines 5 ff., with Martène and Durand, *Thes. nov. anec.*, V, 1731, lines 5—39.

An explanation of the similarities may be that a scribe who wished to supplement the discussion of heresy in the *Disputatio* knew of a suitable document on the Eucharist which Moneta had also utilized as a source, but it cannot be ruled out that the addition to the *Disputatio* came directly from Moneta's text.

An alleged connection between the same two works occurred as the result of an accident in editing and copying. At the end of his edition of the *Disputatio*, Martène placed certain passages on the Waldenses and on predestination found in the manuscript he used.⁵⁵ Since similar remarks on predestination also appear found in Moneta's treatise,⁵⁶ Charles Schmidt concluded that Moneta borrowed from the *Disputatio*,⁵⁷ while Charles Molinier suggested that the reverse was more probable,⁵⁸ and Dondaine refused to admit that either took from the other.⁵⁹ That discussion of predestination seems, in fact, to have had an independent existence, for it is found standing alone in a manuscript of Prague under the rubric *Dialogus de praedestinatione inter catholicum et manicheum*.⁶⁰

*The SUMMAE of authorities for preachers and the SUMMA CONTRA HERETICOS
of Jacopus de Capellis*

One of the literary weapons against heresy in the thirteenth century was constructed by assembling scriptural verses appropriate to the defense of orthodox doctrine attacked by heretics. Célestin Douais published several such little compilations⁶¹ and his explanation, that they were for the use of preachers who would thus be prepared to instruct their hearers in the faith and to warn them against heretical perversions of it, has been generally accepted. In these documents, the chapter titles express orthodox doctrine — for example, "That the omnipotent God led the people out of Egypt; on Mount Sinai He gave the law to Moses, His servant"; or "That baptism is effective without the imposition of hands" — and under each heading are then listed scriptural texts,

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, V, 1756—8.

⁵⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*, col. 1756, lines 55 ff., col. 1757, lines 14 ff., with *Adv. Cath. et Vald.*, p. 549, col. 2 (Chap. 15), p. 553, col. 2, lines 29 ff., and p. 553, col. 1, lines 38 ff.

⁵⁷ *Histoire et doctrine de la secte des Cathares ou Albigeois*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1849), II, 230.

⁵⁸ "Un Traité inédit du XIII^e siècle contre les hérétiques cathares," *Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux*, V (1883), 246, n. 3.

⁵⁹ "Le Manuel," *AFP*, XVII (1947), 179; cf. p. 174, n. 10.

⁶⁰ Metropolitan Chapter, Ms. 1561 (N. XXXVII), fols. 122v—23r, according to A. Patera and A. Podlaha, *Soupis rukopisů knihovny metropolitní kapituly pražské*, 2 vols. (Prague, 1910, 1922), II, 412.

⁶¹ *La Somme des autorités*, pp. 34—113.

identified by book and chapter of the Bible and a few words of the verses. Douais published four such little tracts (to which we will refer as Douais I, II, III, and IV). Those which he numbered I and II were found in different manuscripts where each was incomplete but they are actually parts of a single compilation, as Douais suggested might be the case. The complete text appears in Leipzig, Univ. Bibl. Ms. 894, fols. 74v—77v, where a copy of Douais III also follows immediately. So Douais I—II and Douais III may be considered as two little *summae* of authorities which supplement each other: the first, a *Summa contra hereticos et manicheos*, deals with the unity of the one God, Creator, the Old Testament and the prophets, John the Baptist, human souls, the Virgin Mary, the humanity of Christ, His passion and resurrection, and the resurrection of bodies; the second, a *Summa auctoritatum de sacramentis ecclesiae*, defends the institutions of the Church, sacraments, clerical orders, church buildings, prayers for the dead, the licitness of all foods and of taking oaths, resurrection of the body, and, in chapters aimed at the Passagians, upholds the Church's teaching on the Old Testament, observance of the Sabbath, and circumcision.⁶²

The fourth of the pieces published by Douais differs from the others in the range of topics discussed, in quoting the biblical texts in full, and in that the author adds his own comment to show how the errors are refuted, yet it has some link with the other compilations. In one chapter the biblical citations in Douais IV are nearly identical with and in nearly the same order as those used for this subject in Douais I—II,⁶³ the same is partially true in two other chapters.⁶⁴ It has not previously been noticed that there is another copy of Douais IV in Volume XXXVI of the *Collection Doat* of the Bibliothèque nationale.⁶⁵ It is longer by the inclusion of more citations in many chapters and by more lengthy discussion of them by the compiler.

We may see in these documents how lists of scriptural texts relevant to a point of disputed doctrine could be used to fashion a preacher's handbook (Douais I—II, Douais III) and then be utilized in something approaching a full-scale polemical tract. All the works so far mentioned

⁶² See pp. 295—6, above and n. 45.

⁶³ Douais I, iv (p. 37) — Douais IV, ii (pp. 69—71).

⁶⁴ Douais II, xxiii (p. 47) — Douais IV, ix (pp. 76—7); Douais II, xix (p. 45) — Douais IV, x (pp. 77—8).

⁶⁵ Fols. 129r, line 6 to 203r. It was copied from a codex of sixty-six folios in the Archives of the Inquisition at Carcassonne entitled *Quaedam obiectiones hereticorum et responsiones Christianorum*. Fragments were published in Döllinger, *Beiträge*, II, 376. On another entry in this volume see pp. 307—308, below.

belong to one "family," in the sense that in several places they handle the same texts in the same order. This could not be coincidental. The proof lies in the fact that other authors put together other works of the same kind, treating the same subjects, but utilizing quite different sets of authorities. One such, existing without title in a Paris manuscript,⁶⁶ has about the same range of subjects as the Douais pieces, including a chapter against the Passagians; the format is also the same, but the scriptural texts are different.⁶⁷ Nor can any correspondence be found between any of the compilations already mentioned and an incomplete one appended to the *Brevis summula*,⁶⁸ a work which will be discussed later.

If the foregoing seems to pay too much attention to documents which are not of the first importance for the study of heresy, the justification is in the theme of this survey: interrelationships among the polemics. For the basic materials of the *summae* published by Douais were utilized to a certain extent by Jacopus de Capellis who wrote a full-scale *Summa contra hereticos* in the mid-thirteenth century.

Jacopus de Capellis was a Franciscan friar of Milan to whom are attributed a set of Lenten sermons, a devotional tract, *Stimulus amoris*, and the *Summa contra hereticos*, probably written about 1240, which has drawn attention for its testimony about the high moral standards of the Cathars.⁶⁹ In format, the *Summa* is not unusual: after stating a heretical

⁶⁶ BN Ms. lat. 14927, fols. 3r, col. 4, to 7r. It is preceded there (fols. 2r—3r) by another of the same type which is, however, useless because the entries under each chapter title give only book and chapter of the Bible, without identification of the verses.

⁶⁷ For example: In Douais II, xvii (pp. 44—5), *Quod Johannes Baptista sanctus et iustus fuit*, and in BN Ms. lat. 14927, (Chap. v [unnumbered], fol. 4r, cols. 1—2), *Quod Johannes est salvus et angelus qui nunciavit eum bonus et a Deo bono missus fuit*, there are eighteen and nine entries, respectively. Only two, perhaps three, of the citations are to the same verses. Again, in Douais IV, xxxv (pp. 108—9), *Quod sapientia est in ecclesia, et quod bonum est quod habetur ex studio*, and in BN Ms. lat. 14927, (Chap. xxvi, [unnumbered], fol. 6r, col. 2), *Quod sapientes debent esse in ecclesia*, there are ten and eleven entries, respectively, but only four are the same verses. Nor can I find any similarities of note in the verses cited in the chapter on the Passagians in this manuscript and those used in Douais III or in the *Summa* of Praepositinus(?).

⁶⁸ Douais, *La Somme des autorités*, pp. 133—41. On the *Brevis summula*, see pp. 306—7, below. Dondaine, "Durand de Huesca," *AFP*, XXIX (1959), 262—3, mentions another compilation of authorities. From his comments it does not seem comparable to the ones discussed here.

⁶⁹ Ed. Dino Buzzocchi, *La Eresia catara. Saggio storico filosofico con in appendice Disputationes nonnullae adversus haereticos, codice inedito del secolo XIII della biblioteca Malatestiana di Cesena* (Bologna, 1919, appendix separately published, 1920), using Cesena, Biblioteca Malatest. Ms. Pluteus I, viii. Excerpts from this Ms. had appeared in Döllinger, *Beiträge*, II, 273—9. Charles Molinier discussed the treatise and printed excerpts from Milan,

error and its supporting scriptural texts and arguments "from reason," the author in rebuttal reinterprets the authorities to show that they were improperly understood or do not apply, adduces still other texts against the heretics and disproves their rational arguments. Then in separate chapters,⁷⁰ he proves the truth of the orthodox position by assembling a series of scriptural texts under a title which often begins with "Probatio." These chapter titles affirming Catholic doctrine are in much the same words as the chapter titles in the compilations of authorities for preachers just described. In twenty-three of Jacopus' chapters, moreover, so many of the biblical citations are those found in the other works and they occur so much in the same order that coincidence must be ruled out as an explanation of the similarity. Furthermore, when comment in the author's own words is found in the pieces published by Douais, these words usually appear also in the *Summa*. Space allows only brief demonstrations of these resemblances. The first example gives the title and a few lines from comparable chapters.

Douais I, iv (p. 37)	Douais IV, ii (pp. 69—71)	Jacopus de Capellis [Chap.X] (p. XXXV)
Quarto capite probatur quod omnipotens Deus Ade et Eve et aliorum corporum natura[m] plasmavit.	De corporibus hominum specialiter, quod Deus creavitea.	Probatio quod bonus Deus corporum natu- ram plasmavit. Ostenso quod Deus est creator et factor huius mundi et quia elementa divisit, nunc naturam corporum bonam et a Deo omnipotente for- matam esse in divisione sexus dilucidare stude- amus. Dicit enim Chri- stus in Evangelio Ma-

Bibl. Ambrosiana, Ms. J. 5. Inf., in his "Rapport . . . Etude sur quelques manuscrits des bibliothèques d'Italie concernant l'inquisition et les croyances hérétiques du XIIe et XIIIe siècle," *Archives des missions scientifiques et littéraires*, 3rd ser., XIV (1888), 150—3, 280—2, 289—90. There are also manuscripts in Prague, Metropolitan Chapter, Ms. 527, fols. 111r—31v; and Seville, Cabilda Colombina Ms. 5—1—26, fols. 25r—87r: Dondaine, "Durand de Huesca," *AFP*, XXIX (1959), 265—6. On Jacopus de Capellis' works, see Ilarino da Milano, O.F.M. Cap., "La, 'Summa contra haereticos' di Giacomo Capelli, O.F.M., e un suo 'Quaresimale' inedito (secolo XIII)," *Collectanea franciscana*, X (1940), 66—82.

⁷⁰ I supply the chapter numbers, following the divisions of the Cesena Ms., and use pages in Bazzocchi's edition. The Prague and Milan Mss. make somewhat different chapter divisions and in the former some of the titles are missing, others are quite differently worded from other Mss.

Matt., XIX, [4]: Qui fecit ab initio masculum et.

Matt. (*sic*), X, [6]: Ab initio autem creature masculum et feminam.

Lu., III, [38]: Qui fuit Adam, qui fuit Dei.

Matt., XIX, [4]: Non legistis, quia qui fecit ab initio, masculum et feminam fecit eos."

Marcus apercius VIII^o (*sic*), [6]: Ab inicio autem creature masculum et feminam fecit eos Deus, et dixit," etc. Cum diversitas sexuum sit secundum corpus, prout hereticus predicat non est secundum spiritum: constat ergo quod Deus Adam et Eve fecit corpora. Et nota quod Dominus dixit caute "fecit," et non: "creavit," ut expresse innueret Deum corpora fecisse. Nam creare est de non esse ad esse producere, quod corporis est. Lu. III^o, [38]: „Qui fuit Adam, qui fuit Dei." Ergo Adam factus est.

thei [19 : 43]. "Non legistis, quia qui fecit ab initio, masculum et feminam fecit eos," etc. Idem vero Marcus apercius scribens dicit [10 : 6] "Ab initio autem creature masculum et feminam fecit eos Deus," etc. Cum diversitas sexus tantum secundum corpus et non secundum spiritum dicatur, constat ergo quia Deus Ade et Eve fecit corpora, et ita omnia alia corpora. Item in Evangelio Luce [3 : 38] generationem Christi gradatim discurrentis, "Qui fuit Seth, qui fuit filius Ade, qui Adam fuit filius Dei," sic ergo a Deo secundum corpus formatus . . .

There are thirteen citations in this chapter of the *Summa* of Jacopus. All are among the fifteen in the chapters of the other two compilations and are in the same order in all chapters. In Douais IV and in Jacopus' work, the authors' commentary on the texts is sometimes alike, sometimes varies, as in the example just given.

The second illustration comes from chapters on the true human flesh which Christ assumed from the Virgin. Into the list of texts is injected an apostrophe to the heretics beginning:

Douais II, xxviii
(p. 49—51)

O insane et furiosum caput hereticorum! Si filium (*sic*) Dei verum corpus non sumpsit ex substantia beate Virginis, set fantasticum corpus habebat, et oculos hominum ymaginaria visione deducebat

Jacopus de Capellis [Chap.
XXXII] (pp. CXVIII — CXIX)

O insanum et furiosum caput hereticorum! Si Filius Dei verum corpus non sumpsit ex substantia beate virginis, sed fantasticum corpus habebat et oculos hominum et imaginaria visione deludebat, ut

(sic) ut mentiuntur, dicant quem Maria pregnans habebat in utero, quem peperit, quem pannis involvit, quid in presepio reclinavit, quid pastores invenerunt in presepio, quid etiam fuit quod angelus pastoribus nuntiavit. Preterea infans fuit ille de quo pastoribus angelus signum dedit, dicens: Et hoc vobis signum: invenietis infantem pannis involutum et positum in presepio [Luke 2 : 12]. Quid VIII. die circumcisum est ? ...

mentimini, dicite quid Maria habebat in utero? Quid peperit? Quid pannis involvit? Quid in presepio reclinavit? Quid pastores invenerunt in presepio? Dicite etiam quid octavo die circumcisum est et cui nomen impositum est . . .

These passages of rhetorical questions continue, almost identical in each treatise, to the incident of the flight into Egypt. The Douais text goes on with others on Christ up to His resurrection, while Jacopus only writes: *Multa quoque similia in Scripturis diligens lector inveniri poterit*. Each chapter then lists some fifteen more biblical citations which are, with two exceptions, the same and placed in almost the same order.

A table listing the chapters of the *Summa* of Jacopus de Capellis and those of the Douais compilations which have close similarities is placed at the end of this article, but it should be noted also that there are differences between chapters which treat other subjects common to these works; those on Christ's death and resurrection, the sacrament of matrimony, oaths, and the resurrection of bodies have little in common. A tentative explanation may be that when he wrote his *Summa* Jacopus de Capellis had before him a compilation of biblical texts which belonged to the family represented by the Douais pieces, from which he borrowed for his chapters of "proof." For certain subjects he did not use this source; for others he made minor changes, such as cutting off the list of rhetorical questions in the passage quoted above, paraphrasing and summarizing some texts, adding parenthetical comment, or combining the content of two of the Douais chapters under one title in his treatise. This hypothesis explains the similarities and allows for the differences which are difficult to account for if one postulates that the compilation for preachers was made by extracting biblical verses from the longer *Summa*.⁷¹

⁷¹ Ilarino da Milano, ("La 'Summa contra haereticos,'" *Coll. franciscana*, X [1940], 72), without having noted the correspondences just discussed, remarked that the Douais compilations were derived from earlier

Sources Used by Moneta of Cremona for his ADVERSUS CATHAROS ET VALDENSES

By far the lengthiest *Summa contra hereticos* produced in the Middle Ages was that of the Dominican friar, Moneta of Cremona, who gave most of his attention to the Cathars but also briefly discussed the Waldenses as well as the errors of certain "philosophers." Moneta used a variety of sources: he cites the writings of two heretics, Desiderius⁷² and Tetricus,⁷³ and of others who are not named;⁷⁴ it has been suggested that he was familiar with a treatise written by an Albigensian heretic about 1220⁷⁵ and with a Catharist exposition of the nature of the true Church of Christ, written in Provençal.⁷⁶ He knew details of the controversy between the Poor Lombards and the Poor of Lyon.⁷⁷ He also drew on orthodox contemporaries. Moneta praises William of Auvergne, bishop of Paris (d. 1249), admitting his dependence on him for logical proof of the immortality of the soul,⁷⁸ and there is a probability that he also knew the work of the Dominican preacher, Roland of Cremona.⁷⁹ Two other instances of possible dependence of Moneta on other works may be mentioned before turning to the relationship between his treatise and that of Jacopus de Capellis.

polemical treatises. Douais (*La Somme des autorités*, p. 33), observed that it would be easy to find similar scriptural texts used to demonstrate the same truths in great numbers in the *summae* of authorities and the *summae* against heretics. Tedious hours of comparison of texts have not allowed me to substantiate these judgments. Except in instances noted in this article, it has been my experience that when one compares the method by which two authors refute a heretical error or prove a point of doctrine, a few texts may be used in common but the majority will be different and the interpretation of those which are used in common will vary considerably.

⁷² *Adv. cath. et Vald.*, pp. 248, 347, 357. On Desiderius, see Borst, *Die Katharer*, pp. 12, 122, 162, 165.

⁷³ *Adv. Cath. et Vald.*, pp. 61, 71—9. On Tetricus, see Borst, *op. cit.*, pp. 12, 274, n. 19.

⁷⁴ *Adv. Cath. et Vald.*, p. 2, col. 2: "ex scripturis suis"; p. 94, col. 2: "ut Haereticus dixit in quodam suo tractatu"; p. 398, col. 1: "Dixit haereticus et scripsit."

⁷⁵ The "Manichaeian" heretic whom Durand of Huesca attacked: see p. 291, above. The suggestion was made by Jean Duvernoy, "Un Traité cathare du début du XIII^e siècle," *Cahiers d'études cathares*, 2nd ser., No. XIII (1962), 22—54, esp. pp. 29—30, but the evidence is not conclusive.

⁷⁶ Theo Venckeleer, "Un Recueil cathare: le manuscrit A. 6. 10 de la 'Collection vaudois' de Dublin," *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, XXXVIII (1960), 833.

⁷⁷ He comments (p. 403) on the controversial opinions of Brother Thomas who is mentioned in the letter of the Lombards to their German friends: Wilhelm Preger, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Waldesier im Mittelalter," *Abhandlungen der hist. Cl. der k. bay. Akademie der Wissenschaften*, XIII (1877), 234—41. The letter is reprinted with annotations in Gonnet, *Enchiridion*, pp. 169—83.

⁷⁸ *Adv. Cath. et Vald.*, p. 422.

⁷⁹ Borst, *Die Katharer*, pp. 18, n. 20; 272, n. 11; 275, nn. 21, 22.

An example of dependence of two documents on a common source, if of not one directly on the other, is found by comparing portions of Moneta's treatise with parts of the *Brevis summula contra errores notatos hereticorum*. The latter, known in a single manuscript, consists of various materials apparently assembled by a Franciscan preacher for his own use.⁸⁰ There is a prologue, probably written after the other portions had been transcribed. Then comes a passage said to be recorded from the words of two heretics, John de Pergamo und John de Cucullio, which describes the tenets of absolute dualism and the Catharist hierarchy. This is followed by excerpts from the *De heresi catharorum*,⁸¹ supplemented by a further description of beliefs of the Albigenses.⁸² Finally occurs a "catalogue" of heretical beliefs,⁸³ a refutation of which was begun but left incomplete.⁸⁴

Our concern is with the passage attributed to John de Pergamo and John de Cucullio,⁸⁵ because it appears to have some affinity with a statement of Catharist teaching which Moneta of Cremona put as a preface to his work. The *Brevis summula* here notices only absolute dualism; while Moneta, after summarizing beliefs of the absolute dualists, goes on with those of mitigated dualism. Although more succinct, his statements about the first of these groups are phrased much like those in the *Brevis summula*. In rough measure, it may be said that of twenty-four points of belief made in the *Brevis summula* (that is, in the first paragraph and succeeding ones beginning "Item"), more than half are in Moneta's pages but not in the same order, and Moneta makes a number of points unknown to the other.⁸⁶ One example of the passages which are alike may suffice:

⁸⁰ Douais, *La Somme des autorités*, pp. 114—43. It was also edited by Charles Molinier, "Un Texte de Muratori concernant les sectes Cathares: sa provenance réelle et sa valeur," *Annales du Midi*, XXII (1910), 199—206, separately printed (Toulouse, 1910). I cite pages from the separate printing. On the Ms. and the compiler, see Douais, *op. cit.*, pp. 22—8; Dondaine, "La Hiérarchie cathare: I," *AFP*, XIX (1949), 294—8.

⁸¹ See p. 295, above.

⁸² I have not seen this passage on the Albigenses elsewhere, except for excerpts in Döllinger, *Beiträge*, II, 612—3, and in connection with the treatise of Benedict of Alignan: see p. 315, and n. III, below.

⁸³ See p. 315, below.

⁸⁴ See p. 301, n. 68, above.

⁸⁵ The first of these individuals is thought to be John of Lugio, whose theology inspired a Catharist treatise, *Liber de duobus principiis*, published by Dondaine, *Un Traité néo-manichéen du XIII^e siècle: le Liber de duobus principiis, suivi d'un fragment de rituel cathare* (Rome, 1939). See also Borst, *Die Katharer*, pp. 254—84.

⁸⁶ Cf. Douais, *La Somme des autorités*, pp. 115—21 and Molinier, *Texte de Muratori*, pp. 28—36, with *Adv. Cath. et Valde*, pp. 2—5.

Brevis summula (ed. Douais, p. 120, lines 9—31; ed. Molinier, p. 34, line 14 ff.)

Moneta of Cremona (p. 4, col. 2 line 25 to p. 5, col. 1, line 7)

Item, faciunt distinctionem inter spiritum sanctum et spiritum paraclitum et spiritum principalem. Scilicet [Spiritus?] sanctum, id est firmum, ut diximus, appellant unumquemque illorum spirituum, quos superius diximus fuisse datos animabus seductis seu deceptis ad illarum custodiam et regimen in presenti dari [*corr.* vita], quos ideo sanctos appellant, quia firmi perstiterunt nec decepti fuerunt. Spiritum Paraclitum, id est consolatorem dicunt illum quem unaqueque anima recipit, cum in Christo secundum illorum monitionem consolationem sumit. Unde et multos spiritus paraclitos, id est consolatores esse putant; et illos quidam illorum a Deo factos seu creatos oppinantur; alii eorum semper fuisse affirmant; de quo spiritu dicunt Christum dixisse: "Spiritus Paraclitum dabo (*sic*) vobis," etc. [John 14 : 16]. Spiritum principalem dicunt illum esse quem nos Spiritum Sanctum appellamus. Set Psalmista illum dixit principalem; nam, inquit, "spiritu principali confirma me." [Ps. 50 : 14]. Set et ipsi illum spiritum sanctum spiritum appellant, cum dicunt: Adoremus Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum.

Isti distinguunt inter animam, & spiritum: distinctionem etiam faciunt inter Spiritum Sanctum, & Spiritum Paraclitum, & Spiritum principalem. Spiritum Sanctum appellant unumquemque illorum spirituum, quos secundum intellectum eorum Deus Pater dedit ipsis animabus ad custodiam. Illos autem spiritus ideo sanctos dicunt, id est firmos, quia firmi steterunt, nec decepti nec seducti fuerunt a Diabolo. Spiritum Paraclitum dicunt Spiritum consolatorem, quem recipiunt etiam illi quando recipiunt consolationem in Christo; & dicunt multos esse Paraclitos, & a Deo creatos. Spiritum principalem dicunt unum Spiritum Sanctum, de quo intelligunt illud verbum, quod orantes dicunt: *Adoremus Patrem, & Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum.*

A second document which is to a certain extent comparable with passages in Moneta's work is found in Volume XXXVI of the *Collection*

Doat.⁸⁷ In the sixth chapter of his second book, Moneta analyzes the heretics' assertion that on four counts the god of the Old Testament can be shown to be evil; he states and refutes their arguments and then proves the truth of the orthodox position. His opening words are also those of the passage in the *Collection Doat*⁸⁸ (designated as *CD* in the following lines):

Quoniam haeretici, qui Cathari vocantur, Deum Veteris Testamenti datorem (*CD omits* datorem) reprobare nituntur, hunc profanum errorem (*CD adds* prius) elidere intendamus hoc modo, scilicet, ut prius eorum (*CD ipsorum*) objectiones velut proprios gladios in eosdem convertamus . . . Quarta est ex mandato (*CD mendatio*) de quo Deus ipse (*CD omits* ipse) arguens videtur.

Moneta then presents the heretical "objections," that is, their scriptural texts and interpretations thereof, at greater length than does the other version, but there are close similarities between the statements attributed to the heretics in both documents. The refutations of them, however, are not often much alike. As they discuss this subject, the two texts eventually part company completely,⁸⁹ come together again when the theme changes to the Catholics' proof that the same god is author of both testaments,⁹⁰ then diverge again. Moneta does not give his opponents a name other than Cathars. The passage in *Collection Doat* calls them Cathars and also "Bugari" and "Albigenses," terms more common north of the Alps than in Italy. It also has, under the rubric *Haeticus dixit quod non est iurandum*, a passage not found in Moneta, in which is the comment: "But this we will deal with more fully in its place,"⁹¹ allowing the supposition that the document copied into the *Collection Doat* was part of or was intended to be part of a longer work. Perhaps we may see here an instance in which two authors had access to a statement of heretical beliefs and each developed his refutation as he saw fit.

The similarity of another passage in Moneta's work to the words of an early controversialist writer may be only coincidental. In describing the origins of the Cathars, Moneta gives a "genealogy of error" which names as ancestors of the Cathars certain ancient heretics: Pythagoras, Zarden,

⁸⁷ Fols. 91v—129r, where it immediately precedes the *summa* of authorities referred to on p. 300 and n. 65, above. Fragments were published in Döllinger, *Beiträge*, II, 375—6.

⁸⁸ *Adv. Cath. et Vald.*, p. 143, col. 2; *Coll. Doat*, XXXVI, fol. 91v.

⁸⁹ *Adv. Cath. et Vald.*, p. 163, col. 1; *Coll. Doat*, XXXVI, fol. 118v.

⁹⁰ *Adv. Cath. et Vald.*, p. 166; *Coll. Doat*, XXXVI, fol. 119v.

⁹¹ *Coll. Doat*, XXXVI, fol. 105v.

Arfaxat, the Sadducees, Mani, Tatian, Valentinian.⁹² A list of this sort had been drawn up a half-century earlier by Durand of Huesca,⁹³ who enumerates a half a dozen more predecessors of his contemporary heretics than does Moneta. It is possible that Moneta knew and used that earlier list.⁹⁴ At any rate, his own was later copied with minor changes for use in the *Summa* of Benedict of Alignan.⁹⁵

As we now turn to a comparison of the work of Moneta of Cremona with that of Jacopus de Capellis, it must be kept in mind that the former's treatise is much longer; in it his organization is more consistent, his argument more intricate, and he discusses many more heretical errors than Jacopus does. To demonstrate resemblances, a running account of the two works and quotations of selected passages may suffice.

Absolute dualism is the first subject in both treatises, dealt with briefly by Jacopus, at length by Moneta, but when they describe heretical arguments there are comparable passages, for example:

Jacopus de Capellis
(pp. V—VI)

Similiter ad probandum quod diabolus sit creator inducunt quod Dominus dixit in Evangelio Mathei (15 : 13), "Omnis . . . eradicabitur." Ergo aliquid est quod Pater celestis non plantavit, ergo diabolus plantavit, ergo est creator.

Moneta of Cremona
(p. 11, col. 2)

Haer[eticus]. Ad idem inducunt illud, quod dicitur Matth. 15. v. 13. "Omnis . . . eradicabitur." Ergo aliqua plantatio est quam Pater Jesu Christi non plantavit, &c., & ita Diabolus plantavit illam: & ita Diabolus est creator, vel factor creaturarum.

And again: (p. VII)

(p. 36, col. 2)

Ad hec fabulantur quod Lucifer qui filius est mali dei sicut Christus

Ponunt autem isti quod Filius mali dei in caelum ascendit, ubi

⁹² *Adv. Cath. et Vald.*, p. 411.

⁹³ First for his *Liber antiheresis*: see Dondaine, "Aux Origines du valdisme," *AFP*, XVI (1946), 234. Durand repeated it with variations in his *Liber contra manicheos*: see Thouzellier, *Une Somme anti-cathare*, pp. 237—9, cf. pp. 74—6. Valuable notes identifying these ancient heresies are found on the pages of the last-named work.

⁹⁴ Thouzellier (*Une Somme anti-cathare*, p. 237, note) thinks that he did.

⁹⁵ Cf. Martin Grabmann, "Der Franziskanerbischof Benedictus de Alignano († 1268) und seine *Summa* zum Caput *Firmiter* des vierten Laterankonzils," *Kirchengeschichtliche Studien P. Michael Bihl, O.F.M., als Ehrengabe dargeboten* (Kolmar, 1944), pp. 50—64, esp. p. 51. I have used microfilms of the passage of Munich CLM, 7454, fols. 90v—91r. See also p. 316, n. 111, below.

est filius boni Dei, in celum ascendit et ibi transfiguravit se in angelum lucis; unde quia ita pulcherrimus erat angeli celestis curie eum diligentes susceperunt et factus est villicus et quasi dominus super angelos.⁹⁶

in Angelum lucis transfiguratus propter vehementem suam pulchritudinem dilectus est ab Angelis Dei, & assumptus in villicum, & quasi Dominus super ipsos.

The same degree of relationship may be seen in numerous succeeding comments on heretical beliefs. In the refutations of the heretical arguments, however, there is not much that is similar.

In his second book, Moneta turns to the mitigated dualists. Jacopus is briefer in discussing them, but when both come to the occasion of Adam's sin, their statements of heretical teaching are quite similar. Only the opening and closing sentences are quoted, but the portions omitted have the same degree of similarity:

Jacopus de Capellis
(p. XXVIII)

Dicunt enim serpentem accessisse mulieri et cum cauda eam adulterasse, et ita libidinosum pruritum carnis in eam infudisse, de quo coitu quidam illorum ortum esse Caym suspicantur . . . Per hoc etiam versimile credunt esse quod vir et mulier continuo membra illa pudibunda cooperuerunt ad significandum quia in illis membris peccaverunt.

Moneta of Cremona
(p. III, col. 2)

Fuit autem peccatum Adae, ut asserunt fornicatio carnalis, dicunt enim quod semper [serpens?] accessit ad mulierum, et cum cauda corrumpit eam, et ex eius coitu cum ipsa natum esse Cain . . . etiam putant, quod propter hoc vir, et mulier continuo membra illa pudenda velaverunt, sed quod propter hoc fuerit, hoc non possunt ostendere.

When discussing other doctrines, the two treatises are not markedly alike until they come to heretical assertions about the Old Testament. To quote only in part:

Jacopus de Capellis
(pp. XCII—XCIII)

. . . sicut enim diabolum Vetus Testamentum dedisse fabulantur,

Moneta of Cremona
(p. 218, col. 1)

Et sicut diabolum dedisse Vetus Testamentum; ita etiam dicunt

⁹⁶ I have not noted corrections of the text of Bazzocchi's edition which I have made, using microfilm of the Cesena Ms.

eodem errore prophetas misisse mentiuntur . . . Addunt quoque quidam illorum omnes prophetas esse dampnatos preter Ysaïam. Habent enim quemdam libellum Ysaïe in quo continetur quod spiritus Ysaïe a corpore raptus usque ad VII celos ductus est, ibique vidit et audivit archana verba; quem libellum quia tales innectit fabulas carius amplectuntur. Scripturam illam credo esse apocrifam a catholice fidei orthodoxis olim repudiatam que apud illos uetusque retenta est.⁹⁷

ipsum misisse Prophetas . . . aliquando autem omnes damnabant praeter Isaïam, cuius dicunt esse quemdam libellum, in quo habetur, quod spiritus Isaïae raptus a corpore usque ad septimum caelum ductus est, in quo vidit, & audivit quaedam arcana, quibus vehementissime innituntur. Absit autem, quod ille liber unquam fuerit Isaïae: sed eorum peccatis exigentibus, sicut in aliis spiritibus erroris intendunt, ita et in illo libello.

In respect of heretical opinion about John the Baptist, both Jacopus and Moneta have passages reminiscent of the *De heresi catharorum*.⁹⁸

Jacopus de Capellis
(p. CIV)

Addunt preterea quia quando de Christo prophetavit et ipsum digito demonstravit, cogeatur ea dicere Spiritu Sancto eius ministerio quasi per tubam loquente . . . Credunt enim diabolum illum

Moneta of Cremona
(p. 227, col. 1)

Dicunt etiam, quod eius baptismus fuit a Diabolo, qui misit eum baptizare, ut baptismum Christi impediret . . . Dicunt etiam praedicti Haeretici, quod Johannes, si quae bona de Christo dixit,

⁹⁷ This is a reference to the *Vision of Isaiah*, part of an ancient apocryphal work, the *Ascent of Isaiah*, preserved among the Bogomils, which reached the West in Latin translation. On it, see Emile Turdeneau, "Apocryphes bogomiles et apocryphes pseudo-bogomiles," *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, CXXXVIII (1950), 22—52, 176—218, esp. pp. 213—8. The *Vision* narrates Isaiah's ascent to the throne of God, where he beheld Christ's passage through the seven heavens to earth. It is reflected in the *Manifestatio haeresis Albigensium* and related documents: see pp. 293—5, above. Durand of Huesca knew of the Albigenses' use of the apocryphal work about 1223: Thouzellier, *Une Somme anti-cathare*, pp. 256—7, 288. A quotation from it appears in a heretical treatise in Provençal: Venckeleer, "Un Recueil cathare: II," *Rev. belge de phil. et d'hist.*, XXXIX (1961), 764; and for fourteenth century versions see Döllinger, *Beiträge*, II, 166—7, 208—10.

⁹⁸ The *De heresi catharorum* reads: De Johanne baptista dicunt, quod fuit missus a diabolo cum baptismo aque ad impediendam predicationem christi Et quando christum digito demonstrabat vel de eo aliquid predicebat, non a se set a spiritu sancto et eo quasi per tubam loquentem, quasi coactus ignorans loquebatur": Dondaine, "La Hiérarchie cathare: I," *AFP*, XIX (1949), 311, lines 34 ff.

misisse ut in aqua baptizaret et ita eis videtur quia ea que de Christo prophetabat coactus ignominanter dicebat . . . Itaque quando a Spiritu Sancto cogeatur aliquid de Christo predicere tunc quasi cognoscens loquebatur, quando vero subtrahebatur Spiritus, tacens ignorabat.

coactus dixit, nesciens quid diceret . . . volunt quod quando a Spiritu Sancto cogeatur aliquid dicere de Christo, tunc quasi cognoscens loquebatur; quando vero Spiritus bonus subtrahebat se ei, tacebat, ignorans quid diceret.

Both also add that according to the heretics John doubted Christ and was never His disciple.⁹⁹ The replies they make and the biblical texts they cite are much alike.

The similarities in the two texts are close when heretical errors in respect of Christ and His human nature are the subject. Moneta calls the heretics "Sclavi" at this point; Jacopus merely refers to "certain heresiarchs." The doctrine both report is, in part, derived from the *De heresi catharorum*.¹⁰⁰ The refutations of the two authors differ. To quote only the opening and closing words of comparable paragraphs:

Jacopus de Capellis
(p. CXII)

Quidam igitur ex heresiarchis eorum dogmatizant quoniam Deus tres angelos misit in mundum . . . "manere donec veniam" (John 21 : 22).

(p. CXIII)

Machinantur insuper angelum illum in muliebri forma appellatum Mariam . . . quibus similitudinibus moliuntur astruere.

(*ibid.*)

Alii vero de sapientibus hereticorum predictam fabulationem falsam . . . sine semine viri natam esse opinantur.

Moneta of Cremona
(p. 233, col. 1)

Sclavi vero dicunt, quod Deus pater justorum tres Angelos misit in mundum . . . "manere donec veniam." Jo. ultimo 22.

(*ibid.*)

Machinantur autem insuper illum Angelum . . . quod nullo testimonio confirmantur.

(*ibid.*)

Alii autem Haeretici, qui unum ponunt principium . . . de sola muliere sine virili semine natam.

⁹⁹ Jacopus de Capellis, pp. CVI—CVII; Moneta of Cremona, p. 229, col. 1, p. 230, col. 2.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Dondaine, "La Hiérarchie cathare: I," *AFP*, XIX (1949), 311, lines 26—33.

(pp. CXIII—CXV)

Dicunt enim quia Christus in ea sed non de ea corpus assumpsit . . . neque vere in corpore resurrexit, denique nec cum corpore in celum ascendit.

(pp. 247—8)

Est autem et alia aliorum Catharorum . . . qui dicunt quod Christus in ea, non de ea carnem assumpsit . . . nec etiam vere surrexit.

A striking resemblance also exists between the descriptions by Jacopus de Capellis and Moneta of the heretical hierarchy and the method of granting the *consolamentum*. The only differences are Moneta's reference to "subdeacons" among the heretics and Jacopus' comment on the Cathars' missionary zeal and fraternal affection. However, at the end Jacopus appends a defense of heretical morality of which there is no trace in Moneta's pages. The first and last sentences of the two passages will be quoted and Jacopus' peroration translated:

Jacopus de Capellis

(pp. CXXXVI—CXXXIX)

Habent enim sacramentum impositionis manuum quod dicunt esse baptismum Spiritus Sancti sine qua manuum impositione neminem credunt posse salvari, quam manus impositionem illorum episcopus facit. Si vero non adsit episcopus duo filii episcopi hoc faciendi potestatem habent . . . Hanc utique impositionem manuum credentibus sue secte egrotantibus secundum predictam formam faciunt.

Moneta of Cremona

(p. 270)

Impositionem autem manuum Baptismum dicunt esse Spiritus Sancti, sine qua manuum impositione neminem dicunt posse salvari, quam manuum impositionem facit Episcopus eorum, si est praesens; sin autem, eam faciunt duo, quorum unum appellant Filium maiorem, et alium Filium minorem . . . Item si contingat aliquos Sectae suae graviter infirmari, si volunt, praedicto modo eis faciunt impositionem manuum.

Jacques then continues:

"[From their administration of this sacrament to invalids has arisen] the popular rumor that they kill them by strangulation, so that they may be martyrs or confessors.¹⁰¹ From personal knowledge we affirm

¹⁰¹ A reference to the practice of *endura*, murder or suicide after the *consolamentum* was received. There is scholarly dispute as to the prevalence of this practice: see Charles Molinier, "L'Endura, coutume religieuse des derniers sectaires albigeois," *Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux*, ser. I, III (1881), 282—99; Yves Dossat, "L'Evolution des rituels cathares," *Revue de synthèse*, XXIII (1848), 29—30; Manselli, "Per la storia dell'eresia,"

this to be untrue and we urge that no one believe that they commit so shameful an act. For we know that they suppose their behavior to be virtuous and they do many things that are in the nature of good works: in frequent prayer, in vigils, in sparsity of food and clothing, and — let me acknowledge the truth — in the austerity of abstinence, they surpass all other religious, so that truly in them are fulfilled the words of the Apostle: 'For such false apostles, deceitful workers . . .' citing II *Cor.* 11 : 13—15, and *Rom.* 10 : 2—3).

In subsequent chapters, both authors use similar phrases as they describe the heretical ceremony of breaking bread at meals¹⁰² and state the heretics' objections to matrimony, where Jacopus again comments on their morality but Moneta does not.¹⁰³ Finally, in the discussion of errors about resurrection of bodies, there are a dozen passages of more than casual likeness reporting the words of the heretics, although the rebuttals of these are not as much alike. One example, perfectly typical, may be quoted:

Jacopus de Capellis
(p. CXCIH)

Quadam etiam absurditatem . . . attendentes futuram carnis negant resurrectionem. Cadaver quidem aut in terre pulverem redigitur aut a vermibus sive bestiis vel quibuslibet aliis animantibus consumitur, et in carnem eorum transit. Quandoque et per diversa terrarum loca spargitur ut manus sive pes in orientalibus partibus, residuum autem corpus in occidentalibus sepeliatur. Harum itaque absurditate consideratione

Moneta of Cremona
(p. 348, col. 1)

Tertiam causam ponunt per quam credunt, quod ista corpora non sunt resurrectura, scilicet quia vident ea vel in pulverem redigi, vel a vermibus, aut bestiis consumi, quandoque etiam videmus ea diversis terrarum esse conspersa, ita quod una pars corporis sit in una parte mundi, et alia in alia parte.

Bull. dell' Ist. stor. ital. per il med. evo e Arch. murat., LXVII (1955), 225—31; J. L. Riol, "Dernieres connaissances textuelles et folkloriques sur des questions cathares: le salut spirituel et l'abrégement mystique de la vie," *Bulletin de la Société des sciences, arts, et belles-lettres de Tarn*, n. s., XXI (1961), 193—213. Also see *Cahiers d'études cathares*, XVI (2nd ser., No. 27) (1965), 63—4.

¹⁰² Jacopus de Capellis, p. CL; Moneta of Cremona, p. 296, col. 1.

¹⁰³ Jacopus de Capellis, pp. CLVII—CLVIII; Moneta of Cremona, pp. 315 ff. The passage from Jacopus is printed in Molinier, "Rapport . . . Etude sur quelques manuscrits," *Arch. des missions sci. et litt.*, 3rd ser., XIV (1888), 289—90.

pulvisculum illum cohadunari posse et iterum in humanum corpus formari non credunt.

But attention must also be called to the fact that this and other comments on resurrection which are alike in the two treatises are relatively small parts of a long discussion by Moneta, a substantially shorter one by Jacopus.¹⁰⁴

That proportion holds true throughout both works, so that any attempt to analyze their relationship must take account of two facts: passages they have in common are too numerous and too closely alike for the similarity to be attributed to coincidence, yet all of them together constitute only a portion of Jacopus' *Summa*, a very small part of that of Moneta. If one author borrowed from the other's work, it would seem to have been Moneta, not Jacopus, for the Dominican's work is much more inclusive than the rather selective treatment by the Franciscan. It is easier to see how Moneta could have adapted borrowed passages into his methodical, step-by-step analysis and exposition than to find a principle on which Jacopus, if he took over some of Moneta's work, chose certain elements and ignored others. Of course, a possible explanation of the similarities is that both authors exploited a common source. This might account for the differences in their comments on the *Vision of Isaiah*, for Jacopus' addition of a defense of heretical morality, for Moneta's reference to the "Sclavi" when Jacopus wrote "certain heresiarchs," and for Moneta's reference to "subdeacons," an office not mentioned in other descriptions of the Cathars' hierarchy. Beyond suggesting these alternatives we cannot go at the moment.

Minor writings about heresy

It has been suggested in preceding pages that short documents on some aspects of heretical doctrine may have been in circulation and known to various controversialist writers: the bits and pieces of the *De haeresi catharorum*, the debates over predestination and the Eucharist are examples. Another document several times copied is a catalogue of the errors of Italian groups of Cathars which forms part of the *Brevis summula*.¹⁰⁵ Captioned *Hic breviter notantur errores hereticorum trium sectarum*, it gives a long list of heretical tenets, each followed by letters, A, B, C,

¹⁰⁴ Jacopus de Capellis, pp. CXCIII—CCX; Moneta of Cremona, pp. 346—72.

¹⁰⁵ Douais, *La Somme des autorités*, pp. 130—3; Molinier, *Un Texte de Muratori*, pp. 43—6.

to show which faction of the Italian Cathars (Albanenses, Bagnolenses, Concorezzenses) professed it.¹⁰⁶ It was originally composed as a continuation of the description of the "Albigenses" which immediately precedes it in the *Brevis summula*, for the language of many items in the list is that of the preceding passage. However, the catalogue of errors alone was copied into manuscripts used by inquisitors and it was also preserved by an Italian chronicler.¹⁰⁷

Other short items, such as descriptions of the origins of the Waldenses, of their errors and sacramental practices, were also many times copied in the inquisitorial archives.¹⁰⁸ Toward the middle of the thirteenth century, anyone who wished to compose a tract against heresy could probably find a considerable supply of sources for the purpose.

The TRACTATUS FIDEI of Benedict of Alignan

Benedict of Alignan, bishop of Marseilles (1229—68), who became a Franciscan friar without relinquishing his bishopric,¹⁰⁹ wrote a commentary on the first canon of the Fourth Lateran Council, 1215, in which he argued against a very large number of errors, ancient and contemporary. Although not cast in the usual form of the thirteenth century treatises against heresy, it belongs in that tradition.¹¹⁰ Since it is still unedited, its content cannot be discussed here, only certain other matters which were attached to the treatise. In one manuscript (Munich CLM 7454) an introduction was formed from portions of the *Brevis summula* and a passage from Moneta of Cremona's work.¹¹¹ Also, in more than one

¹⁰⁶ The text actually reads "Albigenses" instead of "Albanenses," but the other sects were Italian, and in the passage of refutation which follows (Douais, *La Somme des autorités*, p. 134) are the words: "Set Albanenses dicunt." On the likelihood that Albanenses are in question see: Molinier, *Un Texte de Muratori*, p. 9, n. 1; Ilarino da Milano, "Il 'Liber supra Stella,'" *Aevum*, XIX (1945), 304—6; Etienne Delaruelle, "Le Catharisme en Languedoc vers 1200: une enquête," *Annales du Midi*, LXII (1960), 152.

¹⁰⁷ Molinier, "Rapport . . . Etudes sur quelques manuscrits," *Arch. des missions sci. et litt.*, 3rd ser., XIV (1888), 143; Dondaine, "Le Manuel," *AFP*, XVII (1947), 169.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 95, n. 31; cf. pp. 133, 150, 166, 184. On the short pieces about Waldenses see also Dondaine, "La Hiérarchie cathare," *AFP*, XX (1950), 250, 320—21; Thouzellier, *Catharisme et valdésisme*, pp. 174—6.

¹⁰⁹ Grabmann, "Der Franziskanerbischof Benedictus," in *Kirchengeschichtliche Studien*, p. 50; *Histoire littéraire de la France*, XIX (Paris, 1895), 84—91.

¹¹⁰ Grabmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 62—3. See his analysis of the treatise as it appears in Munich CLM 7454, *ibid.*, pp. 55—9.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 51. On fol. 90v of Munich CLM 7454, preceding the prologue of the treatise is written: *Nota per A. significatur secta Albigenium, per B illorum de Bagulo, per C illorum de Cocoregio*. These words elsewhere introduce the list of heretical tenets mentioned above (cf. Douais, *La Somme des autorités*, p. 130; Molinier, *Un Texte de Muratori*, p. 43), but the list does

manuscript certain short pieces which may not have come from Benedict's pen were appended.¹¹² One of these explains why it should occasion no surprise that heretics bear punishment unflinchingly, since the devil supports them, others explain how converts should be welcomed and suggest procedures for interrogation. Of particular interest is still another, an oath to be taken by those who abjure heresy, which has an ancient lineage, having originated in a fifth century procedure for episcopal ordination. With certain changes, the ancient text became a profession of faith in 991 for Gerbert of Aurillac, archbishop-elect of Reims and later Pope Sylvester II,¹¹³ and was revived during the furor over the heresy discovered at Orléans in 1022.¹¹⁴ With significant additions, the profession was used by Waldes of Lyon to affirm his orthodoxy in 1180¹¹⁵ and was accepted by Durand of Huesca and companions when they were reconciled to the Church by Innocent III in 1208.¹¹⁶ Then, by a few further alterations the credo originating in the fifth century was adapted to thirteenth century conditions and added to Benedict of Alignan's treatise against heresy.

Treatises by inquisitors

After the middle of the thirteenth century, the character of the treatises on heresy changed, for the day of discussion and debate was

not appear here; instead there is the description of the heretics of Concorezzo: *Heretici vero de Cocoregio . . . locum illorum non salvandorum* (cf. Douais, *op. cit.*, pp. 123—4; Molinier, *op. cit.*, pp. 39—40). The scribe then passed over intervening paragraphs in the *Brevis summula* to copy part of its comment on the "Albigenses": *Albigensi dicunt quod Lucifer fuit filius mali dei . . . non comedit nec bibit corporaliter* (cf. Douais, *op. cit.*, p. 125) and followed this with the "genealogy of heresy" taken from Moneta of Cremona: *Fuit quidam paganus pictagoras nomine . . . quos Cathari populi imitantur* (cf. *Adv. Cath. et Vald.*, p. 411).

¹¹² They were printed by Célestin Douais in "Les Hérétiques du Midi au XIII^e siècle: cinq pièces inédits," *Annales du Midi*, III (1891), 367—80 from BN Ms. lat. 4224. Cf. Grabmann, *op. cit.*, p. 59, for Munich 7454. I have seen comment in manuscript catalogues indicating that they are found in other Mss.

¹¹³ Julien Havet, *Lettres de Gerbert (983—997)* (Paris, 1889: "Collection des Textes . . ." [No. 6]), Ep. 180, pp. 161 f. On Gerbert and his supposed heretical leanings, see Ilarino da Milano, O.F.M. Cap., "L'Eresie popolari del secolo XI nell'Europe occidentale," in *Studi Gregoriani*, II (Rome, 1947), 44—5; Borst, *Die Katharer*, p. 78, n. 3.

¹¹⁴ P. Ewald, "Vita Gauzlini abbatis Floriacensis von Andreas von Fleury (ca. 1041)," *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde*, III (1878), 351—83; see Chaps. XLIV, XLV of the *Vita*.

¹¹⁵ Dondaine, "Aux Origines du valdésisme," *AFP*, XVI (1946), 191—203. See the description of the circumstances, the text of Waldes' profession, and the analysis of its antecedents in Thouzellier, *Catharisme et valdésisme*, pp. 25—34.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 218—21.

yielding to that of interrogation of suspects.¹¹⁷ Inquisitors who wrote for the information of their colleagues, with the notable exception of Rainerius Sacconi in his *De catharis et leonistis seu pauperibus de Lugduno* (1250),¹¹⁸ usually used pre-existing documents to supplement the information they had personally acquired. An example of this is found in the work of the so-called "Passau anonymous" who put Sacconi's tract together with a variety of other materials;¹¹⁹ as Anselm of Alesandria had done earlier.¹²⁰ The *Practica inquisitionis* of Bernard Gui, completed about 1323—24,¹²¹ rightly acclaimed as the best work of its kind, shows the wide variety of sources that inquisitorial archives provided for authors. In his fifth book, describing the errors of various sects, in addition to what he had learned from heretics who appeared before him, Gui used some of Stephen of Bourbon's comments on Waldensians,¹²² parts of the *De inquisitione hereticorum* attributed to David of Augsburg,¹²³ the often-copied description of the Waldensian Eucharist,¹²⁴ a treatise of Italian origin on the contemporary sect of Pseudo-Apostles, existing interrogatories for sorcerers and Jews, and probably material gleaned from earlier polemical treatises.¹²⁵

¹¹⁷ *Non est disputandum cum hereticis, maxime in officio inquisitionis. Sed fides catholica sive articuli denunciandi, et queratur super hiis sine strepitu et litigio*: quoted from an inquisitorial consultation by Dondaine, "Le Manuel," *AFP*, XVII (1947), 93.

¹¹⁸ Edited by Dondaine in *Un Traité néo-manichéen*, pp. 64—78; cf. his "Le Manuel," *AFP*, XVII (1947), 170—4.

¹¹⁹ Including Albert the Great's list of errors of Brethren of the Free Spirit, excerpts from the *Evangelium aeternum* of Joachim of Flora, the *Rescript* of the Poor Lombards of 1218, and a passage from the *Disputatio inter catholicum et paterinum hereticum*. On the anonymous author see Borst, *Die Katharer*, pp. 22—3. Franz Unterkircher, "Pseudo-Rainier" und "Passauer Anonymus," *Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, LXIII (1955), 41—6, distinguishes three versions in the Ms. tradition.

¹²⁰ Dondaine, "La Hiérarchie cathare: II," *AFP*, XX (1950), 234—324, esp. pp. 234—54.

¹²¹ Ed. Célestin Douais (Paris, 1886) and the fifth book only, with French translation, by Guillaume Mollat, *Manuel de l'inquisiteur*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1926—7: "Les Classiques de l'histoire de France au moyen âge," 8—9).

¹²² These were very commonly reproduced in inquisitorial archives: Dondaine, "Manuel," *AFP*, XVII (1947), 95, 132—4.

¹²³ The attribution to David is doubtful. On it, see *ibid.*, pp. 104—5, 180—2.

¹²⁴ On which see *ibid.*, pp. 95, 133, 150, 166.

¹²⁵ On Gui's sources, see Mollat, *Manuel*, I, xvi—xxv; Dondaine, "Manuel," *AFP*, XVII (1947), 250, 252. Mollat suggests that traces of Rainerius Sacconi's *Summa* may be detected in the *Practica*. I cannot corroborate this. A misconception about Gui's sources has long existed. In his *Beiträge*, II, 1—17, Döllinger published excerpts from what he called "Acts of the Inquisition of Carcassonne," giving as his source, Vol. VII of the *Collection Doat*, fols. 192 ff. Wilhelm Preger ("Über die Verfassung der französischen Waldesier in der älteren Zeit," *Abhandlungen der III Cl. der k.*

CONCLUSION

This brief review of certain aspects of anti-heretical writing in the thirteenth century may provide a few footnotes to the work of the scholars who have done so much to bring this literature to light and may allow certain minor conclusions:

Exchange of information about heresy and of arguments against it among some authors of the polemics can be discerned and perhaps more intensive scrutiny of the literature would produce more examples than have been mentioned here. Passages of description originating at a relatively early date, such as the *De heresi catharorum in Lombardia* or the *Manifestatio* ascribed to Bonacursus were repeatedly copied, in whole or in part. It may be surmised also that arguments against heresy such as those represented by the compilations of authorities for the use of preachers also appeared early in the thirteenth century (although the versions now known are later copies¹²⁶ because they respond to the earliest motives expressed by writers against heresy, to facilitate preaching,¹²⁷

bayer. Akademie der Wissenschaften, XIX, 3 [1891] 645—55) labored to prove that the "Acts" published by Döllinger constituted a source from which Stephen of Bourbon, David of Augsburg, and Bernard Gui drew, and that Gui relied on these "Acts" directly, rather than on the work of the other two inquisitors. Ilarino da Milano, ("Il 'Liber supra Stella,'" *Aevum*, XVII [1943], 112, n. 1) cites the "Acts" in Döllinger's publication as an independent source. Thouzelier (*Catharisme et valdéisme*, p. 18, n. 21) follows Preger, describing the "Acts" as a record originating between 1233 and 1241 and a valuable early document on the Waldenses. But Döllinger, with carelessness unusual even for him, had mis-stated the volume of the *Collection Doat* which he utilized. Madame Raymond Bloch, Conservator of Manuscripts of the Bibliothèque nationale, was kind enough to ascertain for me that the citation to Vol. VII is erroneous, and comparison of texts shows that what Döllinger used was not "Acts of the Inquisition of Carcassonne" but the manuscript of the *Practica inquisitionis* of Bernard Gui which exists in *Collection Doat*, Vols. XXIX—XXX, part V of the *Practica* occupying fols. 184—305 of the latter volume. The excerpts Döllinger made (and mutilated in copying) correspond to the *Practica*, ed. Mollat, I, 16, 18—26, 34—72 *passim*: ed. Douais, pp. 239—42, 244—55, *passim*. It may be added that two other passages published by Döllinger and attributed to "Acts of the Inquisition of Carcassonne" are slightly differing versions of other excerpts from the same Ms. of Gui's *Practica*: cf. *Beiträge*, II, 286—92 with the *Practica*, ed. Douais, pp. 129—62, *passim*, and pp. 12—26, *passim*; also cf. *Beiträge*, II, 598—605 with the *Practica*, ed. Douais, pp. 129—62, *passim*, pp. 12—26, *passim*, and pp. 84—5.

¹²⁶ Most scholars assign a date to them no more precise than "thirteenth century." Dondaine ("Durand de Huesca," *AFP*, XXIX (1959), 262—3) remarks that they were common in the middle of the century. Cf. n. 71 above.

¹²⁷ Cf. Eckbert de Schönau, *Sermones tredecim contra haereticos* (1163—1167) in Migne, *PL*, CXCIV, 98: he wrote to provide material for sermons to the general public; and (cols. 11—14) to inform persons who wished to debate with heretics. Bernhard of Fontcaude (*Adversus Waldenses* in Migne *PL*, CCIV, 795) wished to instruct the clergy so that they, in turn, could better teach their parishioners.

and because they give some attention to the Passagians, a sect which probably disappeared not long after 1200.¹²⁸

Writers of the longer, full-scale polemics produced toward the middle of the century could supplement their own knowledge by drawing on the work of predecessors or contemporaries. Some copyists did not scruple to abridge freely or make additions to tracts they had before them. A treatise might even be put together, as was the *Brevis summula*, almost entirely from pre-existing documents. Inquisitors who wrote descriptions of heresy might draw on material in their archives. But, on the whole, the amount of material borrowed by one author from others was, as far as we now know, relatively small in proportion to their whole work.

The argument that concordance of testimony of various writers about heresy is proof of their accuracy can only be employed when one is reasonably assured that the agreement is that of independent witnesses. Search for the sources of information of each should be pressed to the extent that the documents permit, especially in the case of those who wrote after 1235—1240, when a substantial corpus of information about heretical doctrines, some of it dating from three or four decades earlier, seems to have been in circulation.

In particular, Jacopus de Capellis and Moneta of Cremona cannot be cited as corroborating each other until the relationship between their works is better understood, and the importance that is usually given to the statements of the latter needs to be tested by a more thorough study of his work, especially of the sources of his information, than has yet been attempted.¹²⁹

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¹²⁸ Manselli, "I Passagini," *Bull. dell' Ist. stor. ital. per il med. evo e Arch. murat.*, LXXV (1963), 209.

¹²⁹ As an appendix we have supplied a chart on the next page showing comparable chapters in the *Summa* of Jacopus de Capellis and the compilations of Scriptural texts published by Douais.

Comparable Chapters in the *Summa* of Jacopus de Capellis and the Compilations of Scriptural Texts Published by Douais.*

Jacopus de Capellis	Douais I—II	Douais III	Douais IV	
2			I	
3	23		9	Jacopus has more citations than either of the others
6	I			
9	2			
10	4		2	Jacopus is a little closer to Douais IV
12	19		10	Jacopus is a little closer to Douais IV
14	5			Chap. 5 of the Douais text is Chap. 6 in the Leipzig Ms.
15	6			Chap. 6 of the Douais text is Chap. 5 in the Leipzig Ms.
17	7			
19	8			
20	11			
21	9			Jacopus paraphrases the scriptural texts but uses the same ones as Douais I—II; similar comment by the author in both
22	10			
23	12			
25	13			
27	14			
28	15			
29	16			
32	28			
33	29			Jacopus paraphrases the scriptures but covers the same points in the same order as Douais I—II
34	30			Jacopus in one chapter includes most texts of Douais I—II in two chapters. A sentence in the middle of Jacopus' chapter has the wording of Douais I—II's chapter title
	31			
38		4		
44		18		

* See pp. 291—2. Douais I—II are here considered as one treatise.

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